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Foreword
Enhancing	these	services,	while	producing	
a	further	doubling	of	conventional	output	
to	meet	the	demands	of	a	growing	global	
population,	is	one	of	the	great	challenges	
facing	world	agriculture	in	the	twenty-first	
century.	
The State of Food and Agriculture 2007	
highlights	the	potential	of	agriculture	for	
enhanced	provision	of	ecosystem	services	
that	are	not	usually	compensated	for	by	
the	market.	When	we	think	of	farmers,	we	
typically	think	of	the	food	and	fibre	that	
they	produce	and	that	they	either	consume	
or	sell	on	markets	to	generate	an	income.	
But	the	production	processes	can	also	result	
in	impacts	on	other	ecosystem	services	that	
are	not	traded	in	markets,	referred	to	in	
this	report	as	“environmental	services”.	
Some	may	be	positive,	such	as	groundwater	
recharge	and	scenic	landscapes;	others	may	
be	negative,	such	as	water	pollution	by	
plant	nutrients	and	animal	waste,	and	soil	
erosion	from	poorly	managed	croplands	
or	overgrazed	hillsides.	As	agricultural	
production	expands,	these	negative	effects	
can	develop	into	increasingly	serious	
problems.	A	fundamental	question	concerns	
how	farmers	can	be	encouraged	to	reduce	
negative	side-effects	while	meeting	the	
growing	demands	for	food	and	fibre.	At	
the	same	time,	changes	in	agricultural	
practices	may	also	contribute	to	addressing	
environmental	problems	generated	outside	
agriculture,	for	example,	by	offsetting	
greenhouse	gas	emissions	from	other	
sectors.	A	relevant	question,	therefore,	is	
how	farmers	can	be	induced	to	increase	their	
provision	of	this	type	of	service.
Farmers	constitute	the	largest	group	of	
natural	resource	managers	on	Earth.	They	
both	depend	on	and	generate	a	wide	array	
of	ecosystem	services.	Their	actions	can	both	
enhance	and	degrade	ecosystems.	Thus,	
understanding	what	drives	their	decisions	
is	critical	in	designing	new	strategies	that	
enhance	ecosystem	services	and	contribute	
to	sustainable	growth.
Paying	farmers	for	the	environmental	
services	they	provide	is	an	approach	that	
Despite	unprecedented	global	economic	
growth,	1.1	billion	people	continue	to	live	
in	extreme	poverty	and	more	than	850	
million	people	suffer	from	chronic	hunger	
while	ecosystems	are	being	threatened	
as	never	before.	Poverty	reduction,	food	
security	and	environmental	sustainability	
have	all	moved	to	the	top	of	a	crowded	
international	agenda,	as	reflected	in	the	
Millennium	Development	Goals.	At	the	
same	time,	the	close	relationships	among	
poverty,	hunger	and	ecosystem	degradation	
are	becoming	ever	clearer.	Most	of	the	
world’s	poor	people	live	in	rural	areas,	many	
of	them	in	marginal	environments,	and	
depend	on	agriculture	for	their	livelihoods.	
Agricultural	development	is	therefore	crucial	
for	alleviating	poverty	on	a	large	scale.	Such	
development	would	also	require	that	the	
natural	resource	base	on	which	the	poor	
depend	for	their	livelihoods	be	preserved	
and	enhanced.	
Services	provided	by	ecosystems	are	
essential,	not	only	for	poverty	reduction,	
but	indeed	for	human	survival.	The	
Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	as	well	
as	reports	arising	from	other	more	recent	
studies	such	as	Water for food, water for 
life	(Comprehensive	Assessment	of	Water	
Management	in	Agriculture,	2007)	and	
Livestock’s long shadow: environmental 
issues and options (FAO,	2006a),	have	
painted	a	stark	picture	of	current	ecosystem	
degradation	and	the	potential	consequences	
of	a	continuation	of	current	trends.	
Agriculture	often	lies	at	the	centre	of	
the	complex	set	of	problems	surrounding	
ecosystem	degradation.	It	contributes	to	
the	problems	and	suffers	from	many	of	
the	consequences,	but	at	the	same	time	it	
offers	possible	solutions.	Modern	agriculture	
has	been	very	successful	in	providing	the	
ecosystem	services	for	which	markets	exist	–	
crops,	livestock,	fish,	and	forest	products	–	in	
ever	greater	quantities.	But	the	expansion	of	
these	services	has	often	been	achieved	at	a	
high	cost	to	other	ecosystem	services,	such	as	
regulation	of	climate,	water	and	biodiversity,	
which	are	necessary	to	sustain	human	life.	
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has	generated	growing	interest	worldwide	
from	policy-makers	and	non-governmental	
and	private	decision-makers.	This	strategy	
is	akin	to	viewing	environmental	protection	
as	a	business	transaction.	This	perspective	is	
not	without	controversy,	but	it	must	be	kept	
in	mind	that	many	services	are	degraded	
precisely	because	they	are	free	to	use	but	
costly	to	provide.	
Payments	for	environmental	services	have	
also	attracted	attention	for	their	potential	to	
mobilize	new	sources	of	finance	to	support	
sustainable	environmental	management	
in	developing	countries	and	to	contribute	
to	poverty	reduction	and	agricultural	
development.	
This	report	examines	this	approach	to	
enhancing	environmental	services	through	
the	lens	of	managing	agriculture	to	meet	
the	agricultural	and	environmental	demands	
of	the	future.	In	addition,	it	examines	the	
potential	of	this	mechanism	to	contribute	
also	to	poverty	reduction.	Of	the	numerous	
services	to	which	agriculture	can	contribute,	
this	report	highlights	three:	climate	change	
mitigation,	enhanced	quality	and	quantity	
of	water	provision	and	the	preservation	of	
biodiversity.	
One	of	the	points	made	in	this	report	is	
that	agriculture	can	be	an	important	source	
of	improvements	in	the	environmental	
services	provided	to	humanity	by	ecosystems.	
Agriculture	employs	more	people	and	uses	
more	land	and	water	than	any	other	human	
activity.	It	has	the	potential	to	degrade	
the	Earth’s	land,	water,	atmosphere	and	
biological	resources	–	or	to	enhance	them	
–	depending	on	the	decisions	made	by	the	
more	than	2	billion	people	whose	livelihoods	
depend	directly	on	crops,	livestock,	fisheries	
or	forests.
Ensuring	appropriate	incentives	for	
these	people	is	essential.	More	and	
better	information	can	influence	farmers’	
decisions	about	their	practices	in	ways	
that	lead	to	environmental	improvements,	
especially	when	changes	in	farming	and	
land-management	practices	that	enhance	
ecosystem	services	would	also	be	profitable	
for	the	farmers	themselves.	However,	should	
such	changes	imply	a	reduction	in	farmers’	
incomes,	they	will	only	be	implemented	
through	effectively	enforced	regulations	
or,	voluntarily,	when	some	form	of	
compensation	is	provided.	In	the	latter	case,	
payments	to	farmers	from	the	beneficiaries	
can	provide	an	answer.	The	relative	
merits	and	effectiveness	of	the	different	
approaches	vary	for	different	environmental	
services.	Key	challenges	in	implementing	
the	payments	approach	lie	in	creating	
a	mechanism	for	valuing	the	relevant	
service	where	none	exists,	identifying	how	
additional	amounts	of	the	service	can	be	
provided	most	cost-effectively,	and	deciding	
which	farmers	should	be	paid	for	providing	
more	of	it	and	how	much	they	should	be	
paid.
Payments	for	environmental	services	
can	increase	the	incomes	of	farmers	who	
produce	the	services.	Other	poor	households	
may	also	benefit,	for	example	from	increased	
productivity	of	the	soils	they	cultivate	or	
improved	quality	of	the	water	they	drink.	
But	the	distribution	of	benefits	depends	on	
who	produces	the	environmental	services	
and	where.	Environmental	service	payments	
can	contribute	to	alleviating	poverty,	but	
such	poverty-reducing	effects	are	neither	
automatic	nor	universal.	In	some	cases,	
payments	may	also	have	adverse	impacts	
on	poverty	and	food	security,	for	example	
if	they	reduce	agricultural	employment	
or	increase	food	prices.	Furthermore,	the	
administrative	costs	of	payment	schemes	
that	fully	integrate	the	poorest	farmers	
may	be	large,	while	other	barriers,	such	as	
absence	of	clearly	defined	property	rights,	
may	prevent	the	poor	from	participating.	
A	major	challenge	is	to	design	payment	
schemes	in	such	a	way	as	to	avoid	negative	
impacts	on	the	poor	and	to	enable	poor	
farmers	to	participate.
In	order	to	maximize	the	benefits	in	terms	
of	enhanced	provision	of	environmental	
services,	minimize	the	costs	in	terms	of	
foregone	production	and	income	and	ensure	
the	broadest	possible	participation	by	poor	
farmers,	careful	analysis	of	the	underlying	
science	–	both	natural	and	social	sciences	
–	will	be	required,	as	well	as	innovative	
institutions.	
Confronting	the	interrelated	challenges	
of	eradicating	poverty	and	hunger	and	
preserving	the	world’s	ecosystems	will	
continue	to	require	purposeful	and	decisive	
action	on	a	range	of	fronts.	Payments	for	
environmental	services	are	not	widely	
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implemented	in	developing	countries	at	
present,	and	much	work	remains	to	be	done	
to	unlock	their	full	potential.	In	conjunction	
with	other	tools,	however,	they	hold	
significant	promise	as	a	flexible	approach	
to	enhancing	the	role	of	farmers	worldwide	
in	sustaining	and	improving	the	ecosystems	
on	which	we	all	depend.	By	clarifying	the	
challenges	that	need	to	be	addressed	in	
implementing	such	an	approach,	it	is	my	
hope	that	this	report	will	help	illuminate	the	
way	forward.
 Jacques Diouf
	 FAO	DIRECTOR-GENERAL
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Explanatory	note
Statistical annex
The	statistical	annex	contains	a	selection	
of	data	from	the	FAO Statistical Yearbook 
2005/06.	A	mini-CD-ROM	containing	the	
full	Yearbook	is	attached	to	the	inside	back	
cover	of	this	report.	A	new	edition	of	the	
Yearbook	will	be	available	in	early	2008	and	
can	be	accessed	at	http://www.fao.org/es/ess/
yearbook.	The	source	for	the	data	on	food	
and	agriculture	is	the	FAOSTAT	database	
(http://faostat.fao.org).	More	information	
on	concepts,	definitions,	country	notes,	etc.,	
can	be	found	at	the	same	address.	Non-
FAO	sources	are	indicated	in	the	notes	on	
individual	tables.
The	statistical	information	in	this	issue	of	
The State of Food and Agriculture	has	been	
prepared	from	information	available	to	FAO	
up	to	July	2007.
Dates and units
The	following	forms	are	used	to	denote	years	
or	groups	of	years:
2004/05	=	 a	crop,	marketing	or	fiscal	year	
running	from	one	calendar	year	
to	another
2004–05	=	 the	average	for	the	two	calendar	
years
Unless	otherwise	indicated,	the	metric	system	
is	used	in	this	publication.
“Billion”	=	1	000	million
Maps
The State of Food and Agriculture	2007	
includes	a	set	of	four	global	and	four	
regional	maps	produced	by	FAO	using	
geographic	data	layers	generated	internally	
as	well	as	externally.	The	maps	are	composed	
of	intersections	of	data	layers	representing	
indicators	of	environmental	service	supply,	
agricultural	production	and	productivity	
and	poverty.	They	are	intended	to	give	
an	indication	of	the	spatial	distribution	
of	agro-ecological	and	socio-economic	
conditions	relevant	to	the	potential	supply	
of	environmental	services.	The	resolution	of	
the	maps	is	5	arc-minute.	The	low	resolution	
precludes	any	definitive	conclusions	about	
the	actual	on-the-ground	conditions	in	
specific	sites.	However,	the	maps	can	provide	
a	broad	indication	of	the	geographic	
distribution	of	selected	indicators.	The	maps	
are	made	available	for	viewing	on	Google	
Earth	via	the	FAO	GeoNetwork	and	can	be	
accessed	using	the	URL	for	each	map.	JPEG	
images	of	the	maps	can	also	be	downloaded	
from	the	GeoNetwork.	Further	technical	
information	on	the	data	layers	used	in	
constructing	each	map	can	be	obtained	from:	
http://www.fao.org/es/esa/en/pubs_sofa.htm
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1.	 Introduction	and	overview
demand	for	biofuels.	About	80	percent	
of	the	increase	in	land-based	agricultural	
production	is	expected	to	derive	from	
increased	input	use	and	improved	technology	
on	existing	agricultural	land,	while	area	
expansion	in	parts	of	South	America	and	
sub-Saharan	Africa	is	expected	to	account	
for	the	remaining	20	percent	(FAO,	2003a).	
Both	sources	of	increased	production	can	
exacerbate	damage	to	land-based	ecosystems.	
Expansion	in	environmentally	fragile	areas	
is	especially	harmful	to	biodiversity.	Poorly	
managed	intensification	can	result	in	soil	
erosion	pressure	on	water	supplies,	rising	
nitrate	levels	in	ground-	and	surface	water,	
salinization,	and	growing	air	and	water	
pollution	from	livestock	wastes.	Coastal	and	
marine	ecosystems	are	also	under	pressure.	
In	response,	the	search	for	ways	to	enhance	
ecosystem	services	is	gaining	attention	from	
policy-makers	as	well	as	non-governmental	
and	private	decision-makers.	This	search	
provides	the	motivation	for	this	report.	The	
chapters	that	follow	examine	the	incentives	
farmers	face	when	making	choices	that	
affect	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services	and	
focus	particularly	on	a	mechanism	that	has	
generated	growing	interest	in	recent	years	
–	direct	payments	to	farmers	to	enhance	the	
delivery	of	selected	ecosystem	services.	
Agriculture’s	role	in	the	provision	of	
ecosystem	services	depends	critically	on	
the	incentives	available	to	farmers.	Such	
incentives	currently	tend	to	favour	the	
provision	of	conventional	outputs	such	as	
food	and	fibre	over	that	of	other	services	
that	are	generally	produced	jointly	with	
them,	in	varying	degrees,	such	as	water	
Ecosystems	sustain	human	life.	They	supply	
food	and	drinking	water,	maintain	a	stock	
of	continuously	evolving	genetic	resources,	
preserve	and	regenerate	soils,	fix	nitrogen	
and	carbon,	recycle	nutrients,	control	floods,	
filter	pollutants,	pollinate	crops	and	much	
more.	Despite	their	importance	to	human	
well-being,	many	of	these	services	are	under	
threat	throughout	the	world.
Agricultural	ecosystems	are	by	far	the	
largest	managed	ecosystems	in	the	world.	
Of	the	total	land	area	of	about	13	billion	
hectares,	crops	and	pasture	occupy	almost	
5	billion	hectares.	Forests	and	woodlands	add	
another	4	billion	hectares.	Inland,	coastal	and	
marine	fisheries	ecosystems	also	generate	
crucial	services	for	humans.	
Today,	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services	
generally,	and	agriculture-based	services	
in	particular,	is	being	challenged	as	never	
before	by	the	combined	effects	of	expanding	
populations,	rapid	economic	growth	and	
greater	global	integration.	Agriculture	is	
being	asked	to	provide	an	ever-growing	
supply	of	ecosystem-based	goods	and	
services.1	The	world’s	population	is	expected	
to	increase	by	50	percent	between	2000	
and	2050,	with	the	developing	countries	
home	to	almost	all	of	that	growth.	Analyses	
indicate	that	there	is	likely	to	be	sufficient	
overall	food	production	at	the	global	level	
to	meet	expected	increases	in	effective	
demand,	although	such	analyses	have	
not	yet	incorporated	the	recent	surge	in	
 The term “agriculture” is used to include the production 
of crops, livestock, fish, and forest products, and the term 
“farmer” to include all producers of agricultural products.
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filtration	and	climate	regulation.	Incentives	
can	be	influenced	by	policies;	it	is	the	goal	of	
this	report	to	shed	light	on	policy	measures	
that	can	modify	the	incentives	available	to	
farmers	to	induce	them	to	provide	a	mix	
of	ecosystem	services	that	better	addresses	
society’s	changing	needs.
Of	the	myriad	of	ecosystem	services,	this	
report	concentrates	primarily	on	three	that	
have	attracted	the	most	interest	in	payment	
programmes	to	date:	climate	change	
mitigation,	enhanced	water	quality	and	
quantity,	and	biodiversity	preservation.
Ecosystem services and agriculture
Healthy	ecosystems	provide	a	variety	of	critical	
goods	and	services	that	contribute,	directly	
or	indirectly,	to	human	well-being.	Ecosystem	
services	are	created	by	the	interactions	of	
living	organisms,	including	humans,	with	
their	environment.	These	services	provide	the	
conditions	and	processes	that	sustain	human	
life.	A	specific	landscape	might	provide	a	
range	of	ecosystem	services.	A	forest	at	the	
top	of	a	watershed	not	only	provides	timber	
but	also	facilitates	or	enhances	soil	retention	
and	water	quality	(filtering	contaminants	
from	the	water	as	it	flows	through	roots	and	
soil),	flood	control	(regulating	the	movement	
of	water	through	the	watershed),	pollination	
(provided	by	the	pollinators	inhabiting	the	
edge	of	the	forest),	carbon	sequestration	(in	
the	form	of	additional	biomass),	biodiversity	
conservation	(including	the	forest	habitat	and	
the	wide	range	of	species	it	harbours)	and	
landscape	aesthetics.
While	ecosystem	services	can	be	
categorized	in	any	number	of	ways,	
the	most	common	approach	is	the	one	
employed	by	the	recent	Millennium	
Ecosystem	Assessment.2	The	Assessment	
classified	ecosystem	services	into	four	broad	
categories,	namely	provisioning	services,	
regulating	services,	cultural	services	and	
 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was called for by 
the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 000 
and undertaken during the period 00–05, drawing on 
the contributions of more than 300 authors and reviewers 
worldwide. Its objective was to assess the consequences of 
ecosystem change for human well-being and the scientific 
basis for action needed to enhance the conservation and 
sustainable use of those systems and their contribution to 
human well-being.
supporting	services	(Figure	1).	Biodiversity,	
while	not	classified	under	any	of	the	four	
categories,	plays	an	important	overarching	
role	in	the	provision	of	ecosystem	services.	
For	example,	biodiversity	is	directly	related	
to	food	production,	the	maintenance	of	
genetic	resources	and	the	aesthetic	value	of	
a	landscape,	and	changes	in	biodiversity	have	
direct	implications	for	the	production	of	all	
ecosystem	services.	
Of	the	24	provisioning,	regulating	and	
cultural	services	examined	by	the	Millennium	
Ecosystem	Assessment,	15	were	identified	
as	being	degraded	or	used	unsustainably	
(Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	
2005a).	Only	four	services	were	identified	
as	having	been	enhanced	over	the	past	
50	years,	and	three	of	those	(crops,	livestock	
and	aquaculture)	were	related	to	food	
production.	In	the	report’s	words	(p.	1):
Over the past 50 years, humans have 
changed ecosystems more rapidly and 
extensively than in any comparable period 
of time in human history, largely to meet 
rapidly growing demands for food, fresh 
water, timber, fiber and fuel. 
...
The changes that have been made to 
ecosystems have contributed to substantial 
net gains in human well-being and economic 
development, but these gains have been 
achieved at growing costs in the form of the 
degradation of many ecosystem services, 
increased risks of nonlinear changes, and the 
exacerbation of poverty for some groups of 
people.
...
The degradation of ecosystem services could 
grow significantly worse during the first half 
of this century and is a barrier to achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals. 
In	essence,	human	ingenuity	applied	
to	the	production	of	food	and	other	
commodities	has	allowed	production	to	
keep	pace	with	population	growth	and	
income-driven	demand,	but	at	the	cost	
of	considerable	degradation	of	other	
ecosystem	services.
The role of farmers
Ecosystems	and	ecosystem	services	can	
be	considered	as	nature’s	equivalent	to	
produced	capital	stocks	(e.g.	roads,	buildings,	
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Source: Adapted from Ecosystems and human well-being: a framework for assessment by the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment. Copyright © 2003 World Resources Institute. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, DC.
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machinery)	and	the	services	deriving	
from	these	stocks.	In	most	regions	of	the	
world,	per	capita	income	is	rising,	but	this	
trend	has	often	been	accompanied	by	the	
drawing	down	of	natural	capital	stocks,	
thereby	jeopardizing	the	future	provision	
of	ecosystem	services.	Furthermore,	many	of	
the	world’s	poorest	people	live	in	marginal	
ecosystems	and	depend	on	ecosystem	services	
for	their	food	and	livelihoods.	If	poverty	is	to	
be	reduced,	ways	must	be	found	to	enable	
these	people	to	increase	their	productivity	
and	that	of	the	natural	resources	they	
depend	on.	
Degradation	of	ecosystems	differs	from	
depreciation	of	produced	capital	in	several	
important	ways.	The	key	difference,	and	
the	most	important	source	of	ecosystem	
degradation,	is	the	perception	that	many	
of	nature’s	services	are	free	–	in	the	sense	
that	no	one	owns	them	or	is	rewarded	for	
them.	Examples	include	carbon	storage,	
flood	control,	clean	water	provision,	habitat	
provision	and	biodiversity	conservation.	
While	these	services	have	great	value	to	
society,	individuals	have	little	incentive	to	
protect	them.	In	addition,	subsidies	that	
explicitly	encourage	the	production	of	
marketed	goods	at	the	expense	of	other	
ecosystem	services	can	cause	ecosystem	
degradation.	
Farmers	constitute	the	largest	group	of	
natural	resource	managers	on	Earth.	They	
both	depend	on	and	generate	a	wide	array	
of	ecosystem	services.	Their	actions	can	
enhance	and	degrade	ecosystems.	Thus,	
understanding	what	drives	their	decisions	
is	critical	in	designing	new	strategies	that	
enhance	ecosystem	services	and	contribute	to	
sustainable	growth.
Farmers	derive	most	of	their	agricultural	
income	from	the	food	and	fibre	they	
produce.	In	producing	these	goods,	however,	
they	may	also	generate	other	impacts	
–	positive	or	negative	–	on	ecosystem	
services.	Positive	effects	could	include	the	
preservation	of	scenic	rural	landscapes	or	
ensuring	groundwater	recharge;	negative	
effects	could	include	the	runoff	of	harmful	
nitrates	from	cropland	to	downstream	
catchments	or	soil	erosion	from	overgrazed	
hillsides.	Whether	positive	or	negative,	
these	impacts	are	not	typically	reflected	in	
farmers’	incomes;	therefore	their	provision	
is	not	a	key	consideration	in	most	farmers’	
choices.	Such	impacts,	in	economists’	terms,	
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are	described	as	“externalities”.	In	this	
report,	the	subset	of	ecosystem	services	
characterized	by	externalities	are	referred	to	
as	“environmental	services”	(Box	1;	see	also	
Swallow	et al.,	2007a).	It	is	precisely	because	
markets	typically	fail	to	reflect	their	value	
that	this	report	focuses	on	environmental	
services.
As	demand	for	food	and	fibre	increases,	
fuelled	by	growing	populations,	rising	
incomes	and	global	integration,	the	
magnitude	of	these	effects	on	environmental	
services	also	increases.	A	key	question,	
therefore,	concerns	how	society	can	motivate	
farmers	to	reduce	negative	side-effects	
while	continuing	to	meet	the	increasing	
demand	for	agricultural	produce.	Whether	
payments	are	an	appropriate	tool	in	this	
context	depends	partly	on	who	holds	the	
rights	to	the	services	in	question.	In	the	
case	of	negative	side-effects	from	industrial	
production,	it	is	generally	accepted	that	
the	polluter	should	pay;	in	the	case	of	
agriculture,	this	has	not	historically	been	
the	case.	The	difference	may	stem	from	the	
relative	difficulty	of	identifying	the	source	
or	magnitude	of	negative	side-effects,	
historical	precedent	or	equity	considerations.	
Regardless,	the	distinction	becomes	blurred	
where	agricultural	production	occurs	on	a	
large	and	concentrated	scale,	as	in	the	case	
of	large	concentrated	livestock	operations,	
and	in	fact	such	operations	are	increasingly	
treated	more	like	industrial	“point	sources”	
(see	p.	22)	of	pollution	(Ribaudo,	2006).	The	
focus	in	this	report	is	on	payments	to	smaller	
farmers	whom	society	has	historically,	at	
least	in	practice,	allowed	to	use	resources	in	
ways	that	may	have	adverse	environmental	
impacts.
But	the	issue	extends	beyond	reducing	
negative	effects	from	agriculture.	Could	it	
also	be	effective	to	pay	farmers	to	change	
their	agricultural	practices	to	address	
environmental	problems	generated	in	
other	sectors	of	the	economy?	The	growth	
in	effective	demand	and	emergence	of	
market	institutions	for	ecosystem	services	
The	report	uses	the	Millennium	Ecosystem	
Assessment	(2003,	p.	3)	definition	of	
ecosystem	services	as	“the	benefits	people	
obtain	from	ecosystems”.	Ecosystem	
services	include	all	outputs	from	
agricultural	activities,	including	outputs	
as	diverse	as	food	production	and	climate	
regulation.	
Outputs	such	as	food	are	generally	
produced	intentionally	for	sale	or	direct	
consumption,	and	buyers	or	consumers	
can	influence	the	production	of	these	
outputs	through	the	prices	they	are	
willing	to	pay	for	them.	Many	other	
ecosystem	services,	however,	are	provided	
only	as	“externalities”,	in	that	they	are	
unintended	consequences	of	the	primary	
activity	(e.g.	food	production),	and	the	
individuals	who	are	affected	by	these	
consequences	cannot	influence	their	
production.	Externalities	typically	involve	
“off-site”	impacts	that	affect	others,	in	
contrast	to	“on-site”	impacts	felt	directly	
by	farmers.	Externalities	can	be	either	
positive	or	negative,	according	to	the	
perspective	of	those	affected	by		
them.	
This	report	examines	the	incentives	
available	to	farmers	when	deciding	what	
mix	of	outputs	to	produce	and	how	to	
produce	them.	It	focuses	on	the	use	of	
payments	to	providers	of	ecosystem	
services	from	beneficiaries	of	those	
services	as	a	way	of	reducing	negative	
externalities	and	enhancing	the	provision	
of	positive	externalities.	
The	term	“ecosystem	services”	is	
sometimes	used	interchangeably	with	the	
term	“environmental	services”.	In	this	
report,	the	term	environmental	services	
is	used	to	refer	specifically	to	the	subset	
of	ecosystem	services	characterized	by	
externalities.	Programmes	to	implement	
payments	for	these	services	are	variously	
referred	to	as	payment	for	ecosystem	
services	programmes,	payment	for	
environmental	services	programmes,	or	
simply	PES	programmes.
BOX	1
Ecosystem services, environmental services and externalities
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such	as	carbon	sequestration	or	biodiversity	
conservation	may	create	new	income-
generating	opportunities	for	farmers	
in	the	short	term	as	well	as	longer-term	
productivity	benefits.
Either	way,	altering	agricultural	production	
systems	to	enhance	the	provision	of	hitherto	
uncompensated	environmental	services	
may	entail	costs	in	terms	of	agricultural	
productivity	growth	and	local	food	security.	
Understanding	whether	trade-offs	exist	
and,	if	so,	what	is	at	stake,	is	crucial	in	
designing	effective	interventions	to	enhance	
environmental	services.
Payments for environmental 
services
The	concept	behind	payments	for	
environmental	services	is	straightforward.	
Because	producers	of	environmental	services	
are	not	usually	compensated	for	providing	
them,	they	tend	to	be	undersupplied	
or	are	not	supplied	at	all.	Payment	for	
environmental	services	(PES)	programmes	
are	an	effort	to	“get	the	incentives	right”	by	
sending	accurate	signals	to	both	providers	
and	users	that	reflect	the	real	social,	
environmental	and	economic	benefits	that	
environmental	services	deliver.	
It	is	important	to	emphasize	that	
payments	are	only	one	of	the	potential	
tools	for	increasing	the	provision	of	
environmental	services.	Others	include	
information	provision,	policy	reforms	to	
reduce	market	distortions,	command-and-
control	regulations	and	taxation.	Assessing	
the	potential	of	PES	programmes	to	improve	
the	environmental	and	economic	benefits	
from	agricultural	ecosystems,	identifying	the	
circumstances	where	these	benefits	are	most	
likely	to	be	obtained,	defining	key	challenges	
for	designing	efficient	programmes,	and	
evaluating	the	implications	for	poverty	
reduction	are	the	key	issues	addressed	in	this	
report.	
For	the	purposes	of	this	report,	PES	
transactions	refer	to	voluntary	transactions	
where	a	service	provider	is	paid	by,	or	
on	behalf	of,	service	beneficiaries	for	
agricultural	land,	forest,	coastal	or	marine	
management	practices	that	are	expected	
to	result	in	continued	or	improved	service	
provision	beyond	what	would	have	been	
provided	without	the	payment.	The	
payment	may	be	monetary	or	in	some	
other	form.	PES	transactions	can	involve	a	
wide	range	of	parties	–	including	farmers,	
communities,	taxpayers,	consumers,	
corporations	and	governments	–	across	
a	wide	range	of	transaction	types	–	from	
direct	payments	between	downstream	
beneficiaries	and	upstream	providers	to	
consumers	paying	for	a	cup	of	“shade-
grown”	coffee	beans	produced	on	the	other	
side	of	the	world.
This	definition	of	payments	for	
environmental	services	is	considerably	
broader	than	that	used	by	some	
practitioners,	who	focus	on	direct	voluntary	
payments	by	service	users	to	service	providers	
(Pagiola	and	Platais,	2007;	Wunder,	2005).	
This	broader	definition,	in	contrast,	also	
includes	payments	by	governments	to	service	
providers	on	behalf	of	society	(which	may	
include	some	members	who	benefit	from	
a	particular	environmental	service	as	well	
as	others	who	do	not),	together	with	other	
tools.	Both	broader	and	narrower	definitions	
recognize	the	importance	of	financial	
incentives	in	influencing	farmers’	decisions	
concerning	production	practices	that	affect	
the	provision	of	environmental	services.	An	
important	difference	between	the	two	is	that	
more	narrowly	defined	PES	transactions	can	
be	sustained	if,	and	only	if,	private	demand	
supports	them,	while	other	approaches	
(such	as	government	payment	programmes)	
depend	in	part	on	political	criteria.	The	two	
definitions	can	have	significantly	different	
implications	for	sustainability,	efficiency	and	
equity.
While	the	concept	of	payments	for	
environmental	services	is	fairly	simple,	their	
implementation	can	be	challenging.	Many	of	
these	services	arise	from	complex	processes,	
making	it	difficult	to	determine	which	
actions	affect	their	provision,	to	identify	
precisely	who	the	providers	and	beneficiaries	
are	and	to	agree	on	who	holds	the	rights	
to	enjoy	those	services.	Beneficiaries	not	
used	to	paying	for	a	service	might	show	
resistance	to	doing	so.	Suppliers	may	need	to	
adopt	novel	practices	with	some	degree	of	
uncertainty.	Key	challenges	in	implementing	
a	PES	approach	include	creating	a	mechanism	
for	valuing	(or	at	least	measuring)	a	service	
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where	none	currently	exists,	identifying	
how	additional	amounts	of	that	service	can	
be	provided	most	cost-effectively,	deciding	
which	farmers	to	compensate	for	providing	
more	of	the	service	and	determining	how	
much	to	pay	them.	
The	report	closely	examines	this	policy	
instrument	in	terms	of	its	possible	role	in	
managing	agriculture	in	such	a	way	as	to	
meet	current	agricultural	and	environmental	
demands	and	its	potential	to	contribute	
to	poverty	alleviation.	Although	the	PES	
approach	is	not	yet	implemented	widely	in	
developing	countries,	important	lessons	can	
be	learned	from	the	experiences	to	date	in	
developed	countries	and	some	developing	
countries.
Current experience with payments 
for environmental services
PES	initiatives	currently	in	operation	have	
two	main	origins:	agricultural	policy	in	
Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	
Development	(OECD)	countries,	dating	from	
the	1980s,	and	forest	conservation	initiatives	
in	Latin	America,	which	began	in	the	1990s	
(FAO,	2007a).	
PES	programmes	implemented	in	
OECD	countries	represent	a	response	to	
environmental	degradation	resulting	from	
intensive	farming	practices	(Regouin,	2003).	
For	example,	the	Conservation	Reserve	
Program	(CRP)	in	the	United	States	of	
America	was	introduced	in	1985	with	the	
aim	of	preventing	soil	erosion	in	cropland	
(see	Box	5	on	p.	38).	Landowners	enrolling	
in	the	voluntary	programme	receive	annual	
rental	payments	in	exchange	for	retiring	
their	farmland	from	crop	production	for	
10	to	15	years.	Similarly,	in	the	United	
Kingdom,	through	the	Environmentally	
Sensitive	Areas	Scheme	created	in	1987,	
farmers	in	eligible	areas	receive	direct	
payments	as	compensation	for	adopting	less	
intensive	farming	practices	that	conserve	
landscape	and	wildlife	values.	Generally,	agri-
environmental	payments	in	OECD	countries	
are	designed	to	compensate	farmers	for	
forgoing	more	intensive	and	more	profitable	
farming	practices.	Environmental	cross-
compliance	is	also	an	important	tool	used	in	
many	OECD	countries	to	leverage	compliance	
with	existing	environmental	legislation.
The	first	PES	programmes	implemented	
in	developing	countries	formed	part	of	
forest	conservation	initiatives	in	Latin	
America,	following	the	limited	success	of	
the	traditional	regulatory	approach	that	
emphasized	protected	areas	(Landell-Mills	
and	Porras,	2002).	One	of	the	most	notable	
programmes,	initiated	in	Costa	Rica	in	1996	
(FAO,	2002a;	FONAFIFO,	2005;	Pagiola,	
2002;	Rosa	et al.,	2003),	was	designed	to	
enhance	various	forest	environmental	services	
(carbon	sequestration,	hydrological	services,	
biodiversity	conservation	and	provision	
of	scenic	beauty)	through	compensation	
payments	to	land	and	forest	owners	in	
exchange	for	multiyear	contracts	for	
reforestation,	sustainable	forest	management	
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FIGURE 2
PES programmes in the forest sector: breakdown by service  
Source: Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002.
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and	forest	protection.	The	main	sources	of	
financing	for	this	programme	have	been	
proceeds	from	a	fossil	fuel	sales	tax,	revenues	
from	hydroelectric	companies,	loans	from	
the	World	Bank	and	grants	from	the	Global	
Environment	Facility	(GEF).	Mexico,	also,	has	
recently	initiated	a	national	PES	programme	
for	forest-based	environmental	services.
The	growing	role	of	the	PES	approaches	
today	reflects	underlying	changes	in	
environmental	policy	and	the	private	sector	
worldwide.	“From	a	situation	dominated	
by	centralized	regulatory	approaches	to	
environmental	governance,	there	is	now	
a	greater	emphasis	on	decentralization,	
flexible	mechanisms,	the	private	sector	as	
a	provider	of	public	services,	corporate	
self-regulation,	consumer	sovereignty,	and	
civil	regulation.	Greater	flexibility	opens	
opportunities	for	PES	mechanisms,	with	
both	the	public	and	the	private	sectors	
taking	advantage	of	this	flexibility”	
(B.	Swallow,	personal	communication,	2007).	
Hundreds	of	PES	schemes	are	now	being	
implemented,	in	both	developing	and	
developed	countries,	primarily	for	forest-
based	environmental	services.	A	global	
review	conducted	by	Landell-Mills	and	Porras	
(2002)	examined	287	cases	of	market-based	
initiatives	in	the	forest	sector.	Figure	2	shows	
the	breakdown	of	these	cases	by	service.	
To	date,	relatively	few	PES	programmes	
have	targeted	farmers	and	agricultural	lands	
in	developing	countries.	Of	those	that	have,	
one	of	the	most	prominent	is	China’s	Grain	
for	Green	programme,	initiated	in	1999	by	
the	central	government	to	address	concerns	
about	erosion,	water	retention	and	flooding	
(see	Box	17	on	p.	83).	The	goal	is	to	convert	
14.67	million	hectares	of	cropland	to	forest	
by	2010.	Farmers	are	paid	to	plant	forests	on	
sloping	and	degraded	lands	(Bennett	and	Xu,	
2005).	
There	have	also	been	relatively	few	
examples	of	private	payment	mechanisms	
for	the	provision	of	environmental	services	
in	agriculture.	One	is	the	Scolel	Té	project	in	
Chiapas,	Mexico,	in	which	farmers	and	rural	
communities	are	paid	by	private	individuals	
and	firms	for	voluntary	carbon	emission	
offsets,	generated	by	the	adoption	of	
agroforestry	practices	(Tipper,	2002).	Other	
examples	include	ecolabelling	schemes	such	
as	the	SalvaNATURA	certification	for	shade-
grown	coffee	from	El	Salvador.
Implications for poverty
There	are	considerable	expectations	about	
the	potential	for	PES	programmes	to	
contribute	to	poverty	reduction	as	well	as	
improved	environmental	management,	
based	largely	on	the	perceived	links	between	
the	two.	Where	poverty	is	associated	with	
environmental	degradation,	paying	poor	
producers	to	adopt	production	systems	that	
are	more	environmentally	friendly	is	likely	
to	generate	a	“win–win”	outcome,	with	
both	poverty	reduction	and	environmental	
benefits	obtained.	However,	such	a	positive	
outcome	is	not	the	only	potential	impact	
of	PES	programmes	on	the	poor.	Indirect	
effects	on	agricultural	wages	and	food	prices	
might	adversely	affect	poor	labourers	and	
consumers.	Increased	land	values	following	
the	implementation	of	PES	programmes	
could	create	greater	competition	for	lands	
to	which	the	poor	have,	at	best,	only	an	
informal	right	of	access,	with	a	resultant	loss	
of	control	to	more	powerful	interests.	Even	
among	groups	of	the	poor,	PES	programmes	
may	favour	some	more	than	others,	with	
implications	for	overall	poverty	reduction	as	
well	as	the	welfare	of	certain	segments	of	
poor	populations.
The	impact	of	a	PES	approach	on	the	poor	
is	highly	dependent	on	who	holds	the	rights	
to	use	resources;	this,	in	turn,	depends	on	
the	distribution	of	land	ownership.	In	some	
countries,	land	ownership	is	highly	skewed;	
in	others	it	is	not.	A	more	even	distribution	
is	likely	to	result	in	more	of	the	benefits	
accruing	to	the	poor.	
Main messages from the report
The	following	chapters	review	the	issues	
introduced	above	in	greater	detail.	
Chapter	2	provides	an	overview	of	the	
technical	relationship	between	agriculture	
and	environmental	services	and	discusses	
how	agriculture	can	increase	its	supply	of	
environmental	services.	Chapter	3	discusses	
the	basis	of	the	demand	for	environmental	
services,	the	differences	between	public-	
and	private-sector	programmes	and	the	
current	market	situation	for	the	three	main	
services	focused	on	in	this	report.	Chapter	4	
addresses	the	supply	of	environmental	
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services,	starting	from	the	farmers’	decision-
making	process;	it	lays	out	policy	options	
to	enhance	the	supply	of	these	services	and	
the	role	that	payment	programmes	can	
play.	Chapter	5	reviews	in	detail	the	various	
issues	involved	in	designing	PES	programmes	
in	agriculture	with	an	emphasis	on	cost-
effectiveness.	Chapter	6	examines	more	
closely	the	implications	of	PES	programmes	
for	poverty	and	possible	synergies	between	
environmental	service	provision	and	poverty	
alleviation.	Finally,	Chapter	7	pulls	together	
the	conclusions	of	the	report	and	lays	out	
the	main	issues	involved	in	developing	the	
potential	of	PES	programmes.	
The	main	messages	emerging	from	the	
report	can	be	summarized	as	follows.
•	 Demand for environmental services from 
agriculture will increase.	Two	forces	
are	generating	a	growth	in	demand	for	
these	services:	a	greater	awareness	of	
their	value;	and	their	increasing	scarcity,	
arising	from	mounting	pressures	on	
the	Earth’s	ecosystems.	At	the	same	
time,	environmental	policy	worldwide	
is	increasingly	characterized	by	greater	
emphasis	on	decentralization,	flexible	
mechanisms,	the	private	sector	as	a	
provider	of	public	services,	consumer	
sovereignty	and	civil	regulation.	
Nevertheless,	the	question	of	who	will	
bear	the	cost	of	providing	environmental	
services	remains	difficult	to	resolve.
•	 Agriculture can provide a better mix 
of ecosystem services to meet society’s 
changing needs.	Farmers	depend	on,	
and	generate,	a	wide	range	of	ecosystem	
services.	Their	actions	can	enhance	
and	degrade	ecosystems.	Through	
changes	in	land-use	and	production	
systems,	agricultural	producers	can	
provide	a	better	mix	of	ecosystem	
services,	expanding	the	share	of	those	
characterized	by	positive	externalities,	to	
meet	society’s	changing	needs.
•	 If farmers are to provide a better 
mix of ecosystem services, better 
incentives will be required. Payments 
for environmental services can help. 
Farmers	lack	incentives	to	consider	
the	impacts	of	their	decisions	on	
environmental	services.	Improved	
information	and	regulations	can	
influence	farmers’	decisions	in	ways	
that	enhance	the	environment	–	as	
can	payments	to	farmers	from	those	
who	benefit.	The	relative	merits	of	the	
different	approaches	vary	according	to	
the	different	environmental	services.	
Payment	programmes	range	from	
highly	competitive	exchanges	to	public-
sector	programmes	with	strong	equity	
objectives.	Programmes	also	vary	in	
terms	of	the	source	of	payments,	the	
transaction	costs	involved	and	the	
impacts	on	agricultural	production	
and	poverty	reduction.	The	type	of	
programme	that	is	most	suitable	for	any	
one	context	will	vary.	Policy-makers	need	
to	be	clear	as	to	what	societies’	priorities	
are,	recognizing	the	synergies	and	trade-
offs	involved	in	alternative	programme	
designs,	as	well	as	the	need	for	careful	
monitoring	and	evaluation	to	ensure	
value	for	public	expenditures.
•	 Cost-effective PES programmes 
require careful design based on the 
characteristics of the service and the 
biophysical and socio-economic context. 
Programme	design	involves	four	main	
steps:	identifying	what	should	be	paid	
for,	who	should	be	paid,	how	much	
should	be	paid	and	what	payment	
mechanism(s)	should	be	used.	These	
are	challenging	in	practice	and	have	
important	implications	for	programme	
results;	careful,	context-specific	design	of	
each	PES	programme	is	therefore	critical,	
as	are	monitoring	and	enforcement	
to	ensure	compliance.	Getting	the	
science	right	is	crucial	and	requires	a	
clear	understanding	of	the	biophysical	
relationships	between	farmers’	actions	
and	their	environmental	consequences,	
as	well	as	the	economic	motives	
and	constraints	facing	suppliers	and	
beneficiaries	of	environmental	services.	
Equally	important	are	the	institutional	
innovations	needed	to	link	suppliers	and	
beneficiaries	as	well	as	an	appropriate	
enabling	environment.	
•	 Payments for environmental services 
are not primarily a poverty reduction 
tool, but the poor are likely to be 
affected and implications for them must 
be considered. Payments	can	increase	
the	incomes	of	farmers	who	produce	
environmental	services.	Other	poor	
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households	may	also	benefit,	for	example	
from	increased	productivity	of	the	soils	
they	cultivate	or	improved	quality	of	
the	water	they	drink.	However,	the	
distribution	of	benefits	depends	on	who	
produces	the	environmental	services,	and	
where.	In	some	cases,	payments	may	also	
have	adverse	impacts	on	poverty	and	
food	security,	for	example	if	they	reduce	
demand	for	agricultural	employment	or	
increase	food	prices.	Nevertheless,	PES	
programmes	have	been	shown	to	be	
potentially	accessible	and	beneficial	to	
the	poor	if	properly	designed.
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2.	 Environmental	services		
and	agriculture
also	exists:	the	potential	for	offsetting	
or	compensating	for	environmental	
degradation	generated	by	other	sectors	of	
the	economy.	Bioenergy	is	another	newly	
emerging	market	that	may	also	lead	to	major	
shifts	in	the	ecosystem	services	provided	by	
agriculture	(see	also	UN-Energy,	2007).
The	changes	in	ecosystem	management	
that	are	necessary	depend	on	location,	the	
existing	level	of	economic	development,	
population	density,	agro-ecological	
conditions	and	primary	technologies	
employed	in	agriculture.	All	these	factors	
affect	the	returns	to	land	and	labour	in	
agriculture	and	the	potential	costs	and	
benefits	of	changes	in	practice	aimed	
at	generating	additional	environmental	
services.	
This	chapter,	and	the	remainder	of	the	
report,	focuses	primarily	on	three	categories	
of	environmental	problems	where	agriculture	
has	a	significant	role	to	play:	climate	change,	
water	degradation	(pollution	and	depletion)	
and	biodiversity	loss.	These	three	domains	
have	already	seen	an	expansion	of	payment	
programmes	to	agricultural	producers	to	
enhance	the	provision	of	environmental	
services.	Farmers	are	being	paid	to	sequester	
carbon	to	mitigate	climate	change,	to	
improve	watershed	management	(and	thus	
water	quality	and	flow)	and	to	conserve	
biodiversity.	These	categories	also	appear	to	
have	the	most	significant	potential	for	future	
growth	in	such	payment	programmes.	There	
are,	of	course,	a	number	of	other	ecosystem	
services	for	whose	management	agriculture	
plays	a	crucial	role,	such	as	soil	formation	
or	nutrient	cycling,	which	are	crucial	for	
maintaining	soil	fertility	and	reversing	land	
degradation.
This	chapter	provides	a	brief	overview	
of	the	technical	relationship	between	
agriculture	and	environmental	changes,	
how	this	relationship	shapes	policy	options	
and	the	specific	types	of	actions	farmers	and	
The	benefits	that	humans	have	realized	
from	agriculture	have	been	immense.	
Today,	agriculture	feeds	over	6	billion	
people,	and	recent	decades	have	seen	
significant	increases	in	the	productivity	of	
agriculture	with	the	introduction	of	new	
varieties	and	production	methods	(Tilman	
et al.,	2002).	However,	these	benefits	have	
come	at	a	cost.	Of	the	ecosystem	services	
evaluated	in	the	Millennium	Ecosystem	
Assessment,	agriculture	is	credited	with	
increasing	the	provisioning	services	of	food	
and	fibre	production	over	the	past	half	
century,	but	at	the	expense	of	degradation	
of	many	other	ecosystem	services.	The	
Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	as	well	
as	reports	arising	from	other	more	recent	
studies	such	as	Water for food: water for 
life (Comprehensive	Assessment	of	Water	
Management	in	Agriculture,	2007)	and	
Livestock’s long shadow: environmental 
issues and options	(FAO,	2006a)	recognize	
that	agriculture	can	and	should	be	managed	
to	enhance	ecosystem	services	beyond	the	
provision	of	food	and	other	goods.	
Increased	production	of	agricultural	
goods	at	the	expense	of	other	ecosystem	
services	has	resulted	in	global	and	local	
environmental	changes	that	have	significant	
impacts	on	human	health	and	well-being	
(Foley	et al.,	2005).	Agricultural	production	
practices	can	generate	greenhouse	gas	
emissions	and	lead	to	water	depletion	
and	pollution,	land	degradation	and	loss	
of	biodiversity.	Agriculture	itself	is	one	of	
the	main	victims	of	degraded	ecosystems,	
with	agricultural	productivity	hampered	by	
problems	of	climate	variability,	soil	depletion,	
water	scarcity	and	quality,	and	pest	and	
disease	vulnerability.	Changing	the	balance	
of	ecosystem	services	provided	by	agriculture	
constitutes	a	significant	step	towards	
redressing	the	negative	consequences	of	
certain	forms	of	agricultural	production.	
A	further	motivation	for	such	a	change	
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other	agricultural	producers	can	undertake	
to	increase	the	supply	of	the	three	categories	
of	environmental	services.	
How can agricultural producers 
generate environmental services?
Before	discussing	the	specific	issues	
associated	with	each	of	the	three	categories,	
some	general	observations	are	called	for.	
Generally,	for	farmers	to	increase	their	supply	
of	certain	environmental	services,	some	
change	in	the	agricultural	production	system	
is	needed.	
To	provide	enhanced	levels	of	
environmental	services,	farmers	can	alter	
their	production	practices	in	a	variety	of	
ways,	including:
•	 changes	in	production	systems,	where	
lands	remain	in	agriculture	but	
production	activities	are	modified	to	
achieve	environmental	objectives	(e.g.	
reduced	tillage	or	leaving	more	crop	
residues	on	fields);
•	 land-diversion	programmes,	where	lands	
are	diverted	from	crop	and	livestock	
production	to	other	uses;
•	 avoiding	a	change	in	land	use	(e.g.	
refraining	from	the	conversion	from	
forest	to	agriculture).
These distinctions	are	important	in	
assessing	the	degree	to	which	environmental	
service	provision	involves	a	trade-off	with	
agricultural	production,	which	in	turn	
is	fundamental	for	understanding	the	
motivations	of	producers	regarding	whether	
or	not	to	implement	a	change.	The	type	of	
change	required	could	also	have	macro-level	
implications,	if	implemented	on	a	large	scale,	
through	its	impacts	on	food,	land	and	labour	
availability,	and	on	prices	(Zilberman,	Lipper	
and	McCarthy,	forthcoming).
The	conditions	determining	the	potential	
to	change	the	mix	of	ecosystem	services	
provided	by	agricultural	production	systems	
have	several	dimensions.	First,	changes	to	
increase	the	output	of	one	ecosystem	service	
are	likely	to	have	effects	on	a	number	of	
other	services.	These	may	be	positive	or	
negative.	In	many	cases,	changes	involve	a	
reduction	in	some	provisioning	services	–	
even	if	only	temporary	–	in	order	to	enhance	
the	supply	of	other	supporting,	regulating	
or	cultural	services.	Trade-offs	may	also		
arise	among	the	various	types	of	regulating	
and	supporting	ecosystems	services	supplied.	
For	example,	establishing	a	plantation	of	
fast-growing	tree	species	to	generate	carbon	
sequestration	may	reduce	biodiversity.	
Likewise,	increasing	habitat	for	one		
species	could	have	negative	impacts	on	
another.	
Second,	agro-ecological	conditions	such	as	
climate,	soil	quality,	topography	and	water	
availability	are	key	determinants	of	the	mix	
of	ecosystem	services	that	can	be	generated	
from	a	particular	system	of	management.	
Specific	agro-ecological	conditions	may	be	
highly	productive	for	one	service	but	not	
for	another;	for	example,	steep	topography	
can	result	in	highly	productive	watershed	
protection,	but	be	very	unproductive	for	
agriculture.	
Third,	the	potential	for	changing	the	mix	
of	services	provided	by	agro-ecosystems	
depends	critically	on	the	management	
systems	currently	in	place	and	on	the	policy	
and	economic	factors	that	drive	them.	For	
example,	wheat	can	be	produced	within	
a	large-scale,	highly	capital-intensive	
mechanized	system,	as	in	Australia	or	
Canada,	or	through	small-scale,	labour-
intensive	systems	with	few	or	no	chemical	
inputs,	as	in	Ethiopia.	Both	are	examples	of	
wheat	farming	systems,	but	the	productivity	
of	each,	in	terms	of	wheat	yield	and	the	
mix	of	ecosystem	services,	is	quite	different.	
Changes	to	increase	environmental	services	
for	one	system	may	not	be	relevant	to	the	
other.	
A	fourth	and	final	point	to	be	made	is	that	
ecosystem	services	take	different	forms,	not	
all	of	which	are	equal	from	the	point	of	view	
of	the	beneficiaries.	A	major	reason	for	the	
past	emphasis	on	provisioning	services	over	
other	types	of	ecosystem	service,	is	the	fact	
that	most	provisioning	services	take	the	form	
of	what,	in	economists’	terms,	are	considered	
“private	goods”.	In	contrast,	regulating,	
supporting	and	cultural	ecosystem	services	
are	often	“public	goods”	(see	Box	2).	
The	sections	below	look	more	closely	
at	the	types	of	change	that	agricultural	
producers	can	make	to	enhance	the	provision	
of	the	specific	services	of	climate	change	
mitigation,	improved	water	management	
and	biodiversity	conservation.
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Agriculture and climate change 
mitigation
The	summary	for	policy-makers	of	
the	Fourth	Assessment	Report	of	the	
Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	
(IPCC)	states	unequivocally	that	global	
warming	is	occurring	and	that	it	is	very	
likely	caused	by	greenhouse	gas	emissions	
arising	from	human	activities.	It	warns		
that:
Continued greenhouse gas emissions at or 
above current rates would cause further 
warming and induce many changes in 
the global climate system during the 21st 
century that would very likely be larger 
than those observed during the 20th 
century.
(IPCC,	2007a,	p.	13)	
Climate	change	will	generate	significant	
costs	to	both	developing	and	developed	
countries.	Such	costs	will	include	increased	
frequency	and	intensity	of	severe	weather	
events	such	as	floods,	tornados	and	
hurricanes;	increased	drought	in	some	
regions;	loss	of	coastal	areas	and	water	
shortages;	and	changes	in	the	incidence	
of	disease.	Developing	countries	are	likely	
to	bear	a	heavier	burden	owing	to	their	
greater	vulnerability	as	well	as	the	severity	
of	changes	they	are	likely	to	experience.	
Climate	change	could	result	in	large-scale	
migration	and	conflicts,	which	also	carry	
significant	costs	(Stern,	2007).
The	IPCC	Fourth	Assessment	Report	also	
notes	the	importance	of	making	immediate	
and	significant	reductions	in	greenhouse	gas	
emissions.	The	report	states	that	mitigation	
efforts	over	the	next	two	to	three	decades	
will	determine	to	a	large	extent	the	long-
term	global	mean	temperature	increase	
and	the	corresponding	climate	change	
impacts	that	can	be	avoided	(IPCC,	2007b).	
Essentially,	there	are	two	ways	of	mitigating	
climate	change:	reducing	the	source	of	
the	emission	or	increasing	the	amount	
of	greenhouse	gas	storage	in	terrestrial	
systems	(e.g.	through	carbon	sequestration).	
Thus,	agriculture’s	role	in	mitigating	
climate	change	is	twofold:	reducing	its	own	
emissions	and	enhancing	the	absorption	of	
greenhouse	gases.	
Agriculture	is	a	notable	source	of	the	three	
major	greenhouse	gases:	carbon	dioxide,	
methane	and	nitrous	oxide.	Carbon	dioxide	
is	most	significant	in	relation	to	global	
warming,	but	methane	and	nitrous	oxide	also	
make	substantial	contributions.	Agricultural	
activities	and	land-use	changes	contribute	
about	one-third	of	the	total	carbon	dioxide	
emissions	and	are	the	largest	sources	of	
methane	(from	livestock	and	flooded	rice	
production)	and	nitrous	oxide	(primarily	
Public	goods	are	a	special	case	of	
externalities	(see	Box	1).	They	are	goods	
or	services	for	which	consumption	cannot	
be	confined	to	a	particular	consumer	or	
group	of	consumers	and	whose	use	by	
one	consumer	does	not	affect	the	use	
by	another.	For	example,	mitigating	the	
impacts	of	climate	change	is	a	benefit	to	
everyone	in	the	global	community,	and	
it	is	not	possible	to	exclude	some	people	
from	enjoying	the	benefit	even	if	they	do	
not	pay	for	the	service.	At	the	same	time,	
one	person’s	enjoyment	of	the	climate	
change	mitigation	benefit	does	not	
detract	from	another	person’s	enjoyment	
of	the	same	benefit.	Public	goods	can	
range	from	global	(e.g.	climate	change	
mitigation,	biodiversity	conservation)	to	
local	(e.g.	flood	control).
It	is	important	to	note	that,	while	
services	such	as	climate	change	mitigation	
are	public	goods,	the	resources	that	
provide	them	(e.g.	forest	lands)	may	well	
be	privately	owned.	Indeed,	it	is	this	
distinction	that	helps	motivate	payments	
for	environmental	services.
Source:	FAO,	2002b.	
BOX	2
Public goods
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from	application	of	inorganic	nitrogenous	
fertilizer).	
Agriculture	also	plays	an	important	role	
as	a	carbon	“sink”	through	its	capacity	
to	sequester	and	store	greenhouse	
gases,	especially	as	carbon	in	soils	and	in	
plants	and	trees	(see	Figure	3).	Carbon	
sequestration	involves	increasing	carbon	
storage	in	terrestrial	systems,	either	above	
or	below	ground.	Changes	in	land-	and	soil-
use	practices	can	trigger	a	process	of	soil	
carbon	accumulation	over	time.	Eventually,	
the	system	will	reach	a	new	carbon	stock	
equilibrium	or	saturation	point,	and	no	
new	carbon	will	be	absorbed.	Carbon	
sequestration	presents	both	advantages	
and	disadvantages	as	a	means	of	mitigating	
climate	change.	The	main	advantage	is	that	
it	is	relatively	low-cost	and	can	be	readily	
implemented.	Moreover,	it	provides	multiple	
associated	benefits	as	the	resultant	increase	
in	root	biomass	and	soil	organic	matter	
enhance	water	and	nutrient	retention,	
availability	and	plant	uptake	and	hence	
land	productivity.	A	major	disadvantage	
is	that,	unlike	other	forms	of	climate	
change	mitigation,	carbon	sequestration	is	
reversible;	indeed,	changes	in	agricultural	
management	practices	can	accelerate	or	
reverse	the	degree	of	sequestration	in	a	
relatively	short	time	frame.	
The	physical	potential	to	sequester	
carbon	varies	considerably	by	land-
use	type	and	region.	Table	1	shows	an	
estimate	of	carbon	sequestration	potential	
through	land-use	change	for	a	total	of	
48	developing	countries	over	a	ten-year	
period.	The	figures	suggest	that	significant	
technical	potential	exists	for	carbon	
emissions	mitigation	from	agriculture:	
almost	2.3	billion	tonnes.	Realizing	
this	potential	would	require	changes	
in	land	management	on	an	additional	
50	million	hectares	of	land	(Niles	et al.,	
2002).	In	comparison,	95	million	hectares	
are	currently	farmed	using	conservation	
agriculture	systems,	which	provide	
significant	soil	carbon	sequestration	
FIGURE 3
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services	(Derpsch,	2005).	The	economic	
feasibility	of	the	required	land-use	changes	
is	not	yet	clear,	although	there	is	growing	
evidence	that	changes	in	production	
systems	leading	to	carbon	sequestration	
could	also	provide	other	economic		
benefits.
Potential for carbon sequestration in 
above-ground biomass
Above-ground	sequestration	is	achieved	
by	increasing	the	amount	of	biomass	
above	ground	in	the	form	of	trees	and	
shrubs.	Carbon	sequestration	rates	vary	
by	tree	species,	soil	type,	regional	climate,	
topography	and	management	practice.	The	
adoption	of	agroforestry,	rehabilitation	
of	degraded	forests	and	establishment	of	
forest	plantation	and	silvopastoral	systems	
count	among	the	many	land-use	changes	
that	can	generate	above-ground	carbon	
sequestration.	
The	carbon	sequestration	potential	of	
a	land-use	system	is	determined	by	the	
average	carbon	stored	in	that	system	during	
a	rotation	period	relevant	to	the	type	of	
growth	in	question.	Carbon	is	sequestered	
when	moving	from	systems	with	lower	to	
higher	time-averaged	stocks.	Palm	et al.	
(2005)	estimated	the	annual	average	amount	
of	carbon	stored	over	20	years	under	various	
land-use	systems	for	three	sites	in	the	humid	
tropics.	They	found	that	a	change	from	
managed	and	logged	forests	to	undisturbed	
forest	in	Indonesia	yielded	a	net	gain	of	
213	tonnes	of	carbon	per	hectare	over	the	
life	of	the	forest.	Similarly,	changing	from	
short	fallow	to	improved	fallow	in	Brazil	
increased	carbon	sequestered	per	hectare	by	
4.6	tonnes	over	eight	years.	
The	highest	average	amount	of	carbon	
that	can	be	sequestered	per	hectare	per	
year	is	generally	obtained	by	expanding	
forest	area	via	afforestation	or	reforestation.	
Annual	crops	and	pastures	store	a	small	
fraction	of	that	amount.	Amounts	achieved	
by	logged	forests,	agroforests,	tree	crops,	
timber	plantations	and	secondary	forest	
fallows	fall	in	between.	Secondary	forest	
fallows	of	20–30	years,	for	example,	store	
around	75	tonnes	of	carbon	per	hectare,	with	
sequestration	occurring	at	an	annual	rate	
of	5	tonnes	per	hectare	during	the	first	ten	
years	of	regrowth	(Fearnside	and	Guimarães,	
1996).	
Any	intervention	that	prevents	conversion	
from	a	higher	to	a	lower	carbon-storing	
land	use,	or	that	encourages	conversion	
from	a	lower	to	a	higher	carbon-storing	land	
use,	will	contribute	to	net	carbon	storage.	
Thus,	a	wide	range	of	other	forestry	and	
agroforestry	systems	can	make	a	meaningful	
contribution.	For	example,	Poffenberger	et 
al.	(2001)	estimated	that,	with	protection	
and	assisted	regeneration,	dry	forests	in	
central	India	could	double	per	hectare	
rates	of	carbon	sequestration	from	27.3	to	
55.2	tonnes	within	ten	years	in	secondary	
forests,	and	increase	them	from	18.8	to	
88.7	tonnes	in	old	growth	forest	after	50	
years,	at	a	very	modest	cost.
Potential for carbon sequestration 
below ground
All	soils	contain	some	carbon,	deposited	as	
dead	plant	material	or	in	some	inorganic	
TAblE 1
Potential carbon mitigation from land-use change, 2003–12
Region
Avoided
deforestation1
Sustainable 
agriculture2
Forest
restoration3 ToTAl
(Million tonnes of carbon)
Africa 167.8 69.7 41.7 279.2
Asia 300.5 227.3 96.2 624.0
Latin	America 1	097.3 93.1 177.9 1	368.3
ToTAl 1 565.6 390.1 315.8 2 271.5
1	Calculated	from	the	most	recent	estimates	of	annual	forest	loss	multiplied	by	weighted	carbon	stocks;		
assumes	deforestation	rates	remain	constant.		
2	Includes	soil	carbon	sequestration	from	reducing	tillage	and	increasing	soil	cover,	conversion	of	annual	crops		
to	agroforests	and	improved	grasslands	management.	
3	Includes	reforesting	degraded	lands	and	agroforestry,	not	plantations.	Excludes	carbon	sequestration	in	soils	
undergoing	reforestation.
Source: adapted	from	Niles	et al.,	2002.	
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form	such	as	calcium	carbonate	or	carbon	
dioxide	dissolved	in	groundwater.	The	extent	
of	additional	carbon	that	can	be	sequestered	
depends	both	on	local	geophysical	conditions	
and	the	cropping	system.	
Map	1	presents	a	global	view	of	areas	with	
significant	potential	to	sequester	additional	
carbon	in	soils.	This	potential,	referred	to	
as	the	“soil	carbon	gap”,	indicates	locations	
where	soil	carbon	levels	are	currently	low	
but	medium-to-high	technical	potential	
for	sequestration	exists,	depending	on	soil	
type,	climate	soil	moisture	and	land	cover	
conditions.	It	must	be	stressed	that	this	
map,	as	well	as	other	maps	presented	in	
this	report,	is	based	on	global	databases	
at	a	coarse	scale	of	resolution	and	with	
variable	accuracy.	Consequently,	the	results	
presented	can	only	suggest	locations	that	
show	potential	for	the	various	indicators	
considered.	Country-level	studies	and	more	
sophisticated	models	would	be	required	to	
derive	more	accurate	estimates.	
Map	2	indicates	the	location	of	croplands	
with	medium-to-high	technical	potential	
to	sequester	carbon.	This	map	provides	a	
preliminary	perspective	on	where	cropping	
systems	could	be	changed	to	achieve	
substantial	soil	carbon	sequestration.	It	
highlights	the	intersection	of	locations	with	
medium-to-high	soil	carbon	sequestration	
potential	(indicated	in	Map	1)	and	croplands,	
as	identified	by	the	Global	Land	Cover	2000	
Project	(GLC	2000)	database.3
Around	30	percent	(4.7	million	km2)	of	
the	land	characterized	by	medium-to-high	
potential	for	carbon	sequestration	is	located	
in	areas	where	agricultural	production	is	
practised,	representing	15	percent	of	total	
croplands	as	defined	by	GLC	2000.	One-
quarter	of	this	area	is	located	in	Asia	and	
one-quarter	in	Africa.
Which	types	of	changes	to	agricultural	
production	practices	could	increase	soil	
3 GLC 000 is a collaboration of partners around the world 
with the general objective to provide for the year 000 a 
harmonized land cover database over the whole globe. 
Croplands are defined by GLC land classes 6 (cultivated 
and managed areas), 7 (mosaic: cropland/tree cover/other 
natural vegetation) and 8 (mosaic: cropland/shrub or grass 
cover). Further details are available at http://www-gvm.jrc.
it/glc000/.
MAP 1
Potential to sequester additional carbon in soils
Soil carbon gap
Note: available at 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/google.kml?id=31151&layers=potential_sequester_carbon
Source: FAO.
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carbon	sequestration?	Lasse	(2002)	provides	
a	list	of	management	techniques	with	this	
potential,	including	the	planting	of	cover	
crops,	mulch	farming	combined	with	zero	
tillage,	and	agroforestry.	Some	of	these	
practices	would	also	increase	above-ground	
carbon	stocks.	Reliable	estimates	on	how	
much	carbon	could	be	sequestered	in	soils	
under	various	management	practices	and	
farming	patterns	in	the	developing	world	are	
still	sparse.	The	estimates	proposed	by	Lal	et 
al.	(1998)	for	tropical	areas	are	about	twice	
as	high	as	those	for	drylands.
The	effects	on	carbon	sequestration	of	
modifications	to	cropping	practices	can	
differ	dramatically	by	practice	and	by	
location.	Studies	in	selected	locations	in	
India	and	Nigeria	simulating	the	impact	
of	land-use	changes	over	a	50-year	period	
suggest	that	under	current	practices	soil	
carbon	will	continue	to	decline	at	a	slow	
pace,	but	that	changes	in	land	use	could	
significantly	increase	soil	carbon	in	the	long	
term	(Figure	4)	(FAO,	2004a).	The	range	of	
sequestration	potential	for	the	different	
practices	considered	is	large,	from	negative	
for	continuous	cultivation	practices	to	
around	40	tonnes	per	hectare	with	the	
retention	of	crop	residues	and	substantial	
addition	of	farmyard	manure.	For	the	
practices	with	the	highest	sequestration	
potential,	carbon	sequestration	continues	
for	the	entire	duration	of	the	simulation	
and	even	then	does	not	reach	equilibrium,	
suggesting	that	carbon	sequestration	
through	changes	in	agricultural	practices	
requires	considerable	time	for	the	full	impact	
to	take	effect.	
Water quantity and quality
Watershed	protection	services	are	physically	
delimited	by	watershed	boundaries.	In	
contrast	with	carbon	sequestration	and	many	
biodiversity	conservation	services,	therefore,	
they	are	primarily	of	interest	to	local	and	
regional	users	(Landell-Mills	and	Porras,	
2002).	
Water quantity
Water	use	has	grown	rapidly	over	the	past	
century,	increasing	more	than	sevenfold	
between	1900	and	2000	while	the	human	
MAP 2
Potential to sequester additional carbon in soils on croplands
Other croplandsCroplands with soil carbon gap Other land with soil carbon gap
Note: available at 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/google.kml?id=31152&layers=potential_sequester_carbon_cropland
Source: FAO.
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population	grew	by	about	a	factor	of	four	
(UNDP,	2006).	Despite	a	decline	in	per	capita	
consumption	since	the	1980s,	global	water	
use	continues	to	increase	(Shiklomanov	and	
Rodda,	2003).
Table	2	reports	two	indicators	related	to	
the	use	of	freshwater	resources.	The	“water	
crowding	index”	measures	the	number	
of	people	served	per	million	cubic	metres	
per	year	of	accessible	runoff.	The	relative	
water	use	or	“water	stress	index”	expresses	
the	ratio	of	water	withdrawals	to	supply.	
At	the	global	level,	current	water	use	
represents	about	13	percent	of	annual	supply	
(Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	2005b)	
with	an	overall	upward	trend,	indicating	
increasing	pressure	on	freshwater	resources.	
The	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment	
(2005b)	projects	an	increase	of	13	percent	
in	the	global	water	crowding	index	by	
2010.	Projections	reported	in	the	Human 
Development Report 2006	(UNDP,	2006)	
suggest	that,	by	2025,	over	3	billion	people	
are	likely	to	be	experiencing	water	stress	
and	14	additional	countries	might	be	
classified	as	water-scarce	(i.e.	having	less	
than	1	000	cubic	metres	per	person	per	
year).	
Most	water	for	human	use	is	drawn	
directly	from	rivers	or	from	groundwater.	
The	latter	may	originate	from	renewable	
or	“fossil”	aquifers.	Each	source	presents	
its	own	management	issues.	Renewable	
groundwater	is	directly	linked	to	the	cycling	
of	freshwater	through	the	atmosphere	and	
soils	and	is	thus	replenished	by	precipitation	
and	certain	agricultural	practices.	Fossil	
groundwater	is	found	in	deep	underground	
aquifers	with	little	long-term	net	recharge.	
The	use	of	fossil	groundwater	is	similar	to	
the	mining	of	minerals:	once	extracted,	
it,	effectively,	cannot	be	replaced	as	
replenishment	times	can	reach	thousands	of	
years	(Margat,	1990).	
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FIGURE 4
Changes in soil carbon for different cropping systems
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LAND-USE PRACTICES
1  Current practice: extensive agropastoral 
with slash and burn 
2  Continuous cultivation 
3  100 kg/ha urea, no grazing residues 
4  Five-year fallow, five-year cultivation, two applications 
farmyard manure (FYM) 3 tonnes/ha, grazing residues 
5  Continuous cultivation, FYM 1.5 tonnes/ha/year,
grazing residues 
6  Continuous cultivation, FYM 1.5 tonnes/ha/year, 
plant residues 0.5 tonne/ha/year, no grazing
LAND-USE PRACTICES
1 Current practice: rainfed cropping, FYM applied 
at 3.9 tonnes/ha/year
2  FYM 3 tonnes/ha/year 
3  FYM 3 tonnes/ha/year, green manure 500 kg/ha/year, 
vermicompost 250 kg/ha/year
4  As current practice but incorporating crop residues 
into soil 
5  FYM 3 tonnes/ha/year, leave plant residues 
6  FYM 3 tonnes/ha/year, plant residues, green manure, 
vermicompost
7  FYM 6 tonnes/ha/year, plant residues, green manure, 
vermicompost
4
3
1
2
6
5
2
1
3
5
4
6
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In	addition	to	direct	extraction	from	rivers	
and	aquifers,	three	other	technologies	are	
used	to	increase	freshwater	availability:	
dams	and	other	artificial	impoundments,	
desalinization	of	ocean	water	and	localized	
rainwater	harvesting.	Desalinized	water	
currently	supplies	less	than	1	percent	of	
global	water	consumption.	Water	harvesting	
refers	to	a	number	of	technologies,	
traditional	and	modern,	that	either	harvest	
surface	runoff	or	increase	water	infiltration.	
These	include	water	channels	and	dams	
to	catch	and	convey	water,	techniques	to	
increase	soil	moisture	content,	and	reservoirs	
for	irrigation	and	household	use	and	to	
reduce	flood	peaks.	
Agriculture	accounts	for	about	
70	percent	of	all	water	use	worldwide	
and	up	to	95	percent	in	many	developing	
countries	and	thus	influences	both	the	
quantity	and	quality	of	water	available	for	
other	human	uses	(FAO,	2007b).	Changes	
in	agricultural	practices	could	contribute	
to	water	quantity	by	promoting	the	
recharge	of	groundwater	aquifers,	but	
perhaps	the	most	important	contribution	
agriculture	could	make	to	improving	the	
quantity	and	quality	of	available	water	
resources	is	through	more	efficient	use	of	
the	water	it	requires.	A	further	possibility	
is	the	reuse	of	wastewater	for	agricultural	
purposes;	currently,	about	2	million	
hectares	are	irrigated	using	this	method	
(Comprehensive	Assessment	of	Water	
Management	in	Agriculture,	2007),	and	
the	potential	exists	to	increase	this	area	
significantly.
Pretty	et al.	(2006)	analysed	144	projects	in	
developing	countries	where	a	combination	
of	resource-conserving	management	
practices,	such	as	integrated	pest	and	
nutrient	management,	conservation	tillage	
and	agroforestry,	had	been	introduced.	It	
was	found	that	these	practices	also	provide	a	
notable	improvement	in	water	productivity,	
especially	for	rainfed	agricultural	systems.	
Average	increases	in	water	productivity	
ranged	from	16	percent	for	irrigated	rice	and	
29	percent	for	irrigated	cotton	to	70	percent,	
102	percent	and	108	percent	for	rainfed	
cereals,	legumes,	and	roots	and	tubers,	
respectively.
Numerous	studies	have	established	the	
positive	impact	of	zero	tillage	on	water	
infiltration	capacity,	soil	moisture	content,	
soil	erosion	and	water-holding	capacity.	In	
the	United	States	of	America,	for	example,	
no-till	systems	were	found	to	reduce	
water	runoff	by	31	percent;	increase	water	
infiltration,	depending	on	soil	type,	by	
between	9	percent	and	100	percent;	and	
reduce	soil	erosion	by	up	to	90	percent,	
which	in	turn	reduced	sediment	loads	
in	rivers	and	pollutants	in	water	bodies	
(Hebblethwaite,	1993).	Also	Guo,	Choudhary	
and	Rahman	(1999)	reported	improved	
percolation	owing	to	better	soil	structure	in	
no-till	systems,	which	resulted	in	decreased	
soil	erosion.	In	various	Brazilian	locations,	
soil	losses	were	reduced	by	up	to	87	percent	
under	conservation	agriculture,	while	runoff	
was	reduced	by	up	to	66	percent	under	
wheat–soybean	rotations	(Saturnio	and	
Landers,	1997).	
TAblE 2
Indicators of freshwater provisioning services, 2010
Geographic region/country grouping
Water crowding index Water stress index 
(People/million m3/year) (Percentage)
Asia 391 19
Latin	America 67 4
North	Africa/Middle	East 2	020 133
Sub-Saharan	Africa 213 3
Former	Union	of	Soviet	Socialist	Republics 161 20
OECD	countries 178 20
WoRlD ToTAl 231 13
Note: These	figures	are	based	on	mean	annual	conditions.	The	values	for	the	relative	use	statistics	shown	rise	when	the	
subregional	spatial	and	temporal	distributions	of	renewable	water	supply	and	use	are	considered
Source:	From	Ecosystems and human well-being: current state and trends by	the	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment.	
Copyright	©	2005	by	the	author.	Reproduced	by	permission	of	Island	Press,	Washington,	DC.
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The	exact	quantification	of	aquifer	
recharge	through	improved	water	infiltration	
requires	further	research.	To	date,	there	
is	mainly	anecdotal	evidence	that	the	
introduction	of	conservation	agriculture	and	
other	soil	and	water	conservation	practices	
improves	watershed	services.	In	the	state	of	
Paraná,	Brazil,	it	was	reported	that,	after	
the	introduction	of	a	no-till	system,	a	pond	
that	had	been	habitually	dry	for	most	parts	
of	the	year	had	refilled	and	that	the	nearby	
river	had	begun	to	carry	water	also	in	the	
dry	season	(FAO,	2003b).	In	India,	Agarwal	
and	Narain	(2000)	reported	that	the	Avari	
and	Ruparel	rivers	began	to	contain	water	
all	year	round	after	a	set	of	water-harvesting	
practices	and	soil	conservation	measures	
were	implemented	in	the	watersheds.	With	
respect	to	livestock	management,	rotational	
grazing,	improved	livestock	distribution	
and	increased	tree	cover	on	pastures	have	
been	found	to	improve	water	recharge	
(FAO,	2006a).	Nevertheless,	more	research	is	
needed	on	the	exact	relationships	and	time	
lags	between	the	introduction	of	improved	
agricultural	management	for	water	
conservation	and	improvements	in	water	
quantity.	
Table	3	summarizes	in	qualitative	terms	
the	likely	impacts	of	major	changes	in	land	
use	on	water	availability.	Unfortunately,	
the	hydrological	relationships	between	
land	use	and	the	generation	of	more	and	
cleaner	water	are	complex	and	site-specific,	
and	scientific	evidence	is	often	lacking	
(Robertson	and	Wunder,	2005;	FAO,	2004b).	
TAblE 3
brief overview of hydrologic consequences associated with major classes  
of land cover and use change
TyPE oF
lAnD-USE CHAnGE
ConSEQUEnCES on FRESHWATER
PRovISIonInG SERvICE ConFIDEnCE lEvEl
natural forest
to managed forest
Slight	decrease	in	available	
freshwater	flow	and	a	decrease	
in	temporal	reliability		
(lower	long-term	groundwater	
recharge)
Likely	in	most	temperate	and	
warm	humid	climates,	but	highly	
dependent	on	dominant	tree	
species
Adequate	management	practices	
may	reduce	impacts	to	a	minimum
Forest to
pasture/agriculture
Strong	increase	in	amount	
of	superficial	runoff	with	
associated	increase	in	sediment	
and	nutrient	flux
Decrease	in	temporal	reliability	
(floods,	lower	long-term	
groundwater	recharge)
Very	likely	at	the	global	level;	
impact	will	depend	on	percentage	
of	catchment	area	covered
Consequences	are	less	severe	if	
conversion	is	to	pasture	instead	of	
agriculture
Most	critical	for	areas	with	high	
precipitation	during	concentrated	
periods	of	time	(e.g.	monsoons)
Forest to urban
Very	strong	increase	in	runoff	
with	the	associated	increase	in	
pollution	loads
Strong	decrease	in	temporal	
reliability	(floods,	lower		
long-term	groundwater	
recharge)
Very	likely	at	the	global	level	with	
impact	dependent	on	percent	of	
catchment	area	converted
Stronger	effects	when	lower	part	
of	catchment	is	transformed
Most	critical	for	areas	with	
recurrent	strong	precipitation	
events
Invasion by species
with higher
evapotranspiration rates
Strong	decrease	in	runoff
Strong	decrease	in	temporal	
reliability	(low	long-term	
groundwater	recharge)
Very	likely,	although	highly	
dependent	on	the	characteristics	of	
dominant	tree	species
Scarcely	documented	except	for	
South	Africa,	Australia	and	the	
Colorado	River	in	the	United	States	
of	America
Source:	From	Ecosystems and human well-being: current state and trends by	the	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment.	
Copyright	©	2005	by	the	author.	Reproduced	by	permission	of	Island	Press,	Washington,	DC.
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Most	studies	in	this	area	have	focused	
on	the	impacts	of	forest	protection	and	
reforestation	in	the	proximity	of	water	
sources,	but	even	in	these	studies	the	results	
have	often	been	ambiguous.	Increasing	
tree	cover	can	reduce,	as	well	as	increase,	
the	availability	of	water.	Because	a	typical	
watershed	is	affected	by	the	activities	
of	many	farmers,	improved	agronomic	
practices	would	need	to	be	adopted	widely	
in	order	to	have	a	measurable	impact,	
and	the	long-term	monitoring	needed	to	
assess	the	changes	in	large	watersheds	
can	be	costly.	Nevertheless,	although	
scientific	evidence	on	the	influence	of	
improved	management	on	water	levels	and	
groundwater	recharge	is	scarce,	research	has	
clearly	established	the	opposite	–	that	soil	
degradation	and	deforestation	cause	water	
tables	to	decline.
Map	3	(p.	23)	shows	croplands	in	South	
Asia	and	Southeast	Asia	with	high	levels	
of	sheet	erosion,	indicating	potential	off-
site	impacts	in	the	form	of	siltation	and	
sedimentation	in	waterways.	The	map	is	
based	on	the	findings	of	the	Assessment	
of	the	Status	of	Human-Induced	Soil	
Degradation	in	South	and	Southeast	Asia	
conducted	between	1994	and	1997	by	the	
International	Soil	Reference	and	Information	
Centre	(ISRIC)	and	FAO	(van	Lynden	and	
Oldeman,	1997).	Not	all	the	areas	shown	
will	necessarily	have	the	potential	to	play	a	
strong	role	in	providing	watershed	services	
through	land-use	change,	depending	on	
their	location	with	respect	to	hydrological	
functions,	but	those	that	do	are	still	
likely	to	represent	a	significant	area	and	
a	considerable	number	of	agricultural	
producers.
Water quality
The	United	Nations	Economic	Commission	
for	Europe	(UNECE)	defined	water	quality	
as	the	“physical,	chemical,	and	biological	
characteristics	of	water	necessary	to	sustain	
desired	water	uses”	(UNECE,	1995,	p.	5).	
Most	aquatic	species	are	able	to	adapt	
to	natural	changes	in	water	quality,	but	
human	activities	have	added	pollutants	that	
threaten	many	species	and	require	treatment	
to	supply	potable	water.	
Most	of	the	human	impacts	on	water	
quality	globally	have	occurred	over	the	last	
century	(Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	
2005b).	While,	in	the	past,	the	main	sources	
of	contaminants	comprised	organic	and	
faecal	pollution	from	untreated	wastewater	
(this	continues	to	be	the	case	in	many	
developing	countries),	today,	the	most	
prevalent	contaminants	can	be	traced	to	
agricultural	and	industrial	production.	
Within	agriculture,	contamination	associated	
with	soil	erosion,	nutrient	runoff	and	
pesticides	predominate.	Livestock	production	
is	a	major	source	of	pollution	in	many	
countries,	with	nutrient	contamination	from	
wastes	representing	a	growing	problem	
(FAO,	2006a).	A	distinction	should	be	made	
between	point	source	pollution	(a	specific,	
confined	discharge	of	pollutants	into	a	water	
body)	and	non-point	source	pollution	(a	
more	diffuse	discharge	of	pollutants).	In	most	
cases,	agriculture	is	a	non-point	source	of	
pollution,	where	the	exact	sources	are	diffuse	
and	difficult	to	detect.	An	exception	is	large,	
highly	concentrated	livestock	operations	
where	impacts	can	be	traced	back	to	an	
identifiable	source.	
Improving	water	quality	through	changes	
in	agricultural	production	systems	generally	
involves	reducing	salinization	and	harmful	
runoff	from	agricultural	fields	in	the	form	of	
soil	erosion,	pesticides	and	other	agricultural	
chemicals	or	livestock	waste.	One	means	is	
the	improvement	of	nutrient-use	efficiency	
by	matching	more	closely	the	application	
of	fertilizers	with	the	capacity	of	plants	for	
nutrient	uptake.	Soil	testing	and	improved	
timing	of	fertilizer	application,	as	well	as	the	
use	of	cover	crops	and	reduced	tillage,	are	all	
useful	means	for	this	purpose	(Tilman	et al.,	
2002).	Measures	to	improve	the	management	
of	livestock	waste	can	also	contribute	to	
enhanced	water	quality.	Such	measures	
include	changes	in	the	production	process	
(feed	management)	and	the	collection,	
storage,	processing	and	utilization	of	manure	
(FAO,	2006a).
A	successful	example	of	measures	to	
reduce	non-point	source	water	pollution	
from	livestock	production	is	found	in	France.	
The	Vittel	bottled	water	company	entered	
into	agreements	with	farmers,	encouraging	
them	to	modify	their	land-management	
practices	to	reduce	nitrates	in	the	water	
source	(Perrot-Maître,	2006).	The	modified	
farming	practices	included	the	elimination	
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of	maize	cultivation	for	animal	feed	and	
application	of	agrochemicals,	the	use	of	
extensive	cattle	ranching	with	reduced	
animal	numbers,	and	the	modernization		
of	farm	buildings	to	minimize	nutrient	
runoff.
As	this	example	illustrates,	measures	
to	reduce	pollution	caused	by	livestock	
production	involve	changes	both	to	
cropping	practices	in	feed	production	and	
to	techniques	for	raising	livestock.	The	
pollutants	concerned	include	nutrient	
excretions	of	excess	levels	of	nitrogen,	
phosphorus	and	heavy	metals.	Livestock	
waste	can	also	include	a	variety	of	micro-
organisms	that	are	a	potential	hazard	to	
human	health.	
biodiversity conservation
The	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	
(CBD)	defines	biological	diversity	as	“the	
variability	among	living	organisms	from	all	
sources	including	...	terrestrial,	marine	and	
other	aquatic	ecosystems	and	the	ecological	
complexes	of	which	they	are	part;	this	
includes	diversity	within	species,	among	
species	and	of	ecosystems”	(CBD,	1993,	
Article	2).
MAP 3
Croplands with high rates of human-induced erosion
Other lands with high rates of 
human-induced sheet erosion
Croplands with high rates of human-induced
sheet erosion
Other croplands 
Note: available at 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/google.kml?id=31153&layers=croplands_humaninduced_erosion
Source: FAO.
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 72
Biodiversity	is	commonly	measured	at	
the	genetic,	species	and	ecosystem	levels,	
although	it	is	difficult	to	define	“units	of	
biodiversity”	for	the	purpose	of	carrying	
out	transactions.	Within	any	of	these	three	
levels,	conservation	of	biodiversity	involves	
maintaining	the	following	dimensions	
(Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	2005b):	
•	 variety, reflecting	the	number	of	
different	types;	
•	 quantity and quality, reflecting	how	
much	there	is	of	any	one	type;	
•	 distribution, reflecting	where	that	
attribute	of	biodiversity	is	located.
The	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment	
concluded	that	human	activities	have	led	
to	a	more	rapid	loss	of	biodiversity	on	
Earth	over	the	past	50	years	than	ever	
before	in	human	history.	It	identified	five	
key	drivers	of	biodiversity	loss:	habitat	
change,	climate	change,	invasive	alien	
species,	overexploitation	and	pollution.	The	
Assessment	argued	that	the	loss	of	species	
and	the	progressive	homogenization	of	
many	ecosystems	continues	to	be	one	of	the	
main	threats	to	the	survival	of	our	natural	as	
well	as	socio-economic	systems	(Millennium	
Ecosystem	Assessment,	2005b).
The	biodiversity	associated	with	
agricultural	ecosystems	is	known	as	
agricultural	biodiversity,	and	is	generally	
regarded	as	the	multitude	of	plants,	animals	
and	micro-organisms	at	genetic,	species	and	
ecosystem	levels,	indispensable	in	sustaining	
key	functions	for	food	production	and	food	
security	(CBD,	2000).	It	provides	the	basis	of	
the	food	security	and	livelihoods	of	everyone	
(FAO,	1997).
Agricultural	biodiversity	is	the	outcome	
of	the	interactions	among	the	environment,	
genetic	resources	and	the	management	
systems	and	practices	used	by	farmers	and	is	
the	result	of	careful	selection	and	inventive	
development	over	millennia.	It	includes	
genetic	diversity	of	crops	and	livestock	as	
well	as	crop-associated	biodiversity	(e.g.	
pest-suppressive	biodiversity	pollinators,	soil	
biodiversity).	
Concerns	have	been	raised	in	recent	years	
over	the	loss	of	agricultural	biodiversity	
through	homogenization	of	agricultural	
production	systems	(FAO,	1997).	For	crop	
and	livestock	genetic	diversity,	two	major	
concerns	have	been	voiced:	increasing	
levels	of	genetic	vulnerability	and	genetic	
erosion	(FAO,	1997).	Genetic	vulnerability	
occurs	where	a	widely	used	crop	or	livestock	
variety	is	susceptible	to	a	pest	or	pathogen	
that	threatens	to	create	widespread	crop	
losses.	Genetic	erosion	is	the	loss	of	genetic	
resources	through	the	extinction	of	a	
livestock	variety	or	crop.	The	main	cause	
of	genetic	erosion	is	the	replacement	of	
indigenous	varieties	with	improved	ones.	
Loss	of	ecosystem	services	useful	to	food	
security	is	a	further	concern.	Without	proper	
management	of	agricultural	biodiversity,	
some	key	functions	of	the	agro-ecosystem	
may	be	lost,	such	as	maintenance	of		
nutrient	and	water	cycles,	pest	and	disease	
regulation,	pollination	and	land	erosion	
control.	
The	conservation	of	crop	and	livestock	
genetic	diversity	may	be	ensured	either	
ex situ	or	in situ.	Ex situ	methods	include	
seed	and	gene	banks,	while	in situ	
conservation	takes	place	in	farmers’	fields,	
ponds	or	forests.	The	two	approaches	are	
complementary;	the	ex situ	collections	
preserve	a	static	set	of	genetic	resources,	
while	in situ	efforts	preserve	a	dynamic	
process	of	evolution,	as	genetic	resources	
adapt	to	changing	pressures	from	natural	
and	human	selection.	
The	approaches	used	to	conserve	
agricultural	biodiversity	link	conservation		
to	sustainable	use	by	humans.	Given		
the	specific	features	of	agricultural	
biodiversity,	the	mechanisms	and	tools	used	
to	guarantee	its	sustainable	management,	
including	conservation,	are	often	specific	
and	differ	from	those	traditionally	used	for	
wild	biodiversity	(such	as	protected		
areas).
How	can	agricultural	producers	conserve	
biodiversity?	The	necessary	measures	
depend	not	only	on	the	type	of	biodiversity	
to	be	conserved	but	also	on	production	
systems	and	location.	The	sections	that	
follow	explore	three	main	ways	in	which	
agricultural	producers	can	contribute	
to	biodiversity	conservation:	reducing	
agricultural	expansion	into	biodiversity-rich	
lands;	adopting	agricultural	production	
systems	that	support	the	joint	production	of	
biodiversity	conservation	and	agricultural	
products;	and	conserving	agricultural	
biodiversity.	
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Minimizing agricultural expansion into 
areas rich in wild biodiversity 
Agriculture	can	contribute	to	wild	
biodiversity	conservation	by	refraining	from	
using	land	and	water	resources	that	are	rich	
in	species	diversity.	This	approach	includes	
both	maintaining	areas	with	relatively	
undisturbed	ecosystems	and	retiring	land	
or	water	areas	currently	in	production	
located	near	species-rich	areas,	especially	if	
they	have	limited	suitability	for	agriculture.	
These	areas	can	then	be	incorporated	into	
protected	areas	such	as	national	parks	and	
reserves,	which	are	the	cornerstones	of	wild	
biodiversity	conservation.	The	approach	
may	also	involve	eliminating,	reducing	or	
improving	agricultural	production	practices	
and	overall	land	management	in	areas	
that	have	been	identified	as	important	
“corridors”	for	wildlife	migration	and	
ecosystem	connectivity.
Map	4	is	one	of	several	generated	by	a	
study	of	land-use	change	in	the	neotropics	
(Wassenaar	et al.,	2007)	and	provides	an	
indication	of	areas	at	risk	of	conversion	to	
agriculture	in	parts	of	South	America.	The	
study	identified	the	areas	at	highest	risk	of	
conversion	to	pasture	and	croplands	using	a	
model	that	explicitly	incorporates	dimensions	
such	as	location,	suitability	and	various	factors	
affecting	the	relative	economic	values	of	
land	uses.	The	map	identifies	deforestation	
hotspot	areas	in	red	(at	risk	of	conversion	to	
pasture)	and	orange	(at	risk	of	conversion	to	
cropland).	Many	of	the	ecoregions	that	would	
be	affected	by	the	projected	deforestation	
are	part	of	the	WWF	(World	Wide	Fund	for	
Nature)	Global	200	priority	ecoregions	(a	
collection	of	the	most	biologically	diverse	
and	representative	habitats	on	earth)	and	
others	fall	into	the	Conservation	International	
biodiversity	hotspot	zones	(Wassenaar	et al.,	
2007;	WWF,	2007).	These	are	areas	where	
crop	and	livestock	producers	could	supply	
significant	biodiversity	conservation	services	
by	avoiding	their	conversion	to	agricultural	
use	or	by	facilitating	conservation	in	
agricultural	areas	(e.g.	by	providing	wildlife	
corridors	linking	habitat	areas).	
Conserving wild biodiversity in 
agricultural ecosystems 
Agricultural	producers	can	also	conserve	
biodiversity	within	agricultural	ecosystems.	
McNeely	and	Scherr	(2002)	outline	a	set	of	
possible	measures:
	 1.	enhance	wildlife	habitat	on	farms	and	
establish	farmland	corridors	that	link	
uncultivated	spaces;
	 2.	mimic	natural	habitats	by	integrating	
productive	perennial	plants;
	 3.	use	farming	systems	that	reduce	
pollution;
	 4.	modify	resource	management	practices	
to	enhance	habitat	quality	in	and	
around	farmlands.
An	example	of	the	first	case	is	found	in	
Costa	Rica,	where	windbreaks	formed	by	
planting	a	mix	of	indigenous	and	exotic	tree	
species	were	established	on	150	hectares	
spanning	19	farming	communities.	The	
windbreaks	served	as	biological	corridors	
connecting	remnant	forest	patches	in	the	
area,	and	they	also	benefited	farmers	by	
reducing	wind	damage	(McNeely	and	Scherr,	
2002).	Other	examples	that	could	fall	into	
this	category	include	the	establishment	of	
hedgerows	and	agroforestry.	Schroth	et al.	
(2004)	provide	a	comprehensive	review	
of	the	role	of	agroforestry	for	conserving	
biodiversity	by	providing	corridors	and	
new	habitat	for	wild	species,	among	other	
measures.	
Shade-grown	coffee	is	a	prominent	
example	of	the	second	type	of	strategy.	
Shade-grown	coffee	is	produced	under	
the	shelter	of	a	canopy	of	trees	of	varying	
heights,	providing	an	environment	that	
tends	to	be	attractive	to	migratory	birds.	In	
contrast,	coffee	grown	under	conventional	
systems	has	low	levels	of	biodiversity	(Pagiola	
and	Ruthenberg,	2002).	
Many	examples	exist	that	can	illustrate	the	
third	category,	that	of	a	change	in	farming	
practices	to	reduce	pollution.	In	Viet	Nam,	
rice	farmers’	overuse	of	pesticides	was	
generating	off-farm	pollution	that	harmed	
local	habitats.	An	education	campaign	led	
to	reduced	pesticide	use,	benefiting	the	
many	species	of	frogs	and	fish	that	inhabit	
rice	paddies.	In	China,	intensive	pesticide	
use	to	control	the	rice	blast	disease	was	
substantially	reduced	by	planting	a	diverse	
set	of	rice	varieties.	In	the	Philippines,	
soil	erosion	and	subsequent	pollution	of	
waterways	were	avoided	by	introducing	
natural	vegetation	contour	strips	(McNeely	
and	Scherr,	2002).
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The	reintroduction	of	short-term	(over	one	
to	two	years)	improved	fallow	systems	into	
smallholder	agricultural	systems	in	Kenya	and	
Zambia	provides	an	example	of	the	fourth	
category.	This	measure	not	only	helped	
to	restore	soil	fertility	but	also	provided	a	
habitat	for	wild	species	(McNeely	and	Scherr,	
2002).
In	certain	areas,	silvopastoral	practices	
can	offer	an	alternative	to	cattle	production	
systems	based	solely	on	pasture.	Such	
practices	include	planting	high	densities	of	
trees	and	shrubs	in	pastures,	cut-and-carry	
systems	whereby	livestock	are	fed	with	the	
foliage	of	specifically	planted	trees	and	
shrubs	in	areas	previously	used	for	other	
agricultural	practices,	and	using	fast-growing	
trees	and	shrubs	for	fencing	and	wind	
screens	(Pagiola	et al.,	2007).	The	on-site	
benefits	of	silvopastoral	practices	to	land	
users	include	additional	production	from	
the	tree	component,	such	as	fruit,	fuelwood,	
MAP 4
Projected expansion of cropland and pasture, 2000–2010
Pasture expansion
Cropland and pasture expansion
Grazed pasture
CroplandCropland expansion Forest
Non-survey area
Note: available at 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/google.kml?id=31154&layers=cropland_pasture_expansion
Source: Wassenaar et al., 2007.
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FIGURE 5
Biodiversity impact of adopting silvopastoral systems in Esparza, Costa Rica
fodder	or	timber;	maintaining	or	improving	
pasture	productivity	by	increasing	nutrient	
recycling;	and	diversification	of	production	
(Dagang	and	Nair,	2003).	
As	Figure	5	illustrates,	silvopastoral	
practices	also	have	important	biodiversity	
benefits.	They	have	been	shown	to	play	a	
major	role	in	the	survival	of	wildlife	species	
by	providing	scarce	resources	and	refuge;	
to	have	a	higher	propagation	rate	of	native	
forest	plants;	and	to	provide	shelter	for	wild	
birds.	They	can	also	help	connect	protected	
areas	(Dennis,	Shellard	and	Agnew,	1996;	
Harvey	and	Haber,	1999).	In	addition,	
silvopastoral	practices	can	fix	significant	
amounts	of	carbon	in	the	soil	and	in	the	
standing	tree	biomass	(Fisher	et al.,	1994;	
Pfaff	et al.,	2000)	and	have	a	beneficial	effect	
on	water	services	(Bruijnzeel,	2004).	
Conserving agricultural biodiversity 
A	wide	range	of	methods	exist	for	conserving	
agricultural	biodiversity,	depending	on	the	
specific	component	that	is	focused	upon.	
Methods	differ	in	terms	of	the	degree	of	
human	intervention	in	the	natural	system,	
ranging	from	highly	managed	ex situ	
gene	and	seed	banks	to	maintaining	wild	
relatives	of	cultivated	species	in	wilderness	
areas.	Measures	also	include	the	on-farm	
conservation	and	utilization	of	so-called	
“landraces”,	or	traditional	varieties	of	crops	
and	livestock,	which	are	often	highly	adapted	
to	their	local	environments.	Diversity	can	
be	promoted	by	providing	incentives	to	
maintain	a	heterogenous	set	of	crop	varieties	
in	production,	particularly	rare	landrace	
varieties,	or	by	managing	field	margins	to	
encourage	pest-suppressing	natural	enemies	
and	pollinators.	Jarvis,	Padoch	and	Cooper	
(2007)	provide	an	extensive	overview	of	the	
tools	used	by	farmers	to	conserve	and	further	
develop	biodiversity	in	their	fields.
Because	agricultural	biodiversity	is	directly	
linked	to	agricultural	production,	working	
within	agricultural	market	channels	to	
provide	incentives	to	farmers	to	conserve	
agricultural	diversity	is	an	important	
strategy.	In	recent	years,	the	international	
community	has	provided	support	to	farmers	
for	conserving	agricultural	biodiversity	in 
situ.	These	programmes	seek	to	increase	the	
availability	and	productivity	of	diversity	in	
production	systems,	or	enhance	the	returns	
to	maintaining	diverse	systems.	Increasing	
the	demand	for	diverse	products	through	
the	establishment	of	labelling,	certification	
or	origin	schemes	and	niche	market	
development	is	one	strategy	(Bioversity	
International,	2006).	Increasing	the	diversity	
of	agricultural	seed	supply	systems	is	another	
(FAO,	2006b).	One	example	that	involves	
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direct	payments	to	farmers	for	maintaining	
diverse	crop	varieties	is	the	GEF-funded	
project	“A	Dynamic	Farmer-Based	Approach	
to	the	Conservation	of	African	Plant	Genetic	
Resources”	implemented	in	Ethiopia	from	
1992	to	2000	(GEF,	2007a).	
other environmental services 
agricultural producers can supply
The	sections	above	have	focused	on	three	
different,	but	very	important,	environmental	
services.	However,	it	should	be	underlined	
that,	apart	from	these,	agricultural	producers	
can	and	do	supply	many	other	environmental	
services.	Landscape	aesthetics	is	one	service	
from	which	some	farmers	are	already	
receiving	significant	economic	benefits	in	the	
form	of	ecotourism	and	agrotourism	(Box	3).	
Other	services	for	which	some	farmers	are	
being	paid	include	pollination	services	and	
reduction	in	the	spread	of	animal	diseases,	
crop	diseases	and	invasive	species.	For	
example,	some	farmers	in	affected	areas	
have	received	payments	to	cull	chickens	as	
a	measure	to	prevent	the	spread	of	avian	
influenza.
Importance of scale, location 
and coordination in supplying 
environmental services
As	the	above	discussion	has	shown,	
agricultural	producers	can	implement	
numerous	changes	to	improve	the	balance	of	
services	provided	by	agricultural	ecosystems.	
The	focus	has	been	on	the	changes	that	
individual	farmers	can	make	to	increase	
the	supply	of	each	of	three	environmental	
services.	However,	particularly	in	cases	of	
watershed	management	and	biodiversity	
conservation	services,	both	scale	and	location	
BOX	3
landscape aesthetics
Managing	landscape	aesthetics	is	another	
environmental	service	for	which	markets	
are	developing,	but	which	is	not	covered	
in	detail	in	this	report.	Landscape	
aesthetics,	or	“rural	amenities”,	involves	
the	pleasure	people	gain	from	seeing,	
visiting	or	even	knowing	of	the	existence	
of	certain	landscape	features.	The	pleasure	
can	come	from	novelty	(watching	a	geyser	
erupt),	diversity	(a	hillside	cultivated	using	
a	variety	of	practices),	natural	beauty	
(vistas	of	the	Himalayas),	culture	(visits	to	
a	sacred	place)	or	the	continued	existence	
of	an	endangered	species	in	a	far-away	
place.
Landscapes	thus	have	distinct	values	
in	themselves	that	can	be	of	different	
types.	People	may	be	interested	simply	
in	ensuring	the	continuing	existence	of	
certain	landscapes,	habitats	or	ecosystems,	
even	if	they	are	not	benefiting	from	
them	directly	in	any	other	way.	However,	
landscapes	can	also	have	more	direct	use	
values,	exploited	through	activities	such	as	
nature	tourism,	ecotourism	or	agritourism.	
Nature	tourism	is	any	visit	to	a	location	
with	the	primary	goal	of	appreciating	
some	element	of	nature.	The	term	
“ecotourism”,	in	this	context,	is	used	to	
describe	visits	to	places	with	unique	flora	
and	fauna,	such	as	the	Amazon	watershed	
or	the	Serengeti	Plains.	Agritourism	(or	
agrotourism)	involves	visits	to	landscapes	
where	humans	have	practised	agriculture	
in	ways	that	result	in	attractive	scenery	
and	distinctive	products	and	cuisine.
Provision	of	landscape	aesthetics	services	
often	has	important	synergies	with	the	
provision	of	other	environmental	services,	
especially	conserving	biodiversity.	Some	
destinations	are	set	up	to	allow	visitors	to	
see	unique	collections	of	diverse	species.	
Many	of	these	destinations	are	protected,	
which	increases	the	likelihood	that	they	
will	maintain	species	lost	in	surrounding	
areas	or	regulate	water	quality	and	
quantity.	Nature	tourism	can	enhance	
the	conservation	of	biological	diversity,	
especially	when	local	communities	are	
directly	involved	with	tourism	operators.		
If	local	communities	receive	income	
directly	from	a	tourist	enterprise,	they	are	
more	likely	to	provide	greater	protection	
for,	and	conservation	of,	local	resources.	
Agriculture	can	have	distinct,	but	
differing,	roles	in	ensuring	the	provision	
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are	highly	relevant	for	the	effectiveness	of	
the	changes,	which	in	turn	has	implications	
for	coordination	requirements.	Indeed,	
changes	on	the	part	of	one	producer	aimed	
at	improving	a	habitat	or	reducing	erosion	in	
a	watershed	are	unlikely	to	be	sufficient	to	
provide	these	environmental	services,	unless	
the	producer	controls	a	large	proportion	
of	the	land	and	water	resources	important	
for	the	service	provision.	This	means	that	
considering	change	at	a	landscape	level	
is	as	important	as	it	is	at	the	scale	of	the	
individual	production	unit.	It	also	means	that	
the	effectiveness	of	any	given	change	may	
depend	critically	on	coordinating	the	actions	
of	a	number	of	producers.
Table	4	(pp.	30–31)	summarizes	a	set	of	
management	changes	agricultural	producers	
can	implement	to	increase	the	supply	of	
the	three	environmental	services	under	
discussion.	It	presents	them	in	the	context	
also	of	the	associated	landscape-level	
management	and	the	degree	of	coordination	
among	producers	required	for	effective	
supply.
Technical versus economic 
potential to supply environmental 
services
The	preceding	sections	have	discussed	the	
technical	potential	for	agriculture	to	provide	
environmental	services.	This,	essentially,	tells	
us	how	much	of	an	environmental	service	
farmers	could provide,	but	it	is	important	to	
recognize	that	this	is	not	the	same	as	what	
they	are likely to provide	in	the	absence	
of	additional	incentives.	The	distinction	
corresponds	to	the	difference	between	
the	technical	and	economic	potential	for	
supplying	environmental	services.	
of	landscape	aesthetics	services.	These	
roles	range	from	bringing	or	maintaining	
specific	areas	or	landscapes	under	
agricultural	production	to	managing	lands	
under	agricultural	production.	Farmers	
may	not	necessarily	take	into	account	that	
their	land	may	provide	rural	amenities	
when	managing	and	deciding	how	to	
develop	it.	Indeed,	in	several	developed	
countries,	the	provision	of	rural	amenities	
is	one	of	the	main	motivations	behind	
the	implementation	of	various	publicly	
funded	farmland	protection	programmes	
(Nickerson	and	Hellerstein,	2003).
There	is	an	increasing	private	market	for	
landscape	aesthetics	services.	Ecotourism	
is	growing	rapidly,	driven	by	higher	
incomes	around	the	world,	increasing	ease	
and	falling	cost	of	travel	and	expanding	
information.	World	tourism	spending	is	
expected	to	grow	over	6	percent	per	year	
(UNWTO,	1998,	as	referenced	in	Hawkins	
and	Lamoureux,	2001)	and	is	increasingly	
focusing	on	natural	environments.	
The	overall	size	of	the	market	for	
the	landscape	aesthetics	and	recreation	
services	that	agricultural	landscapes	
provide	seems	likely	to	remain	smaller.	
Payments	to	farming	communities	are	
likely	to	be	limited	to	those	living	in	
or	adjacent	to	areas	of	high	tourist	
attraction.	In	many	developed	countries,	a	
sector	of	the	tourism	industry	has	formed	
around	pastoral,	agrarian	landscapes	and	
the	aesthetics	and	activities	they	offer,	but	
a	comparable	industry	has	not	yet	formed	
in	developing	countries.	
The	most	important	buyers	of	landscape	
aesthetics	and	recreational	services	are	
likely	to	be	private	tour	operators	and	
related	businesses,	either	directly	or	in	
aggregate	groups	working	in	a	particular	
area	of	high	scenic	aesthetics.	Private	
recreational	hunters	and	fishers	and	
private	park	visitors	could	also	become	
buyers	of	landscape	aesthetics	and	
recreation	services.	There	are	many	models	
now	for	using	public	park	visitor	fees	to	
benefit	community	groups	who	protect	
landscape	and	recreational	values.	Some	
of	these	models	could	become	significant	
in	the	future.	
BOX	3
landscape aesthetics
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TAblE 4
Management options and coordination requirements for three environmental services
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crop	species/varietal	
diversity	
Natural	area	
networks	in	and	
around	farms,	
public	and	
private	protected	
areas	
Moderate
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For	example,	from	a	purely	technical	
perspective,	improved	land	management	
over	the	next	50–100	years	could	
theoretically	make	a	major	contribution	to	
global	carbon	sequestration.	Thus,	Lal	(2000)	
has	estimated	that	the	annual	increase	in	
atmospheric	carbon	dioxide	concentration	
could	be	balanced	out	by	the	restoration	
of	2	billion	hectares	of	degraded	lands	to	
increase	their	average	carbon	content	by	
1.5	tonnes	per	hectare	in	soils	and	vegetation	
through	improved	soil	management	practices	
such	as	reduced	tillage	and	fertilization	(see	
also	Rasmussen,	Albrecht	and	Smiley,	1998;	
Sa	et al.,	2001).	However,	the	actual	amount	
of	carbon	sequestration	that	farmers	will	
supply	depends	on	how	much	they	will	be	
paid	for	the	soil	carbon	and	on	the	costs	
they	would	bear	in	supplying	it.	Economic	
studies	undertaken	in	the	United	States	of	
America	show	that,	at	carbon	prices	in	the	
range	of	US$50–100	per	tonne,	the	economic	
potential	falls	far	below	the	technical	
potential	(Lewandrowski	et al.,	2004;	
Paustian	et al.,	2006).
The	economic	potential	for	supplying	
environmental	services	is	a	critical	criterion	
when	assessing	the	effectiveness	of	
payments	for	environmental	services	in	
increasing	the	economic	and	environmental	
benefits	available	from	agro-ecosystems.	
As	stated	in	the	opening	paragraphs	of	this	
chapter,	this	potential	is	a	function	of	the	
conditions	of	the	agricultural	economy	in	
question.	Population	density,	agro-ecological	
conditions,	level	of	market	integration	and	
primary	technology	employed	in	agriculture	
are	all	important	determinants	of	the	current	
returns	to	land	and	labour	in	agriculture	
and	the	potential	costs	and	benefits	of	
introducing	changes	that	would	generate	
additional	environmental	services.	These	
same	factors	also	affect	the	level	of	economic	
development	and	thus	the	demand	and	
willingness	to	pay	for	environmental	services	
at	the	local	level.
EnvIRonMEnTAl SERvICE
FARM-lEvEl 
MAnAGEMEnT oPTIonS
lAnDSCAPE-lEvEl 
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DEGREE oF
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REQUIRED1
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Connectivity	for		
mobile	species	
Farm	hedgerows,	
windbreaks,	removal	of	
impenetrable	barriers
Natural	area	
networks	in	and	
around	farms
Moderate
to	
high
Protection	of	threatened	
ecological	communities
Restoration	or	protection	
of	farm	patches	of	
natural	habitat
Maintenance	
of	corridors	
connecting	
natural	habitat	
fragments	
through	farm	
and	other	lands
Moderate
to		
high
Protection	of	wild	species Elimination	of	threats	
from	toxic	chemicals,	
breeding	area	protection,	
non-lethal	pest	control	
practices
Barriers	to	
exclude	wildlife	
from	farmlands,	
compensation	
to	farmers	for	
wildlife	damage	
to	stocks	and	
crops
Low
to	
moderate
Protection	of	habitat	for	
aquatic	species
Prevention	of	waterway	
pollution	by	crop	and	
livestock	wastes	and	
agrichemicals,	protection		
or	restoration	of	on-farm	
wetlands
Natural	
revegetation	
along	stream	
banks,	
protection	or	
restoration	of	
wetlands
Low
to	
moderate
1	Reasons	for	coordinated	action	may	include	the	need	for	collective	investments	(e.g.	to	establish	a	community-wide	
windbreak),	the	indivisibility	of	investment	(e.g.	to	restore	a	major	gully),	or	the	need	for	spatial	coordination	to	
produce	the	desired	outcome	(e.g.	the	re-establishment	of	riparian	vegetation	would	only	produce	higher	water	quality	
if	all	landowners	along	the	waterway	participate).
Source:	adapted	from	FAO,	2007c.	
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Conclusions
Agriculture	has	the	potential	to	increase	
significantly	the	provision	of	environmental	
services	such	as	climate	change	mitigation,	
biodiversity	conservation,	watershed	
protection	and	others,	but	this	will	
require	changes	in	the	way	in	which	
agro-ecosystems	are	managed.	How	
environmental	services	can	be	generated	
varies	by	the	service,	the	type	of	production	
system	and	the	agro-ecological	context.	
The	types	of	change	needed	to	enhance	the	
provision	of	ecosystem	services	range	from	
shifts	in	land	or	water	use	(e.g.	out	of	crops	
or	fishing	and	into	less	intensive	uses	such	
as	grasslands	or	forests)	to	changes	within	a	
given	production	system	(e.g.	the	adoption	
of	farming	systems	that	provide	higher	
levels	of	environmental	services).	
The	biophysical	processes	involved	in	
different	ecosystem	services	have	significant	
implications	for	policy	responses.	For	
example,	there	are	no	geographic	limits	for	
carbon	emission	reductions	or	mitigation;	
a	tonne	of	carbon	sequestered	by	a	poor	
farmer	hundreds	of	miles	from	any	road	
has	exactly	the	same	value	as	a	tonne	
sequestered	by	a	commercial	plantation	
near	the	capital	city.	In	contrast,	biodiversity	
conservation	and	watershed	protection	
services	are	generally	location-specific,	with	
the	former	providing	global	benefits	and	the	
latter	being	primarily	of	interest	to	local	and	
regional	users.	
Synergies	often	exist	between	the	
provision	of	different	ecosystem	services.	
Production	practices	adopted	to	enhance	
one	ecosystem	service	may	enhance	others	
at	the	same	time.	For	example,	increasing	
soil	carbon	sequestration	through	the	
adoption	of	conservation	agriculture	can	
have	beneficial	implications	not	only	for	
climate	change	mitigation	and	water	quality	
but	also	for	the	provisioning	services	of	
food	production.	However,	there	are	often	
trade-offs	between	the	delivery	of	different	
ecosystem	services,	which	are	important	to	
understand.	
This	chapter	has	focused	on	the	technical	
potential	of	agriculture	to	supply	enhanced	
levels	of	environmental	services.	Whether	
the	necessary	changes	are	economically	
feasible	is	central	to	determining	if	they	can	
be	achieved	and	what	level	of	payments	
would	be	required	to	realize	them.	The	
next	chapter	takes	up	the	issue	of	demand	
for	environmental	services:	who	would	pay	
for	environmental	services,	why	would	they	
pay	for	them	and	how	much	would	they	be	
willing	to	pay?	
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3.	 Demand	for	environmental	
services
Several	forces	are	stimulating	a	growth	
in	demand	and	willingness	to	pay	for	
environmental	services.	Public	awareness	
of	the	value	of	environmental	services	and	
the	costs	of	their	depletion	is	growing	and	
information	on	the	issues	is	becoming	more	
widely	available.	
Environmental	and,	to	some	extent,	health	
regulations	are	an	important	outcome	
of	this	trend	and	are	major	drivers	of	the	
willingness	to	pay	for	environmental	services.	
Individuals	and	firms	are	ready	to	pay	for	
such	services	when	they	provide	a	low-
cost	way	of	complying	with	a	regulation.	
In	the	early	1990s,	for	example,	the	city	of	
New	York	in	the	United	States	of	America	
concluded	that	the	least-expensive	means	of	
meeting	water	quality	standards	for	the	city’s	
water	supply	was	through	paying	farmers	
in	the	upper	reaches	of	the	watershed	to	
change	their	agricultural	practices	(Box	4).	
Similarly,	payments	for	carbon	sequestration	
are	largely	driven	by	regulations	at	the	
international,	national	and	subnational	levels	
limiting	carbon	emissions	and	creating	a	
market	for	offsets.	
Payments	for	environmental	services	
beyond	the	regulatory	requirements	are	
also	emerging.	When	the	value	of	wetlands	
outside	New	Orleans	in	the	United	States	
of	America	became	clear	in	the	aftermath	
of	Hurricane	Katrina,	the	state	of	Louisiana	
started	directing	funds	towards	coastal	
wetlands	restoration,	reversing	former	
policies	that	had	actually	degraded	
wetlands	(Verchick,	2007).	Consumers	also	
have	shown	a	marked	willingness	to	pay	
for	environmental	services	through	their	
purchases	of	ecolabelled	products.	Swallow	
et	al.	(2007b)	identify	three	important	links	
between	flexible	and	regulatory	approaches	
to	environmental	governance:	
•	 New	environmental	regulations	that	
allow	flexibility	in	the	approach	to	
compliance	create	institutional	space	for	
public	utilities,	local	governments	and	
private	firms	to	innovate	with	regard	
to	PES	activities.
•	 Firms	or	industry	groups	may	actively	
promote	PES	schemes	as	a	way	of	
demonstrating	commitment	to	the	
environment	in	order	to	forestall	
environmental	regulations.	
•	 Firms	may	seek	to	establish	or	illustrate	
best	practice	in	environmental	
management	as	a	way	of	influencing	
the	shape	of	future	environmental	
regulation.	
Most	PES	programmes	are	funded	by	
the	public	sector.	However,	the	private	
sector	is	increasingly	becoming	involved	in	
purchasing	environmental	services.	A	recent	
survey	identified	more	than	100	types	of	
private	environmental	service	payment	
programmes	–	with	a	relatively	even	
distribution	across	the	domains	of	carbon	
sequestration,	water	and	biodiversity	–	and	
an	estimated	number	of	transactions	
totalling	more	than	1	100	(FAO/Forest	Trends,	
2007).
This	chapter	examines	the	basis	for	the	
demand	for	environmental	services	and	the	
differences	between	public-	and	private-
sector	programmes.4	It	then	examines	the	
current	market	situation	for	three	major	
services:	carbon	sequestration,	watershed	
management	and	biodiversity	conservation.	
value and beneficiaries of 
environmental services
To	understand	the	basis	for	payments	
for	environmental	services	provided	by	
agriculture,	it	is	first	necessary	to	look	at	the	
benefits	they	generate	and	to	whom	they	
accrue.	
 The chapter draws heavily on FAO, 007c.  
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valuing environmental services
For	traded	commodities	and	services,	market	
prices	indicate	the	value	at	which	buyers	
and	sellers	agree	to	exchange	them.	For	
many	environmental	services,	however,	
market	prices	do	not	exist,	so	quantifying	
their	importance	or	estimating	their	value	
is	difficult.	Information	is	lacking	regarding	
the	underlying	process	that	results	in	
environmental	services	and	their	implications	
for	human	well-being.	In	many	cases,	the	
benefits	may	be	uncertain	and	may	occur	
only	in	the	future,	if	at	all.	A	common	
approach	to	estimating	environmental	values	
is	the	“total	economic	value”	concept,	which	
encapsulates	the	full	range	of	economic	
values.	that	people	attach	to	each	type	of	
land	use.5	
5 See, for example, Pearce, 993; Johansson, 990; Barbier, 
989; Pearce and Turner, 990; Munasinghe and Lutz, 
993; Ayres and Dixon, 995; Kumari, 995; Adger et al., 
995; Hearne, 996; Andersen, 997; Markandya et al., 
00. 
•	 Direct use values	are	those	derived	
from	marketed	goods	or	services	that	
normally	involve	private	benefits,	such	
as	commodities,	timber,	fuelwood,	
non-timber	forest	products,	recreation,	
education	and	tourism.	These	also	
generally	correspond	to	the	Millennium	
Ecosystem	Assessment’s	category	
of	provisioning	services.	Valuation	
of	these	types	of	service	is	usually	
straightforward.	
•	 Indirect use values	refer	to	benefits	
that	people	derive	indirectly	from	the	
“ecological	functions”	performed,	such	
as	watershed	protection,	fire	prevention,	
water	recycling,	carbon	sequestration,	
biodiversity	conservation,	and	pest	
and	disease	resistance.	Environmental	
services	often	fall	into	the	latter	
category	of	benefits,	which	relate	to	
the	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment’s	
categories	of	regulating	and	supporting	
services.	
Two	well-known	cases	of	payments	for	
environmental	services	in	the	area	of	
water	quality	from	India	and	the	United	
States	of	America	illustrate	the	importance	
of	assessing	both	demand	and	supply.	
The	small	village	of	Sukhomajri	in	India	
provides	an	early	and	complex	example	of	
watershed	development	that	has	helped	
inspire	modern	watershed	development	
programmes.	In	the	1970s,	high	rates	
of	sedimentation	in	Lake	Sukhna	in	
the	northern	Indian	state	of	Haryana	
created	problems	for	the	drinking	water	
supply	of	the	nearby	town	of	Chandigarh	
(Kerr,	2002).	Recreational	benefits	were	
threatened	also.	The	source	of	the	
problem	was	traced	to	a	small	upstream	
village	named	Sukhomajri,	where	villagers	
were	cultivating	steep	lands	and	allowing	
animals	to	graze	freely	throughout	the	
watershed.	Around	80–90	percent	of	the	
sedimentation	in	Lake	Sukhna	was	found	
to	originate	from	Sukhomajri	(Sengupta	
et al.,	2003).	The	Sukhomajri	farmers’	
agricultural	practices	were	not	only	felt	
downstream;	runoff	water	on	one	side	of	
the	watershed	also	flooded	and	destroyed	
agricultural	lands	in	the	village	itself.	
A	central	government	agency,	the	
Central	Soil	and	Water	Conservation	
Research	and	Training	Institute	(CSWCRTI)	
revegetated	the	watersheds	and	installed	
conservation	structures	such	as	check	
dams	and	gully	plugs	to	stop	the	flow	
of	silt.	Villagers	were	asked	to	refrain	
from	allowing	grazing	animals	into	the	
watersheds.	Benefits	to	the	villagers	
were	twofold:	not	only	reduced	damage	
to	agricultural	lands,	but	also	access	to	
irrigation	water	stored	by	the	check	
dams.	Although	no	direct	payments	
were	involved,	the	villagers	were	thus	
indirectly	compensated	for	providing	the	
environmental	service.	At	the	time	of	the	
project	implementation,	the	notion	of	
markets	for	environmental	services	was	
little	known,	but	in	effect	the	project	
functioned	as	an	environmental	services	
payment	scheme.	A	drawback	was	that	
only	a	minority	of	landowners	in	the	
village	benefited	from	the	scheme;	
other	villagers,	particularly	the	landless,	
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stood	to	lose	from	reduced	access	to	
grazing	lands.	The	problem	was	solved	
by	distributing	rights	to	the	water	to	
all	villagers	and	allowing	them	to	trade	
among	themselves	–	a	system	that	was	
later	abandoned	in	favour	of	user	fees	for	
water.	The	project	resulted	in	a	95	percent	
decrease	in	siltation	into	Lake	Sukhna,	
saving	the	town	of	Chandigarh	about	
US$200	000	annually	(Kerr,	2002).
In	the	second	case,	which	was	initiated	
in	the	early	1990s,	a	combination	of	
federal	regulations	and	cost	realities	in	the	
United	States	of	America	drove	New	York	
City	to	reconsider	its	water	supply	strategy.	
Municipal	and	other	water	suppliers	were	
required	to	filter	their	surface	water	
supplies	unless	they	could	demonstrate	
that	they	had	taken	other	steps,	including	
watershed	protection	measures,	to	protect	
their	customers	from	harmful	water	
contamination.	Ninety	percent	of	the	New	
York	City	water	supply	is	drawn	from	a	
watershed	that	extends	200	km	north	and	
west	of	the	city.	City	authorities	concluded	
that	managing	land	use	in	the	watershed	
was	more	cost-effective	than	building	a	
filtration	plant.	A	filtration	plant	would	
have	cost	US$6–8	billion.	Watershed	
protection	efforts,	including	not	only	the	
acquisition	of	critical	watershed	lands	
but	also	payments	to	farmers	to	change	
practices	so	as	to	reduce	contamination	
sources	in	the	watershed,	would	have	
cost	only	about	US$1.5	billion	and	
would	have	provided	the	same	level	of	
water	quality.	New	York	City	chose	to	
invest	in	natural	rather	than	produced	
capital.	Farms	that	opt	to	participate	
in	the	Watershed	Agricultural	Program	
receive	technical	assistance	in	designing	a	
strategy	for	controlling	potential	sources	
of	pollution	on	the	farm,	with	New	York	
City	covering	all	costs	associated	with	the	
implementation,	and	become	eligible	
for	other	elements	of	the	compensation	
package	for	specific	environmental	
services	(Rosa	et al.,	2003).
Source:	FAO,	2007d.
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•	option values	are	based	on	the	benefit	
of	preserving	the	possibility	of	future	
direct	or	indirect	use.	They	represent	the	
insurance	premium	people	are	willing	
to	pay	today	to	secure	environmental	
services	in	the	future.	Much	of	the	
importance	of	biodiversity	conservation	
lies	in	option	values:	preserving	
ecosystems,	species	and	genes	for	
potential	future	use.	
•	 non-use values	are	benefits	that	are	
totally	unrelated	to	any	personal	use	
of	an	ecosystem.	Individuals	may	value	
environmental	services	without	ever	
actually	deriving	any	use	value	from	
them.	Benefits	in	this	category	include	
the	value	of	knowing	that	an	ecosystem	
exists	and	will	be	conserved	for	
future	generations,	as	do	securing	the	
survival	and	well-being	of	biodiversity,	
endangered	species	and	habitats	(FAO,	
2004c).	They	are	also	referred	to	as	
existence	values.
Precisely	because	markets	do	not	exist	for	
many	environmental	services,	estimating	
their	value	is	difficult.	If	society	has	decided	
that	an	environmental	service	is	worth	
protecting	(or	enhancing),	even	without	
a	precise	estimate	of	its	monetary	value,	
other	methods	–	such	as	environmental	
benefits	indices	–	can	be	used	to	prioritize	
spending	in	such	programmes.	These	
methods	are	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	
Chapter	5.
Identifying beneficiaries
Who	actually	benefits	from	these	different	
forms	of	value	from	environmental	services?	
The	benefits	from	environmental	services	
occur	at	local,	regional	and	global	levels.	
They	may	occur	immediately,	after	a	few	
years	or	well	into	the	future.	Establishing	
where	and	when	the	benefits	from	
environmental	services	occur	is	fundamental	
to	understanding	the	basis	of	demand	
and	payments	for	them.	Table	5	provides	a	
Two	well-known	cases	of	payments	for	
environmental	services	in	the	area	of	
water	quality	from	India	and	the	United	
States	of	America	illustrate	the	importance	
of	assessing	both	demand	and	supply.	
The	small	village	of	Sukhomajri	in	India	
provides	an	early	and	complex	example	of	
watershed	development	that	has	helped	
inspire	modern	watershed	development	
programmes.	In	the	1970s,	high	rates	
of	sedimentation	in	Lake	Sukhna	in	
the	northern	Indian	state	of	Haryana	
created	problems	for	the	drinking	water	
supply	of	the	nearby	town	of	Chandigarh	
(Kerr,	2002).	Recreational	benefits	were	
threatened	also.	The	source	of	the	
problem	was	traced	to	a	small	upstream	
village	named	Sukhomajri,	where	villagers	
were	cultivating	steep	lands	and	allowing	
animals	to	graze	freely	throughout	the	
watershed.	Around	80–90	percent	of	the	
sedimentation	in	Lake	Sukhna	was	found	
to	originate	from	Sukhomajri	(Sengupta	
et al.,	2003).	The	Sukhomajri	farmers’	
agricultural	practices	were	not	only	felt	
downstream;	runoff	water	on	one	side	of	
the	watershed	also	flooded	and	destroyed	
agricultural	lands	in	the	village	itself.	
A	central	government	agency,	the	
Central	Soil	and	Water	Conservation	
Research	and	Training	Institute	(CSWCRTI)	
revegetated	the	watersheds	and	installed	
conservation	structures	such	as	check	
dams	and	gully	plugs	to	stop	the	flow	
of	silt.	Villagers	were	asked	to	refrain	
from	allowing	grazing	animals	into	the	
watersheds.	Benefits	to	the	villagers	
were	twofold:	not	only	reduced	damage	
to	agricultural	lands,	but	also	access	to	
irrigation	water	stored	by	the	check	
dams.	Although	no	direct	payments	
were	involved,	the	villagers	were	thus	
indirectly	compensated	for	providing	the	
environmental	service.	At	the	time	of	the	
project	implementation,	the	notion	of	
markets	for	environmental	services	was	
little	known,	but	in	effect	the	project	
functioned	as	an	environmental	services	
payment	scheme.	A	drawback	was	that	
only	a	minority	of	landowners	in	the	
village	benefited	from	the	scheme;	
other	villagers,	particularly	the	landless,	
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stood	to	lose	from	reduced	access	to	
grazing	lands.	The	problem	was	solved	
by	distributing	rights	to	the	water	to	
all	villagers	and	allowing	them	to	trade	
among	themselves	–	a	system	that	was	
later	abandoned	in	favour	of	user	fees	for	
water.	The	project	resulted	in	a	95	percent	
decrease	in	siltation	into	Lake	Sukhna,	
saving	the	town	of	Chandigarh	about	
US$200	000	annually	(Kerr,	2002).
In	the	second	case,	which	was	initiated	
in	the	early	1990s,	a	combination	of	
federal	regulations	and	cost	realities	in	the	
United	States	of	America	drove	New	York	
City	to	reconsider	its	water	supply	strategy.	
Municipal	and	other	water	suppliers	were	
required	to	filter	their	surface	water	
supplies	unless	they	could	demonstrate	
that	they	had	taken	other	steps,	including	
watershed	protection	measures,	to	protect	
their	customers	from	harmful	water	
contamination.	Ninety	percent	of	the	New	
York	City	water	supply	is	drawn	from	a	
watershed	that	extends	200	km	north	and	
west	of	the	city.	City	authorities	concluded	
that	managing	land	use	in	the	watershed	
was	more	cost-effective	than	building	a	
filtration	plant.	A	filtration	plant	would	
have	cost	US$6–8	billion.	Watershed	
protection	efforts,	including	not	only	the	
acquisition	of	critical	watershed	lands	
but	also	payments	to	farmers	to	change	
practices	so	as	to	reduce	contamination	
sources	in	the	watershed,	would	have	
cost	only	about	US$1.5	billion	and	
would	have	provided	the	same	level	of	
water	quality.	New	York	City	chose	to	
invest	in	natural	rather	than	produced	
capital.	Farms	that	opt	to	participate	
in	the	Watershed	Agricultural	Program	
receive	technical	assistance	in	designing	a	
strategy	for	controlling	potential	sources	
of	pollution	on	the	farm,	with	New	York	
City	covering	all	costs	associated	with	the	
implementation,	and	become	eligible	
for	other	elements	of	the	compensation	
package	for	specific	environmental	
services	(Rosa	et al.,	2003).
Source:	FAO,	2007d.
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TAblE 5
Indirect, option, and non-use values associated with environmental services 
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rough	categorization	of	the	benefits	from	
environmental	services,	grouped	according	
to	scale	and	type	of	value.	
Who are the potential buyers?
Owing	to	their	nature,	environmental	
services	are	not	easily	packaged	and	traded,	
and	in	many	cases	their	benefits	will	occur	
mostly	in	the	future.	Many	environmental	
services	take	the	form	of	public	goods	(see	
Box	2	on	p.	14).	Coordination	of	purchasers	
of	public	goods	is	required	in	order	to	
overcome	problems	of	“free-riders”	(those	
who	benefit	from	the	service	without	paying	
for	it).	Moreover,	the	actual	purchaser	of	an	
environmental	service	is	often	not	the	same	
as	the	beneficiary	(see	Table	6).	In	many	
cases,	the	purchaser	is	the	public	sector,	
acting	on	behalf	of	individual	beneficiaries.	
However,	there	are	also	other	intermediaries	
who	coordinate	purchases	for	environmental	
services,	including	non-governmental	
organizations	(NGOs)	and	product		
certifiers.
Public-sector funding of PES 
programmes
Public-sector	funding	for	agriculture	is	
the	most	frequent	source	of	funds	for	PES	
programmes,	whether	it	is	the	Grain	for	
Green	programme	in	China	(see	Box	17	
on	p.	83),	the	CRP	in	the	United	States	of	
America	(see	Box	5	on	p.	38),	Costa	Rica’s	
Payments	for	Environmental	Services	
programme	(see	Box	16	on	p.	81)	or	
Brazil’s	Programme	of	Socio-environmental	
Development	of	the	Rural	Family	Production,	
known	as	Proambiente	(May	et al.,	2004).	
Usually,	public-sector	programmes	do	not	
have	a	direct	link	between	buyers	and	
sellers;	instead,	governments	use	general	
tax	revenues	or	external	funds	such	as	
those	provided	as	overseas	development	
assistance.	In	some	cases,	however,	revenues	
are	generated	by	earmarking	a	share	of	
taxes	or	fees	charged	to	some	users	of	the	
services,	such	as	the	water	fee	in	Mexico	
(Muñoz-Piña	et al.,	2005),	or	the	South	
African	“water	resource	management	fee”	
included	in	the	water	charges,	to	cover	part	
of	the	costs	of	clearing	“thirsty”	invasive	
alien	plants	(see	Box	22	on	p.	97)	(Turpie	and	
Blignaut,	2005).
International	public-sector	funding	is	
also	an	important	source	of	finance	for	PES	
programmes	in	developing	countries.	One	
key	player	is	the	GEF,	which	has	co-funded	
several	PES	projects	in	developing	countries	
(see	Box	6	on	p.	39).	GEF	payments	can	
reasonably	be	considered	as	payments	from	
service	users,	in	that	the	global	community	
(through	the	Convention	on	Biodiversity	
Conservation	and	the	United	Nations	
Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	
[UNFCCC])	has	empowered	the	GEF	to	act	
on	its	behalf	in	conserving	global	public	
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goods	(Pagiola	and	Platais,	2007).	The	
BioCarbon	Fund	provides	an	example	of	an	
international	source	of	payments	for	carbon	
emission	offsets	from	land-use	change	that	
includes	payments	for	activities	allowable	
under	the	Kyoto	Protocol	(see	p.	41),	such	as	
reforestation	and	afforestation,	as	well	as	a	
broader	menu	of	options	for	offsets,	such	as	
soil	carbon	sequestration.
Overseas	development	assistance	in	
the	form	of	loans	and	grants	has	also	
been	a	significant	source	of	funds	for	PES	
programmes.	Loans	from	the	World	Bank	
have	financed	some	of	the	most	well-
established	PES	programmes,	such	as	the	
Costa	Rican	and	Mexican	national	PES	
programmes.	The	critical	role	played	by	
these	projects	has	centred	on	helping	both	
countries	develop	new,	sustainable	sources	
of	finance	from	water	users,	the	tourism	
industry	and	carbon	buyers	to	improve	
programme	efficiency	and	to	support	the	
participation	of	poorer	landholders.
Private-sector purchasers of 
environmental services
The	private	sector	is	playing	an	increasingly	
active	role	in	payment	programmes	in	
developing	countries.	Their	motivation	
for	paying	to	promote	environmental	
service	provision	includes	concerns	about	
maximizing	sales	to	environmentally	aware	
consumers	and	pressures	from	shareholders	
and	consumers	for	greater	corporate	social	
responsibility.	
Examples	of	private-sector	programmes	
include	payments	for	voluntary	carbon	
sequestration	and	biodiversity	conservation,	
payments	through	intermediaries	such	as	
NGOs	for	the	adoption	of	conservation	
practices,	private	purchases	of	water	quality	
services	and	involvement	in	ecolabelling	
initiatives,	including	ecotourism.	It	is	
estimated	that	around	100	megatonnes	
of	carbon	have	been	sequestered	through	
voluntary	payments	to	landowners,	many	of	
whom	are	in	developing	countries	(Bayon,	
Hawn	and	Hamilton,	2007).	Some	companies	
engaged	in	land	development	in	developing	
TAblE 6
Environmental services and examples of buyers 
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countries	are	voluntarily	offsetting	the	
negative	effects	of	their	activities	on	local	
biodiversity	by	restoring	and	enhancing	
habitat	elsewhere.6	
Consumers	of	ecolabelled	products	
represent	a	further	source	of	private-
sector	payments.	The	Forest	Stewardship	
Council	(FSC),	which	sets	standards	for	
6 For more detailed discussion of the potential for 
biodiversity offsets see http://www.forest-trends.org/
biodiversityoffsetprogram.
sustainable	forest	management,	and	the	
Marine	Stewardship	Council	(see	Box	21	
on	p.	92),	which	provides	standards	for	
sustainable	fisheries,	are	two	notable	sources	
of	product	certification.	Both	accredit	
independent	certification	bodies	to	carry	
out	certification.	In	both	cases,	certification	
requires	a	management	system	that	
generates	environmental	services,	particularly	
biodiversity	conservation,	as	well	as	fish	
and	forest	products.	In	the	case	of	the	FSC,	
the	global	extent	of	certified	forest	area	
Created	in	1985,	the	United	States	
Conservation	Reserve	Program	(CRP)	
is	the	largest	payment	scheme	for	
environmental	services	in	the	world,	
providing	annual	rental	payments	and	
sharing	the	cost	of	conservation	practices	
on	farmland.	First	created	to	address	
problems	of	soil	erosion	and	to	support	
farm	incomes	at	a	time	of	declining	crop	
prices,	the	programme	has	grown	over	
the	years	and	now	pays	for	land-use	
changes	that	promote	water	quality	and	
wildlife	habitat,	as	well.	Annual	payments	
exceed	US$1.4	billion	for	activities	on	over	
32	million	acres	(approximately	13	million	
hectares)	(USDA,	2007).	
CRP	contracts	extend	from	10	to	
15	years.	To	be	eligible	for	CRP	support,	
farmland	must	have	been	planted	in	two	
of	the	five	most	recent	crop	years	and	
meet	a	set	of	requirements	to	ensure	
it	can	provide	services.	The	land	must	
be	physically	and	legally	capable	of	
growing	an	agricultural	commodity	or	
constitute	marginal	pastureland	suitable	
for	planting	as	a	riparian	buffer.	In	
addition,	the	land	must	present	some	
sensitive	environmental	characteristics,	
such	as	being	highly	erodible	or	a	cropped	
wetland.
Farmers	wishing	to	enrol	in	the	
CRP	have	their	offers	ranked	by	
government	field	officers	according	to	an	
Environmental	Benefits	Index	(EBI)	that	
includes	such	elements	as	erodibility,	as	
well	as	wildlife	habitat	or	water	quality	
benefits.	Farmers	who	are	selected	
for	enrolment	receive	annual	rental	
payments	(averaging	US$49	per	acre	in	
2006),	as	well	as	cost-share	payments	
to	establish	approved	vegetative	cover.	
Topsoil	loss	on	CRP	land	is	estimated	to	
have	been	greatly	reduced,	and	benefits	
to	water	quality,	wildlife	and	recreation	
have	also	been	significant	(Sullivan	et al.,	
2004).
Despite	CRP’s	achievements,	critics	
have	raised	several	concerns.	First,	land	
withdrawn	from	crop	production	in	
the	CRP	may	be	partially	offset	by	land	
brought	into	production	elsewhere,	
although	the	precise	magnitude	is	
difficult	to	determine	(Roberts	and	
Bucholtz,	2006).	Second,	concerns	
have	been	expressed	about	fairness,	
in	that	participating	farmers	are	paid	
to	adopt	practices	that	other	farmers	
may	have	adopted	voluntarily	(without	
compensation).	Finally,	concerns	have	
been	raised	about	cost-effectiveness,	
as	it	is	possible	for	owners	of	land	with	
substantial	environmental	benefits	
(as	reflected	in	a	high	EBI),	but	low	
agricultural	productivity,	to	qualify	for	
CRP	payments	well	above	what	they	
would	be	willing	to	accept,	in	view	of	
the	low	returns	they	would	have	were	
they	to	keep	that	land	in	production	
(Kirwan,	Lubowski	and	Roberts,	2005).	
Considerations	in	programme	design	
to	address	these	concerns	are	discussed	
further	in	Chapter	5.
BOX	5
The United States Conservation Reserve Program
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is	small,	accounting	for	only	7	percent	of	
total	global	forest	area,	and	most	is	located	
in	developed	countries.	Certification	has	
so	far	focused	on	public	and	large	private	
forests.	It	can	represent	an	additional	cost	
that	poorer	countries	and	smaller	producers	
find	difficult	to	meet	and	thus	they	may	be	
disadvantaged.	Nevertheless,	although	both	
the	demand	for,	and	supply	of,	certified	
products	is	concentrated	primarily	in	
developed	countries,	some	growth	in	supply	
is	also	beginning	to	occur	in	developing	
countries.	For	example,	Argentina	and	China	
rank	second	and	third	in	the	world	for	their	
areas	of	certified	organic	land,	while	virtually	
all	Rainforest	Alliance	certified	crops	are	
grown	in	Latin	America	(P.	Liu,	personal	
communication,	2007).
Considerable	diversity	exists	in	the	
certification	of	agricultural	crop	commodities	
in	terms	of	products	covered	and	types	of	
environmental	benefits	associated	with	the	
standard.	Organic	agriculture	is	the	largest	
certified	product	market	in	agriculture,	with	
over	31	million	hectares	currently	certified	
as	organic	and	a	market	value	of	25.5	billion	
euros	in	2005	(IFOAM,	2007).	Most	types	of	
organic	certification	are	not	directly	tied	
to	a	specific	environmental	service,	and	
evidence	on	the	net	environmental	benefits	
remains	mixed.	They	are	based	on	criteria	
linked	to	environmental	management	and	
thus	could	be	considered	a	form	of	payment	
for	environmental	service.	While	many	
types	of	certified	product	programmes	exist,	
and	they	are	increasing	in	number,	there	is	
considerable	fragmentation	in	the	range	of	
crops	and	environmental	services	receiving	
attention.	Rainforest	Alliance	certification	
for	example,	encompasses	coffee,	cocoa,	
fruits	and	flowers	and	requires	ecosystem	
management,	wildlife	protection	and	the	
protection	of	waterways.	The	Biodiversity	
and	Wine	Initiative	in	South	Africa	(see	
Box	7)	certifies	vineyards	that	implement	
practices	aimed	at	conserving	biodiversity.	
Finally,	examples	exist	of	environmental	
services	that	are	provided	to	discrete	
beneficiaries.	In	such	cases, individual	
private	PES	buyers	may	be	willing	to	pay	
Over	the	early	2000s,	the	Global	
Environment	Facility	(GEF)	has	built	a	
portfolio	of	22	projects	that	have	some	
elements	of	an	environmental	services	
payments	programme.	The	cumulative	
budget	for	these	programmes	is	
somewhat	less	than	3	percent	of	GEF	
cumulative	investments.	Most	of	the	
projects’	total	budgets	are	in	the	range	
of	US$25–100	million.	Almost	all	projects	
are	part	of	the	GEF	biodiversity	portfolio	
and	are	heavily	concentrated	in	the	
Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	region.	
The	ecosystem	services	they	provide	
include	all	those	discussed	in	this	report.	
Thus	far,	GEF’s	role	in	the	payments	for	
environmental	services	arena	has	been	
small,	but	important	in	several	ways:	
acting	as	the	glue	for	other	institutions	to	
participate;	increasing	incentives	for	the	
recipient	country;	bringing	in	funds	for	
institutional	development	and	capacity	
building;	promoting	new	ideas	and	
approaches.	
The	current	GEF	payments	for	
environmental	services	portfolio	is	largely	
focused	on	protection	of	natural	forests	
and	management	of	protected	areas.	
Many	projects	anticipate	the	growth	
of	international	markets	for	biocarbon	
sequestration	and	avoided	deforestation	
for	future	funding.	Others	hope	to	find	
local	buyers	for	watershed	protection	
services.	Current	payers	are	always	the	
national	government	or	international	
donors,	both	bilateral	and	GEF.	With	the	
exception	of	the	carbon	emission	offsets	
projects,	these	projects	do	not	rely	on	the	
markets	of	wealthier	countries	as	a	source	
of	funding.		
1 World Wildlife Fund.
BOX	6
Global Environment Facility and payments for environmental services
Pablo Gutman1
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providers	to	ensure	continuous	provision.	
One	such	example	is	the	French	bottled	
water	company	Vittel	mentioned	in	
Chapter	2,	which	pays	farmers	to	maintain	
specific	land-use	practices	above	the	
aquifers	they	use	for	bottling	(Perrot-
Maître,	2006). In	Costa	Rica,	La	Esperanza	
Hydroelectric	Company	pays	landowners	
in	the	watershed	of	its	power-generating	
reservoir	to	maintain	their	forests	intact	
in	order	to	control	erosion.7	Similarly,	
ecotourism	operators	sometimes	pay	local	
communities	to	ensure	the	conservation	of	
attractive	biodiversity	in	the	surrounding	
areas	(Teixeira,	2006).
7 For further details, see http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/
pages/marketwatch.transaction.other.php?component_
id=87&component_version_id=95&language_id=. 
Demand for three main 
environmental services
The	sections	that	follow	examine	more	
closely	the	trends	in	demand	for	the	three	
main	environmental	services	that	are	
the	focus	of	this	report:	climate	change	
mitigation,	watershed	services	and	
biodiversity	conservation.
Climate change mitigation
The	unique	characteristic	of	carbon	emission	
reductions	or	mitigation	is	the	absence	
of	geographic	limitations.	The	location	
of	carbon	mitigation	is	irrelevant	for	its	
effectiveness.	Furthermore,	increasing	carbon	
stocks	in	farm	soils	and	vegetation	can	
often	be	accomplished	while	simultaneously	
improving	farm	productivity.	This	represents	
a	valuable	opportunity	for	diversification	
South	Africa	is	the	world’s	eighth	
largest	producer	of	wine,	90	percent	
of	which	is	produced	in	the	Cape	Floral	
Kingdom,	a	World	Heritage	site	and	
global	biodiversity	hotspot.	Since	the	
late	1990s,	a	boom	in	wine	exports	has	
raised	concerns	over	the	expansion	of	
vineyards.	Conservation	organizations,	
including	The	World	Conservation	Union,	
Conservation	International	and	the	South	
African	National	Biodiversity	Institute,	
have	teamed	up	with	the	South	African	
wine	industry	to	create	the	Biodiversity	
and	Wine	Initiative	(BWI).	Specific	
biodiversity	best	practice	guidelines	have	
been	incorporated	into	the	environmental	
guidelines	of	the	Integrated	Production	of	
Wine,	an	industry-wide	technical	system	
of	sustainable	wine	production.	From	
the	industry’s	point	of	view,	highlighting	
sustainable	natural	resource	management	
and	efforts	to	conserve	South	Africa’s	
natural	heritage	creates	an	important	
marketing	opportunity.	
The	BWI	now	represents	the	
conservation	element	of	the	Wines	
of	South	Africa	brand.	Participating	
producers	agree	to	implement	biodiversity	
best	practices	to	reduce	negative	impacts	
on	biodiversity	and	enhance	habitat	
quality.	In	properties	with	priority	
habitats,	growers	can	benefit	from	
additional	support	from	the	Cape	Nature	
Conservation’s	Conservation	Stewardship	
Programme	–	a	programme	for	the	
conservation	of	priority	habitats	in	private	
lands.
Benefits	include	assistance	with	on-farm	
habitat	management,	alien	plant	clearing	
and	property	rate	rebates.	The	BWI	
provides	media	coverage	on	its	Web	site	
and	in	wine	and	tourism	magazines	and	
also	plans	to	establish	a	biodiversity	wine	
tour	during	which	visitors	can	enjoy	both	
the	wine	and	the	biodiversity	richness	
in	the	property	of	each	participating	
producer.	
By	mid-2007,	the	BWI	scheme	already	
covers	half	of	the	total	vineyard	footprint	
in	the	Cape	winelands	–	over	50	000	
hectares,	managed	by	76	producers.
Source: adapted	from	BWI,	2007.	
BOX	7
The biodiversity and Wine Initiative in South Africa
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and	risk-spreading,	two	crucial	components	
of	smallholders’	livelihood	strategies	in	
developing	countries.
Most	demand	for	carbon	emission	
reductions	worldwide	is	driven	by	the	Kyoto	
Protocol	and	the	national	and	regional	
implementing	policies	and	trading	schemes	
enacted	to	carry	it	out.	The	Kyoto	Protocol	
is	an	agreement	under	the	UNFCCC	that	
involves	commitments	on	the	part	of	a	set	
of	industrialized	countries	(referred	to	as	
Annex	I	countries)	to	legally	binding	limits	or	
reductions	to	their	greenhouse	gas	emissions	
from	a	base	of	the	levels	prevailing	in	1990.	
The	Kyoto	Protocol	became	legally	binding	in	
2005,	with	its	first	commitment	period	ending	
in	2012.	Two	flexible	trading	mechanisms	
were	established	to	meet	emission	reduction	
requirements	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol:	
the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	
and	the	Joint	Implementation	Program.	The	
first	allows	trading	in	emission	reductions	
between	Annex	I	countries	and	developing	
countries	through	the	issuance	of	a	
certified	emission	reduction	(CER).	Joint	
Implementation	allows	trading	between	
two	or	more	Annex	I	countries.	At	present,	
the	rules	of	the	CDM	restrict	the	type	and	
amount	of	carbon	emission	reduction	
credits	that	can	be	obtained	from	carbon	
sequestration.	Only	afforestation	and	
reforestation	projects	are	allowed,	and	these	
can	only	make	up	1	percent	of	the	total	
base-year	emissions.	The	rules	for	what	will	
be	allowed	after	2012	are	not	yet	clear	and	
remain	the	subject	of	considerable	debate.
Overall,	the	prospects	for	the	market	in	
carbon	emission	reductions	are	extremely	
promising,	and	the	global	carbon	markets	
are	expanding	rapidly.	In	2005,	market	
volume	was	approximately	US$10	billion,	
while	in	the	first	quarter	of	2006	alone	
emissions-related	business	transactions	
were	valued	at	US$7.5	billion	(World	
Bank/IETA,	2006)	and,	by	the	end	of	2006,	
the	global	carbon	market	had	tripled	to	
reach	US$30	billion	(World	Bank,	2007).	
In	2006,	508	megatonnes	of	carbon	dioxide	
equivalents	were	sold	by	developing	
countries	to	Annex	1	countries,	for	a	total	
value	of	US$5.4	billion	(including	transactions	
within	the	CDM,	Joint	Implementation	and	
voluntary	markets)	(World	Bank,	2007).
However,	only	a	small	share	of	the	market	
is	for	emission	reductions	from	carbon	
sequestration,	due	to	the	CDM	restrictions	
mentioned	above	and	because	the	EU	
Emissions	Trading	Scheme	–	the	largest	
market,	accounting	for	US$25	billion	in	
2006	–	does	not	allow	credits	from	forestry	
carbon.	Emission	reductions	from	land	use,	
land-use	change	and	forestry	(LULUCF)	
account	for	only	1	percent	of	volumes	so	far	
(World	Bank,	2007),	with	only	0.3	percent	of	
the	CERs	being	issued	for	LULUCF	projects,	
and	more	than	half	of	these	are	generated	
from	projects	in	China.	
Currently,	these	regulated	markets	are	
unfavourable	to	small	farmers	for	a	number	
of	reasons.	First,	the	CDM	excludes	two	of	the	
major	forms	of	carbon	emission	reductions	
that	farmers	can	deliver	relatively	easily:	
reduced	emissions	from	deforestation	in	
developing	countries	(known	by	its	acronym	
RED-DC)	and	soil	carbon	sequestration.	
Second,	the	process	of	certifying	projects	to	
be	CDM-eligible	is	complex	and	costly,	as	is	
the	process	of	delivering	carbon	credits	to	the	
market	(see	Box	20	on	p.	90).	
A	third	problem	relates	to	the	limits	placed	
on	the	size	of	small-scale	carbon	projects.	
The	CDM	allows	simplified	procedures	for	
establishing	small	projects;	however,	the	
maximum	size	of	these	projects	is	set	at	
8	kilotonnes	of	carbon	dioxide	that	can	
be	offset	from	sequestration	per	year,	
which	is	too	small	for	the	projects	to	be	
financially	feasible	at	current	market	prices.	
Most	country	submissions	to	the	UNFCCC	
in	2007	requested	an	increase	in	this	cap	
to	32	kilotonnes	in	order	to	improve	their	
feasibility.	
Finally,	for	buyers	who	are	not	
interested	in	social	co-benefits	and	who	
are	concerned	about	the	risks	associated	
with	the	reversibility	of	emission	credits	
from	agriculture-based	projects,	other	
energy	projects	and	projects	that	capture	
potent	industrial	greenhouse	gases	are	now	
considered	those	with	the	best	prospects	
for	the	carbon-trading	market.	Nonetheless,	
regulated	markets	could	still	involve	
significant	numbers	of	small	farmers	if	the	
rules	were	changed	to	encourage	their	
inclusion.	
The	prices	that	are	being	paid	for	credits	
for	carbon	emission	reduction	vary	widely	
by	source	of	demand	and	type	of	offset.	The	
Ecosystem	Marketplace	reported	prices	of	
around	US$7	per	tonne	of	carbon	dioxide
	in	
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It	is	estimated	that	at	least	18	percent	
of	all	greenhouse	gas	emissions	
originate	from	deforestation	processes	
worldwide,	making	this	the	second	
largest	emitting	process,	after	fossil	
fuel	combustion.	According	to	the	2005	
FAO	Global	Forest	Resource	Assessment,	
deforestation	is	taking	place	at	a	rate	
of	13	million	hectares	annually	and	
is	principally	a	result	of	conversion	to	
other	land	uses,	forest	degradation,	
timber	and	fuelwood	removals	and	
shifting	cultivation,	as	well	as	forest	fires.	
Important	underlying	and	proximate	
causes	of	deforestation	are	economic	
factors	such	as	market	growth,	policy	
and	institutional	factors,	and	formal	and	
informal	policies,	as	well	as	issues	related	
to	land	tenure	and	property	rights.	
At	the	eleventh	Conference	of	the	
Parties	to	the	United	Nations	Framework	
Convention	on	Climate	Change	(COP	11),	
a	group	of	countries	led	by	Costa	Rica	
and	Papua	New	Guinea	proposed	
the	consideration	of	a	framework	to	
contribute	to	reducing	greenhouse	gas	
emissions	through	avoiding	deforestation	
in	developing	countries.	Developing	
countries	would	identify	projects	to	
achieve	voluntary	carbon	emission	
reductions	by	reducing	deforestation	
in	return	for	international	financial	
compensation.	Other	policy	approaches	
besides	payments,	including	capacity	
and	institution	building,	have	been	
included	in	the	proposals,	as	well.	A	
possible	mechanism	is	currently	being	
discussed	and	is	to	be	addressed	during	
COP	13	(Indonesia,	December	2007).	A	
common	feature	is	the	proposition	that	
the	international	community	would	bear	
the	costs	of	implementing	the	mechanism.	
Options	under	discussion	include	a	
mechanism	based	on	existing	carbon	
markets	and	a	separate	global	fund.	
Issues	include	the	weak	database	on	
actual	and	historic	trends	of	carbon	stock	
changes	in	forests,	the	development	of	
a	baseline	scenario,	technical	matters	
related	to	the	monitoring	of	carbon	
stock	changes	in	forests,	strengthening	
capacities	of	institutions	and	the	need	
to	build	institutional	frameworks	to	
implement	a	mechanism.
1 FAO Forestry Department.
BOX	8
Payments for reduced emissions from deforestation: what is the potential?
Heiner von Lüpke1
2007,	up	from	a	range	of	US$3–6.5	per	tonne	
in	2004	(Walker,	2007).
The	size	of	voluntary	markets	and	public	
payments	is	likely	to	be	smaller	than	for	
the	regulatory	carbon	markets,	but	their	
interest	to	farming	communities	is	likely	
to	be	greater,	because	they	capture	a	
much	higher	share	of	carbon	sequestration	
projects	(Bayon,	Hawn	and	Hamilton,	
2007).	Voluntary	buyers	are	often	more	
interested	in	demonstrating	positive	social	
and	economic	co-benefits,	and	public-sector	
buyers	can	choose	to	invest	in	low-income	
areas	and	to	utilize	carbon	payments	to	
restore	degraded	lands	and	encourage	
agroforestry	on	a	large	scale.	
Another	potential	source	of	payments	for	
emission	reduction	currently	under	much	
debate	is	payments	for	reducing	emissions	
from	deforestation.	Deforestation	arising	
from	conversion	of	land	to	annual	crops	
or	pasture	is	a	major	contributor	to	global	
emissions	of	greenhouse	gases,	and	much	
of	it	occurs	in	developing	countries.	At	its	
eleventh	session	in	2006,	the	Conference	of	
Parties	of	the	UNFCCC	invited	parties	and	
accredited	observers	to	submit	their	views	
on	issues	related	to	reducing	emissions	
from	deforestation	in	developing	countries,	
including	policy	approaches	and	positive	
incentives.	Payments	to	land	users	for	
reducing	emissions	from	deforestation	
are	one	of	the	most	important	types	of	
positive	incentive	measures	being	proposed,	
including	by	FAO	in	its	submission	(UNFCCC,	
2007)	(see	Box	8).	This	source	of	payments,	
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if	it	materializes,	will	have	the	potential	to	
augment	the	flow	of	payments	for	emission	
reductions	from	the	agriculture	sector.	In	
addition,	emission	reductions	from	LULUCF	
activities	have	been	identified	as	having	a	
high	potential	“development	dividend”,	
defined	as	benefits	to	developing	countries.	
These	benefits	include	economic	growth,	
technological	improvement	and	poverty	
reduction	(Cosbey	et al.,	2006).
Bioenergy	represents	another	potentially	
important	source	of	carbon	emission	
reductions.	In	2004,	bioenergy	provided	
about	10	percent	of	total	primary	energy	
supply	at	the	global	level	and	approximately	
35	percent	in	developing	countries	
(Figure	6).
The	share	of	bioenergy	projects	in	the	
CDM	market	has	been	significant.	In	May	
2007,	bioenergy	projects	(excluding	biogas)	
represented	the	fourth	largest	project	type	
in	terms	of	share	of	CERs	but	are	expected	to	
drop	to	the	fifth	largest	share	by	the	end	of	
the	first	crediting	period	in	2012.
Full	life-cycle	greenhouse	gas	emissions	
of	bioenergy	systems	depend	on	a	range	of	
aspects	along	the	entire	production	chain,	
including	land-use	changes,	choice	of	feed-
stock,	agricultural	practices,	refining	or	
conversion	process	and	end-use	practices.	
Estimates	of	net	emission	reductions	that	
can	be	obtained	with	bioenergy	thus	vary	
widely.	Bioenergy	can	reduce	emissions	by	
substituting	for	transport	fuels	and	replacing	
fossil	fuels	such	as	coal	for	power	and	heat	
generation.	Bioenergy	development	can	
have	impacts	on	water	use,	soil	erosion	and	
biodiversity	conservation	also,	depending	
on	the	specific	production	system.	These	are	
important	in	assessing	the	sustainability	of	
emission	offsets	from	this	source	and	could	
affect	their	eligibility	for	CDM	credits.
A	major	problem	with	current	patterns	
of	biomass	use	for	energy,	particularly	
for	traditional	bioenergy	systems	in	
developing	countries,	is	its	low	conversion	
efficiency,	frequently	as	low	as	10	percent	
(Kaltschmitt	and	Hartmann,	2001),	and	
related	degradation	of	carbon	stocks	in	
and	outside	forests.8	Improving	bioenergy	
efficiency	is	a	fairly	straightforward	means	of	
reducing	carbon	emissions	and	it	represents	
a	large	potential	source	of	carbon	payments	
for	those	countries	that	currently	depend	
on	traditional	bioenergy	(i.e.	almost	all	
least-developed	countries).	The	rules	and	
modalities	of	the	CDM	have	so	far	not	
allowed	bioenergy	projects	that	reduce	
emissions	through	improving	efficiency	or	
introducing	renewable	energy	systems.	This	
could	be	a	key	reason	behind	the	very	low	
share	of	CDM	projects	in	sub-Saharan	Africa	
and	least-developed	countries	in	general	
(Jürgens,	Schlamadinger	and	Gomez,	2006).
Watershed services
Demand	for	watershed	services	appears	to	
present	a	growing	opportunity	for	farmers	
8 Wood removal for energy use represents a large share of 
total wood removals from forests, particularly in Africa and 
Latin America. See FAO, 006b. 
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FIGURE 6
Share of bioenergy in total primary energy supply
Source: based on data from OECD/IEA, 2007.
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located	in	a	critical	watershed.	Public	
watershed	payment	schemes,	which	currently	
represent	by	far	the	largest	market	for	
watershed	services,	are	valued	at	US$2	billion	
annually,	worldwide	(Ecosystem	Marketplace,	
2005).	Monetarily,	these	payments	are	
concentrated	mostly	in	China	and	the	United	
States	of	America,	but	numerous	smaller	
public	watershed	programmes	are	being	
established	in	Africa,	Asia	and	Latin	America.	
Private	voluntary	watershed	programmes	
consist	mainly	of	small,	localized	markets	
totalling	about	US$5	million	annually,	
worldwide	(Ecosystem	Marketplace,	2005).	
Table	7	provides	some	estimates	of	the	size	
of	selected	markets	in	the	mid-2000s.
In	contrast	with	carbon	sequestration	
and	many	biodiversity	conservation	
services,	watershed	protection	services	are	
primarily	of	interest	to	local	and	regional	
users	(Landell-Mills	and	Porras,	2002).	
This	characteristic	is	both	an	asset	and	a	
liability	for	the	development	of	watershed	
payment	programmes.	On	the	positive	
side,	it	is	relatively	easy	to	identify	the	
users	or	beneficiaries	of	watershed	services;	
these	include	municipal	water	suppliers,	
hydroelectric	facilities,	industrial	users	and	
irrigation	systems.	Furthermore,	the	critical	
day-to-day	use	value	of	these	services	may	
make	revenue	streams	less	subject	to	market	
fluctuations	than	payment	programmes	
driven	by	philanthropy,	goodwill,	public	
relations	or	long-term	environmental	well-
being	at	the	global	level.	
On	the	negative	side,	the	local	
orientation	of	watershed	service	benefits	
is	the	limited	scope	for	attracting	
payments	from	international	beneficiaries.	
However,	considerable	external	funding	
has	been	provided	by	the	international	
community	to	assist	in	the	establishment	of	
watershed	payment	programmes.	To	date,	
US$108	million	in	approved	World	Bank	
loans	and	US$52	million	in	GEF	grants	have	
been	made	available	for	World	Bank/GEF-
supported	PES	projects	involving	water	
payments.	Likewise,	funding	from	The	
Nature	Conservancy,	an	international	NGO,	
has	helped	establish	the	FONAG	(Fondo	
para	la	Protección	del	Agua)	water	fund	in	
Quito,	Ecuador;	funding	from	Swiss	Aid	has	
helped	fund	the	PASOLAC	(Programa	para	la	
Agricultura	Sostenible	en	Laderas	de	América	
Central)	programme	that	helped	many	rural	
towns	to	establish	local	PES	programmes	
in	Central	America;	and	the	Inter-American	
Foundation	has	provided	start-up	funding	
for	the	PES	mechanism	in	the	Ecuadorian	
town	of	Pimampiro.	Such	external	support	
has	been	used	to	cover	start-up	costs	and,	
perhaps	more	importantly,	technical	support	
for	mechanism	design.	
The	development	of	local	watershed	
PES	programmes	is	difficult	where	the	
water	users	are	poor	and	unable	to	afford	
payments	to	upstream	stewards.	For	
example,	although	funds	collected	from	
household	water	users	in	Pimampiro	covered	
the	payments	made	to	upstream	land	users,	
TAblE 7
Size of selected watershed service markets 
nature and location
of market
Services paid for Size of market
(Million US$)
Price of service
(US$)
Regulatory: 
CoSTA RICA
1
 
Water-based	ecosystem	
services	markets	(1996)
89.0 40–100	per	hectare	of	
forest
Regulatory: 
MExICo
2
Payment	for	hydrological	
services	(2003)
23.1 33	per	hectare
Regulatory: 
UnITED STATES 
oF AMERICA
Water	pollutant	trading	and	
offset	(2003)
11.3 2.37	per	pound	sediment/
nutrients
1	US$0.5	million	of	the	Costa	Rica	funding	was	provided	through	voluntary	agreements	with	water	users,	which	includes	
public-sector	water	users	such	as	the	state	power	corporation	Compañía	Nacional	de	Fuerza	y	Luz	(CNFL)	and	the	public	
utility	of	the	town	of	Heredia.
2	Mexico	is	working	to	develop	voluntary	payments	by	water	users	to	supplement	funding	from	the	central	
government,	under	the	World	Bank/GEF-financed	Environmental	Services	Project.
Source: FAO/Forest	Trends,	2007;	Pagiola,	2004. 
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outside	support	was	needed	to	cover	the	
start-up	costs	of	the	programme	and	its	
ongoing	administrative	expenses	(Echavarria	
et al.,	2004).
biodiversity conservation
Payment	programmes	for	biodiversity	
conservation	are	in	various	phases	of	
development	around	the	world,	addressing	
components	of	biodiversity	ranging	from	the	
genetic	to	the	ecosystem	level	and	including	
both	agricultural	and	wild	biodiversity.	In	the	
United	States	of	America,	the	conservation	
banking	market	is	a	biodiversity	cap-and-
trade	system	that	allows	for	the	sale	and	
purchase	of	endangered	species	credits	to	
offset	negative	impacts	to	endangered	species	
and	their	habitat.	Internationally,	particularly	
in	developing	countries,	payment	mechanisms	
being	developed	include	certification	
of	biodiversity-friendly	agricultural	
products,	hunting	concessions,	ecotourism	
development,	markets	for	biodiversity	offsets	
and	niche	markets	for	products	with	high	
agricultural	biodiversity	value.	
Regulated	markets	for	biodiversity	remain	
practically	non-existent	in	the	developing	
world	at	present,	but	might	become	
significant	if	developing	countries	pass	
regulations	that	require	corporate	real	estate	
and	natural	resource	developers	to	offset	
their	environmental	impacts.	Examples	of	
biodiversity	offsets	have	been	documented,	
and	models	to	mainstream	this	concept	
are	being	developed	(ten	Kate,	Bishop	and	
Bayon,	2004).	Such	programmes	are	unlikely	
to	target	agricultural	lands	in	general	but	
could	do	so	when	there	is	a	preference	for	
offsetting	impacts	locally	and	where	local	
agricultural	landscapes	contain	significant	
biodiversity.	
Biodiversity	markets	aimed	at	protecting	
the	services	of	wild	pollinators	and	pest	
control	agents	are	poorly	developed,	but	
have	the	potential	for	future	expansion.	
The	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment	
(2005b)	quantified	the	high	economic	costs	
associated	with	loss	of	wild	pollinators,	
a	concern	that	has	motivated	a	handful	
of	projects	to	pay	for	pollinator	habitat	
protection	(McNeely	and	Scherr,	2002).	A	
recent	study	by	the	United	States	National	
Academy	of	Sciences	reported	that	more	
than	90	crops	in	North	America	rely	on	
honeybees	to	transport	pollen	from	flower	to	
flower.	These	pollination	services	are	worth	
an	estimated	$14	billion	a	year	to	the	United	
States	economy	(Committee	on	the	Status	of	
Pollinators	in	North	America,	2007).
Three	factors	currently	hinder	the	
development	of	biodiversity	markets.	First,	
many	of	the	benefits	of	biodiversity	will	
arise	in	the	future	and	are	highly	uncertain.	
The	market	is	therefore	driven	mainly	
by	philanthropy,	consumer	preference	
and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	by	regulation.	
Second,	it	is	difficult	to	define	“units	of	
biodiversity”	for	the	purpose	of	carrying	
out	transactions.	Finally,	the	conservation	
community	continues	to	debate	the	value	
of	conservation	funds	being	expended	
in	agricultural	settings,	where	native	
biodiversity	may	already	be	significantly	
degraded,	or	whether	investment	should	
focus	on	lands	that	have	been	less	disturbed.	
Farmers and landholders as buyers 
of services
Chapter	2	focused	on	the	central	role	of	
farmers	as	providers	of	services,	but	it	is	also	
important	not	to	overlook	their	potential	as	
buyers.	Almost	all	agricultural	production	still	
ultimately	relies	upon	fertile	soil,	adequate	
water	and	protection	against	biological	
pests	and	natural	disturbances.	Most	crops	
depend	upon	pollinating	insects,	whose	
recent	declines	have	caused	alarm	within	
the	agricultural	community	(Biesmeijer	
et al.,	2006;	Committee	on	the	Status	of	
Pollinators	in	North	America,	2007).	In	the	
long	term,	agricultural	production	will	also	
depend	on	the	maintenance	of	crop	genetic	
diversity	and	other	biodiversity	that	supports	
agriculture	in	numerous	ways.	
Thus	far,	individual	farmers	and	farmer	
organizations	are	only	minor	buyers	of	
environmental	services	(although	the	
value	of	climate	and	soil	fertility	services	is	
reflected	in	the	price	of	agricultural	land).	
Documented	cases	of	voluntary	private	
markets	include	mainly	irrigators	paying	
for	upstream	water-flow	management,	
fruit-growers	paying	to	protect	pollinator	
habitat	and	farming	communities	paying	
neighbouring	communities	to	protect	critical	
sources	of	drinking	water	(Landell-Mills	and	
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Porras,	2002).	This	approach	seems	likely	to	
grow	significantly	for	large-scale	commercial	
producers,	especially	those	who	seek	to	
export	commodities	to	ecosensitive	markets	in	
Europe	and	elsewhere.	Predicted	shortages	of	
water	for	surface	and	groundwater	irrigation	
may	lead	smallholder	farmer	organizations,	
especially	those	producing	higher-value,	
water-intensive	crops,	to	establish	contracts	to	
secure	hydrological	services.
Future developments affecting 
potential growth of PES 
programmes in developing 
countries
Finally,	this	section	touches	on	some	of	the	
main	issues	that	may	affect	future	demand	
and	willingness	to	pay	for	environmental	
services	from	developing	countries.	There	is	
little	doubt	that	concern	over,	and	awareness	
of,	the	costs	of	environmental	degradation	
will	continue	to	grow,	but	it	is	less	clear	
to	what	extent	this	will	result	in	increased	
funds	to	pay	for	environmental	services,	
particularly	in	developing	countries.	The	
actual	flow	of	funds	to	developing	countries	
for	environmental	services	is	currently	very	
small	and	primarily	derived	from	public-
sector	funding	in	a	handful	of	countries.	
Furthermore,	payments	for	environmental	
services	are	only	small	relative	to	the	income	
that	can	be	obtained	from	alternative	uses	
of	the	resources	(CTS	Nair,	FAO	Forestry	
Department,	personal	communication,	
2007).	Is	there	likely	to	be	an	increase	in	
external	funds	to	developing	countries	for	
payments	for	environmental	services?	Are	
developing	countries	themselves	likely	to	
use	more	public-sector	funds	to	support	PES	
programmes	in	their	countries?	These	are	the	
questions	addressed	in	this	section.
The	private	sector	is	an	important	
source	of	potential	increases	in	external	
funding	for	PES	programmes	in	developing	
countries.	One	indicator	is	the	increasing	
weight	given	to	sound	environmental	
management	as	a	core	business	strategy	
for	companies.	Insurance	companies	and	
investors	are	increasingly	noticing	links	
between	environmental	management	and	
returns	on	investment.	The	insurer	Swiss	Re,	
for	example,	calculates	that	natural	disasters	
cost	approximately	US$230	billion	in	2005,	of	
which	the	insurance	industry	bore	one-third	
(Vigar,	2006).	Insurance	industry	concerns	
are	likely	to	translate	into	higher	premiums,	
and	therefore	greater	operating	costs.	
In	response	to	these	issues,	some	insurers	
are	offering	incentives	for	climate-aware	
actions.	According	to	a	CERES	(2006)	report,	
AIG	and	Marsh	–	the	world’s	largest	insurer	
and	insurance	broker,	respectively	–	have	
launched	carbon	emissions	credit	guarantees	
and	other	new	renewable	energy-related	
insurance	products,	in	an	attempt	to	engage	
more	companies	in	carbon	offset	projects	
and	carbon	emissions	trading	markets	(FAO/
Forest	Trends,	2007).	These	new	insurance	
products,	in	turn,	are	creating	incentives	for	
private	companies	to	enter	carbon	markets.	
Environmental-based	challenges	to	
companies’	“licence	to	operate”,	for	example	
in	the	areas	of	mining,	water	bottling	and	
tuna	fishing,	also	reinforce	their	motivation	
to	pay	for	environmental	services.	Consumers	
are	showing	stronger	interest	in	the	
environmental	performance	of	companies,	
as	illustrated	by	the	growth	in	demand	
for	certified	products.	Finally,	regulators	
–	particularly	in	Europe	–	are	exploring	more	
innovative	approaches	to	environmental	
regulation	for	carbon	offsets,	as	well	as	other	
environmental	services.	
The	two	global	environmental	service	
markets	–	carbon	emission	reductions	and	
biodiversity	conservation	–	appear	to	have	
the	greatest	potential	for	bringing	new	
streams	of	finance	into	the	agriculture	sector	
(including	forestry)	in	developing	countries.	
The	need	to	offset	carbon	emissions	is	
clearly	generating	the	greatest	expectations.	
Interest	among	potential	suppliers	and	
buyers	in	developing	countries	is	also	high	
owing	to	the	lower	cost	of	service	provision,	
although	at	present	sales	of	carbon	offsets	
are	unevenly	distributed	–	with	Africa	far	
behind	Latin	America	and	Asia	(World	Bank,	
2007).	
The	potential	growth	of	this	market	in	
developing	countries	depends	on	three	
main	factors:	the	extent	to	which	the	overall	
market	size	expands	(which	in	turn	depends	
on	the	fate	of	international	agreements	
to	reduce	emissions);	the	types	of	activities	
allowed	as	emission	offsets;	and	the	
comparative	attractiveness	of	carbon	credits	
from	agriculture	vis-à-vis other	sources,	such	
as	energy	conservation	projects.		
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For	example,	an	agreement	on	payments	
for	voluntary	reduction	in	emissions	from	
deforestation	would	significantly	increase	
carbon	payment	flows	to	the	agriculture	
sector	in	developing	countries.	
Developments	in	the	voluntary	carbon	
market	are	equally,	if	not	more,	important.	
Even	though	the	voluntary	market	is	smaller,	
the	share	of	emission	offsets	from	land-use	
change	is	much	higher.	At	the	same	time,	less	
stringent	requirements	are	likely	to	mean	
lower	transaction	costs	and	easier	access	to	
this	market	for	small	farmers	(A.	Ruhweza,	
personal	communication,	2007).	
The	volume	of	compliant	carbon	
transactions	tripled	over	the	last	year,	and	
the	voluntary	offset	segment	is	also	“building	
in	size	and	dynamism”	(Point	Carbon,	2007).	
Some	sources	project	the	voluntary	market	
to	become	as	important,	by	2010,	as	the	
CDM	is	today,	with	a	volume	of	400	million	
tonnes	a	year	compared	with	only	20	million	
tonnes	in	2006	(ICF	International,	2006,	cited	
in	World	Bank,	2007).	Reaching	a	generally	
acceptable	standard	for	this	market	segment	
is	the	next	major	hurdle	to	overcome	(World	
Bank,	2007).	A	determining	factor	for	the	
fate	of	voluntary	markets	is	how	well	offsets	
from	the	agriculture	sector	in	non-regulated	
markets	are	perceived	to	be	performing	in	
mitigating	emissions.	At	present,	concerns	
over	the	validity	of	these	offsets	are	
emerging,	which	could	seriously	impair	the	
growth	of	these	markets	(World	Bank,	2007).	
Even	with	rapid	growth	in	the	regulated	
and	voluntary	markets,	the	potential	for	
developing	countries	to	benefit	depends	on	
their	taking	steps	to	provide	the	necessary	
institutional	structures	to	engage	in	such	
projects.	The	Nairobi	Framework,9	a	United	
Nations-led	partnership	linking	government	
action	to	the	private	sector,	is	one	example	
of	an	initiative	to	spur	the	development	
of	capacity	to	access	carbon	markets	in	
developing	countries,	particularly	Africa.
Unlike	carbon	emission	reductions,	
no	international	regulatory	framework	
currently	underpins	payments	for	biodiversity	
conservation.	Nevertheless,	several	sources	
of	demand	for	biodiversity	services	have	
emerged.	National	regulations	governing	
the	biodiversity	impacts	of	planned	economic	
9 For further information, see http://cdm.unfccc.int/
Nairobi_Framework/index.html.
development	projects	are	stimulating	growth	
in	demand	from	corporate	developers	for	
biodiversity	offsets.	
Even	in	the	absence	of	any	regulations,	
corporations	might	seek	to	enhance	
their	corporate	image	by	offsetting	the	
biodiversity	impacts	of	their	activities.	Large-
scale	development	projects	by	private	and	
public	actors	–	road	building,	mining,	oil	
and	gas	extraction,	and	urban	development	
–	could	bring	significant	funding	and	
high	visibility	to	this	market.	Appropriate	
standards	could	encourage	projects	with	high	
social	co-benefits.	
Second,	philanthropic	buyers,	especially	
large	conservation	NGOs,	are	likely	to	
increase	the	use	of	conservation	payments	
and	conservation	easements	in	developing	
countries	because	the	establishment	of	
new	nature	reserves	has	become	more	
contentious	in	many	regions,	in	part	because	
of	their	impacts	on	rural	livelihoods.	
Individual	consumers	are	driving	the	
development	of	markets	for	agricultural	
products	certified	against	environmental	
standards	and	represent	another	important	
potential	source	of	growth	in	demand	
for	biodiversity	conservation	services.	This	
market	is	small	but	shows	some	promise	of	
significant	growth	with	increased	consumer	
awareness	and	demand	for	improved	
environmental	management.	The	expansion	
in	the	market	for	organic	agricultural	
products	can	provide	some	insights	into	how	
consumer	demands	for	environmentally	
friendly	products	are	changing.	World	retail	
sales	of	such	products	were	estimated	at	
US$35	billion	in	2006.	Sales	trebled	in	the	
period	1997–2005	and,	according	to	industry	
sources,	are	expected	to	double	between	
2006	and	2012.	The	extent	to	which	changing	
consumer	preferences	will	translate	into	
increased	demand	for	products	associated	
with	environmental	services	–	particularly	
biodiversity	–	is	yet	to	be	seen.	
The	global	market	for	biodiversity	
conservation	will	be	influenced	by	the	extent	
to	which	it	can	be	linked	with	economically	
significant	problems	such	as	the	transmission	
of	diseases	or	the	incidence	and	severity	of	
natural	disasters.	Both	problems	generate	
high	social	costs.	To	the	extent	that	
maintaining	various	forms	of	biodiversity	can	
be	found	to	reduce	these	costs,	the	value	and	
demand	for	services	will	increase.
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An	important	constraint	that	developing	
countries	face	in	building	their	markets	
for	ecolabelled	products	is	the	lack	of	
local	certification	systems	or,	when	these	
exist,	their	lack	of	recognition	by	buyers	in	
international	markets.	This	situation	implies	
that	foreign	certification	bodies	must	be	
called	in	to	carry	out	the	inspection	and	
certification	work	for	export	products,	
which	tends	to	raise	costs,	especially	
when	inspectors	must	be	flown	in	from	
abroad.	The	extent	to	which	developing	
countries	will	be	able	to	benefit	from	the	
growth	of	the	market	for	environmentally	
friendly	products	will	be	determined	by	
their	capacity	to	develop	local	certification	
bodies	and	have	them	fully	recognized	in	
importing	countries.	
A	final	question	to	be	considered	is	the	
degree	to	which	payment	programmes	
will	expand	for	environmental	services	
with	primarily	local	benefits,	particularly	
watershed	services.	A	key	issue	here	is	
the	degree	to	which	users	of	the	water	
services	are	willing	and	able	to	pay	for	such	
services;	imposing	fees	on	low-income	urban	
populations	for	drinking	water	is	not	likely	
to	be	politically	or	economically	feasible.	
However,	in	situations	where	water	users	are	
already	bearing	heavy	costs	associated	with	
the	degradation	of	watershed	services	–	be	it	
in	the	form	of	payments	for	water	treatment,	
desiltation	or	new	water-supply	development	
–	the	demand	and	willingness	to	pay	for	
watershed	services	may	be	quite	substantial.	
Conclusions
While	there	has	been	significant	growth	in	
PES	programmes	in	recent	years,	the	overall	
size	of	the	markets	remains	small,	and	they	
are	mostly	confined	to	developed	countries.	
The	public	sector	has	been	the	major	source	
of	payment	programmes	so	far	in	both	
developed	and	developing	countries.	The	
international	public	sector	has	played	an	
important	role	in	financing	PES	schemes	in	
developing	countries	through	the	GEF,	as	
well	as	through	development	loans.	
Future	effective	demand	is	likely	to	
grow,	driven	by	increased	demand	for	
environmental	offsets	(carbon	emissions	
and	biodiversity)	that	developing	countries	
can	supply	at	relatively	low	prices.	Interest	
in	developing	countries	as	suppliers	is	high	
for	two	reasons:	in	the	case	of	carbon	
offsets,	because	of	the	lower	cost	of	service	
provision	found	in	developing	countries;	
for	biodiversity,	because	much	of	the	
world’s	biodiversity	is	located	in	developing	
countries.	
The	carbon	market	has	seen	rapid	growth	
in	recent	years,	but	the	segment	relevant	
to	carbon	emission	reductions	from	land-
use	change	is	still	small.	There	are	two	main	
sources	of	carbon	payments:	the	regulated	
market	under	the	CDM	and	a	variety	of	
voluntary	and	public-sector	sources	of	
payments.	Voluntary	and	public	sources	
allow	a	wider	range	of	land-use	changes	
to	generate	carbon	emission	offsets.	The	
potential	for	growth	in	carbon	markets	is	
promising,	although	the	extent	to	which	
this	will	increase	demand	for	emission	
offsets	from	land	use	depends	on	future	
negotiations	regarding	the	activities	that	
will	be	permissible.	A	potentially	important	
source	of	demand	currently	being	discussed	
is	payments	for	reducing	emissions	from	
deforestation.
Environmental	services	related	to	
biodiversity	are	purchased	by	the	public	
sector	and	NGOs	through	a	variety	of	
mechanisms,	by	consumers	expressing	
demands	for	improved	environmental	
management	via	purchase	of	ecolabelled	
products	and	by	private-sector	buyers	
interested	in	improving	their	corporate	
image.	Biodiversity	offset	programmes	
represent	a	further	potential	source	of	
demand,	but	are	not	yet	well	developed.	
There	is	also	potential	for	growth	in	public-
sector-funded	PES	programmes	in	developing	
countries	where	environmental	services	
meet	critical	policy	objectives	such	as	clean	
water	availability	and	prevention	of	natural	
disasters.	
Growth	in	demand	and	willingness	to	pay	
for	environmental	services	from	developing	
countries	must	be	supported	by	a	set	of	
policy	and	programmatic	efforts.	These	
include	strengthening	the	international	
environmental	regulatory	framework	
governing	climate	change	and	biodiversity	
conservation,	which	are	both	important	
sources	of	demand	for	offset	services,	
and	allowing	activities	that	facilitate	the	
participation	of	agricultural	producers	in	
developing	countries.	This	latter	approach	
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could	include	the	reduction	of	emissions	
from	deforestation	in	climate	change	
mitigation.	Improving	coordination	among	
various	forms	of	ecolabelling	schemes	and	
clarifying	the	environmental	benefits	that	
can	be	obtained	from	certified	products	are	
important	for	future	growth	in	this	form	
of	payments	for	environmental	services.	
Building	institutions	and	capacity	for	
managing	environmental	service	payments	
in	developing	countries	is	equally	important.	
The	potential	of	developing	countries	to	
benefit	from	PES	programmes	will	be	greatly	
diminished	in	the	absence	of	such	policy	and	
institutional	efforts	undertaken	at	the	local,	
national	and	international	levels.	
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4.	 Supplying	environmental	
services:	farmers’	decisions	
and	policy	options	
Given	the	importance	of	environmental	
services,	why	are	they	not	provided	at	higher	
levels?	Environmental	services	are	produced	
(or	degraded)	through	the	interaction	
of	natural	processes	and	the	actions	of	
individual	decision-makers,	including	
agricultural	producers.	For	a	variety	of	
reasons,	the	full	value	of	these	impacts	is	not	
reflected	in	the	incentives	faced	by	ecosystem	
service	providers.	As	a	result,	providers’	
actions	may	diverge	from	those	desired	by	
beneficiaries	as	a	group.	
Any	approach	to	dealing	with	the	
unintended	effects	of	agricultural	production,	
whether	negative	or	positive,	must	recognize	
the	central	role	played	by	farmers.	Each	
farmer	is	a	natural	resource	manager,	making	
decisions	about	how	to	use	resources	under	
his	or	her	(or	their)	control	to	improve	their	
well-being.	It	is	farmers’	collective	decisions	
about	how	to	transform	natural	and	
produced	resources	into	desired	goods	that	
result	in	unintended	outputs.	Understanding	
their	decision-making	is	crucial	to	enhancing	
ecosystem	service	delivery.
Agricultural	policies	play	a	key	role	in	
shaping	the	incentives	to	which	farmers	
respond.	Indeed,	such	policies	–	for	example,	
through	subsidizing	farming	activities,	
providing	infrastructure	such	as	roads	and	
water	supply,	or	more	explicit	incentives	for	
land-use	changes	such	as	the	conversion	of	
wetlands	or	forest	land	to	crop	production	
–	have	often	encouraged	farmers	to	expand	
or	intensify	cultivation.
This	chapter	discusses	the	supply	of	
environmental	services,	taking	as	its	starting	
point	the	decision-making	of	the	individual	
farmer.	It	then	lays	out	policy	options	to	
enhance	the	supply	of	these	services	and	
explores	the	role	that	payment	programmes	
can	play.	It	also	presents	estimates	of	
possible	supply	responses	to	payments	for	
environmental	services.
The role of individual farmers’ 
decisions
The	provision	of	all	agriculture-based	
ecosystem	services	begins	at	the	level	of	
the	plot	of	land	that	is	managed	by	a	single	
individual	or	group	of	individuals.10	For	the	
purpose	of	this	discussion,	this	manager,	
whether	individual	or	collective,	is	referred	
to	as	a	farmer.	Farmers’	decisions	about	
how	to	use	the	resources	inherent	in	the	
plot	of	land	are	driven	by	the	goal	of	
improving	their	well-being	and	that	of	their	
families.	Well-being	is	defined	across	many	
dimensions,	including	income,	security	of	
livelihood,	health,	leisure	and	cultural	values.
Each	plot	embodies	a	set	of	natural	and	
socio-economic	resources.	Natural	resources	
include	inherent	geophysical	characteristics	
(e.g.	soil	quality,	slope	and	elevation,	and	
climate)	and	constructed	characteristics	(e.g.	
bunds,	irrigation	systems	and	terraces).	Socio-
economic	resources	include	characteristics	
such	as	the	property	rights	under	which	the	
plot	is	held	and	used,	the	cost	of	access	to	
markets	and	the	prices	at	those	markets.	
Farmers	also	have	capital	of	different	kinds	
–	physical	(e.g.	equipment	and	animals),	
financial	(e.g.	cash,	bank	accounts	and	
personal	assets),	human	(e.g.	education	and	
on-the-job	skills)	and	social	(e.g.	knowledge	
of	the	community	and	local	community	
sources	of	support).	
Farmers	combine	the	natural	and	socio-
economic	resources	at	their	disposal	to	
produce	goods	and	services.	Their	economic	
activities	may	include	crop,	livestock,	
fishery	and	forestry	production	as	well	
0 The term “land” is used as the most easily understood 
unit of natural resource to illustrate the argument. It could 
also be substituted with other forms of natural resources 
– for example trees or water. However, in many cases 
decisions over these are also driven by land-use decisions.
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as	non-agricultural	activities.	Decisions	
farmers	make	about	how	to	manage	their	
resources	are	influenced	by	the	relative	
return	or	benefit	each	activity	provides,	
which,	in	turn,	depends	on	available	
technology	and	prevailing	market	and	
environmental	conditions.	For	example,	
the	amount	of	agricultural	production	or	
carbon	sequestration	1	hectare	of	land	can	
produce	depends	on	the	agro-ecological	
characteristics	of	the	site	as	well	as	the	
technology	employed	in	the	production	
process.	The	returns	to	the	farmer	from	
either	activity	depend	also	on	market	prices	
and	on	distance	to	market.	
Agricultural,	environmental	and	economic	
development	policies	all	contribute	to	
shaping	farmers’	decisions.	Policies	can	
have	a	significant	impact	on	the	prices	of	
inputs	(e.g.	land,	labour,	credit,	fertilizer	
and	pesticides)	as	well	as	on	output	prices.	
These	factors,	together	with	the	degree	of	
integration	into	international	commodity	
markets,	contribute	to	decisions	about	what	
to	produce	and	how.	Policies	on	land	taxes,	
zoning	and	settlement	also	influence	farm-
level	decisions,	as	do	the	types	of	technology	
available	to	farmers,	their	relative	
accessibility,	and	their	adoption.	Policies	also	
determine	investment	in	infrastructure	such	
as	roads,	irrigation	facilities,	markets	and	
communication,	which,	in	turn,	is	reflected	
in	the	balance	of	incentives	and	constraints	
farmers	need	to	consider	in	making	decisions.
The	allocation	of	productive	resources	
to	economic	activities	generates	a	wide	
variety	of	outcomes,	which	may	include	
private	production	benefits	from	land	
use	(e.g.	agricultural	products),	private	
benefits	from	wage	income	and	positive	or	
negative	impacts	on	neighbours	or	on	the	
environment	(e.g.	carbon	sequestration	or	
emissions,	biodiversity	conservation	or	losses,	
and	watershed	protection	or	degradation).	
These	indirect	effects	are	termed	
“externalities”	(see	Box	1	on	p.	6).
In	the	absence	of	deliberate	policy	
intervention,	the	amount	of	these	
externalities	generated	by	farmers	is	
coincidental	–	determined	by	the	choices	
they	make	in	managing	agricultural	
ecosystems	to	generate	intended	outputs,	
such	as	agricultural	products	and/or	wage	
income.	There	is	no	guarantee	that	the	
amount	of	any	positive	externality	produced	
will	be	optimal	from	society’s	perspective;	
in	many	cases,	negative	externalities	will	
be	generated.	If	society	wants	farmers	to	
provide	more	positive	externalities	and	fewer	
negative	ones,	then	mechanisms	must	be	
found	to	encourage	their	provision.	
Constraints against the provision 
of environmental services
Why	don’t	farmers,	fishers	and	foresters	
manage	natural	resources	in	ways	that	
increase	the	provision	of	environmental	
services?	The	answer	to	this	is	complex	and	
varies	according	to	the	influence	of	a	range	
of	social,	economic,	political	and	technical	
factors.	In	some	cases,	practices	that	generate	
more	environmental	services	may	not	be	
adopted	because	they	would	reduce	farmers’	
net	benefits	(i.e.	they	involve	significant	
opportunity	costs).	In	other	cases,	improved	
practices	that	would	be	potentially	profitable	
for	farmers	may	not	be	adopted	because	of	
other	barriers	(e.g.	lack	of	information	or	
credit,	or	insecure	land	tenure).
Management changes that involve 
opportunity costs
In	general,	it	is	reasonable	to	expect	that	
farmers	will	choose	the	mix	of	production	
practices	that	maximizes	their	well-being	–	
given	the	resources	and	opportunities	
available	to	them.	Many	changes	in	resource	
use	that	could	benefit	the	environment	
are	not	likely	to	be	adopted	by	farmers	in	
the	absence	of	motivating	policy	measures,	
because	they	would	result	in	lower	benefits	
to	the	producers.	For	example,	setting	land	
aside	from	crop	production	and	placing	(or	
leaving)	it	under	natural	grass	or	forest	cover	
could	enhance	carbon	sequestration,	water	
quality	and	biodiversity,	but	might	result	
in	lower	returns	to	the	farmer	and	his	or	
her	household.	Reducing	livestock	numbers	
or	managing	manure	to	reduce	nitrogen	
runoff	to	surface	water,	infiltration	to	
groundwater	or	emissions	to	the	atmosphere	
could	benefit	the	environment	but	would	
probably	increase	costs	or	reduce	returns	to	
the	farmer.	
Figure	7	illustrates	situations	where	
farmers	face	such	opportunity	costs	in	the	
form	of	foregone	benefits.	In	scenario	A,	
high	levels	of	environmental	services	can	be	
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provided	only	by	significantly	reducing	the	
intensity	or	extent	of	agriculture	at	the	plot	
or	farm	level.	Farmers	thus	face	a	permanent	
decrease	in	yields.	They	may	continue	to	
make	a	profit	–	especially	given	that	the	cost	
of	inputs	is	likely	to	decline	–	but	they	would	
earn	less	than	they	could	otherwise.	In	this	
case,	payments	would	typically	be	needed	
to	compensate	farmers	for	the	opportunity	
cost	(i.e.	foregone	income)	of	the	new	
practices;	these	payments	would	need	to	
be	maintained	in	perpetuity	to	ensure	
a	continuing	stream	of	environmental	
services.	This	scenario	forms	the	basis	for	the	
majority	of	established	agri-environmental	
payment	schemes,	including	many	United	
States	and	European	conservation	payment	
programmes.	Conservation	easements	
represent	one	alternative	for	providing	
environmental	service	payments	indefinitely.	
These	are	legally	binding	agreements,	sold	
by	the	landowner,	that	restrict	the	use	of	the	
land	for	certain	environmentally	damaging	
activities.	However,	permanent	or	long-term	
conservation	easements	on	private	lands	are	
an	established	technique	in	only	a	handful	
of	developing	countries	and,	where	they	
exist,	they	may	be	insufficiently	prescriptive	
to	guide	agricultural	management	practices	
and	may	still	involve	significant	ongoing	
monitoring	and	compliance	costs	(Wiebe,	
Tegene	and	Kuhn,	1996).
Beyond	the	decision	of	the	individual	
farmer,	a	further	consideration	in	this	
scenario	is	the	potential	impact	on	local	
or	regional	food	security	if	large	areas	of	
agricultural	land	were	to	be	taken	out	of	
food	production	completely	to	provide	
other	ecosystem	services	(e.g.	a	switch	
from	crops	to	forest	plantations	for	carbon	
sequestration).	Design	options	that	maintain	
strategic	areas	of	agricultural	land	or	that	
pay	for	the	establishment	of	alternative	
avenues	for	food	security	may	need	to	be	
incorporated	into	the	PES	programme.	These	
are	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	6.
In	scenario	B	of	Figure	7,	land	use	or	
production	is	not	affected	by	the	new	
management	practices,	but	enhanced	
provision	of	environmental	services	
requires	farmers	or	farming	communities	
to	incur	continued	additional	management	
or	investment	costs	over	time	(e.g.	for	
protecting	and	managing	forest	fragments	
or	managing	wastes	from	production).	As	in	
scenario	A,	payments	to	compensate	farmers	
for	their	opportunity	costs	would	be	required	
in	perpetuity	to	ensure	a	continuing	stream	
of	environmental	services.
other barriers to adopting beneficial 
changes 
An	array	of	complicating	factors,	particularly	
in	developing	countries,	serves	to	increase	
opportunity	costs	or	raise	other	barriers	to	
the	adoption	of	new	practices.	Limited	access	
to information,	appropriate	technologies	
and	finance,	as	well	as	insecure	property	
Permanent decrease in yieldA Permanent increase in management costsB
FIGURE 7
Barriers to the adoption of improved management practices: 
permanent decrease in farm income 
New management
practices introduced
New management
practices introduced
Net loss to farmer
Net loss to farmer
TimeTime
Baseline net income Current net income Yield
Source: FAO, 2007c.
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rights	and	legal	or	regulatory	constraints,	
count	among	the	most	significant	barriers	
farmers	face.	These	constraints	are	often	
compounded	by	poorly	functioning	markets	
and	infrastructure,	risk	and	difficulties	in	
the	collective	management	of	commonly	
held	resources	such	as	pasturelands	or	
fisheries.	Producers	facing	one	or	more	of	
these	problems	will	find	it	difficult	to	change	
their	resource	management	practices	in	
ways	that	could	provide	a	higher	output	of	
environmental	services	–	and	in	some	cases	
of	conventional	agricultural	commodities	
also.	Sustainable	land-management	
practices	often	fall	into	this	category.	These	
include	cropping	and	livestock	practices	
characterized	by	improved	soil,	plant	
nutrient	and	water	management	and	
often	lead	to	higher	farm	productivity	and	
income	as	well	as	increased	provision	of	
environmental	services	such	as	soil	carbon	
sequestration,	biodiversity	conservation	
and	watershed	protection.	Conservation	
agriculture,	which	encompasses	a	range	
of	agricultural	practices	involving	reduced	
tillage	and	increased	ground	cover,	is	a	good	
example	of	a	practice	that	is	often	privately	
profitable	to	farmers	over	time	but	whose	
adoption	is	hampered	through	lack	of	
information,	technology	and	inputs.
The	following	paragraphs	discuss	five	types	
of	barrier	to	adopting	beneficial	changes:	
lack	of	information,	inability	to	afford	
investments,	risk	aversion,	insecure	property	
rights	and	poorly	performing	markets.	The	
first	two	are	illustrated	by	Figure	8.
Farmers	may	lack	information	on	
production	technologies	or	practices	that	
could	both	maintain	or	increase	their	
own	well-being	and	provide	enhanced	
environmental	services.	In	scenario	A	of	
Figure	8,	the	adoption	of	new	management	
practices	to	increase	the	supply	of	ecosystem	
services	is	nominally	a	win–win	situation	that	
simultaneously	increases	farmers’	net	income	
and	improves	environmental	quality.	The	
new	practices	may	increase	net	income	by	
increasing	production	output	(e.g.	through	
enhanced	soil	fertility	or	water	management),	
by	reducing	input	costs	(e.g.	by	reducing	
labour	needs	or	the	use	of	purchased	
chemical	inputs),	or	both.	Many	traditional	
rural	development	programmes	attempt	
to	do	just	this,	albeit	not	under	the	title	of	
PES	programmes	and	often	without	explicit	
contractual	arrangements	linking	payments	
to	provision	of	environmental	services.11	
In	Brazil,	the	results	of	a	survey	of	70	
producers	in	the	Brazilian	Cerrado	region	
in	1993	identified	lack	of	information	as	a	
barrier	to	adopting	conservation	agriculture	
 One initiative to improve the access of farmers and 
technical advisers to information on improved technologies 
is the World Overview of Conservation Agriculture 
Technologies (WOCAT) project, which facilitates the 
sharing of information about soil and water conservation 
technologies. The project database is available at http://
www.wocat.net/.
Information barrier to adoptionA Investment barrier to adoptionB
FIGURE 8
Barriers to the adoption of improved management practices: 
information and investment constraints 
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(including	zero	tillage)	techniques	that	
had	been	shown	to	be	privately	profitable	
(Table	8)	(FAO,	2001).	In	this	instance,	
demonstrations	and	technical	information	
provided	by	NGOs	and	extension	services	
succeeded	in	removing	this	constraint.	
Thousands	of	Brazilian	farmers	have	
subsequently	adopted	conservation	
agriculture,	with	an	estimated	23.6	million	
hectares	in	production	in	2004/05.	
It	has	been	established	above	that	
farmers	can	only	be	expected	to	adopt	new	
management	practices	if	they	believe	that	
their	well-being	(or	that	of	their	families)	
will	be	enhanced	over	a	relevant	time	frame.	
Well-being	depends	critically	on	income.	
Nevertheless,	even	without	the	prospect	
of	increased	income,	increased	awareness	
of	the	external	damage	caused	by	certain	
production	practices	may	lead	some	farmers	
to	change	their	practices,	motivated	by	
notions	of	good	stewardship	(Box	9).	
Inability	to	afford	investments	requiring	
financial	expenditures	in	the	short	run	in	
order	to	obtain	benefits	in	the	long	run	
constitutes	a	second	major	reason	why	
farmers	sometimes	fail	to	adopt	practices	
that	offer	higher	returns	(Dasgupta	and	
Maler,	1995;	Holden	and	Binswanger,	1998).	
This	problem	is	particularly	acute	for	the	
poor,	who	may	lack	access	to	credit	as	well	as	
reserves	of	wealth	with	which	to	finance	such	
investments	(Hoff,	Braverman	and	Stiglitz,	
1993;	Sunding	and	Zilberman,	2001).	Wunder	
(2006)	cites	the	example	of	moving	from	
slash-and-burn	to	perennial	cropping	systems,	
which	are	far	more	profitable	for	farmers	and	
also	generate	higher	levels	of	environmental	
services,	but	are	not	adopted	because	they	
require	large	capital	investments	and	involve	
risks	and	market	development	costs.
In	scenario	B	of	Figure	8,	the	adoption	of	
new	land	uses	or	management	practices	leads	
to	a	temporary	decline	in	net	farm	income	
resulting	from	agro-ecological	disequilibria	
associated	with	the	transition.	For	example,	
a	change	to	organic	or	no-till	production	
may	initially	give	rise	to	additional	weed	
competition,	nutrient	deficiencies	and	
similar	problems.	After	a	few	years,	however,	
previous	production	levels	will	be	regained	
and	then	surpassed,	eventually	levelling	off	
at	a	new,	higher	equilibrium	of	net	income.	
The	delay	in	benefits,	combined	with	lack	of	
wealth	or	access	to	credit,	may	be	a	barrier	to	
adoption.	Under	this	scenario,	farmers	might	
require	environmental	service	payments	
during	the	transition	period	to	offset	their	
foregone	revenue;	after	which	payments	
may	no	longer	be	needed.	Schemes	for	
converting	land	use	from	low-value	annual	
crops	to	higher-value	tree	plantations	(for	
the	provision	of	carbon	offset	or	watershed	
conservation	services)	that	provide	payments	
TAblE 8
lack of information as an obstacle to adopting conservation agriculture 
RESPonSES To THE QUESTIon “WHy Don’T FARMERS ADoPT ZERo TIllAGE?”
1 PoSITIvE
RESPonSES
2
1.  Insufficient	technical	knowledge.	 39
2.  Know	nothing	at	all	about	zero	tillage. 35
3.  Fear	of	trying	and	getting	it	wrong. 29
4.  Think	that	it	is	necessary	to	buy	an	expensive	zero-tillage	planter. 24
5.  Erosion	losses	under	conventional	cultivation	are	not	significant. 9
6.  Have	not	seen	research	results	validating	the	technology. 9
7.  Zero	tillage	is	not	accepted	for	crop	insurance. 5
8.  My	agronomist	does	not	recommend	it. 3
1	Data	collected	from	a	survey	of	small-scale	farmers	in	the	Cerrado	region	of	Brazil	in	1993.
2	n	=	70.
Source:	adapted	from	FAO,	2001.
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to	enable	producers	to	afford	the	investment	
necessary	to	establish	tree	nurseries	fall	into	
this	category.
In	both	scenarios,	the	opportunity	cost	
to	farmers	of	supplying	the	environmental	
service	is	negative	–	indeed,	they	are	better	
off	with	the	new	land-use	system	even	in	the	
absence	of	payments.	The	system	generates	
sufficient	private	incentives	to	motivate	
farmers	to	maintain	it,	which	increases	the	
likelihood	that	the	environmental	service	
provision	will	be	permanent	even	if	payments	
for	the	services	are	discontinued.	It	should	
be	recognized,	however,	that	opportunity	
costs	are	dynamic	and	may	shift	with	changes	
in	economic	conditions	(e.g.	the	prices	of	
agricultural	inputs	and	products).	Farmers	
may	then	have	an	incentive	to	abandon	the	
practices	in	favour	of	others	that	are	less	
environmentally	benign.	Thus,	it	cannot	be	
assumed	that	temporary	payments	will	result	
in	high	levels	of	environmental	services	being	
provided	in	perpetuity.	
An	unacceptable	degree	of risk	(in	terms	
of	variability	of	outcome)	constitutes	
a	third	barrier	to	the	adoption	of	
profitable	innovations	that	also	enhance	
environmental	services.	Perception	of	risk	
influences	the	way	farmers	manage	their	
resources,	particularly	where	insurance	
is	not	available	or	is	ineffective.	This	is	
particularly	pertinent	for	poor	people,	
who	are	generally	more	risk-averse	and	
likely	to	lack	access	to	formal	means	of	
insurance,	such	as	through	financial	markets	
(FAO,	1999).	A	major	risk-coping	strategy	
for	many	poor	rural	households	is	to	
meet	their	subsistence	food	requirements	
from	their	own	production	as	a	critical	
means	of	insuring	against	food	insecurity	
(Fafchamps,	1992;	Sadoulet	and	de	Janvry,	
1995).	Insecurity	may	arise	from	either	the	
household’s	lack	of	ability	to	buy	food	or	
the	lack	of	food	availability.	Consequently,	
the	impact	of	management	changes	on	
the	security	of	the	farm	household’s	food	
supply	is	a	critical	issue	that	can	prevent	
the	adoption	of	changes	that	may	be	more	
profitable	on	average,	but	that	incur	higher	
risks.
Numerous	studies	have	established	the	
linkage	between	education	and	voluntary	
effort	to	produce	environmental	services.	
Extension	education	and	information	
acquisition	positively	influence	the	
adoption	of	technologies	to	abate	soil	
and	water	quality	damage	caused	by	
agricultural	production	(Feather	and	
Amacher,	1994;	Norton,	Phipps	and	
Fletcher,	1994;	Baidu-Forson,	1999;	
Dasgupta,	1999;	Lichtenberg	and	
Zimmerman,	1999;	Price	2001;	Alrusheidat	
2004).	For	example,	Kenya’s	National	
Soil	and	Water	Conservation	Programme	
was	successful	in	inducing	as	many	as	
a	million	farm	families	to	adopt	soil	
conserving	practices	voluntarily	over	a	
12-year	period	ending	in	2000	(Longley	
et al.,	2005).		Likewise,	limited	attention	
to	environmental	education	has	been	
shown	to	be	a	factor	in	the	low	rate	of	
adoption	of	soil	conservation	technologies	
in	the	Philippine	uplands	(Cramb	et al.,	
2000).	Dietz	and	Stern	(2002)	argue	
that	environmental	education	is	critical	
to	link	private	actions	with	desirable	
social	outcomes	and	remove	incentive	
barriers	to	the	adoption	of	practices	
producing	environmental	services.	
Joint	learning	through	environmental	
education	programmes	can	be	a	cost-
effective	strategy	for	generating	
widespread	environmental	service	
supply	by	harmonizing	the	activities	of	
heterogeneous	individuals	(Feather	and	
Amacher,	1994;	Glachant,	1999).	Farmers	
may	lack	information	on	the	long-run	
financial	and	environmental	benefits	of	
providing	environmental	services,	and	
this	may	reduce	their	farm-level	provision	
(Amacher	and	Feather,	1997).
1 University of Maine, United States of America.
BOX	9
Environmental education and the supply of environmental services
Timothy J. Dalton1
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BOX	10
land tenure and environmental services: insights from the Philippines and nepal 
Awarding	land	tenure	to	farmers	can	
be	an	important	means	of	generating	
environmental	services	as	well	as	
improving	farm	welfare.	Case	studies	from	
land-tenure	projects	in	the	Philippines	
and	Nepal	provide	insights	into	the	way	
different	tenure	instruments	may	affect	
environmental	service	provision.	
In	the	Philippines,	community-based	
forest	management	is	a	development	
strategy	for	sustainable	forestry	and	social	
equity	in	the	uplands.	It	was	adopted	
formally	in	1995	in	response	to	rapid	
deforestation	caused	by	excessive	and	
indiscriminate	logging,	shifting	agriculture	
and	inefficient	forest	management.	The	
two	primary	tenurial	instruments	are	the	
Community-based	Forest	Management	
Agreement	(CBFMA)	and	the	Certificate	of	
Stewardship	Contract	(CSC).	The	CBFMA	is	
a	production-sharing	agreement	between	
the	Department	of	Environment	and	
Natural	Resources	and	the	participating	
people’s	organization	for	a	period	
of	25	years,	renewable	for	another	
25	years.	The	community	commits	itself	to	
protecting	the	entire	forest	in	the	CBFMA	
area	against	illegal	logging,	slash-and-
burn	agriculture,	forest	and	grassland	fires	
and	other	forms	of	forest	destruction,	in	
return	for	the	right	to	utilize	forestland	
resources	in	a	sustainable	manner,	using	
environment-friendly,	labour-intensive	
harvesting	methods	for	timber	and	
non-timber	resources.	Communities	are	
also	allowed	to	harvest	existing	mature	
plantations	of	fast-growing	hardwoods.	
CSCs	are	awarded	to	individuals	or	families	
actually	occupying	or	tilling	portions	of	
forest	lands	within	an	existing	CBFMA.	
CSCs	also	cover	a	period	of	25	years,	
renewable,	and	cover	a	maximum	of	
5	hectares.	Soil	and	water	conservation	
measures	(vegetative	and	physical)	are	
mandatory	on	CSC	land,	and	agroforestry	
is	common.	CSCs	are	transferable	to	next	
of	kin	and	can	be	sold	with	the	prior	
consent	of	the	people’s	organization.	
In	Nepal,	leasehold	forestry	was	
designed	to	achieve	the	dual	goals	of	
poverty	reduction	and	ecorestoration	
targeted	specifically	at	degraded	
forestland	areas.	Forest	leases	are	
awarded	for	a	maximum	of	40	years,	
renewable.	Poor	communities	are	exempt	
from	the	leasehold	fee	and	have	so	far	
Some	farmers	insure	against	risk	by	
maintaining	a	set	of	assets	that	they	
can	rapidly	liquidate	in	times	of	trouble	
(Rosenzweig	and	Binswanger,	1993;	Udry,	
1994;	FAO,	1999).	A	standing	forest,	for	
example,	represents	a	potential	source	of	
income	that	can	be	accessed	through	logging	
in	the	case	of	sudden	need.	Holding	livestock	
also	represents	a	common	form	of	insurance	
against	possible	future	shocks.	Farmers	may	
thus	be	unwilling	to	introduce	changes	to	
their	production	systems	that	involve	a	loss	
of	these	means.
Property	rights	comprise	a	fourth	key	
determinant	of	the	incentives	and	constraints	
faced	by	land	users	in	making	land-use	
decisions.	Lacking,	conflicting	or	poorly	
defined	property	rights	to	land,	water	and	
other	natural	resources	are	a	major	barrier	
to	introducing	changes	in	the	management	
of	these	resources	–	particularly	when	the	
changes	would	require	up-front	investment	
in	order	to	obtain	a	return	in	the	future.	
Producers	who	lack	confidence	in	their	ability	
to	reap	the	future	benefits	of	a	change	
in	land	use	will	be	reluctant	to	make	such	
a	change.	Uncertain	or	complex	property	
rights	reduce	the	incentives	of	land	users	to	
adopt	practices	that	offer	increased	private	
returns	over	the	long	term,	even	if	they	can	
afford	the	initial	investment.	Investments	
or	practices	that	increase	soil	organic	
matter,	for	example,	could	both	increase	
farm	productivity	and	enhance	carbon	
sequestration	for	climate	change	mitigation	
over	the	long	term,	but	incentives	to	adopt	
such	measures	will	be	weak	in	the	absence	of	
secure	property	rights.	
The	need	to	coordinate	group	activities	
in	managing	a	common	pool	resource	such	
as	communal	pastures	can	also	be	a	barrier	
to	land-use	changes	(Dasgupta	and	Maler,	
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1995;	Bromley,	1998).	In	addition,	property	
rights	for	a	given	land	area	may	overlap,	
such	as	rights	to	trees,	water	or	post-harvest	
residue	collection	(Dasgupta,	1993).	In	some	
cases,	the	influence	of	specific	land	uses	on	
property	rights	may	constitute	a	barrier.	In	
some	areas,	for	example,	failure	to	cultivate	
crops	may	be	seen	as	a	relinquishment	of	
rights	and	result	in	land	being	allocated	to	
other	farmers;	conversely,	tree	planting	may	
be	seen	as	an	assertion	of	long-term	property	
rights	and	trigger	conflict.	Either	situation	
could	complicate	the	adoption	of	practices	
that	enhance	environmental	services.
Inexistent	or	poorly	defined	property	
rights	to	land	and	water	are	particularly	
problematic	for	poor	rural	land	users,	
preventing	them	from	making	the	necessary	
investments	to	achieve	a	sustainable	
pattern	of	natural	resource	management	
(Dasgupta,	1996;	Deininger,	1999;	Lipper,	
2001;	FAO,	2005b).	Where	the	poor	do	
hold	rights	over	resources,	they	are	often	
held	as	common	property.	A	diverse	range	
of	programmes	that	address	the	issue	of	
property	rights	have	been	implemented	in	
developing	countries,	including	agrarian	
reform,	community	forestry	and	land-titling	
programmes.	Box	10	describes	two	examples	
and	their	implications	for	environmental	
service	supply.
A	final	category	of	barrier	that	farmers	
may	face	in	adopting	new	production	
systems	is	a	failure	of	agricultural	input	
or	output	markets	to	transmit	demand	
effectively.	Many	consumers	would	be	
willing	to	pay	a	premium	for	products	that	
have	been	produced	in	accordance	with	
environmentally	friendly	standards,	such	
as	organically	labelled	produce.	Even	
though	price	premiums	might,	in	theory,	
compensate	farmers	for	the	costs	of	
BOX	10
land tenure and environmental services: insights from the Philippines and nepal 
been	the	main	beneficiaries	of	leasehold	
forestry.	Leaseholds	may	be	granted	for	
producing	raw	materials	for	forestry	
industries,	selling	or	distributing	forest	
products	from	afforestation,	operating	
tourism,	agroforestry	and	maintaining	
insects,	butterflies	and	wildlife.
In	both	the	Philippine	and	Nepalese	
studies,	tenure	programmes	resulted	in	
increases	in	economic	well-being	and	
environmental	benefits,	but	these	were	
highly	site-specific,	depending	upon	the	
physical	and	ecological	context	as	well	
as	vicinity	to	settlements	and	ease	of	
market	access.	In	the	Philippine	study,	
for	example,	direct	use	values	of	forest	
conservation	ranged	from	31	to	90	percent	
of	overall	benefits.	In	the	Nepalese	study,	
wide	variation	in	the	profitability	of	the	
sites	was	found,	also	affected	by	their	
access	to	markets.	
The	case	studies	indicate	that	the	
provision	of	environmental	services	
such	as	biodiversity	conservation	and	
carbon	sequestration	increased	under	
both	programmes,	but	improved	tenure	
alone	is	not	likely	to	be	sufficient	to	
induce	increased	supply.	One	important	
reason	is	that	barriers	other	than	lack	
of	tenure	inhibit	the	potential	supply	
response;	indeed,	farmers’	lack	of	capacity	
to	make	the	investments	necessary	
to	maintain	a	productive	forest	and	
enforcing	the	management	agreements	
were	problematic	in	both	cases.	In	the	
Philippine	study,	the	tenure	to	single	
households	was	much	more	effective	
than	the	community	tenure	instruments	
in	generating	both	private	returns	and	
environmental	services.	However,	that	
may	have	been	a	result	of	allowing	
a	significantly	greater	utilization	of	
resources	under	the	private	tenure	than	
under	the	community-based	instruments.		
Finally,	both	studies	indicate	that,	as	
project	costs	were	substantial,	awarding	
tenure	is	a	relatively	expensive	means	
of	generating	environmental	services,	
although	potential	long-term	social	
benefits	may	justify	the	expense.
Source:	FAO,	2006d.
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Almost	10	000	farmers	in	the	Highlands	
of	Madagascar	produce	vegetables,	
mostly	hand-picked	fine	French	beans	for	
supermarkets	in	Europe,	where	they	fetch	
a	price	that	is	up	to	three	times	higher	
than	the	price	for	the	more	industrially	
produced	French	beans.
As	is	increasingly	common	in	
international	trade,	the	firm	that	
contracts	with	the	farmers	and	exports	
the	produce	is	obliged	to	meet	the	
requirements	of	European	buyers	related	
to	a	variety	of	characteristics	including	
the	quality	of	the	product	(length	of	the	
beans,	colour,	etc.)	and	ethical	standards	
(no	use	of	child	labour,	for	example).
The	exporting	company	has	set	up	an	
elaborate	system	of	contracting	and	
on-farm	monitoring.	The	imposition	
of	the	product	and	process	standards	
and	requirements	calls	for	a	major	
organization	in	terms	of	monitoring	and	
control.	In	this	global	supply	chain,	small	
farmers’	microcontracts	are	combined	
with	extensive	farm	assistance	and	
supervision	programmes	to	fulfil	complex	
quality	requirements	and	phytosanitary	
standards.	
One	of	the	benefits	to	the	Malagasy	
farmers	of	contracting	with	the	exporting	
firm	is	that	it	teaches	them	how	to	make	
compost.	Its	main	benefit	on	the	fields	is	
in	maintaining	the	soil	structure,	providing	
nitrogen	and	other	minerals	that	promote	
healthy	crop	growth	and	in	enhancing	
the	soil’s	ability	to	retain	moisture.	
The	benefits	spill	over	to	other	crops;	
93	percent	of	the	farmers	report	that	they	
have	changed	the	way	they	cultivate	their	
other	off-season	crops.	Composting	may	
also	have	beneficial	impacts	on	carbon	
sequestration	and	on	water	quality	and	
quantity.	Small	farmers	who	participate	in	
these	contracts	have	higher	welfare,	more	
income	stability	and	shorter	lean	periods.	
	
Source:	adapted	from	Minten,	Randrianarison	and	
Swinnen,	2007.
BOX	11
Can high-value agricultural exports enhance environmental services? one example
compliance,	these	niche	markets	are	
often	characterized	by	greater	price	
volatility	and	non-price	marketing	
barriers	(Regouin,	2003;	Smit,	Driessen	
and	Glasbergen,	forthcoming).	In	other	
instances,	specific	market	outlets	may	
motivate	farmers	to	adopt	environmentally	
progressive	management	practices.	
Retailers	may	encourage	the	application	of	
environmentally	beneficial	technology	in	
the	production	of	high-value	products		
for	a	number	of	reasons	(see	Box	11).	
However,	environmental	benefits	will	only	
be	realized	if	farmers	are	able	to	comply	
with	buyers’	terms	and	find	it	worthwhile		
to	do	so.
Poorly	performing	input	markets	can	
also	serve	as	a	barrier:	some	inputs,	such	as	
non-conventional	seed	varieties	or	organic	
fertilizers,	may	not	be	available	for	farmers	
to	purchase	because	the	input	markets	are	
poorly	developed	(FAO,	2006c).	Input	prices	
may	also	be	distorted	artificially	by	policies,	
as	in	the	case	of	fertilizer	subsidies	common	
throughout	Asia,	which	provide	incentives	
for	overuse	(Pingali	et al.,	1998).
Policy options to shape farmers’ 
incentives
Many	options	are	open	to	policy-makers	
for	enhancing	the	incentives	for	resource	
users	to	supply	services	desired	by	society.	
In	the	past,	non-market	instruments	such	as	
regulations	or	taxes	predominated.	Today,	
market-based	approaches,	such	as	payments	
for	environmental	services,	are	increasingly	
being	used	to	complement	these	earlier	
instruments.	This	section	briefly	examines	
five	possible	approaches	to	addressing	the	
situation	in	which	farmers	face	opportunity	
costs	in	providing	the	desired	level	of	an	
environmental	service.	This	is	followed	
by	a	more	detailed	description	of	the	PES	
approach.	
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•	 Command-and-control.	In	this	approach	
the	government	uses	its	regulatory	
powers	to	mandate	certain	behaviours,	
proscribe	others,	and	impose	penalties	
for	non-compliance.	Command-and-
control	is	the	norm	for	pollution	control	
in	industrial	settings.	It	has	also	been	
used	indirectly	to	provide	services	
related	to	wetlands	and	to	protect	
biodiversity.	The	creation	of	a	national	
park	is	one	example	of	this	approach.	
Implementation	requires	continuous	
and	effective	monitoring	to	supervise	
compliance	and	a	functioning	legal	
system	to	punish	non-compliance.
•	 Financial penalties and charges.	This	
approach	modifies	behaviour	through	the	
financial	signals	of	taxes	and	fees.	Such	
an	approach	does	not	prohibit	certain	
activities	outright;	rather,	it	makes	them	
more	expensive	(e.g.	applying	a	charge	
per	kilogram	of	chlorofluorocarbon	
[CFC]	purchased).	To	be	most	effective,	
the	penalty	would	be	applied	directly	
to	the	negative	externality	(e.g.	the	
quantity	of	nitrogen	or	methane	emitted	
from	livestock	production),	but	where	
the	administrative	costs	of	the	direct	
approach	are	high,	which	is	often	a	
defining	characteristic	of	externalities,	
the	penalty	can	be	applied	to	the	activity	
that	generates	the	externality	(e.g.	the	
production	of	livestock).	Again,	this	
approach	requires	a	functioning	taxation	
and	legal	system,	as	well	as	effective	
monitoring	and	enforcement.	
•	 Removing perverse incentives.	In	some	
cases,	policy	measures	generate	incentives	
to	produce	negative	externalities.	Some	
measures	to	support	the	agriculture	
sector	can	create	incentives	for	
environmentally	damaging	responses	
on	the	part	of	farmers.	One	example	is	
fertilizer	subsidies	that	create	incentives	
for	farmers	to	apply	excessive	amounts	of	
chemical	fertilizers,	leading	to	runoff	and	
water	contamination,	or	energy	subsidies	
that	increase	groundwater	withdrawals.	
Much	of	the	impact	of	support	policies	
depends	on	how	they	are	formulated,	
i.e.	whether	they	are	linked	or	“coupled”	
to	specific	practices	or	inputs,	or	take	
the	form	of	direct	payments.	Generally,	
a	switch	from	price	supports	for	either	
inputs	or	outputs	to	direct	income	
payments	for	agricultural	support	policies	
is	considered	to	be	less	likely	to	cause	
environmental	damage.	However,	even	
direct	payments	may	lead	to	incentives	
for	generating	negative	externalities	if	
they	are	based	on	past	production	or	
input	levels	(OECD,	1998).	
•	 Establishing property rights to the 
externality.	This	instrument	relies	on	the	
privatization	and	allocation	of	rights	to	
generate	an	externality.	Examples	are	
permits	to	emit	a	defined	quantity	of	air	
pollution	or	carbon.	In	“cap-and-trade”	
programmes,	such	as	the	sulphur	dioxide	
trading	programme	in	the	United	States	
of	America	and	the	flexible	mechanisms	
under	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	these	
entitlements	may	be	traded.	In	practice,	
property	rights	instruments	often	work	
in	combination	with	other	instruments.	
Trading	programmes,	for	example,	rely	
on	regulations	to	limit	the	total	number	
of	permits	or	quantities	of	emissions	that	
are	allowable.
•	 Payments for environmental services.	
Payments	for	environmental	services	
compensate	the	producer	for	the	
benefits	foregone	as	a	result	of	
switching	systems	to	generate	a	
different	combination	or	higher	levels	of	
environmental	services.	In	many	cases,	
payments	are	made	to	producers	who	
undertake	to	reduce	the	environmental	
damages	they	inflict	on	others	through	
their	production	decisions	–	for	example	
by	causing	erosion,	which	affects	
local	water	systems.	However,	PES	
programmes	may	also	be	used	to	reward	
agricultural	producers	for	generating	
environmental	services	that	offset	
damages	from	other	sectors,	or	they	may	
simply	be	a	way	of	motivating	farmer	
behaviour	to	match	consumer	demands	
for	specific	environmental	attributes.	
Each	of	the	above	policy	measures	
combines	attributes	of	market	and	
regulatory	approaches.	Market-based	
approaches	are	sometimes	thought	of	as	
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distinct	and	separable	from	“non-market”	
approaches.	This	is	a	false	dichotomy.	No	
market	exists	in	isolation	from	social,	political	
and	legal	rights	and	institutions	(whether	
or	not	these	are	formally	defined).	And	no	
social,	political	or	legal	intervention	occurs	
without	implications	for	markets.	Both	–	
together	–	create	interests	and	incentives	
that	motivate	individual	(and	sometimes	
collective)	actions	that,	in	turn,	determine	
individual	and	collective	well-being.	
Payments	for	environmental	services	
can	be	seen	in	this	light.	On	the	one	hand,	
they	can	be	described	as	a	market-based	
approach	in	that	they	involve	direct	financial	
incentives	to	encourage	actions	that	would	
not	otherwise	be	rewarded,	generating	
benefits	that	would	not	otherwise	be	
realized.	Alternatively,	they	might	be	seen	
as	a	political	or	legal	intervention	in	which	
farmers	are	endowed	formally	with	rights	to	
use	natural	resources	in	specified	ways,	and	
allowed	to	sell	some	or	all	of	those	rights	if	
they	wish.	Whichever	way	they	are	described	
or	perceived,	payments	for	environmental	
services	involve	both	institutional	
interventions	and	market	implications.
Other	approaches	do	likewise,	to	varying	
degrees,	and	each	implies	a	particular	
distribution	of	property	rights.	For	example,	
command-and-control	measures	and	
approaches	involving	taxes	and	user	fees	
both	imply	that	society	(in	the	form	of	the	
government)	holds	the	right	to	the	resources	
or	services	in	question;	the	difference	is	that	
in	the	second	case	society	is	willing	to	sell	
or	rent	those	rights	to	other	users.	In	the	
case	of	cap-and-trade	programmes,	society	
may	grant	an	initial	allocation	of	permits	
to	existing	producers	(explicitly	or	implicitly	
acknowledging	that	the	producers	hold	
those	rights	initially),	or	society	may	sell	
those	rights	to	existing	producers	(if	society	
claims	those	rights	initially).
Why payments?
When	are	payments	the	right	policy	
instrument	to	generate	higher	levels	of	
environmental	services	from	agricultural	
producers?	To	answer	this	it	is	necessary	to	
distinguish	between	situations	where	farmers	
are	asked	(i)	to	enhance	the	provision	of	
certain	environmental	services	that	may	
be	degraded	or	undersupplied	as	a	result	
of	current	agricultural	practices,	and	(ii)	to	
offset	pollution	generated	in	other	sectors.	
The	issue	of	the	appropriateness	of	payments	
is	different	for	each	case.	In	the	first	case,	the	
basic	question	is	whether	farmers	should	be	
paid	to	reduce	negative	externalities	rather	
than	be	required	to	bear	the	cost	themselves.	
In	the	second,	the	important	question	is	how	
efficient	offsets	are	in	meeting	the	intended	
objective.	
Reducing negative externalities from 
agriculture
When	should	farmers	be	paid	to	reduce	the	
negative	impacts	of	their	actions	on	others,	
rather	than	required	to	bear	the	cost	of	
changing	practices?	The	appropriateness	of	
the	PES	approach	depends	fundamentally	
on	whether	the	rights	to	use	or	degrade	
the	environmental	services	in	question	are	
held	initially	by	the	producers	or	by	society.	
If	those	rights	are	held	by	producers,	society	
must	pay	producers	if	more	or	different	
environmental	services	are	desired.	If	those	
rights	are	held	by	society,	the	producers	must	
pay	society	if	they	degrade	those	resources	
or	services.
There	are	no	simple	answers	to	this	
question	of	the	allocation	of	property	rights,	
and	the	answer	may	well	differ	from	one	
service	to	the	next,	and	from	one	context	to	
the	next.	In	the	case	of	negative	side-effects	
from	industrial	production,	it	is	generally	
accepted	that	the	polluter	should	pay,	
whereas	in	the	case	of	negative	side-effects	
from	agriculture	this	has	not	historically	
been	the	case.	The	difference	may	have	to	
do	with	scale	of	production,	or	historical	
precedent,	or	equity	considerations,	or	
relative	difficulty	in	identifying	the	source	
or	magnitude	of	negative	side-effects.	
Regardless,	the	distinction	is	blurred	where	
agricultural	production	occurs	on	a	large	
and	concentrated	scale,	as	in	the	case	of	
large	concentrated	livestock	operations;	
in	fact,	such	operations	are	increasingly	
treated	more	like	industrial	point	sources	of	
pollution.
In	the	case	of	smaller	farmers,	whom	
society	has	historically	allowed	to	use	
resources	in	ways	that	may	have	adverse	
environmental	impacts,	changing	
circumstances	may	raise	new	questions.	For	
example,	if	farmers	have	been	using	certain	
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practices	for	generations	and	the	impacts	of	
those	practices	are	being	felt	downstream	for	
the	first	time	because	of	population	growth	
or	changing	preferences	downstream,	who	
should	pay	the	cost	if	society	wishes	farmers	
to	change	their	practices?	Is	the	situation	
different	if	downstream	impacts	increase	
because	the	number	of	farmers	upstream	
increases,	even	if	their	practices	do	not?	
What	if	society’s	preferences	change	because	
of	new	information	about	the	consequences	
of	impacts	that	have	been	occurring	all	
along?	
Equity	and	power	relationships	also	enter	
into	the	calculation.	When	polluters	have	
sufficient	political	power,	they	may	influence	
the	government	to	move	away	from	taxes	or	
direct	control	(Buchanan	and	Tullock,	1975).	
On	the	other	hand,	if	farmers	do	not	have	
the	resources	to	invest	in	pollution	control,	
payments	may	be	politically	preferable	to	
the	possibility	of	reduced	income	(Hochman,	
Zilberman	and	Just,	1977)	–	especially	if	
the	providers	of	environmental	services	are	
poorer	than	the	beneficiaries	(Pagiola	and	
Platais,	2007).
Economic	theory	suggests	that	paying	
farmers	to	change	their	practices	or	
requiring	them	to	bear	the	costs	should	be	
equally	efficient	in	controlling	pollution	
problems	–	if	markets	are	competitive,	
property	rights	are	enforceable	and	there	are	
no	transaction	costs	(Coase,	1960).	In	reality,	
these	conditions	rarely	apply.	The	degree	
to	which	these	conditions	do	not	hold	has	
implications	for	how	efficient	payments	for	
environmental	services	could	be,	as	well	as	
for	their	distributional	implications.	
In	practice,	producing	environmental	
services	by	reducing	agricultural	pollution	
often	requires	a	cumulative	effort	by	
producers	who	are	spatially	dispersed	and	
operating	under	a	wide	range	of	land	uses	
and	land	types.	In	such	cases	a	command-
and-control	approach	to	pollution	control	is	
difficult	to	implement	(Pagiola,	2006;	Wertz-
Kanounnikoff,	2006).	
A	major	advantage	of	PES	programmes	is	
their	capacity	to	manage	externalities.	This	
is	particularly	important	where	information	
about	the	source	of	the	problem	is	lacking	
and	there	are	multiple	potential	producers	
of	a	benefit	with	different	marginal	costs	
of	provision	(Weitzman,	1974;	Pagiola,	
2006;	Wertz-Kanounnikoff,	2006).	Price-
based	mechanisms	are	more	efficient	
than	quantity-based	measures	(such	as	
mandating	behaviour)	in	this	situation	
because	they	“screen	out	the	high	cost	
producers,	encouraging	them	to	produce	
less,	and	encourage	low	cost	units	to	produce	
more”	(Weitzman,	1974,	cited	in	Wertz-
Kanounnikoff,	2006).
Agriculture as a source of offsets for 
negative externalities generated in 
other sectors
When	payments	are	made	to	agricultural	
producers	to	offset	or	mitigate	negative	
externalities	generated	in	other	sectors,	
the	non-agricultural	polluter	is	paying	the	
agriculture	sector	to	meet	a	compliance	
requirement.	This	situation	arises	under	
cap-and-trade	types	of	environmental	
regulation,	such	as	the	flexible	mechanisms	
of	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	whereby	industries	
under	obligation	to	reduce	carbon	emissions	
are	allowed	to	purchase	emission	offsets	
from	agricultural	producers	in	the	form	
of	increased	carbon	sequestration	in	their	
land	use.	In	this	case,	agricultural	producers	
themselves	do	not	have	any	legal	obligation	
to	reduce	emissions,	but	they	do	have	an	
opportunity	to	offset	the	emissions	of	others	
–	and	to	gain	financially	by	doing	so.	
Similarly,	under	the	practice	of	wetlands	
mitigation	banking	in	the	United	States	of	
America,	developers	must	obtain	a	permit	
in	order	to	dredge	or	fill	a	wetland	(see	
Box	12).	For	issuance	of	the	wetlands	permit	
the	government	agency	requires	mitigation	
of	destroyed	wetlands	to	ensure	no	net	
loss.	On-site	mitigation	has	had	a	poor	
success	record,	so,	in	the	1990s,	government	
regulators	began	to	allow	the	use	of	a	
market	mechanism	that	would,	in	principle,	
ensure	wetlands	conservation	at	minimum	
economic	and	political	cost.	
The	agriculture	sector	may	also	supply	
biodiversity	offsets	for	losses	generated	
by	mining	or	oil	operations.	The	
appropriateness	of	payment	programmes	
depends	on	their	effectiveness	in	generating	
the	desired	environmental	services.	Here,	
part	of	the	difficulty	lies	in	establishing	
equivalent	values	where	service	provision	
is	location-specific	(e.g.	the	biodiversity	
conserved	in	one	site	is	not	the	same	as	that	
in	another	site).	Another	issue	is	risk.	In	the	
negotiations	leading	to	the	establishment	
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of	the	CDM,	concerns	over	the	risk	of	
reversibility	of	emission	reductions	from	
sequestration	(e.g.	the	possibility	that	trees	
could	be	cut	or	burned,	thus	reversing	
the	climate	change	mitigation	benefits	
obtained),	resulted	in	caps	on	the	amount	
of	credits	allowable	from	this	source	and	in	
narrow	definitions	of	the	types	of	land-use	
change	that	could	qualify.
Potential	suppliers	may	also	have	
concerns	related	to	offset	markets.	Loss	
of	national	sovereignty	or	increased	
dependence	on	payments	from	rich	
countries	count	among	the	problematic	
issues	surrounding	the	supply	of	globally	
important	environmental	services	such	as	
climate	change	mitigation	or	biodiversity	
conservation.	Criticism	of	PES	programmes	
as	“rents	against	development”,	i.e.	
compensating	the	poor	for	not	developing,	
has	also	been	voiced,	particularly	in	cases	
where	the	environmental	service	requires	
a	strict	conservationist	approach	(Wertz-
Kanounnikoff,	2006).
Supply response to payments for 
environmental services
How	will	agricultural	producers	respond	
to	payments	for	environmental	services?	
Payment	programmes	typically	seek	to	
increase	provision	of	the	services	through	
changes	in	farmers’	land-use	practices.	
Biodiversity	offset	programmes	can	take	
a	variety	of	forms,	and	are	found	in	both	
developed	and	developing	countries.	
The	general	principle	they	are	built	upon	
is	“no	net	loss”	of	biodiversity.	In	some	
cases,	the	principle	is	ensured	through	a	
legal	requirement,	in	others	through	a	
voluntary	response.		
One	of	the	most	well-known	regulatory	
cases	is	wetlands	mitigation	banking	in	
the	United	States	of	America.	Under	this	
programme,	a	“bank”	of	wetlands	habitat	
is	created	by	restoration	or	preservation	of	
wetlands.	These	are	then	made	available	
to	developers	of	wetlands	habitat,	who	
must	“buy”	mitigation	as	a	condition	of	
government	approval	for	development.	
The	ratio	of	destroyed	wetland	to	
mitigated	wetland	can	vary,	but	generally	
the	developer	must	restore	more	wetland	
than	the	amount	being	destroyed	(often	
at	ratios	of	more	than	two	to	one).	
Another	example	is	the	European	
Union’s	Habitats	Directive,	according	
to	which	developers	can	offset	any	
damage	that	projects	may	have	caused	
on	designated	conservation	priority	sites	
by	undertaking	positive	conservation	
measures	in	other	conservation	priority	
sites	(ten	Kate,	Bishop	and	Bayon,	2004).	
Australia,	Brazil,	Canada	and	Switzerland	
are	other	examples	of	countries	with	a	
legal	framework	for	biodiversity	offsets.	
An	example	of	a	voluntary	offset	comes	
from	the	Chad	to	Cameroon	oil	pipeline	
project,	where	partners	of	a	US$3.5	billion	
project	(ExxonMobil,	Petronas,	and	
Chevron),	together	with	the	World	Bank,	
established	an	environmental	foundation,	
two	new	national	parks	and	a	plan	to	
provide	benefits	to	indigenous	people	
who	may	be	affected	by	the	project,	as	a	
means	of	offsetting	potential	social	and	
environmental	damages	of	the	project	
(ten	Kate,	Bishop	and	Bayon,	2004).
While	attractive	in	principle,	mitigation	
programmes	have	a	mixed	record	in	two	
respects.	The	first	is	the	quality	of	the	
mitigated	habitat.	In	the	early	years	of	
the	United	States	wetlands	mitigation,	
enforcement	was	poor	and	many	restored	
wetlands	were	not	viable.	Second,	how	
to	assess	the	“success”	of	a	mitigation	
programme	needs	careful	consideration.	
One	issue	relates	to	how	well	any	specific	
ecosystem’s	services	can	be	replaced	by	
those	of	another.	Ecosystems	differ	by	
type,	location	and	the	services	they	deliver.	
Guidelines	on	setting	the	requirements	
for	an	offset	vary	by	programme	and	in	
some	cases	are	not	well	defined.	How	well	
these	programmes	actually	do	promote	
conservation	remains	controversial	(ten	
Kate,	Bishop	and	Bayon,	2004;	FAO,	2007d).
BOX	12
biodiversity offset programmes around the world
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In	the	Silvopastoral	Project	in	Nicaragua,	
for	example	(see	Box	26	on	p.	109),	over	
24	percent	of	the	project	area	underwent	
some	form	of	land-use	change	during	
the	project’s	first	two	years	–	a	level	far	
higher	than	those	observed	in	surrounding	
communities	(Pagiola	et al.,	2007).	
From	a	farmer’s	perspective,	supplying	
more	of	a	service	involves	costs	in	terms	of	
foregone	benefits.	Such	benefits	can	include	
the	market	value	of	crop	production,	food	
security	provided	by	producing	one’s	own	
food,	insurance	against	risk	in	the	form	of	
liquid	assets,	flexibility	in	type	and	amount	
of	labour	and	leisure	time,	and	cultural	
preferences	for	a	certain	way	of	life.	The	
foregone	benefits,	or	opportunity	costs,	
involved	in	making	a	change	in	production	
system	are	crucial	to	understanding	where	
and	when	farmers	will	respond	to	payments	
for	environmental	services.	
The	following	section	examines	the	
relative	profitability	of	environmental	
service	production	systems	versus	baseline	
production	systems.	Estimates	of	the	
opportunity	costs	farmers	face	in	making	
proposed	changes	are	then	developed	as	
a	key	indicator	of	what	it	would	take	to	
provide	incentives	to	producers	inducing	
them	to	change.	
A framework for assessing the 
opportunity costs of supplying 
environmental services
The	opportunity	cost	involved	in	changing	
production	systems	is	a	function	of	the	
change	in	the	use	of	inputs,	including	land	
and	labour,	and	the	resulting	outputs,	
such	as	agricultural	products	or	ecosystem	
services,	as	well	as	the	prices	of	both.	
Costs	vary	significantly	by	agro-ecological	
conditions,	agricultural	technology	
employed,	level	of	economic	development	
and	policy	environment.	The	relative	
abundance	of	productive	resources	such	
as	land,	labour	and	water	is	a	key	factor	
affecting	their	relative	prices	and	the	types	
of	technology	most	likely	to	be	adopted	
(Hayami	and	Ruttan,	1985).	In	densely	
populated	areas,	the	opportunity	cost	
of	labour	will	generally	be	lower	than	in	
areas	where	labour	is	scarce	relative	to	
land.	The	level	of	economic	development,	
both	in	agriculture	and	other	sectors,	
also	affects	input	and	output	prices	and	
is	thus	critical	for	opportunity	costs.	For	
example,	increasing	economic	development	
in	the	non-agricultural	sector	of	a	country	
can	raise	the	opportunity	costs	of	labour	
by	providing	new	opportunities	for	
employment	and	income	generation.	Rising	
labour	costs	will	also	enhance	the	incentives	
for	farmers	to	seek	and	adopt	labour-saving	
technologies.	
Lipper,	Pingali	and	Zurek	(forthcoming)	
have	developed	a	framework	for	
classifying	farming	systems	according	to	
the	opportunity	costs	of	land	and	labour	
(Figure	9).	Subsistence	farming	systems	based	
on	the	production	of	traditional	staple	crops	
on	lands	with	poor	natural	productivity,	
as	in	many	sub-Saharan	African	countries,	
exemplify	systems	with	low	opportunity	
costs	of	both	land	and	labour.	Where	labour	
is	abundant	but	land	is	scarce,	intensive	
cereal	systems	have	developed,	relying	on	
high-yielding	varieties	and	fertilizers	to	
increase	productivity	while	saving	land.	
Typical	examples	are	the	intensively	managed	
rice–wheat	production	systems	in	the	Indian	
Punjab	or	the	intensive	rice-production	
systems	found	in	Southeast	Asia.	Intensive	
livestock	production,	generally	associated	
with	stall	feeding,	is	also	common.
In	areas	where	land	is	abundant	but	
labour	is	scarce,	farming	systems	dependent	
on	labour-saving	technology,	such	as	the	
mechanized	cereal	production	systems	of	
Australia,	Canada	and	the	United	States	of	
America,	prevail.	Extensive	agropastoralist	
and	slash-and-burn	systems	often	fall	into	
this	category.	In	contrast,	high	opportunity	
costs	of	both	land	and	labour	can	be	found	
in	areas	with	high	population	density	and	
dynamic,	well-functioning	manufacturing	
and/or	services	sectors	that	provide	off-farm	
labour	opportunities.	Examples	include	the	
intensively	managed	fruit	and	vegetable	
production	areas	around	the	Mediterranean	
(e.g.	Egypt,	Israel	and	Spain).
The	four	categories	of	farming	systems	
in	Figure	9	provide	a	point	of	departure	in	
analysing	the	opportunity	cost	to	a	farmer	
of	making	a	shift	in	land	use	in	order	to	
enhance	environmental	service	provision.	
At	the	beginning	of	Chapter	2,	three	major	
types	of	changes	were	identified:	changes	
in	production	systems	(where	land	remains	
in	agriculture);	land	diversion	(where	land	
is	converted	from	agriculture	to	other	uses);	
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and	avoided	land	diversion	(such	as	avoiding	
the	conversion	from	forest	to	agriculture).	
Land-diversion	programmes	would	be	
most	relevant	where	the	opportunity	costs	
of	land	are	low	in	agriculture.	In	land-
abundant	areas,	including	areas	where	
rising	off-farm	employment	opportunities	
have	drawn	populations	out	of	rural	areas,	
the	potential	for	setting	aside	land	for	non-
agricultural	uses	is	high.	In	such	areas,	the	
trade-off	with	food	and	fibre	production	
is	limited,	particularly	when	transport	
infrastructure	is	a	constraining	factor	for	
competitive	agricultural	production.	In	
land-scarce	environments,	on	the	other	
hand,	the	trade-off	between	agricultural	
and	non-agricultural	services	is	significant,	
and	changes	within	production	systems	
that	retain	a	fairly	high	level	of	agricultural	
production	alongside	environmental	
service	provision	will	tend	to	have	lower	
opportunity	costs.	When	considering	
the	labour	dimension,	labour-increasing	
changes	in	production	systems	(e.g.	a	move	
from	pasture	to	agroforestry)	will	be	most	
suited	in	areas	with	low	opportunity	costs	
of	labour.	Conversely,	labour-saving	changes	
would	be	called	for	in	areas	of	labour	
scarcity.	
Map	5	overlays	information	about	areas	
considered	as	biodiversity	“hotspots”,12	with	
information	on	suitability	for	agriculture	
and	on	current	land-use	patterns.13	Hotspots	
are	often	associated	with	high	willingness	
to	pay	for	biodiversity	conservation.	For	
example,	partly	because	of	the	proximity	of	a	
 Biodiversity hotspot maps are generated by Conservation 
International. They hold especially high numbers of 
endemic species, yet their combined area of remaining 
habitat covers only .3 percent of the Earth’s land surface. 
Each hotspot faces extreme threats and has already lost 
at least 70 percent of its original natural vegetation. Over 
50 percent of the world’s plant species and  percent 
of all terrestrial vertebrate species are endemic to the 
3 biodiversity hotspots. The Biodiversity Hotspots Species 
Database is available at www.biodiversityhotspots.org. 
3 Because biodiversity hotspots are based on both 
biodiversity of endemic species and threat, they may 
conflate other variables such as land values and agricultural 
suitability, as expansion of agriculture is a key source 
of threat. Thus, overlaying hotspots with areas of low 
agricultural suitability may generate a lower estimate of 
areas that are high in biodiversity and low in agricultural 
values than those generated by approaches that use other 
measures of biodiversity (Wilson et al., 006).
FIGURE 9
Dryland farming system types: a classification framework according 
to opportunity costs of land and labour 
?? High-value commercial
 agriculture
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Source: adapted from Lipper, Pingali and Zurek, forthcoming.
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large,	relatively	highly	educated	population,	
there	are	many	private	and	civil	society-
backed	schemes	to	conserve	the	Atlantic	
Forest	hotspot	in	Brazil.	The	map	indicates	
areas	where	the	opportunity	costs	are	
potentially	low	for	supplying	biodiversity	
conservation	services	by	either	avoiding	
conversion	of	land	to	agriculture	or	changing	
farming	system	practices	on	lands	currently	
in	agricultural	production.	The	red	areas	
represent	croplands	in	biodiversity	hotspot	
regions	with	low	suitability	for	rainfed	
production.14	In	these	areas,	the	costs	of	
taking	land	out	of	agriculture	or	changing	
the	production	system	within	agriculture	to	
supply	biodiversity	conservation	are	likely	
to	be	low	and	the	returns	to	conserving	
biodiversity	high.	Indeed,	they	combine	low	
opportunity	costs	of	making	the	change	with	
high	productivity	of	environmental	services	
provision.	In	these	areas,	farmers	would	be	
expected	to	respond	to	relatively	low	levels	
 The suitability for rainfed production is based on the 
Global Agro-Ecological Zones model for intermediate level 
of inputs. Irrigated areas are excluded.
of	payments	for	biodiversity	conservation,	
because	they	are	giving	up	relatively	low	
levels	of	potential	agricultural	production	to	
provide	the	service.	
Gorenflo	and	Brandon	(2006)	identified	
priority	locations	for	biodiversity	
conservation	efforts	by	looking	at	the	
potential	social	and	financial	costs	of	
conserving	biodiversity	through	maintaining	
a	non-agricultural	land	use.	According	
to	their	analysis,	nearly	three-quarters	
of	the	priority	locations	for	biodiversity	
conservation	coincide	with	large	tracts	
of	sparsely	populated	lands	with	limited	
suitability	for	agricultural	production.	
Main	clusters	of	such	sites	were	found	in	
southern	Africa	and	Madagascar,	the	Andes,	
the	coastal	area	of	Brazil,	Central	America,	
various	locations	in	east	and	southeast	China	
and	the	western	Indian	coast.	Their	identified	
locations	coincide	with	several	of	the	
yellow	shaded	areas	in	Map	5,	which	show	
biodiversity	hotspots	of	low	agricultural	
suitability	not	currently	in	croplands.	They	
also	noted	that	in	areas	of	high	population	
densities	and	potential	for	crop	production,	a	
variety	of	conservation	tools	will	be	necessary	
Note: available at 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/google.kml?id=31155&layers=biodiversity_hotspots
Source: FAO.
MAP 5
Biodiversity hotspots in croplands poorly suited to rainfed agriculture
Biodiversity hotspots in other areas
with low agricultural suitability
Other biodiversity hotspots
Biodiversity hotspots in croplands
with low agricultural suitability
Biodiversity hotspots in other croplands
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to	achieve	biodiversity	conservation,	
including	conservation	incentive	agreements.	
Map	6	builds	further	upon	Map	4	(p.	26)	
by	adding	information	on	suitability	for	
rainfed	production.	In	many	areas,	a	
combination	of	economic,	agro-ecological	
and	spatial	characteristics	suggest	a	high	
probability	of	their	conversion	from	forest	
to	agriculture.	Yet	many	of	these	areas	
are	not	likely	to	be	very	productive	for	
rainfed	agriculture	–	these	areas	are	shown	
in	red.	Here,	irrigated	agriculture	may	be	
productive	but	will	require	investment.	To	
the	extent	that	these	areas	are	important	
for	biodiversity	conservation	or	other	
environmental	services,	higher	returns	
to	the	land	may	be	obtained	by	avoiding	
conversion.
MAP 6
Projected expansion of cropland and pasture to lands poorly suited 
to rainfed agriculture, 2000–2010
Note: available at 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/google.kml?id=31161&layers=cropland_pasture_expansion_low_def
Source: FAO.
Other areas with projected expansion of cropland and pasture 
Projected expansion of cropland and pasture in areas with low agricultural suitability
Other areas with low agricultural suitability
Non-study area
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Empirical evidence on the supply 
response to payments for environmental 
services
Several	studies	have	examined	the	level	of	
payments	needed	to	induce	farmers	to	adopt	
cropping	systems	that	increase	the	supply	of	
environmental	services.	Most	have	focused	
on	carbon	sequestration	(or	in	some	cases	
avoided	emissions)	in	response	to	varying	
payment	levels.	Generally,	they	indicate	that	
the	economic	potential	is	considerably	lower	
than	the	technical	potential	but	that	it	varies	
considerably	according	to	location	and	the	
type	of	farming	system	or	land-use	change	
considered.	
Chomitz	(2007)	estimated	the	cost	of	
reducing	deforestation	using	data	on	the	
return	to	common	alternative	land-use	
systems	in	the	selected	areas.	Figure	10	
shows	that	relatively	low	carbon	prices	of	
around	US$11	per	tonne	would	be	sufficient	
to	provide	incentives	to	producers	to	reduce	
deforestation.	The	changes	in	land	use	that	
result	in	reduced	deforestation	at	the	lowest	
costs	are	those	that	also	generate	other	
sources	of	income	from	the	land,	such	as	
community	forestry	and	nut	extraction.
The	trade-offs	faced	by	farmers	in	
adopting	potential	land-use	changes	were	
the	focus	of	the	“Alternatives	to	Slash	
and	Burn”	(ASB)	initiative	by	national,	
international	and	non-governmental	
organizations	in	several	countries	in	
Africa,	Asia	and	Latin	America.15	The	
ASB	initiative	has	conducted	detailed	
assessments	in	Brazil,	Cameroon	and	
Indonesia	of	the	trade-offs	involved	in	
generating	biodiversity	conservation	and	
carbon	sequestration	–	along	with	their	
implications	for	income	and	food	security.	
Figure	11	presents	results	from	a	case-study	
site	in	Cameroon	comparing	the	financial	
returns	to	various	agricultural	production	
systems	with	the	carbon	they	sequester.	
From	a	carbon	sequestration	perspective,	
the	largest	gains	are	indisputably	achieved	
through	leaving	the	forest	intact;	however,	
this	option	generates	essentially	no	financial	
returns.	Moving	from	food	crop/short	
fallow	to	food	crop/long	fallow	significantly	
increases	carbon	sequestration,	but	reduces	
profitability.	However,	moving	from	food	
5 For further information, see www.asb.cgiar.org.
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Source: Chomitz, 2007, based on data from Tomich et al., 2005a.
FIGURE 10
Level of carbon payments required to provide incentives for reducing emissions
by avoided deforestation 
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crop/short	fallow	to	intensive	cocoa	(with	
or	without	fruit	sales)	increases	yields	in	
both	carbon	sequestration	and	agricultural	
profitability.	
The	International	Energy	Agency	
Greenhouse	Gas	Research	and	Development	
Programme	(IEA	GHG)	conducted	an	
assessment	of	the	potential	and	cost	of	
enhanced	carbon	sequestration	in	soils	
for	five	countries	and	regions,	including	
southeastern	Australia,	India,	northern	
Kazakhstan,	Sweden	and	Uruguay.	Two	
types	of	land-use	change	were	considered,	
depending	on	technical	feasibility	at	the	
location:	the	adoption	of	minimum	or	
no-tillage	in	cropping	systems	and	the	
conversion	of	cropland	to	permanent	grass	
or	pasture.	According	to	the	assessment,	
which	also	included	estimates	of	transaction	
costs,	at	relatively	low	carbon	prices	(less	
than	US$50	per	tonne)	only	about	16	percent	
of	the	total	technical	potential	would	be	
realized	over	a	20-year	period.	However,	
at	a	price	of	US$200	per	tonne	(equivalent	
to	approximately	US$55	per	tonne	of	
carbon	dioxide),	61	percent	of	the	technical	
potential	was	supplied,	with	farmers	
entering	into	contracts	on	80	percent	of	the	
available	land	(IEA	GHG,	2005).	
Lewandrowski	et al.	(2004)	modelled	
supply	response	for	carbon	sequestration	in	
the	United	States	of	America	under	varying	
land-use	and	payment	options.	At	low	
levels	of	payments,	additional	soil	carbon	
sequestration	would	be	achieved	primarily	
through	the	adoption	of	conservation	
tillage,	for	which,	indeed,	private	returns	
are	very	similar	to	those	of	the	baseline;	
that	is,	opportunity	costs	are	low.	Only	at	
incentive	levels	of	US$125	per	tonne	would	
producers	be	willing	to	shift	from	cropping	
to	grasslands.	
Diagana	et al.	(2007)	analysed	farmers’	
supply	response	to	payments	for	soil	carbon	
sequestration	for	the	Nioro	region	of	
Senegal’s	Peanut	Basin.	Soil	and	climate	
data	were	used	to	estimate	crop	yields	and	
changes	in	soil	carbon	stocks	under	nine	
scenarios	of	increased	fertilizer	use	and	
increased	incorporation	of	crop	residues	in	a	
peanut–millet	rotation	system.	An	economic	
model	was	used	to	simulate	a	carbon	
payment	scheme	requiring	farmers	to	apply	
higher	fertilizer	rates	and	incorporate	some	
crop	residues	into	the	soil.	Figure	12	shows	
the	carbon	sequestration	supply	curve	for	the	
scenario	that	incorporates	half	of	the	peanut	
residue.	The	vertical	axis	shows	the	price	paid	
Time-averaged carbon (tonne/ha)
Financial profitability (US$/ha)
FIGURE 11
Profitability and carbon sequestration in Cameroon
Source: Tomich et al., 2005b.
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per	tonne	of	carbon	sequestered	and	the	
horizontal	axis	indicates	the	corresponding	
average	annual	quantity	of	carbon	
sequestered	over	the	20-year	life	of	the	
contract	in	the	Nioro	region.	At	a	payment	of	
US$100	per	tonne,	more	than	500	000	tonnes	
of	carbon	were	estimated	to	be	supplied	by	
the	region.
The	potential	supply	response	of	small	
landholders	in	the	central	highlands	of	
Chiapas	in	Mexico	to	payments	for	above-
ground	carbon	sequestration	obtained	by	
switching	to	forestry	and	agroforestry	were	
estimated	by	De	Jong,	Tipper	and	Montoya-
Gómez	(2000).	According	to	their	estimates,	a	
positive	supply	response	to	payments	would	
be	obtained	at	prices	between	US$5	and	
US$15	tonne	of	carbon	with	the	adoption	
of	community	forestry	and	improved	
fallow	systems.	Their	findings	indicate	that	
improved	management	of	natural	forests	
and	secondary	vegetation	will	be	the	most	
important	elements	of	any	large-scale	carbon	
sequestration	programme	in	the	area.
FAO	(2003c)	modelled	the	cost	of	switching	
from	cassava	to	agroforestry	systems	in	
Indonesia	and	the	break-even	carbon	price	
needed	to	generate	such	shifts.	Table	9	
shows	the	net	present	values	of	four	
agroforestry	systems,	assuming	a	70-year	
time	frame	and	poor	quality	lands.	The	
results	indicate	that	cinnamon	production	
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FIGURE 12
Carbon supply response in Nioro Region, Senegal
Source: adapted from Diagana et al., 2007.
Carbon sequestered after 20 years (tonnes)
TAblE 9
Financial performance and costs of selected agroforestry systems on poor land: 
modelling results for Sumatra, Indonesia over 70 years
 AGRoFoRESTRy SySTEM
Rubber Cinnamon Damar1 oil-palm
Net	present	value	(US$/ha) –96.35 114.99 –36.46 –91.10
Average	carbon	stock	(tonnes/ha) 21.18 11.35 51.34 13.31
Opportunity	cost2	(US$/ha) 132.35 –78.99 72.46 127.10
Sequestration	cost	(US$/tonne carbon) 6.25 –6.96 1.41 9.55
1	The	damar	system	is	a	complex	agroforest	developed	by	the	Krui	people	of	Lampung,	south	Sumatra.		
The	system	consists	of	a	sequence	of	crops	building	up	to	a	“climax	that	mimics	mature	natural	forest”	(ASB,	2001).		
The	main	tree	species	is	damar	(Shorea javanica),	a	source	of	resin	that	provides	a	flow	of	income.	
2	Cost	(in	terms	of	net	present	value)	of	switching	land	use	from	cassava	to	agroforestry.
Source:	FAO,	2003c.
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would	be	profitable	even	without	carbon	
payments,	whereas	damar	(an	indigenous	
management	system)	would	require	very	low	
levels	of	carbon	payments	to	support.
In	general,	the	supply	response	to	
payments	for	environmental	services	
will	depend	on	the	opportunity	costs	of	
changing	practices,	which	depend,	in	turn,	
on	the	degree	to	which	the	land-use	or	
farming-system	change	reduces	agricultural	
production	and	income.	In	cases	where	
high	environmental	service	benefits	can	be	
achieved	with	little	reduction	(or	even	a	
gain)	in	agricultural	production	and	income,	
low	payments	can	trigger	significant	supply	
response,	and	thus	PES	programmes	are	
likely	to	be	cost-effective.	This	situation	
corresponds	to	case	1	shown	in	Table	10.	
In	the	opposite	case,	where	environmental	
service	benefits	are	low	but	opportunity	
costs	are	high	(case	4),	PES	programmes	are	
unlikely	to	be	cost-effective.
In	the	intermediate	cases,	environmental	
service	benefits	are	proportional	to	
opportunity	costs.	For	example,	in	many	
areas	the	adoption	of	conservation	
agriculture	in	place	of	conventional	tillage	
systems	involves	relatively	low	levels	of	
opportunity	cost	for	producers,	because	
the	change	does	not	result	in	a	major	
decrease	(and	may	even	lead	to	an	increase)	
in	agricultural	output,	but	environmental	
service	benefits	are	correspondingly	low.	This	
situation	corresponds	to	case	2.	In	contrast,	
when	changes	in	production	systems	to	
enhance	the	supply	of	environmental	services	
result	in	a	large	decrease	in	agricultural	
production	and	income,	producers	face	
significant	opportunity	costs.	Here,	for	a	
change	to	be	attractive	to	producers,	either	
the	quantity	of	the	environmental	service	
that	can	potentially	be	supplied	or	its	price	
must	be	high	(case	3).	Cost-effectiveness	in	
these	intermediate	cases	depends	on	the	
precise	magnitudes	of	per-hectare	payment	
levels	and	environmental	service	benefits	
provided.	
In	the	case	of	carbon	sequestration,	this	
suggests	two	situations	(cases	1	and	2)	where	
a	positive	supply	response	can	be	expected	
from	agricultural	producers	even	at	relatively	
low	levels	of	carbon	prices,	and	a	third	
situation	(case	3)	where	a	positive	supply	
response	would	require	a	higher	carbon	price	
but	could	still	be	cost-effective	because	a	
higher	level	of	carbon	sequestration	would	
be	generated.	Shifting	from	conventional	to	
conservation	agriculture	and	generating	soil	
carbon	sequestration	is	an	example	of	the	
former	two	situations,	while	reforestation	on	
degraded	pastureland	could	be	an	example	
of	the	latter.	
What	has	experience	from	PES	
programmes	in	the	field	shown	us	about	
producers’	supply	response	to	payments?	
Not	surprisingly,	evidence	suggests	that	
supply	response	has	been	positive	in	the	
case	of	land-use	changes	that	have	no	or	
only	low	opportunity	costs.	In	Costa	Rica,	for	
example,	payments	for	forest	conservation	–	
which	essentially	reward	the	provision	of	
environmental	services	regardless	of	whether	
they	are	incremental	to	a	baseline	supply	–	
were	very	popular	among	landowners,	and	
the	supply	of	forest	conservation	services	
exceeded	the	funding	capacity	of	the	
programme	(Pagiola,	2006).	This	outcome	
was	in	large	part	attributable	to	the	low	
opportunity	costs	landowners	faced	(Pagiola,	
2006;	Ortiz,	Sage	and	Borge,	2003).	De	Jong,	
Tipper	and	Montoya-Gómez	(2000)	noted	
that	substantial	shifts	in	land	uses	were	
obtained	under	the	Scolel	Té	pilot	project	
for	above-ground	carbon	sequestration	
TAblE 10
Cost-effectiveness of the PES approach under different circumstances
HIGH environmental
service benefits
loW environmental
service benefits
loW
oPPoRTUnITy CoSTS
1.			PES	approach	likely	to	be	
cost-effective
2.			PES	approach	may	be	cost-
effective
HIGH
oPPoRTUnITy CoSTS
3.			PES	approach	may	be	cost-
effective
4.			PES	approach	unlikely	to	be	
cost-effective
Source:	FAO.
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even	with	only	modest	incentive	payments,	
precisely	because	conventional	agricultural	
production	was	only	marginally	profitable.
Assessments	of	supply	response	to	date	
have	not	taken	into	account	the	recent	rapid	
growth	in	the	market	for	bioenergy,	which	is	
likely	to	result	in	substantial	changes	in	the	
opportunity	costs	of	supplying	environmental	
services.	Bioenergy,	defined	as	energy	
produced	from	organic	matter	or	biomass,	
has	recently	become	one	of	the	most	
dynamic	and	rapidly	changing	sectors	of	the	
global	energy	economy	(UN-Energy,	2007).	
The	use	of	biomass	in	the	form	of	plants	and	
trees	increases	demand	for	land	and	water	
resources.	The	extent	to	which	the	growth	of	
the	bioenergy	sector	will	affect	the	provision	
of	other	ecosystem	services,	including	food	
production	as	well	as	climate	regulation	and	
other	environmental	services,	is	the	subject	
of	considerable	interest	and	attention.	While	
significant	impacts	are	possible,	their	nature	
and	magnitude	remain	uncertain	(UN-Energy,	
2007).
Conclusions
Given	the	importance	of	ecosystem	services,	
why	are	they	not	provided	at	the	levels	
desired	by	society?	Ecosystem	services	
are	produced	(or	degraded)	through	the	
interaction	of	natural	processes	and	the	
actions	of	individual	decision-makers,	
including	agricultural	producers.	For	a	variety	
of	reasons,	the	full	value	of	all	ecosystem	
services	is	not	reflected	in	the	incentives	
faced	by	the	service	providers.	As	a	result,	
providers’	actions	may	diverge	from	those	
desired	by	beneficiaries	of	the	ecosystem	
services.	
Many	possible	changes	in	resource	use	that	
would	benefit	the	environment	are	not	likely	
to	be	adopted	by	farmers	in	the	absence	
of	motivating	policy	measures,	because	
they	would	result	in	lower	benefits	to	the	
producers	themselves.	For	example,	setting	
land	aside	from	crop	production	and	placing	
(or	leaving)	it	under	natural	grass	or	forest	
cover	could	enhance	carbon	sequestration	
as	well	as	provision	of	biodiversity,	water	
quality	and,	possibly,	other	ecosystem	services.	
Likewise,	reducing	the	number	of	livestock	or	
managing	manure	to	reduce	nitrogen	runoff	
to	surface	water,	infiltration	to	groundwater	
or	emissions	to	the	atmosphere	could	have	
beneficial	impacts	on	the	environment	but	
would	probably	increase	costs	or	reduce	
returns	to	the	producer.	
Many	farmers,	particularly	in	developing	
countries,	also	face	a	wide	array	of	
constraints	that	increase	opportunity	costs	
and	raise	additional	barriers	to	the	adoption	
of	new	practices:	constraints	on	access	to	
information,	appropriate	technologies	and	
financing,	as	well	as	inexistent	or	insecure	
property	rights	and	legal	or	regulatory	
constraints.	These	constraints	are	often	
compounded	by	poorly	functioning	markets	
and	infrastructure,	risk	and	difficulties	in	
the	collective	management	of	commonly	
held	resources,	such	as	pasturelands	or	
fisheries.	The	presence	of	one	or	more	of	
these	problems	makes	it	more	difficult	
for	producers	to	change	their	resource	
management	practices	in	ways	that	could	
increase	their	output	of	environmental	
services	–	and	in	some	cases	of	conventional	
agricultural	commodities.
Policy-makers	have	several	options	for	
providing	resource	users	with	incentives	
for	farmers	to	change	their	behaviour	in	
order	to	supply	the	services	society	desires.	
In	the	past,	non-market	instruments	such	as	
regulations	or	taxes	predominated;	today,	
market-based	approaches,	such	as	payments	
for	environmental	services,	are	increasingly	
complementing	these	earlier	instruments.	
When	are	payments	the	right	policy	
instrument	to	generate	higher	levels	of	
environmental	services	from	farmers?	To	
answer	this	question,	a	distinction	must	be	
made	between	the	two	cases	where	farmers	
are	being	asked	(i)	to	enhance	the	provision	
of	certain	ecosystem	services	that	may	be	
degraded	or	undersupplied	as	a	result	of	
their	current	agricultural	practices	or	(ii)	to	
offset	pollution	generated	in	other	sectors.	
In	the	first	case,	the	critical	issue	is	
whether	farmers	should	be	paid	to	reduce	
the	negative	externalities	they	generate	
rather	than	requiring	them	to	bear	the	cost	
themselves.	A	fundamental	issue	is	whether	
the	rights	to	the	environmental	services	in	
question	are	held	initially	by	producers	or	
by	society.	If	they	are	held	by	producers,	
society	needs	to	compensate	the	producers	
if	more	or	different	environmental	services	
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 72
are	desired;	if	they	are	held	by	society,	the	
cost	of	degrading	the	resources	or	should	be	
borne	by	the	responsible	producers.	There	
are	no	simple	solutions	to	determining	which	
situation	applies.	The	answer	may	well	differ	
from	one	service	to	the	next,	and	from	one	
context	to	another.	
In	the	second	case,	the	appropriateness	
of	payments	depends	on	the	efficiency	
of	offsets	in	meeting	the	intended	
objective.	Here,	the	PES	approach	may	be	
conceptually	straightforward	with	regard	
to	carbon	sequestration,	where	benefits	are	
independent	of	location.	For	location-specific	
environmental	services,	however,	establishing	
equivalent	values	of	service	provision	may	be	
difficult	(for	example,	biodiversity	conserved	
in	one	location	may	differ	from	that	of	
another	location).		
Whether	and	where	farmers	will	make	
changes	in	production	systems	in	response	to	
payments	for	environmental	services	depends	
on	the	opportunity	costs	or	foregone	
benefits	implied	in	making	the	change.	
These	vary	significantly	by	agro-ecological	
conditions,	type	of	technology	employed,	
level	of	economic	development	and	policy	
environment.	Land-diversion	environmental	
service	programmes	are	most	likely	to	be	
effective	where	opportunity	costs	of	land	
are	low	in	agriculture.	In	land-abundant	
areas,	including	areas	where	rising	off-farm	
employment	opportunities	have	drawn	
populations	out	of	rural	areas,	the	potential	
for	setting	aside	land	for	non-agricultural	
uses	is	high.	In	land-scarce	environments,	
on	the	other	hand,	the	trade-off	between	
agricultural	and	non-agricultural	services	is	
high,	and	changes	to	production	systems	that	
generate	returns	to	both	agricultural	and	
environmental	services	are	therefore	more	
relevant.	The	opportunity	cost	of	labour	is	
also	important	for	determining	the	suitability	
of	changes.	In	situations	where	labour	is	
scarce,	production	changes	that	reduce	
labour	use	are	more	likely	to	be	accepted.	
In	general,	the	supply	response	to	
payments	for	environmental	services	will	
depend	on	the	opportunity	costs	of	changing	
practices	as	well	as	the	environmental	
service	benefits	that	can	be	generated.	In	
cases	where	high	benefits	can	be	achieved	
with	little	reduction	(or	even	a	gain)	in	
agricultural	production	and	income,	low	
payments	can	trigger	significant	supply	
response,	and	thus	PES	programmes	are	likely	
to	be	cost-effective.	Where	environmental	
service	benefits	are	low	but	opportunity	
costs	are	high,	PES	programmes	are	unlikely	
to	be	cost-effective.	In	intermediate	cases,	
where	opportunity	costs	and	environmental	
benefits	are	either	both	low	or	both	high,	
cost-effectiveness	will	depend	on	the	precise	
magnitudes	of	per-hectare	payment	levels	
and	the	environmental	service	benefits	
provided.
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5.	 Designing	effective	payments	
for	environmental	services
The	effectiveness	of	PES	programmes	
depends	on	their	design	and	
implementation.	These	factors	must	be	
addressed	within	the	specific	political,	
socio-economic	and	environmental	context	
of	the	programme.	Cost-effectiveness	is	a	
key	criterion	for	programme	design	and	
constitutes	the	point	of	departure	for	this	
chapter.	The	focus	is	on	issues	involved	
in	designing	PES	programmes	for	cost-
effectiveness	in	meeting	environmental	
objectives.	Chapter	6	will	broaden	the	
discussion	to	include	design	issues	as	they	
relate	to	impacts	on	the	poor	and	the	
possibilities	for	participation	of	the	poor	in	
PES	programmes.
The	preceding	chapters	discuss	demand	for	
environmental	services	and	the	opportunity	
costs	associated	with	their	provision.	In	
addition	to	these	factors,	transaction	
costs	associated	with	making	an	exchange	
between	buyers	and	sellers	need	to	be	taken	
into	account	when	designing	cost-effective	
programmes.	Transaction	costs	include	
the	cost	of	attracting	potential	buyers	or	
finding	potential	providers	of	environmental	
services,	of	working	with	project	partners	
(e.g.	negotiations	with	project	participants	
and	capacity-building)	and	of	ensuring	
that	parties	fulfil	their	obligations	(e.g.	
contract	development	and	enforcement,	
legal	and	insurance	costs,	and	monitoring	
of	environmental	services).	These	costs	are	
partly	determined	by	the	institutions	and	
rules	that	govern	environmental	service	
exchanges,	whether	they	are	publicly	funded	
programmes	or	private	exchanges	of	offsets.
The	considerable	uncertainties	and	
complexities	involved	in	measuring,	
monitoring	and	exchanging	services	mean	
that	transaction	costs	can	be	significant.	
Moreover,	the	relevant	institutions	and	
rules	are	still	being	established.	Indeed,	
transaction	costs	can	easily	exceed	the	cost	of	
actually	providing	the	environmental	service.	
For	example,	one	preliminary	assessment	
suggests	that	transaction	costs	in	forest	
carbon	projects	absorb	more	than	50	percent	
(and	in	some	cases	more	than	90	percent)	of	
the	value	of	total	payments	made,	while	the	
forest	producer	receives	only	the	residual	
(Niles	et al.,	2002).	
Several	studies	have	examined	programme	
design	issues	and	tools	in	the	context	of	
payments	for	environmental	services.	For	
example,	Weinberg	and	Claassen	(2005)	
and	Claassen	et al.	(2001)	discuss	issues	of	
effective	conservation	programme	design	
in	the	context	of	United	States	public	
environmental	service	payment	programmes,	
and	van	Noordwijk	et al.	(2007)	present	a	
conceptual	framework	for	characterizing	
various	types	of	compensation	or	reward	
mechanisms	for	environmental	services	
in	terms	of	their	effectiveness,	efficiency,	
sustainability	and	equity.	The	Rewarding	
Upland	Poor	for	Environmental	Services	
(RUPES)	project	in	Southeast	Asia	has	
explicitly	focused	on	the	development	of	
simplified	methodologies	for	cost-effective	
measurement	of	the	potential	for	payments	
for	biodiversity	and	watershed	services.16	
In	this	chapter,	the	main	design	issues	
discussed	are:	what	should	payments	be	
made	for,	who	should	be	paid,	how	much	
should	they	be	paid	and	in	what	form?	It	
then	briefly	considers	several	issues	involved	
in	reducing	transaction	costs	and,	finally,	
the	importance	of	creating	an	enabling	
environment,	in	the	form	of	supporting	
institutions,	within	which	PES	programmes	
can	operate.
6 For further information, see www.worldagroforestry.
org/sea/networks/rupes.
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What should payments be made 
for?
Careful	identification	of	the	service	of	
interest	is	a	critical	first	step	in	designing	
an	effective	PES	scheme.	This	requires	
an	assessment	of	the	potential	for	
environmental	service	payments	to	
contribute	to	environmental,	social	and	
economic	objectives.	This	assessment,	in	
turn,	must	be	based	on	an	understanding	of	
the	underlying	biophysical	science	and	the	
economic	motivations	of	suppliers	as	well	
as	an	assessment	of	demand	(Figure	13).	
In	practice,	assessing	demand	and	supply	
potential	are	iterative	processes.	Box	13	
gives	an	example	of	how	these	processes	are	
occurring	in	São	Paulo,	Brazil.
Payments for actual services or for 
proxies?
Whether	to	pay	for	the	service	itself	or	
for	some	proxy	is	an	important	design	
consideration.	If	the	environmental	service	
can	be	measured	easily	and	the	cause-
In	the	state	of	São	Paulo,	Brazil,	there	
are	a	million	hectares	of	riparian	areas	
in	need	of	rehabilitation.	Restoring	
vegetation	along	margins	of	water	
bodies	traps	sediments	and	pollutants	
before	they	reach	the	waterways,	plays	
an	important	role	in	flood	protection	
and	can	provide	habitat	for	wildlife	and	
carbon	sequestration.	Although	today	
these	areas	are	protected	from	conversion	
by	state	law,	there	are	no	incentives	for	
the	restoration	of	previously	degraded	
sections.	Yet	the	cost	of	degradation	in	
riparian	zones	is	mounting.
For	example,	when	the	water	utility	
serving	the	city	of	Piracicaba	had	to	switch	
its	main	water	intake	from	the	Piracicaba	
River	to	its	tributary	Corumbataí	because	
of	escalating	water	treatment	costs,	great	
concern	arose.	As	a	consequence,	in	1999	
the	intermunicipal	consortium	of	the	
Piracicaba–Capivari–Jundiaí	watersheds	
initiated	a	programme	whereby	R$0.01	
per	cubic	metre	was	allocated	to	support	
restoration	of	the	rivers’	riparian	strips.	
Participation	of	consortium	members	is	
voluntary.	
The	São	Paulo	State	Riparian	Forest	
Restoration	Project	(PRMC)	is	supporting	
this	effort	by	working	with	farmers	
currently	engaged	in	subsistence	
farming	and	low-productivity	pasture	
management	to	identify	alternative	land	
uses	and	restore	and	protect	riparian	
strips.	The	PRMC	is	sponsored	by	the	State	
Environment	Secretariat,	with	the	support	
of	the	Global	Environment	Facility,	the	
Nature	Conservancy	and	the	National	
Water	Agency,	in	conjunction	with	the	
ongoing	State	Programme	for	Sustainable	
Microwatershed	Management.
The	management	committee	of	the	
Piracicaba–Capivari–Jundiaí	watersheds	
has	approved	US$280	000	per	year	to	
support	a	project	for	extending	and	
experimenting	with	payments	for	riparian	
restoration.	Part	of	these	funds	will	be	
used	to	make	payments	to	farmers	who	
adopt	land-use	changes	that	restore	the	
riparian	zones	and	provide	watershed	
services	to	downstream	users.	The	next	
big	step	will	be	to	secure	a	regular	
contribution	from	the	water	utility	
serving	the	city	of	São	Paulo,	a	city	of	
over	20	million	people.	The	project	is	also	
exploring	the	potential	for	attracting	
buyers	of	carbon	emission	offsets	and	
purchasers	of	biodiversity	conservation	
services	to	support	the	rehabilitation	
programme.
In	this	context,	the	State	Environment	
Secretariat,	together	with	various	
partners,	is	initiating	a	state-level	PES	
fund	to	secure	a	long-term,	consistent,	
statewide	restoration	programme.	
1 São Paulo State Riparian Forest Restoration 
Project.
BOX	13
Payments for restoring riparian areas in São Paulo, brazil
Paolo Toledo and Helena Carrascosa1
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and-effect	linkages	are	straightforward,	
payments	will	be	most	effective	if	made	
directly	for	performance	in	increasing	
the	output	of	the	environmental	
service	delivered.	Payments	for	carbon	
sequestration	are	relatively	simple	in	this	
regard.	Payments	for	watershed	services,	on	
the	other	hand,	are	complicated,	because	
the	complex	hydrological	relationships	make	
it	difficult	to	establish	the	links	between	
cause	and	effect	in	service	provision.	In	
these	cases,	payments	are	more	easily	
linked	to	observable	land-use	changes	
that	are	associated	with	changes	in	the	
provision	of	the	desired	environmental	
service.	For	example,	FAO	(2002b)	describes	
how	perceptions	of	the	linkages	between	
land	use	and	water	resources	determined	
the	terms	of	a	contract	between	the	La	
Esperanza	Hydropower	Project	and	the	
Monteverde	Conservation	League	in	Costa	
Rica.	The	hydropower	facility	pays	the	
upstream	landowners	(represented	by	the	
Monteverde	Conservation	League)	for	
conserving	and	protecting	existing	forests	in	
the	expectation	that	this	will	lead	to	a	more	
stable	stream	flow	over	the	year	and	lower	
sedimentation,	both	of	which	reduce	the	
costs	of	the	hydropower	operation.	In	the	
New	York	City	example	described	in	Box	4	
(see	p.	34),	payments	were	made	for	changes	
in	land	use	and	management	and	not	
directly	for	water	quality	improvements.	
When	it	is	difficult	to	measure	the	service	
inexpensively	or	to	monitor	compliance,	
payments	for	quantifiable	changes	in	
agricultural	practices	that	are	likely	to	result	
in	enhanced	service	provision	can	be	more	
cost-effective.	In	the	vast	majority	of	PES	
transactions	to	date,	payments	have	been	
associated	with	land-use	changes	rather	than	
with	service	provision	directly,	and	the	buyers	
have	borne	the	risk	of	inadequate	service	
provision.	So	long	as	the	farmers	manage	
their	property	in	accordance	with	the	terms	
of	the	contract,	they	are	paid	whether	the	
service	is	provided	or	not.	
Whether	payments	are	made	for	the	actual	
service	or	linked	to	a	proxy	has	implications	
for	who	bears	the	risk	of	an	unforeseeable	
or	uncontrollable	factor	affecting	supply.	
For	the	seller,	a	contract	for	a	specific	land-
management	change,	such	as	planting	and	
maintaining	a	riparian	buffer,	involves	much	
less	risk	than	a	contract	based	on	payments	
for	water	purification	services,	which	might	
be	affected	not	only	by	land-management	
changes	but	also	by	a	drought	or	a	major	
rainfall	that	could	wash	nutrients	and	soil	into	
watercourses.	Insurance	against	variability	
in	service	supply	is	an	important	transaction	
cost	in	PES	exchanges.	Self-insurance,	where	
Source: FAO.
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Tropical	deforestation	in	the	Latin	America	
and	the	Caribbean	region	is	continuing	
at	a	high	rate	with	serious	consequences	
for	the	environment.	In	Central	America,	
more	than	9	million	hectares	of	primary	
forest	have	been	deforested	for	pasture	
expansion,	and	more	than	half	of	this	area	
is	degraded.	Traditional	pasture	systems	
are	based	on	clearing	the	land	of	trees,	
which	has	negative	impacts	on	biodiversity	
and	carbon	sequestration.	Furthermore,	
once	established,	such	systems	cause	
soil	fertility	and	water	resource	issues,	
leading	to	diminishing	grass	cover	and	
lower	productivity.	Lower	income	for	
producers	results	in	continuing	poverty	
and	in	pressure	to	clear	additional	areas.	
One	alternative	to	traditional	systems	
is	silvopastoral	systems,	which	combine	
trees	with	pasture.	These	systems	can	
be	grouped	in	four	major	categories	
(Murgueitio,1999):
•	 systems	in	which	high	densities	of	
trees	and	shrubs	are	planted	in	
pastures,	providing	shade	and	diet	
supplements	while	protecting	the	soil	
from	packing	and	erosion;	
•	 cut-and-carry	systems,	which	replace	
grazing	in	open	pasturelands	with	
stables	in	which	livestock	are	fed	with	
the	foliage	of	different	trees	and	
shrubs	specifically	planted	in	areas	
formerly	used	for	other	agricultural	
practices;	
•	 systems	that	use	fast-growing	trees	
and	shrubs	for	fencing	and	wind	
screens.	These	systems	provide	an	
inexpensive	alternative	to	fencing	
and	supplement	livestock	
diets;	
•	 systems	where	livestock	graze	in	
forest	plantations.	In	these	systems,	
grazing	is	used	to	control	the	invasion	
of	native	and	exotic	grasses,	thus	
reducing	the	management	costs	of	
the	plantations.	
Adopting	improved	silvopastoral	
practices	in	degraded	pasture	areas	is	
thought	to	provide	valuable	local	and	
global	environmental	benefits,	including	
carbon	sequestration	and	biodiversity	
conservation.	However,	producers	face	
barriers	to	adopting	these	practices,	as	
they	involve	high	initial	costs.	
Over	the	past	five	years,	a	project	
experimenting	with	the	use	of	payments	
for	environmental	services	as	an	
incentive	mechanism	for	the	adoption	
of	silvopastoral	practices	has	been	
implemented	in	Colombia,	Costa	Rica	
and	Nicaragua.	The	Regional	Integrated	
Silvopastoral	Ecosystem	Management	
Project	is	funded	by	the	Global	
Environment	Facility	and	the	multi-
institutional	FAO	Livestock,	Environment	
and	Development	initiative	and	
implemented	by	the	Tropical	Agricultural	
Research	and	Higher	Education	Center	
in	Costa	Rica	with	the	collaboration	of	
the	research	and	development	institute	
Nitlapán	in	Nicaragua	and	the	Colombian	
NGO	Centro	para	la	Investigación	en	
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sellers	produce	more	services	than	they	have	
contracted	(e.g.	by	planning	extra	area	for	
carbon	offsets)	or	buyers	contract	for	more	
services	than	they	need,	is	one	approach.	
In	Guatemala,	for	example,	markets	for	
watershed	services	offered	payments	on	three	
times	the	estimated	area	needed	to	ensure	
delivery	of	contracted	services	to	the	investor.	
In	some	cases,	NGOs	or	governments	assume	
responsibility	for	absorbing	the	risks	of	both	
buyers	and	sellers	(FAO,	2007c).
The use of indices
In	an	effort	to	ensure	that	changes	in	
land-management	practices	generate	the	
intended	service,	indices	of	environmental	
service	provision	have	been	developed.	The	
challenge	in	selecting	indicators	is	that	of	
establishing	an	appropriate	balance	between	
accuracy	and	cost.	One	example	is	the	scoring	
system	used	as	part	of	the	Silvopastoral	
Project	implemented	in	Colombia,	Costa	Rica	
and	Nicaragua	described	in	Box	14.	
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The	scoring	system	attempts	to	capture	the	
relationships	among	various	types	of	land	use	
and	multiple	environmental	services	(Pagiola	
et al.,	2004).	Table	11	(p.	78)	shows	the	index	
value	for	a	variety	of	agricultural	systems.	
The	index	for	carbon	sequestration	assigns	
0.1	points	per	tonne	of	carbon	sequestered,	
while	that	for	biodiversity	conservation	
ranks	land	uses	from	most	unfriendly	to	
biodiversity	(degraded	monoculture	pasture,	
0.0	points)	to	most	friendly	(primary	forest,	
1.0	points).	For	both	carbon	sequestration	
and	biodiversity,	specific	point	values	
were	assigned	by	a	panel	of	experts	based	
on	available	data.	The	two	indices	were	
combined	to	create	a	single	environmental	
services	index.	Biodiversity	and	carbon	
sequestration	were	monitored	in	all	land-use	
types	in	the	three	pilot	areas	to	verify	that	
the	land	uses	promoted	under	the	project	
were	actually	generating	the	expected	
environmental	benefits.	For	biodiversity,	
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Sistemas	Sostenibles	de	Producción	
Agropecuaria.	
The	project	seeks	to	monitor	and	
evaluate	environmental	services	
generated	by	silvopastoral	systems	
so	as	to	develop	a	methodology	for	
payments	for	environmental	services	in	
agricultural	landscapes	dominated	by	
cattle	production.	An	ecological	index	was	
developed	as	a	tool	for	such	payments,	
which	incorporates	the	value	of	different	
land	uses	for	carbon	sequestration	and	
conservation	of	biodiversity.	From	2003	
to	2006,	cattle	farmers	participating	in	
the	project	received	between	US$2	000	
and	US$2	400	per	farm,	representing	10	
to	15	percent	of	net	income.	The	area	of	
degraded	pastures	was	reduced	by	more	
than	60	percent	in	the	three	countries,	
and	the	area	of	silvopastoral	land	use		
(e.g.	improved	pastures	with	high	density	
trees,	fodder	banks	and	live	fences)	
increased	significantly.	
The	environmental	benefits	associated	
with	the	project	include	a	71	percent	
increase	in	carbon	sequestered	(from	
27.7	million	tonnes	of	CO2	equivalent	
in	2003	to	47.6	million	tonnes	in	2006),	
increases	in	bird,	bat	and	butterfly	species	
(see	Chapter	2,	Figure	5)	and	a	moderate	
increase	in	forested	area.	Milk	production	
and	farm	income	also	increased,	by	more	
than	10	and	115	percent	respectively.	
Herbicide	use	dropped	by	60	percent,	
and	the	practice	of	using	fire	to	manage	
pasture	is	now	less	frequent.
1 Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher 
Education Center.
Impact of payments on land-use change 
(total project area for the three countries)
land use
2003 2006 Difference
(ha) (Percentage)
Degraded	pasture 2	258.28 802.04 –64.48
Natural	pasture	without	trees 1	122.53 368.85 –67.14
Pasture	with	low	tree	density 2	232.92 2	582.10 +15.64
Pasture	with	high	tree	density 1	074.15 2	488.60 +131.68
Fodder	bank 106.30 378.85 +256.40
Forest 3	054.12 3	109.82 +1.82
ToTAl AREA	 9 848.30 9 730.26
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 7
TAblE 11
Environmental service indices in the Silvopastoral Project in Colombia, Costa Rica and 
nicaragua (points per hectare, unless otherwise specified)
lAnD USE biodiversity
index
Carbon
sequestration
index
Environmental
service
index
Annual	crops	(annual,	grains,	and	tubers) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Degraded	pasture 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural	pasture	without	trees 0.1 0.1 0.2
Improved	pasture	without	trees 0.4 0.1 0.5
Semi-permanent	crops	(plantain,	sun	coffee) 0.3 0.2 0.5
Natural	pasture	with	low	tree	density	(<	30/ha) 0.3 0.3 0.6
Natural	pasture	with	recently	planted	trees	(>	200/ha) 0.3 0.3 0.6
Improved	pasture	with	recently	planted	trees	(>	200/ha) 0.3 0.4 0.7
Monoculture	fruit	crops 0.3 0.4 0.7
Fodder	bank 0.3 0.5 0.8
Improved	pasture	with	low	tree	density	(<	30/ha) 0.3 0.6 0.9
Fodder	bank	with	woody	species 0.4 0.5 0.9
Natural	pasture	with	high	tree	density	(>	30/ha) 0.5 0.5 1.0
Diversified	fruit	crops 0.6 0.5 1.1
Diversified	fodder	bank 0.6 0.6 1.2
Monoculture	timber	plantation 0.4 0.8 1.2
Shade-grown	coffee 0.6 0.7 1.3
Improved	pasture	with	high	tree	density	(>	30/ha) 0.6 0.7 1.3
Bamboo	(guadua)	forest 0.5 0.8 1.3
Diversified	timber	plantation 0.7 0.7 1.4
Scrub	habitats	(tacotales) 0.6 0.8 1.4
Riparian	forest 0.8 0.7 1.5
Intensive	silvopastoral	system	(>	5	000	trees/ha) 0.6 1.0 1.6
Disturbed	secondary	forest	(>	10	m2	basal	area) 0.8 0.9 1.7
Secondary	forest	(>	10	m2	basal	area) 0.9 1.0 1.9
Primary	forest 1.0 1.0 2.0
New	live	fence	or	established	live	fence	with	frequent	
pruning	(per	km)	
0.3 0.3 0.6
Windbreaks	(per	km)	 0.6 0.5 1.1
Note: The	environmental	service	index	attempts	to	assess	the	level	of	environmental	services	generated	by	different	
types	of	land	use.	It	combines	two	indices:	an	index	for	biodiversity	and	an	index	for	carbon	sequestration.		
The	biodiversity	index	assigns	a	number	from	0.0	to	1.0	from	most	unfriendly	to	biodiversity	to	most	friendly.		
The	carbon	sequestration	index	assigns	0.1	points	per	tonne	of	carbon	sequestered.	The	two	indices	are	added	to	arrive	
at	a	single	environmental	services	index.
Source:	Pagiola	et al.,	2004.
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counts	of	bird	species	were	the	main	
indicator	used,	complemented	by	studies	of	
butterflies,	ants	and	molluscs.	Factors	such	as	
endemicity	and	rarity	in	the	species	observed	
were	also	taken	into	consideration.
Another	example	emerged	from	the	
Australian	BushTender	programme	(see	
Box	19,	p.	86),	which	used	a	field	staff	scoring	
system	for	establishing	environmental	service	
indicators.	Agency	officials	visited	farms	
and	“scored”	how	land-use	changes	would	
change	biodiversity	service	provision.	The	
score	was	then	divided	by	the	bid	price	in	
order	to	determine	“biodiversity	per	dollar”.
Certification
In	payment	programmes	involving	
certification,	the	payment	is	linked	to	
a	characteristic	of	the	product	or	its	
production	process	that	is	associated	with	
the	supply	of	an	environmental	service.	
The	number	of	ecolabel	and	certification	
programmes	has	risen	markedly	in	recent	
years.17	By	the	mid-2000s,	nearly	30	national	
and	international	bodies	were	certifying	
natural	resource-based	products	(Searle,	
7 For example, a United States Web site 
 (http://www.eco-labels.org/labelIndex.cfm), lists 6 
ecolabels, each differing in the products they certify, the 
type of environmental benefit associated with the product, 
and the standards they use.
Colby	and	Milway,	2004).	The	standards	
and	procedures	involved	in	obtaining	
certification	vary	considerably,	although	
efforts	are	being	made	to	consolidate	and	
standardize	certification	standards	(ISEAL,	
2006).
International trade rules
Finally,	international	or	regional	trade	
agreements	may	affect	what	can	be	
paid	for	and	how	PES	programmes	can	
be	designed.	In	particular,	World	Trade	
Organization	(WTO)	rules	restrict	public	
payment	programmes	that	directly	affect	
production	of	marketed	commodities.	The	
most	significant	WTO	provisions	of	relevance	
for	payments	for	environmental	services	
from	agriculture	are	found	in	the	Agreement	
on	Agriculture.	According	to	the	Agreement,	
payments	to	enhance	environmental	services	
would	be	permitted	under	the	Green	Box	
provisions	(Annex	2	of	the	Agreement)	
provided	that	they	are	decoupled	from	
agricultural	production,	from	post-base	
period	prices	and	from	factors	of	production	
(see	Box	15).	Direct	payments	under	
“environmental	programmes”	are	specifically	
permitted	under	paragraph	12	of	the	Green	
Box,	provided	payments	are	limited	to	extra	
costs	or	loss	of	income	involved	in	complying	
with	the	programme.	In	the	current	trade	
round,	Green	Box	criteria	may	be	reviewed	
Support	measures	that	are	“decoupled”	
from	output	quantities	and	prices	and	
therefore	only	minimally	distort	trade,	
fall	under	the	Green	Box	and	are	exempt	
from	reduction	commitments	under	
the	current	Agreement	on	Agriculture.	
In	order	to	fall	under	the	Green	Box,	
support	measures	must	be	provided	
through	a	publicly	funded	government	
programme	and	the	support	in	question	
should	not	have	the	effect	of	providing	
price	support	to	producers.	Examples	for	
Green	Box	subsidies	are	compensation	
for	income	loss	for	producers	located	
in	disadvantaged	regions,	or	for	
producers	implementing	environmental	
programmes.	Agri-environmental	
programmes	can	be	categorized	into	
three	different	types:	programmes	
focusing	on	the	retirement	of	land	
from	agricultural	uses	for	conservation	
purposes;	programmes	focusing	on	
improving	the	environmental	performance	
and	production	practices	on	current	
agricultural	land;	and	programmes	
focusing	on	maintaining	specific	
performances	or	agricultural	practices.
Source:	excerpt	from	ICTSD,	2006,	pp.	2–3.
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and	clarified	with	a	view	to	ensuring	that	
Green	Box	measures	have	no,	or	at	most	
minimal,	trade-distorting	effects.	Concerns	
have	been	raised	that	some	current	Green	
Box	measures	may	not	meet	this	criterion	
and	that	some	payments	under	Green	Box	
measures	may	indeed	be	trade-distorting.	
(UNCTAD,	2007;	FAO,	2004d).
Other	provisions	of	the	Agreement	
on	Agriculture	could	also	be	potentially	
relevant	for	PES	programmes,	including	
provisions	covering	structural	adjustment	
assistance,	where	land	could	be	removed	
from	agricultural	production,	for	example	on	
environmental	grounds,	or	payments	under	
regional	assistance	programmes,	where	
payments	could	be	made	to	producers	in	
“disadvantaged	regions”.	
Other	multilateral	trade	agreements	could	
also	be	relevant	for	environmental	service	
payments	in	agriculture,	for	example	the	
Agreement	on	Subsidies	and	Countervailing	
Measures	and	the	WTO	General	Agreement	
on	Trade	in	Services.	For	environmentally	
based	product	certification	or	labelling	
schemes,	some	provisions	of	the	WTO	
Agreements	on	the	Application	of	Sanitary	
and	Phytosanitary	Measures	(SPS)	and	on	
Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	(TBT)	could	also	
be	of	relevance.	
Who should be paid?
The	answer	to	the	question	of	who	should	
be	paid	to	supply	environmental	services	is	
highly	dependent	on	the	overall	programme	
objectives.	Perhaps	the	most	controversial	
issue	is	whether	environmental	service	
payments	should	be	directed	to	those	who	
currently	provide	services	or	to	those	whose	
land	parcels	have	the	greatest	potential	for	
increased	service	provision.	
To	frame	this	dilemma	more	starkly,	we	
can	imagine	two	adjacent	farmers,	A	and	
B,	who	raise	cows	for	a	dairy	operation	
on	gently	rolling	land	beside	a	stream	
that	flows	into	a	reservoir.	Five	years	ago,	
Farmer	A	constructed	fencing	alongside	her	
streams,	creating	a	3-metre	riparian	buffer	
on	either	side	of	the	bank.	This	change	in	
land	management	significantly	reduced	the	
amount	of	nutrients	and	soil	washing	off	her	
land	and	the	eutrophication	and	turbidity	
downstream.	On	the	other	hand,	Farmer	B	
has	continued	to	manage	her	land	in	such	
a	way	that	nutrient	and	soil	runoff	after	
large	storm	events	affect	water	quality	in	the	
downstream	reservoir.	Should	a	downstream	
water	consumer	make	payments	to	Farmer	A,	
Farmer	B,	or	both?	Although	Farmer	A	
provides	the	greatest	level	of	current	
service	provision,	the	most	efficient	use	of	
payments	to	enhance	services	is	likely	to	be	
to	Farmer	B.	
“Additionality”	is	a	key	concept	in	
PES	programmes	designed	for	efficiency.	
To	meet	an	additionality	requirement,	
payments	should	be	for	a	service	that	would	
not	have	been	supplied	otherwise.	Farmer	A	
was	already	providing	the	service	and	thus	
would	not	qualify	under	an	additionality	
standard. 
Paying	only	for	additional	services	can	
potentially	present	risks	arising	from	what	
is	known	as	“moral	hazard”.	For	example,	
some	farmers	might	knowingly	use	a	
polluting	production	practice	because	they	
expect,	sometime	in	the	future,	to	receive	
payments	to	stop	doing	so.	In	practice,	
however,	there	are	checks	that	limit	the	
potential	seriousness	of	problems	resulting	
from	moral	hazard.	Increasing	one’s	
attractiveness	for	potential	service	payments	
can	carry	a	significant	cost	in	terms	of	long-
term	farm	productivity.	Such	a	strategy	
also	carries	a	significant	risk	to	the	farmer	
if	payments	are	granted	on	a	competitive	
basis,	as	some	farmers	may	end	up	receiving	
no	funds.	Both	the	Australian	BushTender	
(see	Box	19	on	p.	86)	and	the	Costa	Rican	
(see	Box	16)	programmes,	for	example,	were	
oversubscribed.	In	the	context	of	payments,	
risks	associated	with	moral	hazard	should	
not	present	serious	cause	for	concern	unless	
the	expected	private	benefits	of	poor	land	
management	exceed	the	costs	dramatically.	
The	hypothetical	example	above	
nevertheless	points	to	a	more	general	
problem:	should	farmers	be	paid	for	services	
that	are	already	being	provided?	Given	
social	and	political	realities,	it	may	be	very	
difficult	to	implement	programmes	based	
on	strict	efficiency	and	additionality	criteria,	
especially	publicly	funded	programmes.	
Programmes	based	on	additionality	may	be	
perceived	as	“not	fair”	and	as	“rewarding	
the	bad	guys”	(Dobbs	and	Pretty,	2004).	
As	critics	of	the	United	States	CRP	have	
made	clear,	responsible	land	managers	can	
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become	dispirited	if	those	who	employ	less	
responsible	land-management	practices	
are	effectively	rewarded	for	doing	so	(see	
Box	4).	On	the	other	hand,	international	
markets	such	as	the	CDM	require	
additionality.	If	a	country	wishes	to	access	
international	payments	for	environmental	
services,	especially	for	carbon	credits,	
meeting	an	additionality	criterion	will	be	
necessary.
Costa	Rica’s	PSA	(Pago	de	Servicios	
Ambientales	–	Payments	for	Environmental	
Services)	programme	is	explicitly	non-
additional.	In	principle,	given	a	sufficient	
budget,	the	PSA	programme	would	pay	
every	forest	owner	for	the	services	that	the	
forest	provides	(Pagiola,	2006).	Of	course,	
budgets	are	generally	limited	and	thus	
some	choices	need	to	be	made.	One	way	
of	making	that	choice	is	to	identify	sites	
that	present	credible	threats	to	the	loss	of	
environmental	services.	Wünscher,	Engel	
and	Wunder	(2006)	analysed	the	potential	
efficiency	gains	from	improved	targeting	
The	Costa	Rica	PSA	(Pago	de	
Servicios	Ambientales	–	Payments	for	
Environmental	Services)	programme,	one	
of	the	oldest	and	best	known	examples	
of	a	national	payments	for	environmental	
services	scheme	in	a	developing	country,	
demonstrates	the	need	for	setting	a	good	
baseline.
In	1997,	the	country	pioneered	
payments	for	environmental	services	
programmes	based	on	a	national	forestry	
law	that	explicitly	recognized	four	
environmental	services	provided	by	forest	
ecosystems:	climate	change	mitigation,	
biodiversity	conservation,	watershed	
protection	and	landscape	beauty.	The	
government	contracts	with	landowners	to	
maintain	forest	area	in	order	to	provide	
these	services.	
By	the	end	of	2005,	about	10	percent	
of	the	country’s	forest	area	was	enrolled	
(Pagiola,	2006).	The	programme	was	
initially	untargeted,	with	participation	
on	a	“first-come,	first-served”	basis.	This	
resulted	in	inclusion	of	land	that	was	at	
low	risk	of	deforestation.
As	Pfaff,	Robalino	and	Sanchez-Azofeifa	
(2006)	describe	in	their	evaluation	of	its	
first	five	years,	the	programme	annually	
inhibited	deforestation	on	only	a	small	
portion	of	the	enrolled	forest.	“…[O]ver	
99	percent	of	the	PSA	funds	allocated	
did	not	change	land	use.”	In	a	separate	
study,	Tattenbach,	Obando	and	Rodríguez	
(2006)	found	that	an	area	equal	to	about	
half	the	contracted	area	would	have	been	
deforested	in	the	absence	of	the	PSA	
programme.	Differences	in	methodology,	
study	area	and	study	period	make	it	
hard	to	compare	these	results	directly,	
and	a	consensus	on	the	impacts	of	the	
programme	has	not	been	reached,	but	it	is	
clear	that	only	a	part	of	the	enrolled	area	
represents	actual	land-use	change.	A	more	
detailed	discussion	of	the	debate	is	given	
in	Walker	(2007).
The	relatively	low	apparent	
additionality	of	the	PSA	programme	
should	be	seen	in	the	context	of	an	
overall	trend	of	falling	livestock	prices,	
which	had	made	the	conversion	of	
forest	to	pastures	much	less	profitable	
and	had	reversed	deforestation	trends	
even	before	the	introduction	of	the	PSA	
programme	in	1997.	The	PSA	programme	
has	also	been	accompanied	by	the	
introduction	of	new	legal	restrictions	
on	clearing	land;	compliance	with	these	
restrictions	would	likely	have	been	much	
less	forthcoming	had	they	not	been	
accompanied	by	payments.	It	also	bears	
mention	that	Costa	Rica’s	PSA	programme	
has	no	additionality	requirement.	In	
principle,	if	the	budget	were	sufficient,	
the	programme	would	pay	every	land	
user	with	forest	for	the	services	that	
that	forest	is	providing	(Pagiola,	2006).	
With	support	from	the	World	Bank	and	
the	Global	Environment	Facility,	the	PSA	
programme	has	been	evolving	towards	
a	more	targeted	approach	that	seeks	to	
improve	its	efficiency.
BOX	16
The Payments for Environmental Services programme of Costa Rica:  
setting the baseline
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for	the	Costa	Rica	programme.	They	show	
that,	given	a	fixed	budget,	selecting	sites	
according	to	their	service	delivery	potential	
increases	the	amount	of	contracted	services	
supplied.	Even	greater	efficiency	is	gained	
where	opportunity	costs	and	payment	levels	
are	differentiated.	Wunder	(2006)	compared	
the	potential	efficiency	of	payments	in	
Amazonian	states	in	Brazil	having	low	
development	pressures	and	government	
support	for	conservation	policies	to	areas	
experiencing	high	rates	of	land	conversion	
to	agriculture.	He	noted	that	payments	in	
low-development	areas	are	non-additional,	
while	in	areas	of	high	conversion	rates	they	
may	not	be	sufficient	to	achieve	desired	
objectives.	An	important	strategy	for	
targeting	suppliers	of	environmental	services,	
therefore,	is	the	identification	of	areas	
where	threats	are	projected	to	emerge,	and	
where	payments	for	environmental	services	
are	likely	to	be	effective	in	changing	land	use	
and	farming	practices.	
Setting baselines
Identifying	what	would	have	happened	
under	a	“business	as	usual”	(no	payments)	
scenario	is	necessary	to	assess	the	
effectiveness	of	a	programme	and	is	
linked	to	the	question	of	additionality.	
The	establishment	of	a	baseline	requires	
consideration	not	just	of	the	level	of	services	
when	payments	start,	but	also	of	potential	
changes	in	external	factors	during	the	period	
when	the	environmental	service	payments	
are	being	made.18	For	example,	deforestation	
and	reforestation	rates	change	in	response	
to	many	economic	and	social	pressures,	
and	an	increase	in	forest	cover	may	not	be	
attributable	to	the	payment	at	all,	but	rather	
to	other	forces,	as	the	Costa	Rica	example	
illustrates	(see	Box	16).	
Targeting and self-targeting
For	environmental	service	purchasers	
concerned	solely	with	the	efficient	supply	
of	environmental	services,	the	ideal	
programme	would	identify	and	target	
payments	to	the	lowest-cost	suppliers.	
The	key	information	needed	for	effective	
targeting	to	the	lowest-cost	suppliers	relates	
8 See, for example, UNEP (005) for a discussion of 
baseline methodologies for the CDM.
to	the	spatial	distribution	of	land	ownership	
and	productivity.	The	distribution	of	land	is	
a	factor	in	determining	not	only	who	could	
benefit	most	from	a	PES	scheme,	but	also	
what	kind	of	PES	scheme	(e.g.	land-use	vs	
farming	system	change)	is	most	likely	to	be	
attractive	to	producers	(FAO,	2006e).
In	recent	decades,	considerable	field	
experience	has	been	gained	in	targeting	
development	projects	that	is	relevant	also	for	
the	potential	targeting	of	PES	programmes.	
The	optimal	level	of	targeting	depends	on	
the	trade-offs	between	the	cost	and	the	
tolerable	degree	of	errors	of	exclusion	and	
inclusion	(the	reduction	of	which	is	the	
benefit	of	targeting)	and	is	constrained	by	
administrative	capacity.	There	are	different	
levels	and	degrees	of	targeting.	Area-based	
targeting	criteria,	for	example	identifying	
marginal	regions	or	communities,	are	
generally	relatively	inexpensive.	Targeting	
becomes	more	data-intensive,	and	therefore	
expensive,	when	moving	to	a	household	or	
individual	level.	In	general,	a	trade-off	exists	
between	the	complexity	of	targeting	strategy	
and	its	cost.
Applying	targeting	criteria	is	particularly	
challenging	in	developing	countries	with	
poor	data	availability	and	low	institutional	
capacity,	as	is	the	case	in	a	number	of	
African	countries.	Self-targeting,	where	
programmes	offer	benefits	that	appeal	
only	to	a	selected	group,	has	been	used	by	
some	project	designers	to	try	and	attract	the	
participants	with	the	desired	characteristics.	
This	approach	can	be	problematic,	however,	
as	it	may	exclude	the	most	vulnerable	and	
is	only	appropriate	in	certain	circumstances.	
A	recent	global	study	on	poverty	targeting	
methods	(Coady,	Grosh	and	Hoddinott,	
2004)	found	that	more-developed	countries	
tend	to	use	means-testing	while	less-
developed	countries	use	self-selection	or	
characteristics-targeting,	which	are	often	
easier	to	implement.	However,	given	the	
wide	variation	in	results	across	countries	and	
programmes,	the	study	concludes	that	the	
most	important	determinant	of	targeting	
success,	regardless	of	the	methodology,	is	the	
implementation	capacity	specific	to	a	given	
programme.
As	environmental	service	supply	is	
inherently	linked	to	location,	the	use	of	
geographical	criteria	represents	a	low-
cost	means	of	targeting	programmes.	For	
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example,	because	the	main	objective	of	the	
China	Grain	for	Green	programme	(Box	17)	
is	to	prevent	soil	erosion,	steepness	of	slope	
is	one	of	the	main	criteria	by	which	plots	
are	selected	(Uchida,	Rozelle	and	Xu,	2007).	
The	programme	targets	lands	with	slopes	
of	25	degrees	or	higher	in	southwest	China	
and	15	degrees	in	the	northwest.	As	slope	
is	easy	to	measure,	this	is	a	relatively	low-
cost	targeting	tool	(Uchida,	Rozelle	and	
Xu,	2007),	although	several	studies	have	
found	the	programme’s	targeting	to	have	
been	less	than	optimal	in	certain	regions,	
where,	indeed,	a	number	of	productive	and	
low-sloped	plots	were	retired	when	less	
productive	and	high-sloped	plots	were	still	
available	(Xu	et al.,	2004;	Uchida,	Xu	and	
Rozelle,	2005).
Mapping	locations	with	high	potential	
environmental	service	benefits	and	low	
opportunity	costs	of	supply	(see,	for	
example,	Maps	5	and	6)	is	a	further	means	
of	geographic	targeting,	and	is	becoming	
progressively	less	expensive	as	increasing	
amounts	of	geographically	referenced	
information	become	available.	
One	approach	to	self-selected	targeting	
is	the	use	of	a	reverse	auction	system	as	
described	in	the	Australian	BushTender	
programme	(see	Box	19).	In	this	system,	
landholders	provide	sealed	bids	for	the	
amount	they	are	willing	to	accept	for	
changes	in	land-use	management.	Funding	
is	provided	in	the	order	of	the	bidders	
providing	the	greatest	service	provision	at	
the	lowest	cost,	and	the	process	continues	
until	the	funds	run	out.	This	approach	
has	two	major	benefits	compared	with	
direct	grants.	First,	communication	is	
more	efficient:	under	a	reverse	auction,	
farmers	weigh	the	costs	and	benefits	of	
their	own	land-use	changes	and	inform	the	
government	of	their	willingness	to	accept	
in	order	to	institute	these	changes.	The	
government,	for	its	part,	decides	which	
of	the	proposed	land-use	changes	will	be	
most	effective	for	meeting	its	overall	service	
provision	goal.	Reverse	auctions	are	also	well	
suited	to	situations	in	which	there	is	only	
one	buyer	and	many	sellers.	This	is	often	the	
case	with	water	quality	services,	for	example,	
when	a	utility	seeks	to	change	the	behaviour	
of	many	landowners.
Targeting	is	complicated	by	the	potential	
for	“holdouts”	–	individuals	who	try	to	
exploit	their	location	or	choose	not	to	
participate	in	a	programme	but	capture	
the	benefits	of	actions	of	others.	The	
effectiveness	of	holdouts	depends	on	the	
degree	to	which	environmental	service	
provision	requires	coordination	among	
suppliers.	This	is	most	easily	illustrated	in	
the	context	of	biodiversity	conservation.	
The	functional	value	of	a	reserve	design	
or	wildlife	corridor	usually	depends	on	
contiguous	land	parcels.	If	successful,	the	
benefits	from	the	sum	of	the	connected	
parcels	managed	for	biodiversity	
conservation	are	greater	than	those	of	its	
parts.	Success	can	be	frustrated	by	the	actions	
Pushed	into	action	by	a	series	of	
devastating	floods	in	1998,	the	
Government	of	China	launched	the	Grain	
for	Green	programme	in	1999.	One	of	the	
largest	conservation	set-aside	programmes	
in	the	world,	its	main	objective	is	to	
increase	forest	cover	on	sloped	cropland	
in	the	upper	reaches	of	the	Yangtze	and	
Yellow	River	Basins	to	prevent	soil	erosion.	
When	possible	in	their	community,	
households	set	aside	all	or	parts	of	certain	
types	of	land	and	plant	seedlings	to	
grow	trees.	In	return,	the	government	
compensated	the	participants	with	grain,	
cash	payments	and	free	seedlings.	By	
the	end	of	2002,	officials	had	expanded	
the	programme	to	some	15	million	
farmers	in	more	than	2	000	counties	in	
25	provinces	and	municipalities	in	China	
(Xu	et al.,	2004).	If	the	programme	meets	
its	original	goals,	by	2010	nearly	15	million	
hectares	of	cropland	will	have	been	set	
aside,	affecting	the	land	of	more	than	
50	million	households.	
Source:	Uchida,	Rozelle	and	Xu,	2007.
BOX	17
China’s Grain for Green programme 
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of	a	very	small	number	of	landholders	of	key	
parcels	who	hold	out	for	prices	well	above	
market	rates.	Without	their	participation,	
it	may	be	impossible	to	create	effective	
habitats.	
Equity and efficiency 
Decisions	on	how	to	set	and	implement	
targeting	criteria	are,	of	course,	strongly	
related	to	the	overall	programme	objectives.	
Alix-Garcia,	de	Janvry	and	Sadoulet	
(forthcoming)	compared	two	hypothetical	
PES	schemes	–	one	with	a	flat	payment	
and	a	cap	on	the	amount	of	land	that	
could	be	enrolled	by	any	one	participant	
and	another	that	took	deforestation	risk	
and	land	productivity	into	account.	In	
their	simulations,	targeted	payments	were	
far	more	efficient	in	terms	of	generating	
environmental	services,	but	the	flat	payment	
scheme	was	more	egalitarian.	Their	results	
indicate	the	importance	of	considering	trade-
offs	between	efficiency	and	equity.	These	
issues	are	revisited	in	Chapter	6.
Setting	programme	objectives	and	
targeting	strategies	in	order	to	balance	
equity	and	efficiency	goals	is	inherently	
a	political	process,	and	the	balance	may	
change	over	the	course	of	programme	design	
and	implementation	(see	Box	18).
How much should be paid?
The	amount	of	an	environmental	service	
provided	will	depend	on	the	level	of	
payments.	In	general,	how	much	should	be	
paid	depends	on	the	options	available	to	
buyers	and	sellers	of	environmental	services,	
along	with	other	factors	that	determine	their	
supply	and	demand.	For	a	transaction	to	
take	place,	the	maximum	amount	the	buyer	
would	be	willing	to	pay	for	the	services	must	
be	at	least	as	much	as	the	minimum	that	the	
seller	would	be	willing	to	accept	to	provide	
them.	The	amount	the	buyer	is	willing	to	
pay	is	affected	by	factors	such	as	the	cost	of	
alternatives	to	the	services	in	question	and	
the	financial	resources	available.	The	amount	
the	seller	is	willing	to	accept	depends	on	the	
cost	of	adopting	new	practices	to	provide	the	
services.
Historically,	some	public	programmes	
have	set	a	flat	payment	rate	per	hectare	
for	a	land-management	practice.	These	
programmes	did	not	distinguish	between	
varying	service	supply	potentials	and	often	
set	prices	significantly	above	what	farmers	
would	have	been	willing	to	accept,19	either	
because	of	inadequate	analysis	of	supply–
demand	dynamics	because	the	programmes	
had	income-support	objectives	in	addition	
to	environmental	objectives,	or	because	it	
was	administratively	too	costly	to	determine	
farmer-specific	payment	rates	(or	politically	
infeasible	to	implement	them).	
In	some	cases,	pressure	to	maintain	flat	
payments	arise	out	of	equity	concerns.	For	
example,	in	the	case	of	the	Nairobi	National	
Park	Ecosystem	Wildlife	Conservation	
Lease	programme,	the	Maasai	community,	
who	were	the	intended	recipients	of	the	
payments,	objected	(at	least	initially)	to	
differentiated	payments	on	social	grounds,	
even	though	environmental	service	values	
and	opportunity	costs	did	vary	by	location.
In	most	programmes	to	date,	prices	for	
environmental	services	have	been	set	close	
to	the	minimum	amount	that	farmers	would	
accept,	although	the	reasons	for	this	outcome	
differ	by	service	(Pagiola	and	Platais,	2007).	
In	carbon	markets,	the	supply	of	potentially	
salable	carbon	credits	from	land-use	change	
and	forestry	projects	exceeds	current	demand,	
thus	giving	buyers	the	upper	hand	in	setting	
prices	(Bayon,	Hawn	and	Hamilton,	2007).	
In	markets	for	watershed	and	biodiversity	
services,	potential	sellers	are	rarely	able	to	
exclude	any	of	the	potential	buyers	from	
benefiting	from	the	resources,	which	gives	
them	little	leverage	in	setting	prices	(Landell-
Mills	and	Porras,	2002).	
Publicly	funded	payment	systems	face	
pressure	to	maximize	programme	cost-
effectiveness.	This	can	be	achieved	by	setting	
payment	levels	close	to	the	amount	farmers	
would	accept	or	through	a	reverse	auction	
system.	
Reverse	auction	approaches,	while	a	
potentially	useful	means	of	improving	
the	efficiency	of	supply,	can	be	expensive	
and	difficult	to	implement,	especially	with	
the	limited	institutional	capacity	in	many	
developing	countries	and	where	producers	
have	low	levels	of	information	and	formal	
education.	The	Silvopastoral	Project	in	Costa	
9 An example was Costa Rica’s PSA programme, see 
Ferraro, 00.
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The	design	of	payments	for	environmental	
services	programmes,	including	the	areas	
they	target	and	their	recipients,	can	be	
strongly	influenced	by	ongoing	political	
debates	and	institutional	arrangements.	
A	payments	for	environmental	services	
programme	in	Mexico	to	conserve	water	
services	is	an	example	of	how	political	
realities	shape	programme	outcomes.	
At	its	inception	in	2003,	the	programme	
had	both	environmental	and	anti-poverty	
goals.	Because	of	water	scarcity	in	many	
areas	with	high	population	density,	and	
because	the	potential	seemed	highest	for	
developing	local	markets	for	the	service,	it	
developed	into	a	programme	focused	on	
hydrological	services.	
The	programme	faced	challenges	in	
obtaining	funding	and	management	
changes.	Instead	of	a	2.5	percent	levy	on	
municipal	water	fees,	a	fixed	amount	per	
year	was	applied.	Initially,	the	programme	
was	implemented	only	in	priority	
watersheds,	but	final	implementation	
was	nationwide.	The	focus	on	poor	
communities	was	abandoned.	The	scheme	
was	classified	as	a	subsidy	and	not	as	
a	payment,	which	created	a	host	of	
additional	problems.	The	rules	had	to	be	
publicly	debated,	and	the	money	could	not	
be	targeted	in	a	decentralized	manner.	
Changes	in	targeting	rules	from	the	first	
proposal	to	the	final	scheme	can	be	seen	
in	the	table.	Other	important	changes	
included	the	removal	of	the	originally	
planned	pilot	programme,	the	elimination	
of	the	focus	on	marginalized	communities,	
the	inclusion	of	commercial	forests	and	
private	properties	and	the	decision	to	give	
payments	based	on	percentage	of	forest	
rather	than	on	forest	density.	
An	evaluation	(FAO,	2005b)	of	the	first	
two	years	of	the	programme	showed	that	
most	of	the	payments	had	gone	to	protect	
forests	outside	of	critical	watersheds	and	
were	too	fragmented	in	their	distribution	
to	provide	a	measurable	improvement	in	
water	services.	In	addition,	payments	were	
made	mainly	for	forests	that	were	not	at	
risk	of	being	lost.	
BOX	18
The political economy of targeting: the Payment for Hydrological Services 
Programme in Mexico
Changes in targeting rules for Mexico’s PES scheme to protect water services
original targeting rules
(SEMARnAT/InE)
Final targeting rules
(SEMARnAT/ConAFoR)
n  Pilot	programme	with	an		
experimental	design
n  Nationwide	programme:
–  Rules	of	operation
–  Establishment	of	a	Trust	Fund
n  Beneficiaries’,	ejidos1	and	indigenous	
communities	located	in	priority	
watersheds:
–  Overexploited
–  Serving	large	populations
n  Beneficiaries	augmented	to	include	
private	owners
n  Other	selection	criteria:
–  Forest	cover
–  Clear	property	rights
–  Ecosystem	type
–  Marginalization
n  Added	selection	criteria:
–  Priority	mountains
–  Availability	of	satellite	image
–  Protected	areas
n  Priority	given	to	forest	with		
high	deforestation
n  Subtracted	selection	criteria:
–  Marginalization
–  Deforestation	risk
Notes:
SEMARNAT = Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Secretariat for the Environment, Natural Resources); 
INE = Instituto Nacional de Ecología (National Ecology Institute); CONAFOR = Comisión Nacional Forestal (National Forestry 
Commission).
1	Ejidos are a special form of land tenure in Mexico resulting from the land reform process that started after the Mexican 
revolution in 90. Ejidos are composed of two different kinds of property rights over land: individual parcels and  
common lands
Source: FAO, 005b.
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Rica,	Colombia	and	Nicaragua	(Box	14,	p.	76),	
for	example,	opted	to	offer	fixed	payments	
for	eligible	land	uses	because	the	reverse	
auction	approach	was	deemed	too	complex	
for	the	setting.	
The	potential	of	auctions	in	a	developing	
country	context	is	being	explored	in	the	
Sumberjaya	subdistrict	in	Sumatra	for	the	
purchase	of	erosion	abatement	services	
from	coffee	farmers.	Researchers	have	
found	that	extending	the	auction	approach	
to	a	developing	country	setting	required	
several	adaptations	in	their	design	and	
implementation,	including	the	use	of	a	
uniform	price	rule	to	minimize	risks	of	social	
conflict	created	by	discriminatory	pricing	in	
small	communities.	The	prices	achieved	at	
the	auction	allowed	the	purchase	of	
30–70	percent	more	conservation	services	
than	would	have	been	the	case	at	the	
estimated	labour	cost	for	contract	
implementation,	and	bidding	behaviour	
across	rounds	indicated	that	farmers	adjusted	
their	bids	in	response	to	previous	outcomes	
in	ways	that	indicated	an	understanding	of	
the	mechanism	(Leimona,	2007).
Direct	negotiation	between	service	users	
and	providers	–	another	approach	for	price-
setting	–	results	in	individually	crafted	
agreements	that	reflect	the	different	levels	
of	service	that	different	landholders	can	
provide	and	the	specific	conditions	faced	
by	each	landholder.	This	was	the	approach	
adopted	by	Vittel	in	France	and	in	the	New	
York	City	case	(Box	4,	p.	34).	This	approach	
can	result	in	highly	optimized	contracts,	
but	can	also	incur	high	transaction	costs.	
A	variant	of	this	approach	is	used	in	the	
Silvopastoral	Project	in	Costa	Rica,	Colombia	
and	Nicaragua.	Recognizing	that	different	
land	uses	can	provide	different	levels	of	the	
desired	services,	payments	are	based	on	the	
increase	in	services	generated	by	the	specific	
mix	of	land	uses	adopted	by	each	landholder,	
measured	using	an	index	(see	Table	11,	
p.	78).	While	this	approach	has	lower	
BOX	19
Measurement and targeting issues: the bushTender programme of Australia
In	Australia,	the	State	of	Victoria’s	
Department	of	Natural	Resources	and	
Environment	(NRE)	has	developed	a	pilot	
programme	to	conserve	native	vegetation	
remnants	on	private	property.	In	exchange	
for	payments	from	the	state	government,	
landholders	commit	to	fencing	off	and	
managing	an	agreed	amount	of	native	
vegetation	for	a	set	period.	The	first	
BushTender	trial	was	completed	in	2002	
in	the	north	central	and	northeast	regions	
of	the	state.	The	programme	is	based	
on	the	Conservation	Reserve	Program	
in	the	United	States	of	America.	The	
innovation	of	the	BushTender	programme	
is	its	reliance	on	a	robust	assessment	
methodology	and	reverse	auction	
mechanism	to	set	the	price	of	the	contracts.
With	the	assistance	of	farmers’	
associations,	NRE	publicized	that	it	might	
be	willing	to	pay	farmers	to	conserve	
native	vegetation.	Interested	landholders	
contacted	NRE,	which	sent	out	field	
staff	to	inspect	the	sites,	explaining	
to	landholders	which	of	their	native	
vegetation	was	most	significant	and	the	
most	effective	conservation	activities.	
The	field	staff	assessed	the	value	of	
each	site’s	native	vegetation	on	two	scales	
of	value.	One	was	called	the	Biodiversity	
Significance	Score,	which	rated	the	
site’s	conservation	value	according	to	
scarcity	of	remnant	types.	The	other	
was	the	Habitat	Services	Score,	which	
assessed	the	contribution	of	the	proposed	
management	action,	such	as	fencing	or	
weeding,	to	biodiversity	improvement.	
Landholders	were	informed	of	the	
Habitat	Services	Score	but,	not	of	the	
Biodiversity	Significance	Score.	Interested	
landholders	could	then	choose	to	submit	
bids,	detailing	in	a	management	plan	
developed	with	the	field	officer	which	
remnant	vegetation	(and	how	much)	
they	would	be	willing	to	conserve,	as	
well	as	the	management	regime	for	the	
remnants.	The	proposed	management	
actions	ranged	from	excluding	livestock,	
retaining	large	trees	and	controlling	
rabbits	to	controlling	weeds	and	
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negotiation	costs,	it	still	has	relatively	high	
monitoring	costs	(Pagiola	et al.,	2004).
How should payments be made?
Three	main	issues	must	be	addressed	in	
determining	the	form	payments	should	take:	
	 1.	Should	payments	be	in	cash	or	in	
another	form?	
	 2.	How	should	payments	be	timed?	
	 3.	What	payment	mechanism	should		
be	used?
Cash versus in-kind payments
Other	types	of	payments	than	cash	can	be	
envisaged.	Wunder	(2005)	describes	the	
perceived	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	
cash	versus	the	use	of	beehives	as	payment	
for	watershed	services	in	Bolivia.	The	in-kind	
payment	involved	providing	farmers	with	
beehives	and	technical	assistance	in	bee-
keeping.	This	form	of	payment	was	perceived	
as	creating	a	lasting	benefit,	while	cash	
would	more	likely	have	been	spent	right	
away.	One	way	to	address	this	concern	is	by	
targeting	payments	towards	women,	which	
has	been	shown	to	be	particularly	effective	
in	increasing	spending	on	education,	
health	and	nutrition	(Davis,	2003;	Haddad,	
Hoddinott	and	Alderman,	1997).	One	
objection	to	in-kind	payments	is	that	they	
allow	less	flexibility	for	meeting	fluctuating	
labour	and	skill	requirements.	Moreover,	
they	can	also	be	seen	as	paternalistic	–	i.e.	it	
is	an	outsider	who	determines	what	is	best	
for	suppliers,	rather	than	allowing	them	to	
choose	how	to	invest	or	dispose	of	their	cash	
payments.	Offering	a	variety	of	payment	
modes,	if	the	administrative	costs	of	doing	
so	are	not	too	high,	could	be	one	way	to	
overcome	these	objections	(Wunder,	2005).
Timing and duration
The	timing	and	duration	of	payments	are	
critical	issues	from	both	a	buyer’s	and	seller’s	
BOX	19
Measurement and targeting issues: the bushTender programme of Australia
revegetation.	In	the	end,	98	landholders	
submitted	148	bids	for	186	sites.
Since	NRE	had	an	estimate	of	potential	
biodiversity	importance	for	each	of	these	
sites,	they	were	able	to	calculate	the	best	
value	for	money	(i.e.	by	identifying	those	
bids	that	offered	greatest	biodiversity	
value	for	least	cost	per	hectare).	Given	
a	limited	funding	budget,	only	the	
most	cost-effective	bids	were	funded.	
In	the	end,	NRE	accepted	97	bids,	with	
landholders	committing	to	conserve	and	
manage	roughly	3	200	hectares	of	native	
vegetation	under	three-year	BushTender	
Management	Agreements	for	a	total	cost	
of	approximately	$A400	000.	Compliance	
monitoring	occurs	through	random	site	
inspections.	
Beyond	the	fact	that	the	scheme	was	
well	received	and	oversubscribed,	the	
environmental	benefits	seem	significant.	
NRE	field	staff	concluded	that	most	of	
the	successful	bids	contained	sites	of	high	
or	very	high	conservation	significance,	
including	24	new	populations	of	rare	or	
threatened	plant	species.	Perhaps	the	
most	unexpected	finding	was	that	many	
of	the	bids	were	for	less	money	than	the	
NRE	would	have	been	willing	to	pay,	had	
they	negotiated	directly	with	landholders.	
It	is	not	clear	whether	the	lower	price	was	
a	result	of	market	pressures	of	competitive	
bidding,	the	NRE	underestimating	
landholders’	willingness	to	accept,	or	the	
fact	that	once	landholders	understood	
the	non-market	value	of	their	native	
vegetation	they	were	willing	to	
internalize	some	of	the	perceived	costs	
of	conservation.	It	is	an	open	question	
whether	persuasion	instruments,	such	
as	brochures	or	educational	visits	from	
conservation	staff,	would	have	achieved	
the	same	result.	At	first	glance,	this	seems	
unlikely	because	the	landholders	would	
not	have	been	forced	to	consider	the	true	
value	of	their	willingness	to	accept	land	
changes.
Source:	FAO,	2007d.	
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point	of	view.	In	many	cases,	environmental	
services	are	only	generated	years	after	
the	supplier	actually	makes	the	required	
land-use	changes	(and	bears	the	costs).	
Obtaining	investment	credit	is	often	difficult	
and	expensive	for	developing	country	
farmers,	further	strengthening	the	need	
for	payments	in	the	short	term.	Whether	
payments	should	be	made	in	a	single	
instalment	or	periodically	also	needs	to	be	
considered.
Referring	back	to	Figures	7	and	8	in	
Chapter	4	(pp.	52–3),	we	can	see	that	
different	arrangements	for	the	timing	of	
payments	may	be	required	when	considering	
a	farmer	in	scenario	B	in	Figure	8,	who	faces	
an	investment	barrier	to	adoption	and	thus	
a	temporary	decline	in	income,	versus	those	
in	scenarios	A	and	B	in	Figure	7,	who	face	
a	permanent	decrease	in	income	from	the	
land	by	adopting	the	land-use	system	that	
generates	environmental	services.	In	the	
former	case,	payments	can	allow	the	farmer	
to	overcome	the	investment	barrier	through	
short-term	funds	to	facilitate	the	transfer	to	
new	production	systems	that	will	be	more	
profitable	in	the	long	run,	even	without	the	
payment.	
This	is	the	strategy	used	in	the	
Silvopastoral	Project	in	Colombia,	Costa	
Rica	and	Nicaragua	(Box	14),	where	payments	
are	explicitly	short-term.	Indeed,	despite	
their	long-term	benefits,	silvopastoral	
practices	tend	to	be	unattractive	to	farmers	
primarily	because	of	the	substantial	initial	
investment	and	the	time	lag	between	the	
investment	and	returns.	The	project	assumed	
that,	given	this	situation,	relatively	small	
payments	provided	in	the	early	stages	could	
“tip	the	balance”	between	current	and	
silvopastoral	practices	by	increasing	the	net	
present	value	of	investments	in	silvopastoral	
practices	and	by	reducing	the	initial	period	
in	which	these	practices	impose	net	costs	
on	farmers.	The	payments	also	alleviate	
the	liquidity	problems	faced	by	many	
farmers	and	help	them	finance	the	required	
investments	(Pagiola	et al.,	2004).
When	the	land-use	change	needed	to	
generate	environmental	services	results	in	
a	permanent	decrease	in	income,	payments	
for	the	environmental	service	must	be	
maintained	indefinitely	to	preserve	the	
incentive	to	supply	it.	Farmers	continue	
to	receive	payments	every	season	for	the	
agricultural	products	they	generate	from	their	
lands;	receiving	a	continuing	payment	for	
the	environmental	services	they	generate	is	
analogous	to	receiving	continuous	payments	
for	the	crops	they	produce	each	year.	
Payment forms
Three	main	types	of	mechanism	for	
environmental	service	payments	can	be	
identified:
•	 direct	payments	(public	and	private);	
•	 offsets	(both	voluntary	and	mandatory);	
•	 agricultural	product	certification	
programmes	(ecolabels).	
Each	involves	different	sets	of	stakeholders	
among	the	buyers	and	sellers,	as	well	as	
intermediaries	involved	in	making	the	
transaction.	In	the	following	paragraphs,	
we	summarize	the	main	features	of	each	of	
these	mechanisms	and	identify	key	actors	in	
the	transaction	chain.
Direct payments.	This	category	includes	
direct	payments	from	public	programmes,	
such	as	the	China	Grain	for	Green	
programme,	as	well	as	public	programmes	
in	Australia	(Box	19),	Costa	Rica	(Box	16),	
Mexico	(Box	18)	and	the	United	States	of	
America	(Box	12).	Private	payments	may	
also	fall	into	this	category,	including	cases	of	
hydropower	companies	paying	for	watershed	
services	(FAO,	2002a)	and	payments	made	by	
NGOs	for	biodiversity	conservation	services.	
Currently,	this	mechanism	accounts	for	the	
largest	share	of	payments.	
Sources	of	funds	in	this	category	range	
from	general	tax	revenues	to	specific	taxes	
or	charges	on	beneficiaries.	International	
funds	(e.g.	the	GEF)	are	a	further	source,	
and	in	some	cases	public	and	private	funding	
sources	are	combined.	In	Costa	Rica,	in	
the	Rio	Segundo	watershed,	for	example,	
payments	to	landholders	are	financed	in	
part	with	payments	from	a	private	bottler,	
Florida	Ice	&	Farm,	and	in	part	by	the	local	
town’s	public	service	utility	ESPH	(Empresa	
de	Servicios	Publicos	de	Heredia)	(Pagiola,	
2006).	An	important	distinction	in	these	
cases	is	the	extent	to	which	funds	come	
directly	from	service	users	or	through	
intermediaries.	When	payments	are	made	
directly	by	service	users,	a	good	case	can	be	
made	that	payments	are	likely	to	be	efficient	
and	sustainable,	as	the	financing	source	
has	both	a	direct	incentive	to	pay	and	the	
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power	to	insist	on	an	efficient	use	of	their	
monies;	where	payments	are	made	through	
intermediaries,	such	as	government	agencies,	
as	in	the	case	of	the	United	States	CRP,	
Mexico’s	Payment	for	Hydrological	Services	
Programme	(PSAH)	and	Costa	Rica’s	PSA,	it	
can	be	argued	that	this	efficiency	is	muted	
(Pagiola	and	Platais,	2007).
Mandatory and voluntary offsets.	
Mandatory	offsets	are	the	medium	of	
exchange	in	regulated	cap-and-trade	
markets,	such	as	the	Kyoto	flexible	trading	
mechanisms	and	United	States	wetlands	
mitigation	banking	(see	Box	12	on	p.	62).	
Private-	or	public-sector	entities	wanting	to	
meet	regulatory	compliance	through	offsets	
are	the	ultimate	purchasers	in	this	exchange,	
although	there	are	usually	one	or	more	
intermediaries	involved.	These	include	NGOs	
as	well	as	private-sector	firms	specializing	in	
carbon	market	exchanges.	(See	Box	20	for	
a	more	detailed	description	of	the	process	
of	certification	under	the	CDM.)	There	
also	exists	a	significant	and	growing	sector	
concerned	with	voluntary	carbon	offset	
payments.	The	certification	standards	and	
procedures	vary	between	voluntary	and	
mandatory	offset	schemes.	Several	actors	are	
present	in	the	transaction	chain	between	
buyer	and	sellers	for	both.	
Agricultural product certification 
programmes.	When	consumers	buy	certified	
products,	they	are	paying	not	just	for	the	
product	itself,	but	also	for	the	manner	in	
which	it	was	produced	and	brought	to	
the	market.	The	source	of	funds	is	from	
within	the	private	sector	and	the	payment	
mechanism	is	via	price	premiums	and/or	
market	access.	These	programmes	establish	
a	set	of	standards	for	particular	categories	
of	goods	or	services	and,	for	a	payment,	
certify	whether	the	producer	has	met	
these	requirements.	If	so,	they	may	use	
an	identifying	label	on	their	product	and	
in	their	advertising	to	distinguish	their	
products	from	others	in	the	marketplace	
and,	presumably,	benefit	from	increased	
prices	or	market	share	by	serving	the	“green”	
consumer	niche.	
Certified	products	involve	three	sets	of	
buyers	along	the	supply	chain.	The	most	
obvious	is	the	point-of-sale	buyer	–	the	
green	consumer.	Moving	up	the	supply	
chain,	the	second	is	the	retailer	–	Home	
Depot,	Carrefour	or	other	companies	buying	
wholesale	before	selling	to	the	consumer.	
The	third	buyer	is,	ironically,	the	supplier	
of	the	green	product,	who	must	pay	the	
certification	organization	for	use	of	the	
label	and	sometimes	separate	certifiers.	
The	transaction	costs	associated	with	
the	certification	process	and	the	need	to	
streamline	marketing	value	chains	to	provide	
producers	with	sufficient	incentives	to	
participate	in	the	certification	schemes	can	
prove	to	be	a	formidable	barrier,	especially	
for	small	and	low-income	producers	(Searle,	
Colby	and	Milway,	2004).	Some	efforts	have	
been	made	to	facilitate	the	participation	
of	such	groups	through	the	introduction	of	
simplified	procedures	or	promotion	of	group	
certification	schemes.	
There	is	also	a	trade-off	in	terms	of	
market	growth	between	setting	highly	
stringent	and	more	flexible	standards.	Highly	
stringent	standards	can	result	in	fairly	small	
“luxury	good”	market	niches	that	may	be	
inaccessible	to	most	producers,	whereas	
more	flexible	standards	could	involve	a	much	
broader	market	segment	but	may	not	deliver	
any	real	environmental	benefits.	A	hybrid	
solution	that	involves	a	dynamic	process	
of	standard	setting	to	promote	continuous	
improvement	is	an	option	being	used	by	the	
Marine	Stewardship	Council	(see	Box	21).
Payments	for	any	one	service	may	fall	
into	any	one	of	these	three	categories	of	
mechanisms.	This	is	illustrated	in	Table	12,	
which	presents	a	variety	of	specific	payment	
mechanisms	for	biodiversity	conservation	
services.	There	is	also	potential	to	combine	
payment	mechanisms.	One	strategy	being	
implemented	is	the	use	of	public	payment	
programmes	to	initiate	PES	programmes,	
with	the	eventual	intention	of	transitioning	
to	private-sector	and/or	offsets	payments.	
PES	programmes	with	funding	from	the	
GEF	typify	this	strategy.	Here,	public	funds	
are	being	used	to	establish	capacity	and	
mechanisms	and	to	illustrate	the	potential	
for	these	types	of	mechanisms,	in	the	
expectation	that	private-sector	purchasers	
of	services	will	participate	once	they	have	
been	convinced	of	the	benefits	they	could	
reap.	Establishing	strong	public–private	
partnerships	in	the	implementation	of	PES	
programmes	is	a	key	part	of	a	new	strategy	
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proposed	by	the	GEF.	The	partnerships	are	
intended	to	encourage	the	development	
and	scaling	up	of	voluntary	PES	payments,	
and	reduce	the	transaction	costs	of	such	
instruments	(GEF,	2007b).
Reducing transaction costs
The	need	to	reduce	transaction	costs,	subject	
to	achieving	a	defined	level	of	service	
provision,	is	an	overarching	issue	in	all	the	
exchange	mechanisms	discussed	above.	In	the	
early	stage	of	PES	programme	development,	
when	institutions	and	participants	are	
inexperienced	and	projects	are	small,	
transaction	costs	per	unit	of	service	tend	to	
be	relatively	high,	but	they	can	be	expected	
to	decline	over	time.	However,	unless	
institutions	exist	to	manage	and	coordinate	
transactions	among	large	numbers	of	
smallholders	and	unless	economies	of	scale	
in	monitoring	and	payment	systems	can	be	
found,	such	costs	can	render	PES	initiatives	
unworkable.	Three	main	approaches	to	
reducing	transaction	costs	in	developing	
country	PES	schemes	can	be	identified:
•	 Simplify the rules.	A	rule	of	thumb	is	to	
use	the	simplest	rules	possible	and	the	
simplest	compliance	mechanisms	that	
will	satisfy	the	buyers	and	beneficiaries	
in	the	contract.	For	example,	for	
determining	baselines	and	monitoring	
carbon	outcomes,	standardized	measures	
can	be	developed	and	scientifically	
evaluated	to	serve	as	proxies	for	detailed	
measures.	Independent	bodies	would	
determine	the	reference	rates,	and	
BOX	20
Rules and modalities for afforestation and reforestation payments under the  
Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol
Under	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	
(CDM)	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	industrialized	
countries	can	meet	a	part	of	their	
greenhouse	gas	reduction	obligations	
through	offset	projects	in	developing	
countries.	CDM	projects	must	also	promote	
sustainable	development	in	host	countries.	
Emission	offsets	can	be	generated	either	by	
reducing	emissions	or	by	removing	carbon	
from	the	atmosphere	(sequestration).	
Afforestation	and	reforestation	(A&R)	
projects	are	the	only	type	of	carbon	
sequestration	projects	currently	allowed	
under	the	CDM.	Emission	offsets	are	
measured	in	metric	tonnes	of	carbon	
dioxide	equivalents	and	are	traded	as	
certified	emission	reductions	(CERs).
Rules and modalities 
baseline.	Baselines	for	A&R	projects	
are	calculated	based	on	the	changes	in	
carbon	stocks	in	above-	and	below-ground	
biomass	that	would	have	reasonably	
occurred	without	the	project.	Baselines	
are	calculated	using	an	approved	CDM	
methodology,	or	a	new	methodology	may	
be	proposed	for	approval	along	with	the	
project.
Additionality.	A	strict	additionality	
criterion	is	applied	for	projects.	A	project	
may	be	additional	if	it	overcomes	barriers	
related	to	investment	or	technology	
constraints.
leakage.	Any	increase	in	greenhouse	gas	
emissions	that	occurs	outside	the	project	
area	and	is	measurable	and	attributable	to	
the	project	must	be	minimized,	monitored	
and	subtracted	from	project	carbon	
sequestration	credits.
Credits.	Two	types	of	credits	have	been	
developed	for	A&R	projects,	based	on	
the	possibility	that	forests	can	eventually	
release	carbon	(i.e.	sequestration	may	not	
be	permanent):
•	 temporary	credits	that	expire	at	the	
end	of	the	commitment	period	for	
which	they	were	issued	and	must	
be	replaced	by	the	buyer	to	ensure	
continuing	carbon	storage.	This	type	
of	credit	commands	a	low	price,	
but	the	producer	faces	no	risk	if	the	
carbon	sequestration	is	lost	as	a	result	
of	calamity	(e.g.	fire)	or	harvesting.	
•	 long-term	credits	that	expire	at	the	
end	of	the	project’s	crediting	period,	a	
time	span	of	up	to	60	years.	
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verification	would	only	involve	a	third	
party	confirming	that	the	activities	had	
been	undertaken	(Sandor,	2000,	cited	in	
Landell-Mills	and	Porras,	2002).	
•	 Facilitate buyer–seller linkages.	Most	
PES	programmes	involve	buyers	and	
sellers	who	are	geographically	and	
socially	distant	from	one	another.	To	
reduce	search	costs,	some	countries	
have	established	“one-stop	shops”	for	
potential	buyers	of	carbon	emission	
offsets,	where	they	can	find	out	
all	the	relevant	rules,	identify	pre-
screened	sellers	and	learn	about	locally	
knowledgeable	market	intermediaries.	
•	 Exploit economies of scale.	Costs	
such	as	project	design,	management	
and	certification	are	characterized	
by	economies	of	scale;	consequently,	
project	size	has	an	important	effect	
on	unit	costs.	Transaction	costs	can	
be	greatly	reduced	by	developing	
projects	in	communities	where	active	
local	organizations	and	participatory	
development	programmes	are	already	
in	place,	with	representatives	already	
selected	and	authorized	to	negotiate	
with	outsiders.	For	example,	organized	
indigenous	communities	in	El	Salvador	
have	undertaken	their	own	diagnostic	
studies	of	local	needs	and	priorities	
and	are	actively	marketing	specific	
ecosystem	services	from	specific	areas	
that	would	contribute	to	meeting	those	
priorities	(Rosa	et al.,	2003).	Because	
carbon	can	be	sequestered	in	almost	
BOX	20
Rules and modalities for afforestation and reforestation payments under the  
Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol
The project cycle
The	first	step	of	the	CDM	project	cycle	
is	the	preparation	of	a	Project	Design	
Document.	In	the	document,	the	project	
developer	must:
•	 identify	a	suitable	region	with	areas	
not	covered	by	forests	since	at	least	
1990;	
•	 gather	land-use,	social	and	economic	
information	about	the	project	area	to	
develop	the	baseline;	
•	 identify	suitable	forms	of	A&R	and	
estimate	their	carbon	sequestration	
potential;	
•	 contact	and	establish	relationships	
with	the	local	people;	
•	 negotiate	the	terms	of	the	project	and	
the	schedule	of	payments	for	carbon	
sequestration	services;	and	
•	 analyse	possible	environmental	and	
social	impacts.	
After	the	document	is	prepared,	it	must	
be	approved	by	the	Designated	National	
Authority	of	the	host	country,	validated	
by	a	Designated	Operational	Entity	
accredited	by	the	CDM	Executive	Board	
and	registered	with	the	Executive	Board.	
Once	the	CDM	Executive	Board	issues	the	
appropriate	number	of	CERs	for	a	project,	
the	project	developer	becomes	a	seller	in	
the	international	carbon	market.
Once	the	project	is	approved	and	under	
way,	the	next	part	of	the	CDM	cycle	is	
monitoring	the	carbon	dioxide	abatement	
actually	achieved	by	the	project,	including	
certification	and	verification	by	the	
Designated	Operational	Entity.	Monitoring	
costs	are	incurred	every	time	a	new	batch	
of	carbon	is	submitted	for	CER	credits.	
Project	management	costs	include	the	
establishment	of	a	local	project	office	
and	the	training	of	staff,	the	cost	of	
keeping	records	of	project	participants	
and	administration	of	payments	to	sellers,	
as	well	as	salaries	and	transportation	
costs	of	project	employees.	Enforcement	
and	insurance	costs	arise	from	the	risk	
of	project	failure	or	underperformance,	
which	might	be	caused	by	fire,	slow	tree	
growth	or	leakage.	
Source:	FAO	Forest	Resource	Division	Fact	Sheet	
(FAO,	n.d.).
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any	site	(unlike	the	more	site-specific	
biodiversity	and	watershed	services),	
area-based	projects	can	be	designed	in	
which	an	entire	jurisdiction	commits	to	a	
defined	increase	in	forest	cover	or	area	
of	forest	protected.	This	increases	land-
use	flexibility	and	is	especially	useful	for	
heterogeneous	landscapes	(Smith	and	
Scherr,	2002).
Establishing an enabling  
environment
No	transactions	–	ranging	from	the	informal	
to	the	highly	regulated	–	take	place	in	the	
absence	of	supporting	institutions.	Even	the	
simplest	contracts	between	buyers	and	sellers	
rely	on	legal	institutions	to	protect	property	
With	trade	in	fishery	products	at	an		
all-time	high	and	concern	over	the	
status	of	wild	marine	stocks	growing,	
ecolabelling	offers	a	way	to	promote	
responsible	fish	trade	while	preserving	
natural	resources	for	future	generations.	
In	2005,	the	FAO	Committee	on	Fisheries	
adopted	a	set	of	voluntary	guidelines	
for	the	ecolabelling	of	marine	capture	
fisheries	products.	They	provide	guidance	
to	governments	and	organizations	that	
already	maintain,	or	are	considering	
establishing,	labelling	schemes	to	certify	
and	promote	fish	and	fishery	products	
from	well-managed	marine	capture	
fisheries.	The	guidelines	outline	general	
principles	that	should	govern	ecolabelling	
schemes,	including	the	need	for	reliable,	
independent	auditing,	transparency	of	
standards-setting	and	accountability,	and	
the	need	for	standards	to	be	based	on	
good	science.	They	also	lay	down	minimum	
requirements	and	criteria	for	assessing	
whether	a	fishery	should	be	certified	and	
whether	an	ecolabel	should	be	awarded.	
The	FAO	guidelines	acknowledge	the	
hurdles	that	developing	countries	face	
in	responsibly	managing	their	fisheries.	
These	result	from	a	lack	of	financial	
and	technical	resources,	as	well	as	the	
particular	challenges	posed	by	the	
small-scale	fisheries	common	in	many	
developing	nations.	The	guidelines,	
therefore,	call	for	financial	and	technical	
support	for	developing	countries	to	
help	them	implement	and	benefit	from	
ecolabelling	schemes.	
Over	the	past	15	years,	a	number	of	
countries	and	private	organizations	
have	put	ecolabelling	programmes	into	
place	for	a	wide	range	of	products.	The	
proliferation	of	ecolabels	has	created	a	
number	of	challenges,	as	well	as	confusion	
among	producers	and	consumers.	
There	have	also	been	concerns	that	
ecolabelling	schemes	could	result	in	
unfair	competition.	The	purpose	of	the	
FAO	guidelines	is	to	create	a	framework	
for	the	development	of	responsible	and	
trustworthy	ecolabelling	schemes.
The	main	fishery	certification	and	
ecolabelling	programme	is	currently	run	
by	the	Marine	Stewardship	Council	(MSC),	
an	independent	non-profit	organization	
that	promotes	responsible	fishing	
practices.	A	number	of	major	seafood	
retailers	carry	MSC-certified	products.	For	
example,	Wal-Mart,	a	retail	chain	in	the	
United	States	of	America,	has	committed	
itself	to	sourcing	all	its	fresh	and	frozen	
fish	products	from	MSC-certified	fisheries	
within	three	to	five	years.	There	are	
currently	more	than	50	fisheries	that	are	
certified	by	the	MSC	or	under	assessment.	
Only	three	MSC-certified	fisheries	are,	
however,	from	developing	countries	
(South	African	hake,	Mexican	Baja	
California	spiny	lobster	and	Patagonian	
scallop	fisheries).
1	FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department.
BOX	21
Ecolabelling in fisheries
William Emerson1
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rights	and	adjudicate	disputes,	when	they	
arise,	and	on	law	enforcement	to	ensure	the	
legal	judgments	are	carried	out.	Property	
rights,	institutions	to	support	collective	
management	of	resources,	capacity-building	
needs	and	coherence	of	the	overall	policy	
framework	are	key	aspects	of	establishing	an	
enabling	environment.	
Effective	ownership	of	resources	is	
often	a	prerequisite	for	entering	into	PES	
programmes	(Landell-Mills	and	Porras,	2002;	
Grieg-Gran,	Porras	and	Wunder,	2005),	but	
ownership	need	not	be	on	an	individual	
private	basis.	There	are	already	a	number	
of	PES	programmes	that	target	community	
groups	(Muñoz-Piña	et al.,	2005;	Scherr,	
White	and	Kaimowitz,	2002;	Swallow,	
Meinzen-Dick	and	van	Noordwijk,	2005;		
van	Noordwijk,	Chandler	and	Tomich,		
2004).	
TAblE 12
Types of payments for biodiversity protection 
PURCHASE oF HIGH-vAlUE HAbITAT
n  Private	land	acquisition	(purchase	by	private	buyers	or	NGOs	explicitly	for	biodiversity	conservation)
n  Public	land	acquisition	(purchase	by	a	government	agency	explicitly	for	biodiversity	conservation)
PAyMEnT FoR ACCESS To SPECIES oR HAbITAT
n  Bioprospecting	rights	(rights	to	collect,	test	and	use	genetic	material	from	a	designated	area)
n  Research	permits	(rights	to	collect	specimens,	take	measurements	in	an	area)
n  Hunting,	fishing	or	gathering	permits	for	wild	species
n  Ecotourism	use	(rights	to	enter	an	area,	observe	wildlife,	camp	or	hike)
PAyMEnT FoR bIoDIvERSITy-ConSERvInG MAnAGEMEnT
n  Conservation	easements	(owner	paid	to	use	and	manage	a	defined	piece	of	land	only	for	conservation	
purposes;	restrictions	are	usually	in	perpetuity	and	transferable	upon	sale	of	the	land)
n  Conservation	land	lease	(owner	paid	to	use	and	manage	a	defined	piece	of	land	for	conservation	purposes,		
for	defined	period	of	time)
n  Conservation	concession	(public	forest	agency	is	paid	to	maintain	a	defined	area	under	conservation	uses		
only	–	comparable	to	a	forest	logging	concession)
n  Community	concession	in	public	protected	areas	(individuals	or	communities	are	allocated	use	rights	to	a	
defined	area	of	forest	or	grassland,	in	return	for	commitment	to	protect	the	area	from	practices	that	harm	
biodiversity)
n  Management	contracts	for	habitat	or	species	conservation	on	private	farms,	forests,	grazing	lands		
(contract	that	details	biodiversity	management	activities,	and	payments	linked	to	the	achievement	of	specified	
objectives)
TRADAblE RIGHTS UnDER CAP-AnD-TRADE REGUlATIonS
n  Tradable	wetland	mitigation	credits	(credits	from	wetland	conservation	or	restoration	that	can	be	used	to	
offset	obligations	of	developers	to	maintain	a	minimum	area	of	natural	wetlands	in	a	defined	region)
n  Tradable	development	rights	(rights	allocated	to	develop	only	a	limited	total	area	of	natural	habitat	within	a	
defined	region)
n  Tradable	biodiversity	credits	(credits	representing	areas	of	biodiversity	protection	or	enhancement	that	can	be	
purchased	by	developers	to	ensure	they	meet	a	minimum	standard	of	biodiversity	protection)
SUPPoRT To bIoDIvERSITy-ConSERvInG bUSInESSES AnD PRoDUCTIon PRoCESSES
n  Business	shares	in	enterprises	that	manage	for	biodiversity	conservation
n  Biodiversity-friendly	products	(ecolabelling)
n  Niche	market	development	for	products	with	valuable	agricultural	biodiversity
Source: Scherr, White and Khare, 00.
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Property	rights	to	land-	and	water-based	
resources	in	many	developing	countries	
are	often	complex,	incorporating	multiple	
layers	of	claims	for	access,	use,	exclusion	
and	management	rights	among	both	well-	
and	poorly	defined	groups.	If	individuals,	a	
community	or	its	members	cannot	document	
their	ownership,	structuring	a	PES	transaction	
will	be	difficult.	
Several	countries,	including	Brazil	and	
Ghana,	have	proposed	or	implemented	laws	
to	facilitate	PES	programmes.	To	facilitate	
exchange	of	carbon	sequestration	credits,	
the	Australian	state	of	New	South	Wales	has	
statutorily	created	an	alienable	property	
right	in	sequestered	carbon.	Thus,	a	forest	
landowner	can	sell	credits	for	carbon	stored	
in	his	or	her	trees,	and	this	can	then	be	resold	
by	third	parties.	A	number	of	countries	have	
created	the	equivalent	of	a	national	carbon	
office	that	keeps	track	of	carbon	emission	
reduction	and	carbon	sequestration	projects,	
and	private	certification	organizations	now	
ensure	that	carbon	sequestration	projects	
report	accurately	on	their	activities.	
It	is	often	necessary	to	coordinate	actions	
within	a	group	in	order	to	achieve	effective	
supply	of	the	environmental	service.	
Examples	include	managing	watersheds,	
communal	lands	and	fisheries.	A	supporting	
institutional	environment	is	needed	here	
also.	For	example,	consider	a	payment	
scheme	to	rehabilitate	upstream	areas	to	
reduce	soil	erosion	and	improve	water	
quality	and	flow	downstream.	If	the	land	
is	held	in	common	and	the	environmental	
service	buyer	is	concerned	that	all	claimants	
are	adequately	compensated,	the	buyer	
needs	to	establish	certainty	over	the	primary,	
secondary	and	tertiary	claims	to	various	
resources	–	a	potentially	difficult	task.	
Both	public	and	private	groups	can	serve	
as	intermediaries	or	brokers	to	overcome	
collective	action	problems.	For	example,	The	
Nature	Conservancy	has	played	a	central	role	
in	brokering	forest	carbon	projects	in	Belize,	
Bolivia	and	Brazil	(Wunder,	The	and	Ibarra,	
2005),	and	small	farmers	in	the	Macquarie	
River	Valley	in	Australia	have	relied	on	their	
local	organization	(Macquarie	River	Fruit	and	
Fibre)	to	negotiate	with	upper	watershed	
ranchers.
Devising	enforcement	schemes	and	
penalty	mechanisms	poses	additional	
difficulties	in	common	property	regimes.	
Should	the	entire	group	be	punished	for	
one	individual’s	infraction,	following	the	
group-credit	rationale?	Unlike	credit	groups,	
where	members	choose	to	work	together,	
communities	have	members	with	existing	
rights	to	resources.	Thus,	membership	
is	likely	to	be	more	heterogeneous	and	
power	relations	are	far	more	important.	
It	remains	an	open	question	whether	and	
how	PES	mechanisms	would	increase	self-
monitoring	and	enforcement	rather	than	
engender	conflicts	and	hasten	a	breakdown	
in	collective	management.
Empirical	work	by	Alix-Garcia,	de	Janvry	
and	Sadoulet	(2005,	forthcoming)	in	Mexico	
provides	insights	for	the	design	of	payment	
mechanisms	in	areas	where	many	resources	
are	held	communally.	They	find	that,	in	
order	to	generate	appropriate	incentives,	
PES	programmes	should	be	based	on	an	
understanding	of	the	traditional	rules	and	
institutions	that	govern	land	use.	They	argue	
that	payment	schemes	should	be	based	on	
variables	that	cannot	be	manipulated	by	the	
recipient.	They	also	stress	the	importance	of	
identifying	both	environmental	outcomes	
and	distributional	outcomes.	
Participation	in	some	types	of	
environmental	service	exchanges	can	
require	a	fairly	high	level	of	production,	
marketing	or	information	management	
skills.	Smallholders	who	are	potential	
environmental	service	suppliers	need	
business	skills	to	negotiate	private	
deals	effectively.	To	facilitate	an	equal	
participation	of	smallholders	in	PES	schemes,	
there	is	a	clear	need	for	stronger	investment	
in	building	human	and	institutional	capacity	
among	these	groups	(FAO,	2007c).
Thus	far,	however,	PES	capacity-building	
efforts	in	developing	countries	have	
remained	fragmentary,	with	little	practical	
guidance	for	implementation	and	with	
most	resources	being	absorbed	by	agency	
staff	costs.	The	limited	experience	available	
internationally	suggests	that	existing	farmer	
organizations	and	technical	assistance	
programmes	already	effectively	serving	
smallholders	are	best	placed	to	build	PES	
capacity	among	smallholders.	In	addition,	
interesting	success	stories	have	resulted	
from	“learning	by	doing”,	where	secondary	
community-based	organizations	developed	
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internal	capacity	in	conjunction	with	pilot	
projects	(Waage,	2005).20	The	Katoomba	
Group	began,	in	2006,	to	develop	resource	
materials	for	community	capacity-building,	
but	these	have	not	yet	addressed	issues	
specific	to	farmers.21	Experience	has	indicated	
that	local	communities	play	a	critical	role	
in	the	process	of	setting	and	adapting	the	
“rules	of	the	game”,	at	both	policy	and	
programme	levels.	For	example,	through	
civil	society	engagement	in	the	International	
Tropical	Timber	Organization,	community-
based	forestry	organizations	have	
contributed	to	policy	dialogue	on	payments	
for	environmental	services.	Resources	are	
required,	however,	to	enable	community	
groups	to	organize	themselves,	prepare	for	
meetings	and	attend	them.	Organizations	of	
smallholder	farmers	could	play	a	similar	role	
in	local,	national	and	international	policy	
dialogues	on	payments	for	environmental	
services	(FAO,	2007c;	van	Noordwijk	et al.,	
2007).
In	addition	to	establishing	policies	
and	institutions	directly	related	to	PES	
programmes,	coherence	in	the	overall	policy	
structure	that	may	have	indirect	impacts	
on	programme	effectiveness	is	critical.	For	
example,	programmes	to	encourage	farmers	
to	reduce	water	pollution	from	agricultural	
chemical	runoff	will	be	less	effective	in	the	
presence	of	a	policy	providing	pesticide	
subsidies.	Cross-sectoral	policy	coherence	is	
an	important	issue	requiring	coordination	
between	agricultural,	environmental,	
financial,	trade	and	other	policy	sectors.	
Conclusions 
The	process	of	designing	an	effective	
payment	programme	involves	four	important	
and	challenging	steps:	identifying	what	
should	be	paid	for;	who	should	be	paid;	how	
much	should	be	paid;	and	what	payments	
mechanisms	should	be	used.	
0 Examples include ACICAFOC (Asociación Coordinadora 
Indígena y Campesina de Agroforestería Comunitaria 
de Centroamérica) in Central America, the Sierra Gorda 
Biosphere Reserve in Mexico and EcoTrust-Uganda.
 For further information, see the Katoomba Group Web 
site at www.katoombagroup.org.
Cost-effectiveness	is	an	important	
overall	criterion	for	programme	design	
because	public	budgets	are	generally	
constrained.	Minimizing	the	transaction	
costs	associated	with	making	payments	for	
services,	while	ensuring	at	least	a	minimal	
level	of	service	provision,	is	a	key	element	
of	cost-effectiveness.	Transaction	costs	
include	the	cost	of	attracting	potential	
buyers,	identifying	potential	sellers	of	
services,	working	with	project	partners,	
ensuring	compliance	and	monitoring	
of	service	provision.	They	are	affected	
by	the	availability	of	information	and	
the	institutional	capacity	for	managing	
exchanges,	both	of	which	vary	by	country	
as	well	as	by	environmental	service.	There	
is	often	a	direct	relationship	between	
the	transaction	costs	associated	with	a	
programme	design	and	its	effectiveness	
in	achieving	the	desired	environmental	
outcomes.	Thus,	choosing	the	most	cost-
effective	payment	design	may	not	be	
straightforward.
Payments	schemes	will	be	easier	to	develop	
for	some	services,	countries	and	locations	
than	for	others	because	better	information	
is	available.	Indeed,	understanding	the	
underlying	biological	science	as	well	as	the	
economic	motivation	of	farmers	is	critical.	
The	success	of	a	PES	scheme	hinges	on	the	
accuracy	and	cost	of	such	assessments	and,	by	
extension,	on	the	creation	of	cost-effective	
assessment	methodologies	for	use	in	the	
field.
A	variety	of	payment	mechanisms	are	
currently	in	use.	Where	environmental	
services	are	easily	measured,	payments	
should	be	linked	directly	to	the	service	
itself.	However,	more	frequently	payments	
are	linked	to	some	proxy	associated	with	
changes	in	the	provision	of	services,	as	this	
may	minimize	transaction	and	measurement	
costs.	The	most	common	payments	are	made	
for	changes	in	land	use	(e.g.	from	agriculture	
to	forestry),	but	payments	are	also	common	
for	changes	in	farmers’	practices	on	land	that	
remains	in	agricultural	production.	
If	changes	in	production	practices	are	to	
be	adopted,	payments	to	providers	must	
exceed	the	opportunity	costs	they	face	
in	making	the	change.	To	maximize	cost-
effectiveness,	payments	must	be	targeted	
to	locations	where	the	biggest	gain	can	be	
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obtained	per	unit	of	payment.	Targeting	
also	involves	costs,	however,	and	the	ideal	
strategy	must	be	based	on	the	best	trade-
offs	between	these	costs	and	the	added	
efficiency	achieved.	Because	environmental	
service	provision	is	linked	to	location,	
strategies	aimed	at	areas	with	relatively	
low	costs	of	provision	offer	a	promising	
solution.	Some	payment	programmes	may	
address	multiple	objectives	(for	example	
environmental	service	provision	and	poverty	
reduction);	this	will	generally	involve	some	
degree	of	trade-off	between	the	objectives	
or	an	increase	in	the	cost	of	providing	the	
environmental	service.
Transaction	costs	can	swamp	effective	
payments	if	a	programme	is	ill-designed.	
Although	reducing	transaction	costs	is	
an	overarching	concern	for	effective	
programme	design,	some	specific	additional	
measures	can	be	taken	with	a	view	to	
minimizing	them:	simplifying	the	rules,	
where	possible,	facilitating	buyer–seller	
linkages	and	looking	for	ways	to	capture	
economies	of	scale.
An	enabling	environment	is	critical	
for	payment	programmes.	Indeed,	no	
transactions	can	take	place	in	the	absence	
of	supporting	institutions,	which	can	
range	from	informal	to	highly	regulated	in	
nature.	Capacity	building,	in	particular,	is	an	
essential	component	of	efforts	to	broaden	
the	use	of	the	PES	approach	in	developing	
countries.	Working	with	local	communities	
can	play	a	key	role	in	developing	PES	
programmes.	A	final,	but	crucial,	issue	
is	the	need	for	coherence	between	the	
objectives	of	PES	programmes,	the	overall	
national	policy	framework	and	multilateral	
commitments.
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6.	 Implications	for	poverty
There	are	considerable	expectations	
that	PES	programmes	can	contribute	to	
poverty	reduction	as	well	as	to	improved	
environmental	management.	These	
expectations	are	largely	based	on	actual	
or	perceived	links	between	poverty	and	
environmental	management.	If	poverty	–	
which	may	be	defined	as	lack	of	income	or	
assets,	vulnerability	or	powerlessness	–	is	a	
major	cause	of	environmental	degradation,	
then	paying	poor	producers	to	adopt	
more	environmentally	friendly	systems	of	
production	would	appear	likely	to	generate	
a	“win–win”	outcome	resulting	in	both	
poverty	reduction	and	environmental	
benefits.	There	are,	indeed,	many	situations	
in	which	this	is	likely	to	be	the	case.	
However,	reducing	poverty	and	increasing	
the	supply	of	environmental	services	are	
two	distinct	policy	objectives.	Using	one	
policy	instrument,	for	example	payments	
for	environmental	services,	to	reach	both	
objectives	can	reduce	its	effectiveness	in	
achieving	either.	This	is	clearly	undesirable	
from	the	standpoint	of	either	poverty	
reduction	or	environmental	services.	
Blanket	assumptions	that	PES	programmes	
will	or	should	also	benefit	the	poor	are	
thus	problematic.	This	is	particularly	true	
for	PES	programmes	that	are	strongly	
market-oriented.	However,	the	reality	
may	be	quite	different	for	public-sector	
funded	projects;	indeed,	almost	all	public	
investments	have	multiple	objectives.	
Public	investments	need	to	pass	ethical	
standards	of	fairness	and	justice	as	well	as	
environmental	impact	assessments	and	thus	
some	combination	of	policy	objectives	and	
instruments	is	inevitable.	The	Working	for	
Water	programme	in	South	Africa	is	a	good	
example	of	a	programme	that	combines	
poverty	reduction	and	environmental	service	
provision	(see	Box	22).
PES	programmes	can	affect	the	poor,		
either	positively	or	negatively,	and	this		
is	undoubtedly	a	major	consideration		
when	assessing	the	role	of	payment	
programmes	in	developing	countries.	Much	
of	the	discussion	on	the	links	between	PES	
programmes	and	poverty	reduction	focuses	
on	the	role	of	the	poor	as	potential	suppliers	
of	environmental	services;	yet	the	indirect	
impacts	on	non-suppliers	may	be	as,	if	not	
more,	important.	Iftikhar	et al.	(2007)	suggest	
three	levels	of	criteria	should	be	considered	
in	assessing	the	impact	of	PES	programmes	
The	Working	for	Water	Programme	is	a	
public-sector-funded	programme	that	
supports	rural	employment	programmes	
that	involve	the	removal	of	alien	invasive	
species	from	riparian	zones,	as	well	as	
mountainous	areas,	in	South	Africa.	The	
programme	is	based	on	the	premise	that	
alien	vegetation	uses	higher	quantities	of	
water	than	indigenous	vegetation;	this	
phenomenon	is	even	more	pronounced	
where	alien	vegetation	falls	within	upper	
catchment	areas	and	along	riparian	zones	
(Herling	and	King,	2005).	The	programme	
has	350	sites	covering	approximately	
1.2	million	hectares	of	riparian	areas	and	
11	million	hectares	of	mountain	areas.	The	
programme	employs	over	25	000	people	
who	were	previously	unemployed.	
The	main	focus	of	the	programme	is	
employment	generation;	however,	the	
programme	combines	the	provision	of	
improved	watershed	services	with	its	main	
social	objectives	(Turpie	and	Blignaut,	
2005).
BOX	22
The Working for Water Programme in South Africa
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on	the	poor.	Programmes	should:	(i)	leave	
the	poor	at	least	as	well	off	as	they	were	
before;	(ii)	explicitly	involve	the	poor	in	the	
streams	of	benefits;	and	(iii)	ensure	that	the	
poor	gain	disproportionate	benefits.	The	first	
two	criteria	can	usually	be	met	with	minimal	
loss	of	efficiency,	while	the	third	can	be	met	
only	in	certain	circumstances.
This	chapter	takes	a	closer	look	at	the	
potential	implications	of	PES	programmes	
for	poverty,	starting	with	an	analysis	of	
the	potential	for	the	poor	to	benefit	
as	suppliers	in	PES	programmes.	It	then	
expands	the	discussion	to	consider	the	
possible	indirect	impacts	of	PES	programmes	
on	the	poor	and	the	role	of	the	poor	as	
consumers	of	environmental	services.	
Finally,	some	conclusions	are	drawn	on	how	
PES	programmes	can	be	designed	so	as	to	
facilitate	participation	of	poor	producers.
The poor as suppliers of 
environmental services
Three	main	dimensions	govern	the	ability	of	
poor	agricultural	producers	to	participate	
in,	and	benefit	from,	PES	programmes:	their	
location,	their	access	to	the	productive	assets	
needed	to	generate	environmental	services,	
and	the	characteristics	of	their	livelihood	
systems.	Each	is	considered	in	turn.	The	
discussion	also	focuses	on	the	significance	of	
transaction	costs	for	participation	of	the	poor	
and	summarizes	the	conditions	under	which	
the	poor	are	most	likely	to	benefit.
Where are the poor located?
As	we	have	seen,	location	is	a	key	factor	
affecting	the	potential	returns	to	the	
provision	of	an	environmental	service	
as	well	as	the	cost	in	terms	of	foregone	
agricultural	production,	which	agricultural	
producers	face	when	participating	in	PES	
programmes.	
The	rural	poor	tend	to	live	and	work	in	
ecologically	fragile,	economically	marginal	
and	environmentally	degraded	areas.	The	
World	Bank	estimates	that	more	than	one	
billion	people	in	developing	countries	
live	in	fragile	ecosystems	covering	more	
than	70	percent	of	the	Earth’s	land	surface	
(Table	13).	Half	a	billion	of	these	people	
reside	in	fragile	arid	regions;	400	million	
occupy	land	with	soils	unsuitable	for	
agriculture;	200	million	have	their	homes	
in	slope-dominated	regions;	and	more	than	
130	million	live	in	fragile	forest	ecosystems	
(World	Bank,	2003a).	Poverty	maps	reveal	
that	the	poor	tend	to	reside	in	areas	with	
one	or	more	environmentally	problematic	
feature,	such	as	degraded	land,	naturally	
low	soil	fertility,	air	and	water	pollution,	
and	limited	access	to	water	(UNDP,	2005).	
These	areas	generally	have	low	agricultural	
productivity,	which	is	one	of	the	most	
important	constraints	against	improving	
incomes	among	the	poor.	
When	looking	at	where	the	poor	are	
located,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	
between	poverty	rates	and	poverty	density	
(Chomitz,	2007).	The	former	is	a	measure	
of	the	proportion	of	inhabitants	who	are	
poor,	while	the	latter	is	a	measure	of	the	
number	of	poor	people	per	unit	of	land	
area.	The	two	measures	can	show	strikingly	
different	results:	for	example,	the	Brazilian	
Amazon	has	high	poverty	rates	but	low	
poverty	densities,	because	overall	population	
densities	are	low	(Chomitz,	2007).	Using	
poverty	rate	measures	to	locate	the	poor	can	
yield	an	indication	of	the	extent	to	which	
TAblE 13
People living on fragile land
REGIon
Population on fragile land
(Millions)
Share of total population
(Percentage)
East	Asia	and	the	Pacific 469 25
Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean 68 13
Middle	East	and	North	Africa 110 38
South	Asia 330 24
Sub-Saharan	Africa 258 39
Note: Fragile	lands	are	defined	as	lands	with	limited	ability	to	sustain	growing	populations	and	include	arid	lands,	
significantly	sloped	land,	lands	with	poor	soils,	and	forest	lands.	See	World	Bank,	2003a,	Table	4.1.
Source: adapted	from	World	Bank,	2003a,	Table	4.2.	
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people	living	in	an	area	that	could	supply	
environmental	services	are	poor;	however,	
it	gives	no	indication	of	the	number	of	
people	involved	or	the	extent	to	which	
environmental	service	supply	could	be	a	
major	means	of	reducing	poverty	in	a	given	
country	or	region	(see	Box	23).	
Map	7	builds	on	Map	5	(see	p.	65),	
which	shows	biodiversity	hotspots	with	
low	suitability	for	rainfed	agricultural	
production,	by	adding	a	poverty	dimension.	
The	map	shows	areas	where	the	prevalence22	
of	stunting	among	children	under	the	age	
of	five	exceeds	40	percent.	The	stunting	
indicator	is	based	on	an	estimate	of	the	
distribution	of	chronic	undernutrition	
at	national	and	subnational	levels	using	
stunting	in	growth	among	children	under	
 The 0 percent prevalence criterion is based on the 
World Health Organization (WHO) classification for very 
high prevalence of malnutrition (for further information, 
see http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/about/introduction/
en/index5.html).
five	years	of	age.23	This	indicator	reflects	the	
long-term	cumulative	effects	of	inadequate	
food	intake	and	poor	health	conditions	
resulting	from	lack	of	hygiene	and	recurrent	
illness	in	poor	and	unhealthy	environments.	
This	prevalence	measure	is	used	here	as	an	
indicator	of	regions	where	the	poor	are	likely	
to	be	affected	by	land-use	changes,	noting	
that	in	many	cases	these	are	areas	with	low	
population	densities	where	the	number	of	
people	involved	may	be	small.	
As	can	be	seen	in	the	map	(shown	in	
red),	relatively	few	areas	of	high	poverty	
prevalence	overlap	with	biodiversity	hotspots	
with	poor	agricultural	suitability.	Clearly,	
the	scale	of	the	map	is	insufficient	to	arrive	
at	any	definitive	assessments	of	the	spatial	
intersection	of	poverty,	low	agricultural	
3 Stunting is defined as height-for-age below – standard 
deviations from the National Center for Health Statistics/
WHO International Growth Reference Standard. New 
standards have been issued based on regional averages; 
however, actual data based on these are not yet available. 
The analyses in this report are therefore based on the old 
standards. 
Note: available at 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/google.kml?id=31156&layers=biodiversity_hotspots_high_poverty_rates
Source: FAO.
MAP 7
Biodiversity hotspots in areas poorly suited to rainfed agriculture and 
with high poverty rates
Other areas with high poverty ratesBiodiversity hotspots in areas with low 
agricultural suitability and high poverty rates Other areas with low agricultural 
suitabilityOther areas with biodiversity hotspots
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suitability	and	biodiversity	conservation;	
however,	it	suggests	that	the	overlap	
between	the	three	may	be	smaller	than	is	
often	assumed.	Lowering	the	cut-off	point	
for	prevalence	of	stunting	in	children	below	
five	years	of	age	to	20	percent	results	in	only	
a	very	modest	increase	in	the	overlap.
Map	8	uses	the	Soil	Degradation	in	South	
and	Southeast	Asia	(ASSOD)	database	
(ISRIC,	2007)	to	investigate	the	potential	
synergies	between	soil	carbon	sequestration,	
improvements	in	soil	fertility	and	poverty	
reduction.	The	map	identifies	locations	
in	agricultural	production	that	are	highly	
Will	the	poor	respond	to	payments	for	
reducing	deforestation	(and	thus	carbon	
emissions)?	If	so,	more	or	less	than	others?		
These	were	the	questions	posed	in	a	
study	of	the	potential	supply	response	
of	the	poor	to	carbon	payments	in	Costa	
Rica.	The	study	used	district-level	data	
on	poverty,	as	well	as	returns	to	crop	and	
livestock	production	and	agro-ecological	
indicators,	to	predict	the	rates	of	
deforestation	for	each	of	various	possible	
levels	of	carbon	payments.
The	results	indicated	that	landowners	
would	respond	to	payments	by	reducing	
deforestation	and	thus	emissions	but	also	
that	there	were	no	significant	differences	
in	response	between	poorer	and	less	
poor	districts.	However,	as	the	poorer	
areas	have	more	forest,	payments	could	
help	both	forests	and	the	poor.	As	the	
figure	indicates,	those	areas	could	receive	
a	larger	share	of	carbon	payments.	The	
results	suggested	neither	gains	nor	losses	
in	efficiency	from	having	poor	land	users	
in	carbon	payments	programmes.	Because	
this	study	used	district-level	estimates	of	
poverty	incidence,	caution	is	needed	in	
interpreting	the	results.	It	may	be	that,	
in	poor	areas,	though	a	large	fraction	of	
people	are	poor,	those	who	own	the	land	
are	not.	If	services	and	payments	were	
proportional	to	landholdings,	payments	
to	poor	areas	would	not	necessarily	go	to	
poor	people.
Source: Pfaff	et al.,	2007.	
BOX	23
Will the poor respond to payments for avoided carbon emissions? Evidence from 
Costa Rica
Average wealthier location
Average poorest quartile location
Annual carbon payment per tonne of carbon
Cumulative carbon stored as a percentage of baseline carbon
Carbon supply in 2020 for poorest and less poor districts
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Source: Pfaff, Robalino and Sanchez-Azofeifa, 2006 and Kerr et al., 2004.
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degraded	as	well	highly	degraded	areas	
that	also	have	medium-to-high	soil	carbon	
sequestration	potential.	In	the	latter	areas,	
adoption	of	soil	carbon	sequestration	
may	generate	both	an	agricultural	and	
an	environmental	benefit	in	the	form	
of	improved	soil	quality	and	carbon	
sequestration.	These	areas	are	overlaid	with	
areas	that	have	a	high	percentage	of	stunted	
children	under	the	age	of	five.	The	red	
areas	indicate	where	supplying	soil	carbon	
sequestration	might	generate	a	further	
benefit	in	the	form	of	poverty	reduction.	
The	map	suggests	that	areas	in	central	and	
western	China	and	central	and	eastern	India	
are	potentially	good	sites	for	programmes	
that	combine	environmental	service	and	
poverty	reduction	objectives.	However,	
analysis	with	data	at	a	higher	degree	of	
resolution	and	more	detailed	information	
about	farming	systems	and	access	of	the	
poor	to	the	land	will	be	needed	to	verify	this	
potential.
Poverty and access to productive 
resources
Poverty,	by	its	very	nature,	is	associated	
with	a	lack	of	access	to,	and	control	over,	
productive	resources	–	including	land,	water,	
investment	capital	and	human	capital.	This	
lack	of	access	is	a	major	barrier	also	for	
participation	of	the	poor	in	PES	programmes.	
MAP 8
Highly degraded croplands with soil carbon sequestration potential 
and high poverty rates
Other areas with soil degradation and 
high poverty
Other croplands with soil carbon gap
Croplands with soil carbon gap, soil 
degradation and high poverty rates
Non-study area
Note: available at 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/google.kml?id=31159&layers=highly_degraded_croplands
Source: FAO.
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 7102
Moreover,	a	gender	bias	is	often	found	to	
exist,	and	rural	women,	who	constitute	a	
significant	share	of	the	rural	poor,	encounter	
particular	difficulties	in	accessing	resources	
(FAO,	2006g).	
Many	of	the	obstacles	impeding	
participation	of	the	poor	in	PES	programmes	
are	the	same	ones	that	inhibit	their	adoption	
of	more	productive	and	sustainable	
management	practices	and	prevent	them	
from	rising	out	of	poverty.	Chapter	4	
identifies	several	constraints	to	the	adoption	
of	farming	and	forestry	production	systems	
that	would	benefit	the	producers	themselves	
in	addition	to	generating	higher	levels	of	
environmental	services.	Lack	of	information,	
property	rights	and	financing,	as	well	as	risk,	
were	all	identified	as	barriers	that	can	inhibit	
desirable	changes	in	production	systems.	
Even	when	the	poor	do	have	access	to	land	
and	other	productive	resources,	the	control	
and	rights	they	have	over	the	resource	are	
often	weak	and	poorly	defined.	This	can	also	
be	an	important	barrier	to	participation	in	
PES	programmes	as	well	as	to	undertaking	
any	type	of	investment	for	sustainable	
management	(Lipper,	2001;	Dasgupta,	1996).	
Moreover,	there	is	a	risk	that	the	poor	may	
lose	out	from	PES	programmes	by	being	
excluded	from	lands	to	which	they	have	
only	tenuous	rights	by	wealthier	or	more	
politically	powerful	groups,	as	land	values	
increase	with	such	payments	(Pagiola,	
Arcenas	and	Platais,	2005).
In	practice,	“ownership”	of	resources	
is	often	a	prerequisite	for	entering	into	
contracts	for	the	provision	of	environmental	
services	(Grieg-Gran,	Porras	and	Wunder,	
2005).	In	Costa	Rica,	both	Thacher,	Lee	and	
Schelhas	(1996)	and	Zbinden	and	Lee	(2005)	
found	tenure-related	variables	to	be	highly	
significant	in	explaining	participation	in	
the	country’s	current	and	preceding	PES	
programmes.	In	some	cases,	the	barrier	
of	tenure	insecurity	has	been	overcome	
by	allowing	holders	of	non-formal	kinds	
of	tenure	to	enter	into	contracts.	In	Costa	
Rica,	for	example,	participants	were	initially	
required	to	have	land	titles;	this	requirement	
has	since	been	eliminated	but	while	in	
force	it	served	to	exclude	poorer	land	users	
(Pagiola,	Arcenas	and	Platais,	2005).	
Where	the	poor	do	hold	rights	over	
resources,	they	often	take	the	form	of	
common	property	rights,	with	resultant	
implications	for	their	ability	to	respond	
to	PES	programmes.	Changes	in	natural	
resource	management	of	commonly	held	
resources,	such	as	pastures	or	waterways,	
require	group	coordination,	which	is	costly	
to	the	producers	and	in	many	cases	difficult	
to	achieve.	The	experience	of	the	Mexican	
PSAH	(see	Box	18),	which	was	implemented	
targeting	indigenous	communities	and	ejidos	
(both	communally	held	land	and	individually	
controlled	plots),	serves	as	an	enlightening	
example.	For	the	ejidos,	payments	were	
made	to	the	entire	community,	which	
could	then	either	distribute	them	among	
individuals	or	make	investments	for	the	
benefit	of	the	community.	The	effectiveness	
of	this	type	of	communal	payment	scheme	
in	providing	incentives	for	changing	
land	use	is	under	review	(Muñoz-Piña	et 
al.,	2005).	The	distribution	of	costs	and	
benefits	of	programme	participation	among	
participants	has	also	been	raised	as	a	
concern	(Alix-Garcia,	de	Janvry	and	Sadoulet,	
forthcoming).
Lack	of	access	to	financial	resources	can	
be	another	major	barrier	to	participation	of	
the	poor	in	PES	programmes	(see	Chapter	4).	
Frequently,	the	land-use	changes	needed	to	
generate	environmental	services	require	an	
up-front	investment,	with	returns	occurring	
only	later	in	the	future.	In	many	parts	of	the	
developing	world,	rural	financial	markets	
function	poorly,	resulting	in	lack	of	access	to	
external	finance.	The	poor	may	be	unable	
to	finance	the	changes	from	their	own	
assets,	unlike	wealthier	PES	programme	
participants.	For	example,	the	owner	of	a	
20-hectare	farm	in	Nicaragua	wishing	to	
introduce	a	variety	of	silvopastoral	practices	
to	receive	payments	under	the	Silvopastoral	
Project	might	have	to	invest,	in	the	first	
year,	about	US$500	(equivalent	to	about	
70	percent	of	net	income	under	current	
practices),	in	addition	to	forgoing	part	
of	the	farm’s	normal	income	in	that	year.	
These	are	heavy	costs	for	poor	households.	
Savings,	remittances	or	off-farm	income	may	
help	some	households	make	the	necessary	
investments,	but	poorer	households	will	
tend	to	have	fewer	such	alternatives	
–	and	a	greater	likelihood	of	needing	such	
supplements	for	subsistence	requirements.	
Front-loading	payments	or	credit	may	be	
necessary	in	such	cases	(Pagiola,	Rios	and	
Arcenas,	forthcoming).
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Where	a	PES	project	entails	adopting	
new	practices	that	are	complex,	difficult	or	
unfamiliar,	households	may	need	technical	
assistance	from	extension	services.	However,	
poor	households	are	less	likely	to	have	access	
to	extension	than	better-off	households,	
and	this	factor,	too,	may	prohibit	their	
participation	in	the	programme.	
livelihood systems of the poor
Even	if	the	poor	are	located	in	areas	that	
are	likely	to	be	economically	viable	sources	
of	environmental	service	supply	and	have	
access	to	the	productive	resources	needed	
for	participation,	their	ability	to	participate	
in,	and	benefit	from,	PES	programmes	will	
depend	on	how	well	the	changes	required	
by	the	PES	programme	fit	into	their	overall	
livelihood	strategy.	A	key	consideration	is	
the	overall	rural	nature	of	poverty.	Of	the	
world’s	1.1	billion	extremely	poor	people,	
75	percent	live	in	rural	areas	and	depend	on	
agriculture,	forestry,	fisheries	and	related	
activities	for	survival.	Increasing	the	return	to	
natural	resource	management,	be	it	through	
agricultural	production	or	environmental	
service	supply,	is	thus	a	critical	means	of	
reducing	poverty	(FAO,	2007e).	
As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	there	are	many	
ways	in	which	agricultural	producers	may	
shift	land-management	systems	towards	
producing	environmental	services,	ranging	
from	a	complete	change	of	land	use	to	minor	
modifications	in	a	current	system.	
Table	14	gives	some	insight	into	the	
primary	production	activities	of	the	rural	
poor	by	region.	Smallholder	farmers	
constitute	a	major	segment	of	the	rural	
poor	in	several	regions,	including	Asia	and	
the	Pacific,	East	and	southern	Africa,	West	
and	Central	Africa	and	Latin	America	and	
the	Caribbean.	In	addition,	the	rural	poor	in	
Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	and	in	the	
Near	East	and	North	Africa	are	often	rainfed	
farmers	or	pastoralists	(IFAD,	2001).
A	clearer	understanding	of	the	potential	
of	environmental	services	to	fit	into	these	
strategies	can	be	obtained	by	closer	
examination	of	the	types	of	changes	
to	farming	systems	required	within	the	
framework	of	the	decision-making	process	
of	poor	farmers.	The	nature	of	the	change	
is	of	particular	importance	for	poor	farmers,	
who	are	more	likely	to	face	market	failures	
for	food,	credit,	insurance	and	labour.	
Consequently,	food-security	and	food-access	
concerns,	including	through	their	own	
production,	are	more	likely	to	be	determining	
factors	in	their	decisions	regarding	
participation	in	PES	programmes.	Naturally,	if	
a	PES	programme	restricts	or	bars	traditional	
land	uses,	such	as	unsustainable	grazing	
TAblE 14
Who are the poor?
REGIon
CATEGoRy
West
and
Central
Africa
East
and 
southern 
Africa
Asia
and
the
Pacific
latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean
near East 
and
north 
Africa
Rainfed farmers n n
Smallholder farmers n n n n
Pastoralists n n n
Artisanal fishers n n n n
Wage labourers/landless n n n n
Indigenous people; scheduled castes/tribes n n n
Female-headed households n n n
Displaced people n n n
Source: IFAD, 00.
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and	cropping,	it	must	provide	acceptable	
alternatives;	otherwise	it	is	unlikely	that	
the	poor	will	be	able	to	participate.	Use-
restriction	rules	count	among	the	main	
conditions	that	discourage	or	exclude	
smallholder	participation.	In	contrast,	PES	
programmes	allowing	mix-use	activities	that	
provide	diversified	sources	of	income	(e.g.	
agroforestry	and	silvopastoral	systems)	play	
a	positive	role	in	facilitating	participation	of	
the	poor	(WRI	in	collaboration	with	UNDP,	
UNEP	and	World	Bank,	2005;	Grieg-Gran,	
Porras	and	Wunder,	2005).
Risk,	too,	is	a	critical	dimension	for	poor	
farmers.	When	PES	programmes	promote	
a	change	in	resource	management	and	
perhaps	input	use	(e.g.	switching	from	
pesticides	to	an	integrated	pest	management	
strategy,	or	from	conventional	tillage	to	
reduced	or	no	tillage),	adopters	may	face	
increased	risks	while	they	are	learning	about	
these	new	practices.	Because	the	poor	are	
generally	more	risk-averse	than	the	well-
off	and	have	fewer	options	for	managing	
risk,	their	supply	response	to	risk-increasing	
activities	is	likely	to	be	lower.	Thus,	poor	
farmers	may	be	less	inclined	to	participate	
in	a	PES	programme	if	an	enhanced	supply	
of	environmental	services	is	accompanied	by	
reduced	food	production,	especially	if	food	
markets	are	functioning	poorly.	However,	PES	
programmes	can	also	contribute	to	reducing	
risk	when	the	payments	represent	a	stable	
source	of	reliable	income.	
A	2001	FAO/World	Bank	study	on	farming	
systems	and	poverty	gives	some	insights	into	
the	types	of	changes	in	livelihood	strategies	
in	general	and	farming	system	management	
specifically,	that	may	benefit	the	poor	
(Dixon	and	Gulliver	with	Gibbon,	2001).	
Table	15	shows	the	degree	of	relevance	
of	different	strategies	for	poor	farmers	to	
exit	from	poverty	for	areas	of	high	and	low	
agricultural-resource	potential,	respectively.	
In	the	high-potential	areas,	the	most	
important	strategies	are	diversification	of	
production	activities	and	increased	off-farm	
income;	in	the	areas	of	low	agricultural	
potential,	the	highest	benefits	are	obtained	
by	exiting	from	agriculture	and	increasing	
off-farm	income.	
PES	programmes	could	contribute	to	such	
poverty	reduction	strategies	to	the	extent	
that	they	can	support	diversification	of	
agricultural	production	in	high-potential	
areas	or	facilitate	exiting	agriculture	in	
low-potential	areas.	Indeed,	farmers	could	
conceivably	diversify	the	output	from	their	
agro-ecosystems	to	include	environmental	
services	along	with	agricultural	products.	
Payment	schemes	could	also	represent	a	
de	facto	means	of	exiting	from	agriculture,	
at	least	at	a	specific	site,	in	cases	where	
environmental	service	provision	involves	
changing	land	use	away	from	agriculture.	
The	study	found	increased	off-farm	income	
and	exiting	from	agriculture	to	be	important	
poverty	reduction	strategies,	given	that	
improving	agricultural	productivity	in	the	
agro-ecosystems	managed	by	the	poor	is	
costly	and	in	some	cases	impossible.	However,	
increasing	the	returns	to	such	ecosystems	by	
TAblE 15
Relative importance of different poverty reduction strategies by resource potential
Agricultural resource potential
High1 Low1 
S 
T 
R
 A
 T
 E
 G
 y
 
Intensification 1.9 0.	9
Diversification 3.1 1.4
Increased farm size 1.2 0.9
Increased off-farm income 2.5 2.4
Exit from agriculture 1.2 4.4
Note: This	table	is	from	an	FAO	study	prepared	as	a	contribution	to	the	World	Bank	Rural	Development	Strategy,	
Reaching the rural poor	(World	Bank,	2003b).	Over	20	case	studies	were	prepared	to	support	the	analyses,	which	
investigated	innovative	approaches	to	small	farm	or	pastoral	development.	The	material	in	the	World	Bank	publication	
draws	upon	this	study	as	well	as	on	expertise	from	years	of	specialized	work	on	the	topic	at	FAO	and	the	World	Bank.
1	Scores	add	to	10.
Source: Dixon	and	Gulliver	with	Gibbon,	2001.
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switching	to	environmental	service	provision	
may	offer	a	viable	alternative.
Transaction costs and participation of 
the poor in PES programmes
Transaction	costs	may	constitute	the	
biggest	impediment	to	participation	of	
poor	households	in	PES	programmes	(FAO,	
2003c;	Zilberman,	Lipper	and	McCarthy,	
forthcoming;	Antle	and	Valdivia,	2006;	
Landell-Mills	and	Porras,	2002;	Pagiola,	
Arcenas	and	Platais,	2005;	Wunder,	2005).	
As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	transaction	
costs	can	be	a	determining	factor	for	the	
feasibility	of	PES	exchanges	in	general.	
When	the	potential	suppliers	of	the	service	
are	poor	farmers,	the	issue	of	transaction	
costs	becomes	more	critical.	Fixed	costs,	such	
as	developing	a	project	proposal,	setting	a	
baseline	and	identifying	a	buyer,	account	
for	a	large	share	of	the	transaction	costs.	
In	the	case	of	a	very	small	transaction	–	say	
for	carbon	sequestration	at	a	site	of	less	
than	1	hectare	in	size	–	transaction	costs	per	
hectare	will	be	prohibitively	high.	The	larger	
the	transaction	costs,	the	more	attractive	it	
will	be	for	PES	programmes	to	focus	on	large	
land	holdings.	As	farm	size	tends	to	be	highly	
correlated	with	income,	in	practice	this	
means	focusing	on	better-off	households.
FAO	(2006f)	found	that	one	of	the	most	
important	ways	of	improving	the	feasibility	
of	smallholder	carbon	sequestration	projects	
is	to	reduce	the	ex-ante	fixed	transaction	
costs	faced	by	the	buyers.	They	identify	three	
broad	strategies	to	this	effect:
	 1.	 increasing	project	size	by	fostering/
building	upon	collective	action	among	
suppliers;
	 2.	 reducing	contracting	costs	by	utilizing	
existing	management	structures;	
	 3.	 reducing	information	costs	through	
public	provision	of	data,	templates		
and	guidelines.	
The	three	strategies	are	not	mutually	
exclusive	and,	in	many	cases,	can	be	
complementary.
Examples	of	the	first	strategy,	with	
projects	involving	smallholder	coordination	
in	the	supply	of	carbon	services,	have	been	
documented	by	FAO	(2003c),	Smith	and	
Scherr	(2002)	and	Orlando	et al.	(2002).	
In	these	projects,	the	costs	to	buyers	of	
identifying,	contracting	and	enforcing	
viable	carbon	sequestration	opportunities	
among	smallholders	are	reduced	through	the	
presence	of	an	intermediary	representing	the	
suppliers.	This	intermediary	can	be	an	NGO,	
a	community	group	or	a	government	agency.	
However,	such	group	schemes	may	lead	to	the	
participating	sellers	facing	greater	transaction	
costs;	these	costs,	however,	must	not	exceed	
the	benefits	they	derive	from	participation.	
Several	of	the	carbon	smallholder	projects	
were	built	upon	pre-existing	community	
projects,	such	as	ongoing	community-based	
natural	resource	management	projects	
(particularly	community	forestry	projects)	or	
farmers’	groups.	
The	second	way	of	reducing	transaction	
costs	in	projects	involving	small-	and	low-
income	suppliers	is	to	utilize	management	
structures	and	lessons	from	existing	projects.	
For	example,	important	lessons	on	how	
to	design	and	administer	PES	schemes	for	
poor	producers	can	be	obtained	from	the	
experience	with	conditional	cash	transfers	
(see	Box	24).
Making	information	available	on	situations	
where	the	poor	could	potentially	become	
significant	providers	of	environmental	
services	–	via	the	use	of	maps	such	as	
those	presented	in	this	chapter	–	together	
with	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	type	of	
programme	design	needed	to	facilitate	
the	participation	of	the	poor	is	the	third	
strategy	to	reduce	transaction	costs	facing	
low-income	suppliers.	This	strategy	is	being	
pursued	by	a	wide	range	of	international	
and	national	public	agencies,	and	NGOs.
Finally,	the	possibility	of	marketing	
environmental	services	that	are	explicitly	
linked	to	poverty	reduction	merits	
consideration.	If	buyers	of	environmental	
services	are	willing	to	pay	a	premium	for	
environmental	services	provided	by	the	poor,	
higher	levels	of	transaction	costs	could	be	
supported	(FAO,	2006f).	Is	there	any	evidence	
of	this	type	of	market	demand?	Several	
examples	of	carbon	buyers	specifically	
interested	in	livelihoods	and	poverty	
reduction	benefits	are	given	in	Box	25.	The	
projects	referred	to	in	the	box	indicate	some	
development	of	a	poverty-focused	market	
niche	for	carbon	offsets	in	the	voluntary	
market.	Even	in	regulatory	markets	such	
as	the	CDM,	sustainable	development	is	a	
mandatory	aspect	of	certifying	the	eligibility	
of	offsets.	The	definition	of	sustainability	
is	left	to	the	implementing	countries,	and	
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thus	a	wide	range	of	definitions	have	
been	proposed,	some	of	which	include	a	
poverty	reduction	dimension.	Nevertheless,	
only	limited	evidence	is	available,	to	date,	
on	the	willingness	to	pay	a	premium	for	
environmental	services	that	explicitly	include	
a	poverty	benefit.
When are the poor likely to benefit from 
PES programmes?
Summarizing	the	discussion	in	the	above	
sections,	the	spatial	distribution	of	poverty,	
property	rights	to	land,	and	the	productivity	
of	the	land	for	the	provision	of	agriculture	
and	environmental	services	are	key	
Cash	payments	are	often	considered	the	
most	flexible,	and	thus	the	preferable,	
mode	to	pay	for	environmental	services.	
However,	there	are	concerns	about	both	
the	capacity	to	reach	poor	producers	with	
cash	payments	and	the	effectiveness	of	
these	payments.	Important	insights	into	
this	debate	can	be	obtained	from	the	
experience	of	conditional	cash	transfers.	
Conditional	cash	transfers	(CCTs)	are	a	
form	of	social	assistance	that	has	come	
to	dominate	the	social	protection	sector	
in	the	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	
region	over	the	past	decade	and	is	
increasingly	being	considered	for	use	in	
other	parts	of	the	world,	including	Africa.	
CCTs	are	linked	directly	to	human	capital	
development	by	making	receipt	of	the	
transfer	conditional	on	school	attendance	
and	a	variety	of	health-	and	nutrition-
related	activities.	In	most	cases,	CCTs	
are	provided	directly	to	mothers	on	the	
assumption,	substantiated	in	the	literature,	
that	they	are	more	likely	to	use	the	
resources	for	the	benefit	of	their	children.	
The	experience	of	CCTs	in	Latin	America	
has	shown	this	type	of	cash	transfer	to	be	
very	effective	in	obtaining	its	objectives.	
The	conditional	aspect	of	CCTs	is	one	of	
the	most	attractive	(and	controversial)	
features	of	the	programme,	and	also	
one	of	the	most	complicated	to	execute.	
The	administrative	burden	of	monitoring	
conditionality,	particularly	in	countries	
with	weaker	institutional	structures,	leads	
to	the	question	of	whether	conditionality	
is	feasible	or	necessary	and,	if	so,	the	type	
of	monitoring	mechanism	that	is	most	
appropriate.	
Despite	this	concern,	countries	from	
Mexico	to	Nicaragua,	at	opposite	ends	
of	the	spectrum	of	wealth,	development	
and	administrative	capacity	in	the	region,	
have	successfully	implemented	CCT	
conditionality.	
One	important	dimension	of	
the	CCT	experience	is	that	of	the	
professionalization	of	administrative	
practices.	Beginning	particularly	with	the	
Oportunidades	(formerly	the	Education,	
Health,	and	Nutrition	Program	of	
Mexico	[PROGRESA])	programme	of	the	
Government	of	Mexico,	and	improving	
over	time	in	other	programmes	in	the	
region,	CCTs	have	modernized	the	public	
administration	of	social	assistance.	CCTs	
have	established	modern	information	
and	management	systems	for	beneficiary	
selection,	registration	and	payment,	as	
well	as	the	monitoring	of	conditionality,	
assuring	more	transparency	and	efficiency	
in	implementation	(de	la	Brière	and	
Rawlings,	2006).	
Despite	the	complex	nature	of	these	
programmes,	they	have	been	shown	
to	be	relatively	cost	efficient	(Caldés,	
Coady	and	Maluccio,	2006).	While	many	
challenges	remain,	including	how	to	
institutionalize	and	formalize	effective	
community	participation,	as	well	as	the	
coordination	of	the	provision	of	services,	
the	administrative	setups	of	CCTs	have	
done	much	to	promote	transparency	and	
counter	problems	in	the	application	of	
social	spending.	A	core	element	in	this	
professionalization	has	been	the	concerted	
effort	to	conduct	independent	evaluations	
of	CCT	programmes.	
1 FAO Economic and Social Development 
Department.
BOX	24
Reaching the poor with cash? lessons from conditional cash transfers
Benjamin Davis1
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determinants	of	where	and	when	the	poor	
could	benefit	from	supplying	environmental	
services,	as	well	as	the	type	of	change	
required	to	generate	the	service.	
The	poor	are	most	likely	to	benefit	from	
participation	in	PES	programmes	where	land	
distribution	is	relatively	equitable	and	where	
the	poor	are	found	on	lands	of	poor	quality	
for	agricultural	production	but	high	quality	
for	environmental	service	supply.	They	are	
most	likely	to	benefit	from	programmes	
involving	a	change	of	farming	system,	
rather	than	land	use,	because	the	small	size	
of	the	land	holdings,	combined	with	food	
security	concerns,	will	limit	their	ability	
and	inclination	to	take	land	totally	out	of	
agricultural	production.	
Indirect impacts of PES 
programmes on the poor
Separate	from	the	issue	of	the	poor	as	
potential	participants	in	the	programmes,	
PES	programmes	may	also	have	indirect	
impacts	on	the	poor	via	land	price,	wage	
and	food	price	effects	(Zilberman,	Lipper	
and	McCarthy,	forthcoming).	It	is	useful	
to	consider	three	different	groups	which	
may	be	affected	by	PES	programmes:	
consumers	of	food	products,	wage	labourers	
and	consumers	of	environmental	services.	
For	example,	payment	programmes	that	lead	
to	a	significant	reduction	in	food	production	
could	have	impacts	on	food	prices.	If	food	
markets	are	functioning	poorly	and	food	
supplies	are	largely	locally	procured,	even	
a	small	reduction	in	local	food	production	
could	have	significant	negative	impacts	
on	poor	food	consumers.	Impacts	on	rural	
consumers	are	likely	to	be	more	or	less	
localized,	depending	on	the	degree	of	
integration	of	rural	areas	with	urban	markets.	
Changes	in	farming	systems	or	land	use	
may	also	involve	changes	in	labour	use.	For	
example,	converting	land	from	agricultural	
production	to	forestry	will	release	labour,	
while	moving	to	silvopastoral	production	
systems	from	conventional	systems	is	likely	to	
absorb	labour.	This,	in	turn,	will	affect	local	
wage	rates,	either	upwards	or	downwards,	
depending	on	how	the	PES	programme	
affects	labour	demand.	Effects	on	wage	rates	
could	have	a	significant	impact,	for	better	
or	worse,	on	the	poor,	who	are	generally	
highly	dependent	on	wage	labour	for	their	
income	(Zilberman,	Lipper	and	McCarthy	
forthcoming).	As	with	food	markets,	the	
overall	effect	of	a	PES	programme	depends	
not	only	on	the	magnitude	and	direction	
of	the	changes	in	labour	use,	but	also	the	
degree	to	which	labour	markets	are	isolated	
or	integrated	into	national	or	international	
markets.	Uchida,	Rozelle	and	Xu	(2007)	find	
Plan	Vivo	has	established	standards	for	
carbon	emission	offsets	with	explicit	
poverty	reduction	aspects.	The	Plan	Vivo	
System	is	managed	by	BioClimate	Research	
and	Development	(BR&D),	which	is	a	non-
profit	organization.	BR&D	is	responsible	
for	development	and	maintenance	of	
the	Plan	Vivo	System	and	“contracts”	
the	Edinburgh	Centre	for	Carbon	
Management	(ECCM)	to	provide	the	
systems	maintenance	resources	needed	for	
the	continued	development	of	Plan	Vivo.	
Plan	Vivo	has	three	operational	projects	
that	are	producing	carbon	for	the	sale	
of	Plan	Vivo	carbon	offsets:	the	Scolel	Té	
project	in	Chiapas,	Mexico,	the	Trees	for	
Global	Benefit	project	in	Uganda	and	and	
the	N’hambita	Community	Carbon	Project	
in	Mozambique.	
At	present,	purchasers	of	the	carbon	
offsets	generated	by	the	Scolel	Té	
project	include	the	FIA	Foundation,	to	
offset	carbon	emissions	from	Formula	1	
and	World	Rally	championships,	The	
CarbonNeutral	Company,	on	behalf	of	a	
number	of	companies,	the	World	Bank	
International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	
and	Development	and	the	United	
Kingdom	Department	for	International	
Development.
Source:	Plan	Vivo,	2007.
BOX	25
A market for carbon offsets from the poor?  
Evidence from the Plan vivo System
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that	one	of	the	most	important	benefits	
for	the	poor	of	China’s	Grain	for	Green	
programme	has	been	an	increase	in	off-
farm	income.	The	programme	provides	cash	
funds	that	allow	participants	to	overcome	
a	liquidity	constraint	against	entering	the	
labour	market.
Finally,	PES	programmes	could	provide	
benefits	to	the	poor	as	consumers	of	an	
environmental	service.	A	prominent	example	
would	be	services	related	to	water	quality	
and	quantity,	where	studies	have	shown	
that	even	poor	consumers	are	willing	to	
pay	for	good	water	quality.	In	any	of	the	
watershed	protection	programmes	where	
water	quality	or	quantity	has	been	improved,	
poor	consumers	have	benefited	also,	even	
though	many	of	them	do	not	pay	for	water.	
There	may	also	be	a	significant	gender	
dimension	to	benefits	from	environmental	
services.	Rural	women	are	often	the	
household	members	in	charge	of	collecting	
water,	fuelwood	and	other	natural	resources	
needed	for	household	consumption	and	
could	therefore	be	major	beneficiaries.	Other	
environmental	services	for	which	there	may	
be	demand	from	the	poor	include	access	to	
crop	genetic	resources	or	pollinator	services.	
Of	course,	the	question	remains	whether	the	
poor	will	be	willing	and	able	to	pay	for	these	
services.
Payments for environmental 
services and poverty reduction: 
where are the synergies?
As	noted	in	Chapter	4,	a	wide	range	of	land-
use	and	farming	system	changes	that,	in	the	
long	run,	will	be	more	profitable	for	farmers	
are	not	adopted	owing	to	problems	such	as	
lack	of	credit,	property	rights	and	technical	
information.	Poor	farmers	face	these	types	
of	barriers	disproportionately.	Where	a	
privately	profitable	practice	is	not	adopted	
for	these	reasons,	the	solution	should	aim	at	
removing	the	barrier	concerned.	However,	
in	many	cases,	addressing	these	barriers	is	
fraught	with	difficulty.	Assuming	that	the	
main	objective	of	PES	programmes	is	to	
increase	the	provision	of	environmental	
services,	would	it	be	reasonable	to	use	such	
programmes	to	help	farmers	overcome	the	
barriers	to	change?	
First,	it	is	important	to	note	that	for	
location-specific	services,	such	as	watershed	
management	and	biodiversity	conservation,	
the	poor	may	be	located	in	exactly	the	
areas	identified	as	having	high	potential	
for	environmental	service	provision,	making	
their	participation	necessary	in	order	to	meet	
the	environmental	objective.	But	location	
alone	is	not	enough.	Pagiola,	Arcenas	and	
Platais	(2005)	noted	that	the	requirement	of	
formal	title	for	participation	in	the	Costa	Rica	
PES	programme	reduced	the	efficiency	of	the	
programme	by	excluding	poor	landowners.	
Addressing	barriers	preventing	the	poor	
from	participating	is	essential	when	the	poor	
are	in	key	locations	for	environmental	service	
supply.	Evidence	to	date	does	indicate	that	
those	who	do	participate	as	suppliers	in	PES	
programmes	are	likely	to	become	better	off	
(Pagiola,	Rios	and	Arcenas,	forthcoming).
The	maps	presented	in	this	chapter	show	
several	locations	where	a	combination	of	high	
poverty	rates,	low	agricultural	productivity	
and	high	potential	for	environmental	service	
supply	suggest	a	potential	for	poor	producers	
to	benefit	from	PES	programmes.	This	type	
of	mapping	can	be	helpful	as	an	indication	of	
where	PES	programmes	could	result	in	both	
environmental	service	supply	and	poverty	
reduction.	However,	such	maps	can	only	be	
indicative,	and	careful	investigation	into	
land	tenure,	farming	systems	and	land-use	
patterns	is	needed	in	order	to	confirm	the	
real	potential.
Innovative	PES	programme	designs	may	
be	needed	to	ensure	the	participation	of	
the	poor.	For	example,	providing	up-front	
or	early	payments	(e.g.	large	payments	
within	the	first	year	of	a	project,	rather	than	
spreading	the	total	amount	over	several	
years)	may	be	desirable	in	PES	projects	
requiring	initial	investments	in	areas	with	
many	poor	households.	Also,	while	full	title	
or	private	ownership	of	land	or	resources	
may	be	preferable	in	some	PES	programmes,	
it	does	not	have	to	be	a	prerequisite.	There	
are	other	ways	to	increase	security	of	tenure	
for	the	poor,	including	legally	sanctioned	
use	of	key	resources,	the	right	to	exclude	
and	the	right	to	manage	the	resource	
for	optimum	benefit.	In	conservancies	in	
Namibia,	for	example,	the	devolution	of	
wildlife	rights	on	communal	lands	was	
sufficient	to	allow	local	communities	to	
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earn	income	from	managing	the	wildlife	
even	though	they	could	not	exclude	others	
from	using	the	land	(FAO,	2007f).	Another	
option	is	to	distribute	payments	to	larger	
community	associations,	which	can	then	
attempt	to	identify	and	implement	an	
appropriate	solution.	Box	26	describes	the	
participation	of	the	poor	in	one	innovative	
programme	in	Nicaragua.
Can	poorer	households	participate	in	
PES	programmes?	A	recent	study	of	the	
experience	of	the	Regional	Integrated	
Silvopastoral	Ecosystem	Management	
Project	(see	Box	14)	in	Matiguás-Río	
Blanco	indicates	that	they	can.	Not	
only	did	poorer	households	participate	
quite	extensively,	but	by	some	measures	
they	participated	to	a	greater	extent	
than	better-off	households.	Extremely	
poor	households	do	appear	to	have	
had	somewhat	greater	difficulty	in	
participating,	but	even	in	their	case	
the	difference	is	solely	a	relative	one.	
Extremely	poor	households	not	only	were	
not	shut	out,	but	participated	at	high	
rates	in	the	project.	Their	participation	
was	not	limited	only	to	the	simpler	and	
cheaper	practices,	but	included	the	full	
spectrum	of	land	uses.	
These	results	are	particularly	strong	
in	that	the	Silvopastoral	Project	imposes	
much	greater	burdens	on	participants	
than	most	PES	programmes.	Nevertheless,	
one	should	not	jump	to	the	conclusion	
that	all	poor	farm	households	everywhere	
will	always	be	able	to	participate	in	such	
programmes.	Both	the	programmes	
and	local	conditions	differ	from	case	to	
case,	and	there	may	well	be	cases	where	
otherwise	eligible	poor	households	
may	find	it	difficult	or	impossible	to	
participate.	Indeed,	the	results	show	that	
extremely	poor	households	do	appear	to	
have	had	greater	difficulty	in	participating	
as	intensively	as	other	households.
The	study	helps	identify	several	factors	
that	tend	to	affect	participation.	Lack	of	
credit	may	be	an	important	constraint	for	
poorer	households.	This	constraint	will	
not	always	be	critical	in	PES	programmes,	
for	example	in	programmes	that	maintain	
an	existing	land	use.	However,	financing	
constraints	are	likely	to	be	important	
when	land-use	changes	are	required	
for	participation,	as	in	Costa	Rica’s	
reforestation	or	agroforestry	contracts.	
Providing	some	initial	financing	(such	
as	the	baseline	payment	made	by	the	
Silvopastoral	Project)	may	be	desirable	
for	PES	programmes	that	involve	initial	
investments	in	areas	with	many	poor	
households.	The	importance	of	technical	
assistance	emerges	far	less	clearly	from	
the	study	results.	The	practices	being	
promoted	by	the	project	were	relatively	
complex,	but	were	also	relatively	well	
known	in	the	area.	
The	availability	of	multiple	options	in	
the	Silvopastoral	Project	may	well	have	
contributed	to	high	participation	by	the	
poor,	as	they	were	able	to	choose	the	
options	that	worked	best	for	them	in	the	
light	of	their	particular	requirements.	
When	a	given	service	can	be	provided	
in	different	ways	(or	at	different	levels),	
it	makes	sense	to	offer	multiple	ways	
in	which	households	can	participate,	as	
long	as	transaction	costs	do	not	increase	
unduly.	It	is	worth	noting,	however,	
that	at	Matiguás-Río	Blanco	the	poorer	
households	did	not	predominantly	choose	
the	cheaper	and	easier	land	uses	–	in	fact,	
the	better-off	households	were	more	
likely	to	do	so.	
Source:	Pagiola,	Rios	and	Arcenas,	forthcoming.	
BOX	26
Can the poor benefit from payments for environmental services programmes? 
Evidence from the Silvopastoral Project in nicaragua
Conclusions
Reducing	poverty	and	increasing	the	supply	
of	environmental	services	are	two	separate	
and	distinct	policy	objectives	that	would	
normally	need	to	be	addressed	by	separate	
policy	instruments.	Blanket	assumptions	that	
PES	programmes	will,	or	should,	also	benefit	
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the	poor	are	thus	problematic.	However,	
public-sector-funded	projects	and	many	
voluntary	sources	of	payments	are	interested	
in	both	environmental	and	socio-economic	
objectives,	thus	leading	to	multi-objective	
PES	programmes.	PES	programmes	can	affect	
the	poor	–	either	positively	or	negatively.	The	
poor	may	be	affected	directly,	as	potential	
suppliers	or	consumers	of	environmental	
services,	but	there	may	also	be	an	indirect	
impact	on	non-participants	through	effects	
on	local	wages,	food	prices	or	land	values.	
PES	programmes	could	hurt	the	poor,	
particularly	the	landless,	by	driving	down	
wages	or	increasing	food	prices.	Likewise,	
they	may	result	in	pressures	to	exclude	the	
poor	from	lands	to	which	they	have	only	
informal	rights	if	the	value	of	the	land	
increases.
The	discussion	above	has	identified	
situations	where	there	may	be	strong	
potential	for	poor	farmers	to	supply	
environmental	services.	For	location-specific	
services,	such	as	watershed	management	
and	biodiversity	conservation,	the	presence	
of	the	poor	in	areas	of	importance	for	
environmental	service	provision	makes	their	
participation	necessary.	In	these	situations,	
addressing	the	barriers	preventing	the	poor	
from	participating	is	indispensable.	
Environmentally	beneficial	land-use	and	
farming-system	changes	that	will	be	more	
profitable	for	the	farmer	in	the	long	run	
are	not	always	adopted	owing	to	problems	
such	as	lack	of	credit,	property	rights	or	
technical	information.	Often,	it	is	the	poor	
producers	who	face	these	types	of	barriers,	in	
which	case	PES	programmes	may	offer	some	
opportunities.	
The	maps	in	this	chapter	suggest	that	the	
poor	could	benefit	from	PES	programmes,	
particularly	in	areas	characterized	by	a	
combination	of	high	poverty	rates,	low	
agricultural	productivity	and	high	potential	
for	environmental	service	supply.	However,	
such	maps	are	only	indicative.	Further	
research	on	land	tenure,	farming	systems	
and	land-use	patterns	is	needed	to	identify	
the	actual	potential.	Evidence	from	PES	
programmes	to	date	has	shown	that	the	
poor	can	participate	and	benefit	from	PES	
programmes.
A	critical	problem	is	that	of	the	transaction	
costs	of	PES	programmes,	which	may	be	
prohibitive	in	the	case	of	poor	producers,	
unless	strategies	are	adopted	to	minimize	
them	as	far	as	possible.	
Innovative	PES	programme	designs	are	
needed	to	ensure	the	ability	of	the	poor	to	
participate	as	suppliers	of	environmental	
services.	Two	important	examples	are	the	
timing	of	the	payment	to	help	address	credit	
and	investment	constraints	farmers	may	
have,	and	making	provisions	to	work	with	
producers	who	have	only	informal	title	to	
lands.
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7.		Conclusions
This	issue	of	The State of Food and 
Agriculture	has	examined	the	role	of	
agriculture	in	the	provision	of	ecosystem	
services.	These	include	all	outputs	from	
agricultural	activities,	ranging	from	food	
production	to	climate	regulation.	Many	
of	these	services	are	provided	only	as	
externalities;	that	is,	they	are	unintended	
consequences	of	the	production	of	food	or	
fibre.	These	services,	which	we	refer	to	as	
environmental	services,	are	normally	not	
compensated	for.	Therefore	farmers	lack	
incentives	to	supply	them	in	the	desired	
quantity.	
In	exploring	the	potential	of	agriculture	
to	provide	enhanced	levels	of	environmental	
services	and	how	these	can	be	achieved,	
the	discussion	has	focused	on	one	relatively	
novel	approach	that	aims	to	provide	positive	
incentives	to	farmers	for	their	provision:	
payments	for	environmental	services.	The	
three	types	of	environmental	services	that	
have	seen	the	most	significant	growth	in	PES	
programmes	have	been	emphasized:	climate	
change	mitigation,	improved	water	supply	
and	quality,	and	biodiversity	conservation.	
Five	main	messages	emerge	from	the	report.
 Demand for environmental services from 
agriculture will increase.
Two	forces	are	generating	a	growing	
demand	for	environmental	services:	greater	
awareness	of	their	value	and	their	increasing	
scarcity,	arising	from	mounting	pressures	on	
the	Earth’s	ecosystems.	The	growing	demand	
for	these	services	has	led	to	a	significant	
increase	in	the	number	of	PES	programmes	
in	recent	years.	The	overall	magnitude	of	
these	programmes	is	still	small,	however,	
and	they	remain	mostly,	but	not	exclusively,	
confined	to	developed	countries.	The	public	
sector	has	been	the	major	source	of	payment	
programmes	so	far,	in	both	developed	and	
developing	countries,	but	privately	funded	
programmes	are	also	emerging.
Future	demand	for	environmental	services	
is	likely	to	increase,	driven	by	population	
and	income	growth,	and	globalization.	The	
demand	may	come	from	disparate	sources,	
such	as	local	water	users,	international	offset	
programmes	for	carbon	sequestration	and	
biodiversity,	and	private-sector	purchasers	
interested	in	meeting	consumer	demand	
for	improved	environmental	management	
(certified,	for	example,	via	ecolabels)	or	in	
improving	their	corporate	image.	There	
is	also	potential	for	additional	growth	in	
national	public-sector	programmes,	even	
in	low-income	developing	countries	where	
environmental	services	can	meet	critical	
policy	objectives,	such	as	the	availability	
of	clean	water	and	prevention	of	natural	
disasters.	
Although	this	report	has	focused	on	the	
three	environmental	services	that	have	
seen	the	most	significant	expansion	in	PES	
programmes	to	date,	demand	for	other	
services	–	for	example,	disaster	prevention,	
pollination	and	disease	control	–	is	likely	to	
rise	in	the	future.	In	addition,	bioenergy	has	
recently	become	one	of	the	most	dynamic	
and	rapidly	changing	sectors	in	the	global	
energy	economy.	While	significant	impacts	
on	agriculture	and	environmental	services	
are	possible,	their	nature	and	magnitude	
remain	uncertain.	Bioenergy	will	be	
examined	in	greater	detail	in	next	year’s	
State of Food and Agriculture	report.
 Agriculture can provide a better mix 
of ecosystem services to meet society’s 
changing needs.
Farmers	both	depend	on	and	generate	a	
wide	range	of	ecosystem	services,	and	their	
actions	can	enhance	or	degrade	ecosystems.	
As	population	and	income	growth	puts	
increased	pressure	on	farmers	and	the	
ecosystems	they	manage	to	provide	ever	
greater	volumes	of	conventional	agricultural	
outputs,	threats	to	other	services	–	such	
as	the	three	referred	to	above	–	are	
intensifying.	There	are	very	significant	costs	
involved	in	the	inadequate	provision	of	
these	services,	and	these	costs	are	receiving	
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increased	attention	from	the	media	and	
policy-makers	as	well	as	the	private	sector.	
Through	changes	in	land	use	and	production	
systems,	agricultural	producers	can	
provide	a	better	mix	of	ecosystem	services,	
expanding	the	share	of	those	characterized	
as	externalities,	to	meet	society’s	changing	
needs.
The	way	in	which	environmental	services	
can	be	generated	varies	by	service,	type	
of	production	system	and	agro-ecological	
context.	The	changes	needed	range	from	
shifts	in	land	or	water	use	(e.g.	away	from	
crops	or	livestock	production	to	grasslands	
or	forest)	to	modifications	within	a	
given	production	system	(e.g.	adopting	
farming	practices	that	provide	higher	
levels	of	environmental	services	alongside	
conventional	agricultural	outputs).	
Often	there	are	synergies	in	the	provision	
of	different	ecosystem	services.	Production	
practices	adopted	to	enhance	one	type	of	
service	may	enhance	others	at	the	same	
time.	For	example,	enhancing	soil	carbon	
sequestration	through	the	adoption	of	
conservation	agriculture	can	have	beneficial	
implications	not	only	for	climate	change	
mitigation	and	water	quality	but	also	for	
the	provisioning	services	of	food	production.	
However,	in	many	cases	there	are	trade-offs	
among	the	provision	of	different	ecosystem	
services.	Although	agriculture	has	the	
technical	potential	to	supply	enhanced	
levels	of	environmental	services,	the	
costs	and,	hence,	the	economic	feasibility	
of	the	changes	required,	are	central	to	
understanding	whether	they	can	be	achieved	
and	what	level	of	payments	would	be	
required	to	realize	them.	
 If farmers are to provide a better mix of 
ecosystem services, better incentives will 
be required. Payments for environmental 
services can help.
For	a	variety	of	reasons,	the	full	value	
of	all	ecosystem	services	is	not	normally	
reflected	in	the	incentives	faced	by	the	
service	providers.	As	a	consequence,	many	
environmental	services	are	underprovided,	
because	adopting	the	necessary	changes	in	
land	use	or	management	practices	would	
result	in	lower	benefits	to	the	producers.	
In	addition,	many	farmers,	particularly	
in	developing	countries,	face	barriers	
to	the	adoption	of	new	practices,	such	
as	constraints	on	access	to	information,	
appropriate	technologies	and	financing,	as	
well	as	non-existent	or	insecure	property	
rights	and	legal	or	regulatory	constraints.	
The	effect	of	these	barriers	is	often	
compounded	by	poorly	functioning	markets	
and	infrastructure,	risk	and	difficulties	in	
collective	management	of	commonly	held	
resources.
There	are	several	options	for	policy-
makers	to	change	farmers’	incentives.	In	
the	past,	non-market	instruments,	such	as	
regulations	or	taxes,	were	most	common,	
but	today	flexible,	decentralized	market-
based	approaches	are	receiving	increasing	
attention.	Payments	for	environmental	
services	are	among	these	options.
Farmers	may	be	compensated	either	
to	enhance	the	provision	of	certain	
environmental	services	that	may	be	
degraded	or	undersupplied	as	a	result	of	
current	agricultural	practices	or	to	offset	
pollution	generated	in	other	sectors.	In	
the	first	case,	a	critical	decision	is	whether	
farmers	should	be	paid	to	reduce	the	
negative	externalities	they	generate	rather	
than	requiring	them	to	bear	the	cost	
themselves.	Who	holds	the	initial	rights	to	
the	environmental	services:	the	producers	
or	society?	The	answer	to	this	question	
is	complex	and	may	differ	according	to	
service	and	context.	In	the	second	case,	the	
appropriateness	of	payments	to	farmers	
hinges	on	the	more	technical	consideration	
of	the	efficiency	of	the	offset	in	meeting	the	
intended	objective.	
 Cost-effective PES programmes require 
careful design based on the characteristics 
of the service and the biophysical and 
socio-economic context.
Different	types	of	PES	programmes	are	
appropriate	to	different	socio-economic	
and	agro-ecological	contexts.	The	process	of	
designing	an	effective	payment	programme	
involves	four	important	and	challenging	
steps:	identifying	what	should	be	paid	for;	
who	should	be	paid;	how	much	should	
be	paid;	and	what	payment	mechanism(s)	
should	be	used.	Ideally,	payments	should	
be	linked	directly	to	the	level	of	service	
provided.	More	frequently,	however,	they	
are	linked	to	some	proxy	associated	with	
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changes	in	the	provision	of	environmental	
services,	as	this	may	reduce	transaction	
and	measurement	costs.	The	most	common	
payments	are	those	made	for	changes	in	land	
use,	but	farmers	are	also	frequently	paid	
to	change	their	management	practices	on	
agricultural	land.	
To	maximize	cost-effectiveness,	payments	
must	be	targeted	to	farmers	and	locations	
where	the	largest	gain	in	environmental	
service	provision	can	be	obtained	for	a	
given	level	of	payment,	or	where	a	given	
increase	in	environmental	service	can	be	
achieved	for	the	lowest	cost.	Some	PES	
programmes	address	multiple	objectives	
(e.g.	environmental	service	provision	and	
poverty	reduction);	in	many	cases	this	will	
lead	to	some	degree	of	trade-off	between	
the	objectives	or	to	an	increase	in	the	cost	of	
providing	the	environmental	service.
The	level	of	payments	required	to	motivate	
farmers	depends	on	the	opportunity	costs,	
or	foregone	benefits,	they	face	in	making	a	
change	in	land	use	or	management.	These	
vary	according	to	agro-ecological	conditions,	
technology	employed,	level	of	economic	
development	and	policy	environment.	
Land	diversion	programmes	(away	from	
agriculture)	are	most	likely	to	be	effective	
where	the	returns	to	land	in	agriculture	are	
low.	In	land-scarce	environments,	changes	
that	generate	environmental	services	within	
agricultural	production	systems	are	more	
likely	to	be	favoured.	The	opportunity	cost	
of	labour	also	plays	a	role	in	determining	the	
feasibility	of	changes.	Where	labour	is	scarce,	
production	changes	that	reduce	labour	use	
are	more	likely	to	be	adopted.	
Minimizing	the	transaction	costs	involved	
in	programme	implementation,	including	
monitoring	and	enforcement,	can	play	
a	pivotal	role	in	designing	programmes	
that	will	be	cost-effective.	These	costs	are	
influenced	by	the	availability	of	information	
and	the	institutional	capacity	for	managing	
exchanges,	both	of	which	vary	by	country	
as	well	as	by	environmental	service.	Choices	
may	need	to	be	made	between	programme	
designs	that	may	be	effective	in	service	
provision	but	entail	high	transaction	
costs	and	others	with	lower	levels	of	both	
effectiveness	and	transaction	costs.	
An	enabling	environment	is	critical	for	PES	
programmes.	No	transactions	can	take	place	
in	the	absence	of	supporting	institutions,	
which	can	range	from	informal	to	highly	
regulated	in	nature.	Capacity	building	
will	therefore	be	an	essential	component	
of	efforts	to	support	the	use	of	the	PES	
approach	in	developing	countries.
 Payments for environmental services are 
not primarily a poverty reduction tool, 
but the poor are likely to be affected, 
and implications for the poor must be 
considered.
Reducing	poverty	and	increasing	the	supply	
of	environmental	services	are	two	distinct	
policy	objectives.	Using	one	policy	instrument	
to	achieve	both	may	reduce	its	effectiveness	
in	reaching	either.	However,	most	public-
sector-funded	payment	programmes	require	
that	socio-economic	impacts	be	taken	into	
account,	and	even	some	private-sector-
funded	schemes	include	poverty	reduction	
criteria.	PES	programmes	can	affect	the	poor,	
either	positively	or	negatively.	The	poor	may	
be	affected	directly,	as	potential	suppliers	of	
environmental	services,	or	indirectly,	through	
effects	on	wages,	food	prices	or	land	values,	
particularly	in	large-scale	programmes	or	
in	areas	with	limited	links	to	external	food	
and	labour	markets.	If	appropriate	measures	
are	not	incorporated	into	the	programme	
design,	PES	programmes	could	hurt	the	poor,	
especially	the	landless,	by	driving	down	
wages	or	increasing	food	prices.	They	could	
also	result	in	the	poor	being	excluded	from	
lands	to	which	they	have	only	informal	
rights.	Given	these	possibilities,	universal	
assumptions	that	PES	programmes	will	
benefit	the	poor	should	be	avoided.	
Nevertheless,	PES	programmes	have	been	
shown	to	be	potentially	accessible	and	
beneficial	to	the	poor.	Where	poor	producers	
considering	adopting	improved	agricultural	
practices	are	faced	with	barriers	such	as	
lack	of	credit,	property	rights	or	technical	
information,	PES	programmes	can	sometimes	
offer	opportunities	for	overcoming	them.	For	
location-specific	services	such	as	watershed	
management	and	biodiversity	conservation,	
the	presence	of	the	poor	in	specific	areas	
of	importance	for	environmental	service	
provision	makes	their	participation	
indispensable.	
The	transaction	costs	involved	in	
contracting	with	numerous	small-scale	
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producers,	many	of	whom	have	limited	
access	to	resources,	can	be	a	critical	
constraint	on	the	participation	of	the	
poor	in	PES	programmes.	These	costs	may	
remain	prohibitive	in	the	case	of	poor	
producers	–	who	are	generally	small-scale	
suppliers	–	unless	strategies	are	adopted	to	
reduce	them.	
The way forward
Payments	for	environmental	services	
represent	a	broad	and	flexible	array	of	
measures	aimed	at	improving	farmers’	
incentives	to	provide	services	such	as	carbon	
sequestration	and	water	purification	that	
are	increasingly	valued	by	society.	These	
measures	range	from	narrowly	defined	
voluntary	private	transactions	to	more	
broadly	applied	public	programmes.	
Although	payments	for	environmental	
services	are	not	a	panacea	for	solving	all	
environmental	problems,	they	nevertheless	
have	significant	potential	for	further	
application	in	both	developing	and	
developed	countries.	However,	much	work	
remains	to	be	done	before	they	can	play	
their	role	in	full.	Three	key	challenges	
confront	public	and	private	stakeholders	at	
the	local,	national	and	international	levels.
The rights to environmental services 
must be clarified
First,	the	establishment	of	PES	programmes	
involves	inherently	difficult	and	potentially	
controversial	decisions	about	who	should	
bear	the	cost	of	providing	the	services.	Any	
environmental	policy	is	based	on	an,	at	
least	implicit,	assumption	about	who	holds	
the	rights	to	a	service	and	who	should	bear	
the	costs	of	providing	it.	These	rights	are	
related	to,	but	not	the	same	as,	rights	to	the	
resources	that	contribute	to	the	provision	
of	environmental	services.	If	society	decides	
that	farmers	hold	the	right	to	use	the	land,	
water	and	other	resources	at	their	disposal	in	
ways	that	may	have	adverse	environmental	
consequences	(as	has	historically	been	
the	case),	then	those	who	wish	to	reduce	
those	adverse	consequences	will	have	to	
compensate	farmers	for	any	necessary	
changes.	On	the	other	hand,	if	changes	in	
production	practices	or	impacts	warrant,	
society	may	decide	that	farmers	should	bear	
the	cost	of	reducing	those	impacts.	Naturally,	
the	question	is	open	to	debate	and	must	be	
resolved	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	The	answer	
will	vary	according	to	the	nature	of	the	
threat	involved	and	the	specific	biophysical	
and	social	context	it	occurs	in.	
Resolving	the	question	at	the	practical	
level	requires	a	political	process	of	
negotiation,	which	may	range	from	the	
international	level	for	issues	such	as	
climate	change	mitigation	and	biodiversity	
conservation,	to	the	local	level	involving	
community-based	farmer	associations	and	
representatives	of	urban	consumers	in	the	
case	of	watershed	management.	Equity	as	
well	as	efficiency	concerns	are	important	
in	making	these	decisions,	and	in	some	
cases	it	will	be	necessary	to	balance	trade-
offs	between	the	two	criteria.	However,	
growing	pressure	on	the	Earth’s	natural	
resource	base,	together	with	the	increasing	
scarcity	of	environmental	services	and	their	
associated	costs,	calls	for	serious	political	
commitment	to	clarify	the	issue	of	rights	to	
environmental	services	to	allow	the	problem	
of	environmental	management	to	be	
addressed	effectively,	be	it	through	payments	
for	environmental	services	or	through	other	
instruments.
More information is needed through 
research in both natural and social 
sciences
A	second	area	of	pressing	need	is	further	
research	in	both	the	natural	and	social	
sciences	of	environmental	service	provision	
and	use.	Better	information	on	the	causal	
links	between	land-use	and	farming-system	
practices	and	their	environmental	outcomes	
is	critical	not	only	as	an	aid	to	clarifying	
rights	to	environmental	services,	but	also	for	
identifying	the	locations	and	activities	that	
will	generate	the	highest	environmental	
service	benefits	and	for	designing	effective	
PES	programmes.	
Social	science	research	is	equally	important	
in	order	to	identify	the	socio-economic	
contexts	in	which	payments	will	be	most	
effective.	More	work	is	also	needed	on	the	
development	of	guidelines	and	frameworks	
for	assessing	potential,	institutional	
requirements	and	ways	of	meeting	them,	
as	well	as	for	designing	programmes.	Such	
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research	outputs	will	constitute	an	important	
means	of	reducing	the	high	transaction	
costs	that	PES	programme	participants,	both	
buyers	and	sellers,	currently	face.	High-
quality	data	on	both	natural	and	social	
science	indicators	are	needed	to	support	
the	analysis	required	for	effective	targeting	
of	priority	services,	areas	and	programme	
participants.	Geographic	information	
systems	can	be	used	to	understand	and	
illustrate	the	interactions	among	agriculture,	
environmental	services	and	poverty.	Rich,	
spatially	referenced	databases	are	already	
being	generated	and	offer	strong	potential	
for	improvement	in	this	area.
In	addition,	it	should	be	recognized	that	
agricultural	production	is	just	part	of	a	long	
and	complex	chain	that	begins	with	input	
supply	and	continues	with	post-harvest	
processing,	transportation,	marketing,	
consumption	and	disposal.	Each	of	these	
stages	has	impacts	on	environmental	services,	
and	a	more	complete	understanding	of	the	
provision	and	use	of	environmental	services	
would	require	analysis	of	these	processes	also.
Institutions and capacity building must 
be strengthened
A	third	and	final	challenge	relates	to	
institutional	support	and	capacity	building.	
Improved	coordination	between	the	public	
and	private	sectors	through	partnerships	
can	enhance	the	demand	for	environmental	
services	as	well	as	the	sustainability	of	
funding.	The	public	sector	also	has	an	
important	role	to	play	in	establishing	
frameworks	for	private-sector	PES	
programmes.	For	instance,	improving	the	
coordination	among	the	various	ecolabelling	
schemes	and	clarifying	the	environmental	
benefits	that	can	be	obtained	from	
certified	products	will	help	to	increase	the	
effectiveness	of	this	form	of	payments	for	
environmental	services.	
Designing	rules	that	facilitate	the	access	of	
developing	country	suppliers	to	international	
PES	programmes	is	a	further	important	
aspect	of	the	institutional	requirements.	
Rules	for	certification	are	indispensable,	
but	can	represent	serious	barriers	to	entry	
into	global	markets	for	developing	country	
suppliers	of	environmental	services,	and	
there	is	a	need	to	work	across	the	public	
and	private	sectors	to	develop	strategies	to	
overcome	these	barriers.	A	relevant	issue	in	
this	domain	concerns	the	types	of	activities	
allowed	under	flexible	trading	mechanisms	
such	as	the	CDM.	Restrictions	on	the	type	
of	land-use	activities	allowable	under	this	
mechanism	greatly	limit	the	potential	
demand	for	environmental	services	supplied	
by	farmers.	
Institutions	and	capacity	building	are	also	
needed	at	the	national	level	to	establish	the	
enabling	environment	required	for	effective	
PES	programmes	and	to	facilitate	the	
transfer	of	internationally	sourced	payments	
for	environmental	services.	Aligning	national	
environmental,	agricultural	and	financial	
regulations	to	support	PES	projects	is	another	
important	area	where	national	governments	
can	provide	institutional	support.	In	some	
cases,	national	government	support	in	
clarifying	property	rights	to	the	natural	
resources	on	which	PES	programmes	are	
based	(particularly	land)	can	be	critical	for	
their	success.	Close	cooperation	among	
various	national	ministries	and	other	
bodies	is	a	necessary	condition	for	effective	
coordinated	national	efforts.	
Finally,	local	institutions	and	capacity	
building	are	required	to	facilitate	the	
technical	and	institutional	changes	needed	
for	enhanced	provision	of	environmental	
services.	Building	upon	and	strengthening	
the	capacity	of	existing	community	groups	is	
essential.	Working	with	local	organizations	
to	facilitate	the	transfer	of	payments,	
monitoring	and	certification	also	serves	to	
reduce	transaction	costs,	particularly	where	
smallholders	are	involved.	Non-governmental	
organizations	can	play	a	fundamental	role	
as	mediators	between	buyers	and	sellers,	as	
neutral	brokers	or	by	helping	to	facilitate	
farmers’	collective	action.
Current	policies	and	incentives	favour	the	
production	of	conventional	agricultural	
outputs	at	the	expense	of	non-marketed	
environmental	services	such	as	climate	
change	mitigation,	improved	water	quality	
and	quantity,	and	biodiversity.	The	costs	to	
society	of	degrading	environmental	services	
are	increasingly	being	recognized.	However,	
it	is	also	essential	to	recognize	that	providing	
enhanced	levels	of	these	services	entails	
costs.	Potential	providers	must	be	offered	
appropriate	incentives.	
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Developing	mechanisms	to	provide	these	
incentives	is	challenging.	This	is	a	new	
area	–	the	science	is	not	always	clear,	the	
policy	context	is	complex	and	budgetary	
resources	are	a	constraint,	especially	in	
poorer	countries.	Nevertheless,	payments	
for	environmental	services	can	trigger	
creativity	in	finding	innovative	solutions	to	
improve	the	management	of	agricultural	
and	environmental	resources,	even	in	
countries	that	are	poor	in	budgetary	
resources	but	rich	in	potential	supply	of	
environmental	services.	When	effectively	
designed,	PES	programmes	can	give	both	
providers	and	users	of	environmental	
services	more	accurate	indications	of	the	
consequences	of	their	actions,	so	that	
the	mix	of	ecosystem	services	provided	
matches	more	closely	the	true	preferences	
of	society.
Part II
WORLD	AND	
REGIONAL	REVIEW	
a	longer-term	perspective
Part II
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World	and	regional	review	
A	longer-term	perspective1
World	agriculture	has	achieved	notable	success	over	the	past	half	century	but	
faces	 serious	 challenges	 now	and	 in	 the	 coming	decades.	 The	 proportion	 of	
people	 suffering	 from	 hunger	 has	 fallen	 by	 half	 since	 1969–71,	 the	 earliest	
period	for	which	estimates	are	available.	In	developing	countries,	where	most	
of	 the	 world’s	 undernourished	 people	 live,	 progress	 is	 still	 being	 made	 on	
reducing	the	proportion	of	undernourished	people,	but	the	absolute	number	
appears	to	be	rising.
Steady	 growth	 in	 agricultural	 output	 and	 a	 long-term	 decline	 in	 real	
agricultural	 commodity	prices	 attest	 to	 the	 success	of	 the	global	 agricultural	
system	in	meeting	the	increase	in	effective	global	demand	for	food	and	other	
products.	Recent	rises	in	commodity	prices	have	been	driven	by	weather-related	
production	shortfalls	and	other	factors	such	as	the	emergence	of	liquid	biofuels	
as	a	 large	source	of	demand	for	agricultural	commodities.	 It	 remains	unclear	
whether	 this	 signals	 a	 new	paradigm	 for	 agricultural	 prices	 and,	 if	 so,	what	
that	might	mean	 for	 agricultural	 development,	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 food	
security.
Agricultural	growth	contributes	directly	to	food	security,	but	it	also	supports	
poverty	reduction	and	acts	as	an	engine	of	overall	economic	growth	in	much	
of	 the	developing	world.	 The	 success	 of	 the	 agriculture	 sector	 has	 not	been	
uniform	across	regions	and	countries,	however,	and	seems	to	have	waned	since	
the	early	1990s.	The	challenge	is	to	revive	it	and	extend	it	to	those	left	behind.	
Many	of	the	least-developed	countries,	particularly	those	located	in	marginal	
production	environments,	continue	to	experience	low	or	stagnant	agricultural	
productivity,	increasing	food	deficits	and	rising	levels	of	hunger	and	poverty. 
 This report is based on Wik, Pingali and Broca, 007, and several previously published FAO reports 
cited in the text.
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AGRICUlTURAl PRoDUCTIon
The	value	of	total	agricultural	output	(all	
food	and	non-food	crop	and	livestock	
commodities)	has	almost	trebled	in	real	
terms	since	1961	(Figure	14),	representing	
an	average	increase	of	2.3	percent	per	year,	
well	ahead	of	global	population	growth	
(1.7	percent	per	year).	Much	of	this	growth	
has	originated	in	developing	countries,	but	
it	also	reflects	the	rising	share	of	high-value	
commodities	such	as	livestock	products	and	
horticulture	in	the	total	value	of	production	
(FAO,	2006i).	
Regional differences in performance
Global	agricultural	value	added	per	capita	
has	grown	at	an	average	rate	of	0.4	percent	
per	year	in	real	terms	since	1961	(World	
Bank,	2006),	but	not	all	regions	have	
followed	the	same	trend	(Figure	15).	Latin	
America	and	the	Caribbean	and	South	Asia	
have	had	a	small	increase,	while	the	East	Asia	
and	Pacific	region	has	more	than	doubled	
agricultural	value	added	per	capita	over	the	
last	four	decades.	Sub-Saharan	Africa	is	the	
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1 400
1 600
0
30
60
90
210
180
150
120
240
International dollars per capita
  Developing
countries
  Production
per capita
 World
Billion international dollars
FIGURE 14
Total and per capita agricultural production
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only	region	in	which	per	capita	agricultural	
value	added	has	not	seen	a	sustained	
increase,	with	an	overall	declining	trend	and	
a	considerable	variation	over	time	and	across	
countries	(Figure	16).
Changing composition of 
agricultural production
The	composition	of	agricultural	production	
has	changed	considerably	over	the	last	
40	years.	The	global	output	of	cereals,	oil	
crops,	sugar,	vegetables,	eggs	and	meat	has	
increased	more	than	population	growth	
rates,	while	the	production	of	pulses	and	
roots	and	tubers	has	declined	relative	to	total	
population	growth	(Table	16).
Since	1990,	cereal	production	growth	
has	slowed	compared	to	that	of	earlier	
decades.	On	the	other	hand,	production	of	
oil	crops	has	accelerated,	fuelled	by	growth	
of	demand	in	developing	countries	for	these	
crops’	feed	and	food	uses	(FAO,	2006i).	
In	developing	countries,	egg	and	
meat	production	has	grown	even	more	
rapidly	than	that	of	oil	crops.	Given	the	
diversification	of	diets	driven	by	rising	
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FIGURE 15
Average growth rate in per capita agricultural value added, by region
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TAblE 16
Global growth rates for outputs of different agricultural commodities
 1961–76 1977–91 1992–2005  1961–2005
Annual percentage change
CEREAlS 
WORLD 3.5 1.8 1.3 2.2
Developing	countries 3.9 2.8 1.5 2.8
oIl CRoPS
WORLD 2.9 4.8 4.2 4.0
Developing	countries 3.1 5.0 4.9 4.4
SUGAR 
WORLD 3.4 2.3 0.8 2.2
Developing	countries 3.1 3.5 1.2 2.6
PUlSES
WORLD 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.1
Developing	countries 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.0
RooTS AnD TUbERS 
WORLD 1.3 0.5 1.5 1.1
Developing	countries 3.0 1.6 2.2 2.3
vEGETAblES 
WORLD 1.8 3.2 4.7 3.2
Developing	countries 1.9 4.4 6.1 4.1
EGGS 
WORLD 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.4
Developing	countries 4.6 7.0 6.0 5.9
MEAT
WORLD 3.5 3.0 2.6 3.0
Developing	countries 4.3 5.3 4.8 4.8
MIlK
WORLD 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.4
Developing	countries 2.7 3.3 3.8 3.2
Source:	FAO,	2006h.
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 7122
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Percentage
Source: FAO, 2006h.
FIGURE 16
Growth rate in per capita agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2004
Ghana
Angola
Benin
Malawi
Sudan
Burkina Faso 
Mozambique
Guinea
Ethiopia
Côte d'Ivoire 
Chad
Cameroon 
Nigeria
Niger
South Africa 
Mali
Uganda
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Zambia
United Republic of Tanzania 
Rwanda
Senegal
Burundi
Madagascar
Democratic Republic of the Congo
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 05030199
Million of tonnes
Pig meat
Beef and buffalo meat
 Poultry
 Mutton and lamb
FIGURE 17
Meat production in developing countries
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incomes	and	urbanization,	it	will	probably	
continue	to	grow	at	a	faster	rate	than	will	
the	population.	Growth	in	the	milk	sector	is	
expected	to	accelerate,	mainly	because	of	
increased	demand	in	developing	countries.
Sugar	production	growth	has	accelerated	
recently.	It	is	expected	that	this	sector	will	
see	continued	growth	in	the	future	because	
of	both	increased	demand	from	developing	
countries	(including	China,	which	has	very	
low	sugar	consumption	per	capita)	and	
the	potential	for	using	sugar	cane	for	the	
production	of	biofuels	(FAO,	2006i).
Spotlight on livestock production
Total	meat	production	in	developing	
countries	more	than	quintupled	from	
27	million	tonnes	to	147	million	tonnes	
between	1970	and	2005	(Figure	17).	
Although	the	pace	of	growth	is	slowing	
down,	global	demand	for	meat	is	expected	
to	increase	by	more	than	50	percent	by	
2030	(FAO,	2006i).	Satisfying	the	increasing	
demand	for	animal	food	products,	while	
at	the	same	time	sustaining	the	natural	
resource	base	and	coping	with	climate	
change	and	vulnerability,	is	one	of	the	major	
challenges	facing	world	agriculture	today.
Globally,	livestock	production	is	the	largest	
user	of	agricultural	land	and	accounts	
for	almost	40	percent	of	the	total	value	
of	agricultural	production.	In	developed	
countries,	this	share	is	more	than	50	percent.	
In	developing	countries,	where	livestock	
production	accounts	for	one-third	of	the	
value	of	agricultural	production,	its	share	is	
rising	rapidly	as	a	result	of	growth	in	income	
and	changes	in	lifestyle	and	dietary	habits.
Until	recently,	a	large	proportion	of	
livestock	in	developing	countries	were	not	
raised	for	food,	but	for	providing	draught	
power	and	manure	and	as	capital	assets	
that	were	only	disposed	of	in	times	of	
emergency.	Livestock	were	an	integral	
part	of	agricultural	systems,	distributed	
among	many	owners	and	raised	close	to	
their	feed	supplies.	This	pattern	is	changing	
rapidly.	Almost	all	of	the	growth	in	livestock	
production	is	now	occurring	in	industrial	
systems,	where	meat	production	is	no	longer	
tied	to	a	local	land	base	for	feed	inputs	or	to	
supplying	animal	power	or	manure	for	crop	
production	(Naylor	et al.,	2005).	
The	world	has	been	getting	more	meat,	
milk	and	eggs	per	kg	of	cereals	used	as	feed.	
A	rising	share	of	poultry	production	in	total	
meat	production	has	contributed	to	this	gain	
(poultry	requires	much	smaller	quantities	of	
cereal	feed	per	kg	of	meat	than	beef),	but	
the	growing	use	of	high-protein	oilmeals	
in	livestock	feeding	is	another	important	
factor.	World	production	of	soybean,	which	
is	mainly	processed	into	oil	for	human	
consumption	and	oilmeal	for	animal	feed,	
grew	at	5	percent	per	year	in	the	last	decade.
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FooD ConSUMPTIon
The	world	has	made	significant	progress	
in	raising	food	consumption	per	capita,	
from	an	average	of	2	280	kcal/person/day	
in	the	early	1960s	to	2	800	kcal/person/day	
(Figure	18).	The	gains	in	world	average	food	
consumption	predominantly	reflect	those	of	
developing	countries,	given	that	developed	
countries	already	had	fairly	high	levels	of	
per	capita	food	consumption	in	the	mid-
1960s.	The	overall	progress	of	developing	
countries	has	been	decisively	influenced	by	
the	significant	gains	made	in	East	Asia.	
Diversification of food consumption 
Both	reflecting	and	driving	the	changes	in	
agricultural	production	described	above,	
global	dietary	patterns	have	changed	
significantly	over	the	past	four	decades	
(Figure	19).	Diets	have	shifted	away	from	
staples,	such	as	cereals,	roots	and	tubers	and	
pulses,	towards	more	livestock	(meat	and	
dairy)	products,	vegetable	oils	and	fruits	and	
vegetables.
Income	growth,	relative	price	changes	and	
urbanization	have	altered	dietary	patterns	
in	both	developed	and	developing	countries.	
When	people	have	more	money	to	spend,	
they	normally	add	more	variety	and	more	
expensive	and	high-value	foods	to	their	
diets,	although	responses	differ	between	
developing	and	developed	countries.	In	the	
latter,	most	consumers	can	already	afford	
the	foods	they	prefer.	Therefore,	when	their	
incomes	rise,	changes	in	their	diets	and	food	
purchases	are	relatively	small.
In	developing	countries,	on	the	other	
hand,	rising	incomes	have	an	immediate	and	
pronounced	impact	on	diets,	as	people	adjust	
their	budgets	to	include	higher-value	food	
items	(Figure	20).	As	wages	increase,	people	
are	also	willing	to	pay	for	convenience,	
freeing	up	their	time	for	income-earning	
activities	or	leisure.	They	demand	more	
processed	foods	with	shorter	preparation	
times.	This	is	typically	the	case	when	more	
women	participate	in	the	labour	market	
(Pingali,	2007).	Also,	declining	real	food	
prices	have	allowed	poor	consumers	to	access	
improved	diets	at	existing	income	levels.
Urbanization	is	another	important	
factor	influencing	consumers’	preferences.	
Urbanization	is	taking	place	at	a	high	
pace,	and	urban	dwellers	were	expected	to	
outnumber	rural	populations	by	around	2007	
(Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	2005b).	
Large	urban	markets	create	opportunities	
for	the	establishment	of	large	supermarket	
chains,	and	they	attract	foreign	investment	
and	advertising	from	global	corporations.	
Non-traditional	foods	are	also	becoming	
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more	accessible	to	urban	populations	as	a	
result	of	trade	liberalization	and	declining	
transportation	costs	(Pingali,	2007).	
Emerging obesity concerns in 
developing countries
The	progress	in	raising	and	diversifying	per	
capita	food	consumption	has	had	positive	
and	negative	effects	in	several	developing	
countries.	In	raising	dietary	energy	supplies	
to	3	000	kcal/person/day,	the	related	diet	
transition	often	includes	a	large	increase	in	
the	consumption	of	refined	carbohydrates	
and	processed	fats	and	oils.	In	developing	
countries,	this	diet	transition,	combined	with	
a	more	sedentary	lifestyle,	generally	results	
in	rapidly	growing	rates	of	overweight,	
obesity	and	a	number	of	diet-related	non-
communicable	diseases	such	as	Type	2	
diabetes	and	heart	disease	(Boutayeb	and	
Cereals 60
Source: FAO, 2006h.
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Boutayeb,	2005;	Popkin,	2004).	It	is	now	
common	to	find	overweight/obesity	and	
malnutrition	side	by	side	in	developing	
countries,	even	within	the	same	household,	
with	obese	parents	and	malnourished	
children	under	the	same	roof	(Doak et 
al.,	2000).	
Globally,	1.6	billion	adults	are	overweight,	
and	at	least	400	million	are	obese.	Two	out	
of	three	overweight	and	obese	people	now	
live	in	low-	and	middle-income	countries,	
with	the	vast	majority	in	emerging	markets	
and	transition	economies	(WHO,	2006).	
Health	problems	resulting	from	obesity-
related	non-communicable	diseases	tend	to	
appear	side	by	side	with	health	problems	
related	to	undernutrition,	making	these	
countries	confront	a	“double	burden	of	
malnutrition”,	resulting	in	novel	challenges	
to,	and	strains	on	their	health	systems.
AGRICUlTURAl TRADE2
Trade
Since	the	early	1960s,	the	nominal	value	of	
agricultural	exports	has	increased	tenfold,	
while	the	share	of	agricultural	trade	in	total	
merchandise	trade	has	followed	a	long-
term	downward	trend,	falling	from	almost	
25	percent	to	less	than	10	percent	in	recent	
years	(Figure	21).
Over	this	period,	the	net	flow	of	
agricultural	commodities	between	
developed	and	developing	countries	
has	reversed	direction	(Figure	22).	In	the	
early	1960s,	developing	countries	had	an	
overall	agricultural	trade	surplus	of	almost	
US$7	billion	per	year.	By	the	end	of	the	
1980s,	however,	this	surplus	had	disappeared.	
During	most	of	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	
developing	countries	were	net	importers	of	
agricultural	products.	Without	Brazil,	the	
deficit	of	the	rest	of	the	developing	world	
would	have	been	considerably	bigger;	it	
 This section is based on FAO, 00d and FAO, 006j.
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would	have	grown	from	US$20	billion	in	
2000	to	US$27	billion	in	2004	(FAO,	2006i).
The	change	has	been	even	more	
pronounced	for	the	least-developed	
countries,	which	over	the	same	period	
have	changed	from	being	net	exporters	
to	significant	net	importers	of	agricultural	
commodities	(Figure	23).	By	the	end	of	the	
1990s,	imports	by	these	countries	were	more	
than	double	their	exports.
Cereal	foodstuffs	once	dominated	
international	agricultural	trade.	Now,	
however,	the	share	of	cereals	in	total	
agricultural	imports	has	fallen	below	
50	percent	in	developing	countries	and	
below	one-third	in	developed	countries.	
While	the	share	of	cereal	imports	has	
declined,	both	developed	and	developing	
countries	are	importing	greater	quantities	
of	higher-value	and	processed	foods,	
particularly	edible	oils,	livestock	products		
and	fruits	and	vegetables.
Prices
An	analysis	of	agricultural	commodity	prices	
over	the	past	40	years	reveals	some	striking	
features	(Figure	24):	
•	 Real	prices	of	agricultural	commodities,	
that	is,	prices	relative	to	those	of	all	
manufactured	goods,	have	declined	
significantly	–	almost	2	percent	per	year.	
•	 Real	prices	have	fluctuated	considerably	
around	the	long-term	downward	trend.
•	 Both	the	fluctuations	and	the	long-term	
decline	have	been	less	pronounced	since	
the	mid-1980s.
•	 Cereal	and	oilseed	prices	have	increased	
recently,	driven	partly	by	rising	demand	
for	biofuels	and	by	weather-related	
production	shortfalls.
A	number	of	factors	have	contributed	
to	these	trends.	Trade	policy	reforms	
and	improvements	in	transportation	and	
logistics	have	helped	to	hold	down	prices	
of	traded	goods,	including	agricultural	
products.	Technological	advances	have	
reduced	costs	and	made	it	possible,	at	
given	prices,	to	expand	production	at	a	
rate	that	has	outstripped	demand	growth,	
despite	rising	population	and	income.	Trade	
liberalization	has	permitted	a	wider	range	of	
countries	to	participate	in	world	commodity	
markets,	reducing	the	relative	importance	
of	the	supply	situation	in	any	one	country.	
Technological	advances	have	reduced	the	
vulnerability	of	some	crops	to	climatic	
influences.
Production	and	export	subsidies	in	some	
developed	countries	have	also	contributed	
to the	downward	trend	of	world	prices	
for	many	agricultural	products	grown	in	
temperate	zones,	reducing	the	export	
earnings	of	developing	countries	that	export	
commodities	such	as	cotton,	sugar	and	rice.
Even	though	real	prices	for	all	agricultural	
commodities	have	declined	over	the	past	
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40	years,	the	rate	of	decline	has	varied	
from	one	commodity	to	another.	Prices	
of	traditional	commodities	such	as	raw	
materials,	tropical	beverages,	oil	crops	
and	cereals	have	experienced	the	largest	
variation	and	the	steepest	decline.
Trade diversification
Some	developing	countries	have	managed	
to	take	advantage	of	changing	price	and	
demand	trends	by	shifting	production	
and	trade	into	the	non-traditional	higher-
value	sectors.	It	has	mainly	been	the	more	
advanced	and	prosperous	developing	
countries	that	have	managed	to	do	this.	
Developing	countries	other	than	the	least-
developed	countries	have	more	than	doubled	
the	share	of	horticultural,	meat	and	dairy	
products	in	their	agricultural	exports,	while	
reducing	the	share	of	tropical	beverages	and	
raw	materials	in	their	agricultural	exports	
from	55	percent	in	the	early	1960s	to	around	
30	percent	in	1999–2001.	
An	analysis	of	FAOSTAT	data	(FAO,	2004e)	
found	that	trade	in	some	non-traditional	
agricultural	exports,	including	fruits,	
vegetables	and	selected	speciality	and	
processed	products	(excluding	trade	in	
bananas	and	citrus)	was	worth	more	than	
US$30	billion	annually.	Developing	countries	
held	a	56	percent	share	of	world	trade	in	
non-traditional	fruit	and	vegetables	in	2001	
and	also	accounted	for	two-thirds	of	trade	in	
selected	speciality	products,	such	as	chillies,	
ginger	and	garlic.
Across	a	broad	range	of	these	products,	
developing	countries	have	been	gaining	
market	share	at	the	expense	of	developed	
countries.	This	is	especially	the	case	of	trade	
in	vegetables	and	speciality	products,	in	
which	developing	countries	have	taken	the	
lion’s	share	of	the	substantial	growth	in	
global	trade	during	the	last	decade.
The	non-traditional	agricultural	export	
market	is,	however,	dominated	by	just	a	
handful	of	countries.	Some	of	these,	such	
as	Argentina,	Brazil,	Chile,	Costa	Rica	and	
Mexico	are	leading	exporters	of	more	than	
one	product.	Other	countries	are	dominant	
in	the	market	for	only	one	product	–	for	
example,	Kenya	for	green	beans,	Malaysia	
for	minor	tropical	fruits,	Thailand	for	minor	
fresh	fruits	and	Zimbabwe	for	green	peas.	
A	large	number	of	countries	have	only	a	
very	limited	participation	in	the	market	for	
non-traditional	products.	Least-developed	
countries	account	for	only	0.5	percent	
of	world	fruit	trade	and	0.8	percent	of	
world	vegetable	trade.	On	the	other	hand,	
they	have	increased	their	dependence	on	
traditional	export	products	such	as	raw	
materials	and	tropical	beverages	for	their	
agricultural	export	earnings	from	59	percent	
to	72	percent	during	the	last	40	years.
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For	these	countries,	export	earnings	have	
failed	to	increase,	and	rising	import	prices	
have	further	eroded	their	purchasing	power.	
Real	agricultural	export	earnings	of	least-
developed	countries	have	fallen	by	more	
than	30	percent	over	the	last	two	decades,	
and	by	half	over	the	last	40	years	(Figure	25).
FooD InSECURITy
The	World	Food	Summit	(WFS)	established	
the	target	of	reducing	by	half	the	number	of	
undernourished	people	in	the	world	by	2015,	
from	a	1990–92	base	period.	The	Millennium	
Development	Goal	target	is	to	reduce	by	
half	the	proportion	of	people	who	suffer	
from	hunger,	during	the	same	time	period	
(1990–2015).	
The	historical	trend	of	increased	per	capita	
food	production	and	consumption	at	the	
global	level	resulted	in	a	reduction	of	the	
proportion	of	undernourished	people	in	
developing	countries	from	37	percent	in	
1969–71	to	17	percent	in	2002–04	(Figure	26)	
(FAO,	2006k).	Most	of	the	reduction	occurred	
in	the	first	two	decades	of	this	period;	
indeed,	from	the	1990–92	base	period,	
the	proportion	of	undernourished	fell	by	
only	3	percentage	points.	The	number	of	
undernourished	people	in	the	developing	
world	declined	from	960	million	in	1969–71	
to	830	million	in	2002–04,	but	almost	all	of	
the	decline	occurred	before	1990–92,	and,	
in	fact,	the	number	rose	from	1995–97	to	
2002–04	(FAO,	2006k).
In	the	period	1990–92	to	2001–03,	the	
only	significant	progress	towards	reducing	
the	number	of	undernourished	people	was	
concentrated	in	very	few,	but	populous,	
countries	and	subregions:	China,	Southeast	
Asia	and	South	America	(Figure	27).	In	
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India,	the	prevalence	of	hunger	declined	
by	5	percentage	points,	but	the	progress	
in	terms	of	reducing	the	number	of	
undernourished	people	was	small	because	
of	population	growth.	At	the	same	time,	the	
number	of	undernourished	increased	in	the	
rest	of	East	Asia	(excluding	China)	and	even	
more	in	the	rest	of	South	Asia	(excluding	
India)	(FAO,	2006l).
The	Near	East,	Central	America,	East	
Asia	(excluding	China)	and	Central	Africa	
subregions	experienced	an	increase	in	
both	the	number	and	proportion	of	
undernourished	between	1990–92	and		
2001–03	(FAO,	2006l).
In	sub-Saharan	Africa,	recent	
progress	in	reducing	the	prevalence	of	
undernourishment	is	noteworthy.	For	the	
first	time	in	several	decades,	the	share	of	
undernourished	people	in	the	region’s	
population	declined	significantly	–	from	
35	percent	in	1990–92	to	32	percent	in	
2001–03,	after	having	reached	36	percent	in	
1995–97.	While	Central	Africa	experienced	
a	dramatic	increase	in	both	the	number	
and	prevalence	of	undernourishment,	
Southern	Africa,	West	Africa,	East	Africa	and	
Nigeria	saw	a	decline	in	the	prevalence	of	
undernourishment	(FAO,	2006l).	
In	addition	to	Ghana,	which	has	already	
reached	the	WFS	goal	of	halving	the	number	
of	undernourished	people,	Angola,	Benin,	
Chad,	the	Congo,	Ethiopia,	Guinea,	Lesotho,	
Malawi,	Mauritania,	Mozambique	and	
Namibia	have	also	reduced	the	number	
of	undernourished	people.	Although	the	
explanations	for	success	have	varied	among	
these	countries,	most	seem	to	have	combined	
good	economic	growth	performances	
with	a	significant	expansion	of	per	capita	
agricultural	and	food	production	(FAO,	
2006l).
The	decline	in	the	prevalence	of	
undernourishment	in	the	region	is	an	
encouraging	development.	Still,	the	task	
facing	sub-Saharan	Africa	remains	daunting.	
Sub-Saharan	Africa	accounts	for	25	percent	
of	the	undernourished	people	in	the	
developing	world,	and	it	has	the	highest	
proportion	(one-third)	of	people	suffering	
from	chronic	hunger.	In	14	countries	in	the	
region,	35	percent	or	more	of	the	population	
were	chronically	undernourished	in	2001–03.	
The	number	of	undernourished	people	
increased	from	169	million	to	206	million	
from	1990–92	to	2001–03,	and	only	15	of	
the	39	countries	for	which	data	are	reported	
reduced	the	number	of	undernourished	
(FAO,	2006l).	
Efforts	to	reduce	hunger	in	the	region	
have	been	hampered	by	natural	and	
human-induced	disasters,	including	conflicts	
occurring	during	the	1990s	and	the	spread	
of	HIV/AIDS.	Indeed,	the	increase	in	the	
number	of	undernourished	people	from	
the	WFS	baseline	period	was	driven	mainly	
by	five	war-torn	countries:	Burundi,	the	
Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo,	Eritrea,	
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Liberia	and	Sierra	Leone.	Particularly	
dramatic	is	the	worsening	of	food	insecurity	
in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo,	
where	the	number	of	undernourished	
people	tripled	from	12	to	36	million,	and	the	
prevalence	rose	from	31	to	72	percent	of	the	
population	(FAO,	2006l).	
There	is	a	clear	negative	correlation	
between	countries’	income	per	capita	and	
prevalence	of	undernourishment	in	the	
population	(Figure	28).	Empirical	evidence	
confirms	that	sustained	economic	growth	
leading	to	increased	productivity	and	
prosperity	at	the	national	level	results	in	
reduced	hunger.	But	cross-country	studies	of	
developing	countries	suggest	that	economic	
growth	alone,	in	the	absence	of	specific	
measures	to	combat	hunger,	may	leave	large	
numbers	of	hungry	people	behind	for	a	long	
time,	particularly	in	rural	areas	(FAO,	2005c).
Numerous	studies	have	provided	evidence	
that	the	impact	of	economic	growth	on	
reducing	hunger	and	poverty	depends	
as	much	on	the	nature	and	distribution	
of	the	growth	as	on	its	scale	and	speed.	
Some	70	percent	of	the	poor	in	developing	
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countries	live	in	rural	areas	and	depend	
on	agriculture	for	their	livelihoods,	either	
directly	or	indirectly.	In	the	poorest	countries,	
agricultural	growth	is	the	driving	force	of	
the	rural	economy.	Particularly	in	the	most	
food-insecure	countries,	agriculture	is	crucial	
for	income	and	employment	generation.	
Agricultural	growth	is,	therefore,	a	critical	
factor	in	hunger	reduction.	
Future trends for food security3
Historical	trends	towards	increased	food	
consumption	per	capita	globally	and	
particularly	in	developing	countries	will,	
according	to	FAO	scenarios,	continue	in	the	
near	future.	However,	they	will	continue	
at	a	slower	rate	than	in	the	past	as	more	
and	more	countries	approach	medium-
high	levels.	The	average	of	the	developing	
countries	may	rise	from	the	current	
2	650	kcal	per	person	per	day	to	3	070	kcal	
by	2050.	By	the	middle	of	the	twenty-first	
century,	more	than	90	percent	of	the	world‘s	
population	may	be	living	in	countries	with	
3 Based on FAO, 006i.
per	capita	food	consumption	of	more	than	
2	700	kcal	per	day,	compared	to	51	percent	
at	present	and	only	4	percent	three	decades	
ago.	As	in	the	past,	great	improvements	in	
China	and	a	few	other	populous	countries	
will	continue	to	play	a	significant	role	in	
these	developments.
However,	not	all	countries	are	likely	
to	achieve	adequate	food	consumption	
levels.	This	is	especially	the	case	for	
countries	that	currently	have	high	rates	
of	undernourishment,	high	population	
growth	rates,	poor	prospects	for	rapid	
economic	growth	and	often	meagre	
agricultural	resources.	Today,	32	countries	
are	in	this	category,	with	an	average	
undernourishment	rate	of	42	percent.	
The	population	of	these	poor	countries	
is	expected	to	increase	from	the	current	
580	million	to	1.39	billion	by	2050,	and	
food	consumption	could,	under	fairly	
optimistic	assumptions,	increase	from	the	
current	2	000	kcal/person/day	to	2	450	
kcal	in	the	next	30	years.	This	will	not	be	
sufficient	for	good	nutrition	in	several	of	
these	countries,	hence	the	conclusion	that	
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reducing	undernourishment	may	be	a	very	
slow	process	in	these	countries.
Despite	the	slow	pace	of	progress	
in	reducing	the	occurrence	of	
undernourishment,	FAO’s	projections	do	
imply	considerable	overall	improvements.	
In	the	developing	countries	the	number	of	
the	well	fed	could	increase	from	3.9	billion	
in	1999–2001	(83	percent	of	the	population)	
to	6.2	billion	(93	percent)	in	2030	and	
to	7.2	billion	(96	percent)	by	2050.	The	
problem	of	undernourishment	will	tend	to	
become	smaller	both	in	terms	of	absolute	
numbers	affected	and,	even	more,	in	terms	
of	the	proportion	of	the	population	that	is	
undernourished.
oPPoRTUnITIES AnD CHAllEnGES 
In THE FUTURE
Population growth in the poorest 
countries
Global	population	growth	has	been	the	
major	driving	force	for	growth	in	food	
demand	and	production.	The	population	
will	continue	to	grow,	but	longer-term	
projections	suggest	that	population	growth	
may	slow	by	the	middle	of	this	century.	
World	population	is	expected	to	increase	
from	the	current	6.7	billion	to	9.2	billion	
by	2050	(UN,	2007).	From	2050,	world	
population	will	be	increasing	by	30	million	
per	year.
Almost	all	of	this	increase	is	expected	
to	take	place	in	developing	countries,	and	
especially	in	the	group	of	the	50	least-
developed	countries.	These	countries	may	
still	have	inadequate	food	consumption	
levels	in	2050,	and,	therefore,	there	is	
significant	scope	for	further	increases	in	
demand	for	food	even	when	population	
growth	slows	down.
Slowing agricultural production 
growth4
Annual	growth	of	world	agricultural	output	
is	expected	to	fall	to	1.5	percent	over	the	
next	decades	and	further	to	0.9	percent	in	
the	succeeding	20	years	to	2050	(FAO,	2006i),	
compared	with	2.3	percent	per	year	since	
1961.	
All	the	major	commodity	sectors	(except	
for	the	milk	sector)	are	expected	to	take	part	
in	the	deceleration	of	agricultural	growth.	
The	cereals	sector	has	already	been	in	such	
a	downward	trend	for	some	time	now,	and	
is	expected	to	continue	to	have	the	lowest	
growth	rate	of	the	major	commodity	sectors	
during	the	next	50	years.
Water 
Agriculture	accounts	for	70	percent	of	all	
water	use	in	the	world	and	as	much	as	
95	percent	in	many	developing	countries,	
almost	all	for	irrigating	crops	(Millennium	
Ecosystem	Assessment,	2005b).	Per	capita	
use	of	water	has	decreased	from	about	700	
to	600	cubic	metres	per	year	since	1980	
(Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	2005b),	
 Based on FAO, 006i.
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and	water	productivity	in	agriculture	
increased	by	at	least	100	percent	between	
1961	and	2001	(FAO,	2003d).	But	total	water	
use	is	still	increasing	and	is	expected	to	
continue	to	increase	because	of	population	
growth,	urban	expansion	and	increasing	
industrialization.	
Today,	more	than	1.2	billion	people	
live	in	areas	of	physical	water	scarcity	
(Comprehensive	Assessment	of	Water	
Management	in	Agriculture,	2007),	and	
by	2025	over	3	billion	people	are	likely	to	
experience	water	stress	(UNDP,	2006).	The	
gap	between	available	water	supply	and	
water	demand	is	increasing	in	many	parts	
of	the	world,	limiting	future	expansion	of	
irrigation.	In	areas	where	water	supply	is	
already	limited,	water	scarcity	is	likely	to	be	
the	most	serious	constraint	on	agricultural	
growth	and	development,	especially	in	
drought-prone	areas	(Millennium	Ecosystem	
Assessment,	2005b).
bioenergy
Recent	high	petroleum	prices	are	creating	
new	markets	for	agricultural	products	that	
can	be	used	as	feedstock	for	the	production	
of	biofuels.	The	competitiveness	of	biofuels	
may	be	further	enhanced	if	the	savings	of	
greenhouse	gas	emissions	resulting	from	
substituting	ethanol	for	gasoline	are	to	be	
monetized	in	the	form	of	tradable	carbon	
credits	(Certified	Emission	Reductions	of	
greenhouse	gases)	through	the	Clean	
Development	Mechanism	under	the	
provisions	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	If	world	
agriculture	were	to	become	a	major	source	
of	feedstock	for	the	biofuel	industry,	this	
would	have	as	yet	unknown	implications	
for	food	security	and	for	the	environment.	
Bioenergy	is	a	new	area	that	deserves	
increased	attention	and	further	analysis	so	
that	the	implications	of	its	development	for	
food	security	and	poverty	alleviation	can	be	
understood.
Climate change
There	are	still	large	uncertainties	as	to	
when,	how	and	where	climate	change	will	
have	an	impact	on	agricultural	production	
and	food	security,	but	it	is	generally	
agreed	that	agricultural	impacts	will	be	
more	adverse	in	tropical	areas	than	in	
temperate	areas	(Stern,	2007;	IPCC,	2007b,	
Parry	et al., 2004, 2005;	Fischer	et al.,	2005).	
Model-based	scenarios	predict	slight	to	
moderate	reductions	of	potential	crop	
yields	(Stern,	2007).	While	the	adverse	
impacts	of	climate	change	will	affect	the	
poor	disproportionately,	actual	impacts	will	
depend	at	least	as	much	on	socio-economic	
conditions	as	on	the	biophysical	processes	
involved.	Policies	and	investments	supporting	
trade,	sustainable	agricultural	practices	and	
technological	progress	can	help	mitigate	the	
effects	of	climate	change	on	agriculture	and	
food	security	while	increasing	the	capacity	of	
people	and	societies	to	adapt	(FAO,	2006i).	
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TABLE	A1
Total and agricultural population (including forestry and fisheries)
Countries
Total population
(Thousands)
Agricultural population
(Thousands)
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Afghanistan 15	069 13	913 10	939 9	778
Albania 2	671 3	280 3	116 3	166 3	194 1	534 1	787 1	502 1	465 1	457
Algeria 18	747 25	014 30	252 31	800 32	339 6	684 6	514 7	260 7	375 7	406
American Samoa 33 47 58 62 63 16 20 20 20 20
Angola 7	056 9	352 12	399 13	625 14	078 5	392 6	969 8	912 9	680 9	962
Antigua and barbuda 63 63 72 73 73 21 18 17 16 16
Argentina 28	098 32	527 37	073 38	428 38	871 3	790 4	075 3	753 3	629 3	585
Armenia 3	115 3	061 3	052 400 359 348
Australia 14	580 16	886 19	151 19	731 19	913 949 931 877 859 853
Austria 7	551 7	733 8	103 8	116 8	120 755 598 415 367 352
Azerbaijan 8	158 8	370 8	447 2	180 2	133 2	118
bahamas 210 255 303 314 317 12 13 11 10 10
bahrain 347 490 677 724 739 14 10 7 7 6
bangladesh 85	034 109	422 137	952 146	736 149	664 61	751 71	290 76	810 77	387 77	454
barbados 249 257 267 270 271 25 17 11 10 10
belarus 10	034 9	895 9	852 1	327 1	162 1	113
belgium 9	858 9	968 10	251 10	318 10	340 296 261 187 169 164
belize 144 186 240 256 261 55 63 74 76 77
benin 3	461 4	654 6	225 6	736 6	918 2	340 2	948 3	360 3	438 3	463
bhutan 1	318 1	694 2	064 2	257 2	325 1	245 1	594 1	935 2	114 2	176
bolivia 5	355 6	670 8	316 8	808 8	973 2	757 3	051 3	574 3	716 3	762
bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3	963 4	161 4	186 205 168 156
botswana 988 1	354 1	724 1	785 1	795 628 635 767 783 783
brazil 121	624 148	787 171	795 178	470 180	654 44	009 34	496 28	285 26	471 25	869
brunei Darussalam 193 257 334 358 366 10 5 3 2 2
bulgaria 8	863 8	718 8	098 7	897 7	829 1	922 1	247 615 493 458
burkina Faso 6	823 8	923 11	909 13	002 13	393 6	291 8	247 10	987 11	988 12	345
burundi 4	134 5	604 6	283 6	825 7	068 3	838 5	136 5	677 6	135 6	341
Cambodia 6	656 9	748 13	147 14	144 14	482 5	041 7	193 9	215 9	747 9	922
Cameroon 8	754 11	663 15	113 16	018 16	296 5	928 7	387 7	958 7	867 7	807
Canada 24	512 27	695 30	766 31	510 31	744 1	743 1	032 786 728 710
Cape verde 289 349 436 463 473 107 107 100 97 96
Central African 
Republic 2	308 2	946 3	713 3	865 3	912 1	954 2	360 2	698 2	708 2	705
Chad 4	507 5	822 7	862 8	598 8	854 3	961 4	842 5	914 6	222 6	319
Chile 11	148 13	101 15	223 15	805 15	996 2	349 2	472 2	417 2	375 2	359
China 1	004	204 1	160	914 1	282	320 1	311	709 1	320	892 742	341 833	139 853	602 851	028 849	417
Colombia 28	448 34	975 42	119 44	222 44	914 11	590 9	549 8	763 8	486 8	386
Comoros 387 527 705 768 790 312 408 519 555 568
Congo 1	805 2	495 3	446 3	724 3	818 1	043 1	210 1	398 1	420 1	425
Costa Rica 2	348 3	076 3	927 4	173 4	250 851 835 824 810 803
Côte d’Ivoire 8	433 12	503 15	826 16	631 16	897 5	474 7	449 7	786 7	635 7	571
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Countries
Total population
(Thousands)
Agricultural population
(Thousands)
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Croatia 4	443 4	428 4	416 377 308 287
Cuba 9	711 10	624 11	201 11	300 11	328 2	604 2	216 1	832 1	717 1	679
Cyprus 612 682 783 802 808 159 94 67 60 58
Czech Republic 10	270 10	236 10	226 842 766 742
former Czechoslovakia 15	253 15	563 2	034 1	780
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 17	201 19	958 22	266 22	664 22	776 7	695 7	569 6	705 6	334 6	206
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 27	907 37	419 48	651 52	771 54	417 19	990 25	366 30	751 32	602 33	355
Denmark 5	122 5	141 5	322 5	364 5	375 362 285 201 180 174
Dominica 74 72 78 79 79 25 20 18 18 17
Dominican Republic 5	698 7	059 8	353 8	745 8	872 1	953 1	841 1	479 1	372 1	337
Ecuador 7	962 10	264 12	420 13	003 13	192 3	347 3	605 3	418 3	309 3	270
Egypt 43	935 55	762 67	799 71	931 73	390 26	541 24	760 25	013 24	977 24	954
El Salvador 4	580 5	114 6	209 6	515 6	614 2	216 2	083 2	048 2	014 1	999
Equatorial Guinea 221 354 456 494 507 173 265 321 341 348
Eritrea 3	714 4	141 4	297 2	881 3	173 3	278
Estonia 1	367 1	323 1	308 154 139 134
Ethiopia 65	597 70	678 72	420 54	039 57	319 58	408
former People’s 
Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia
38	136 51	971 33	895 44	601
Fiji 634 725 814 839 847 301 328 325 323 322
Finland 4	781 4	988 5	177 5	207 5	215 627 453 308 273 262
France 53	888 56	736 59	304 60	144 60	434 4	496 3	118 1	989 1	736 1	659
French Polynesia 151 195 233 244 248 74 83 80 79 78
Gabon 696 953 1	257 1	329 1	351 455 491 475 452 444
Gambia 653 936 1	312 1	426 1	462 551 767 1	037 1	113 1	137
Georgia 5	258 5	126 5	074 1	048 940 905
Germany 78	276 79	439 82	284 82	476 82	526 5	405 3	196 2	069 1	804 1	724
Ghana 11	066 15	283 19	597 20	922 21	377 6	719 8	958 11	009 11	601 11	801
Greece 9	635 10	161 10	895 10	976 10	977 2	510 1	906 1	465 1	331 1	285
Guatemala 6	822 8	752 11	424 12	347 12	661 3	946 4	909 5	706 5	935 6	006
Guinea 4	686 6	131 8	114 8	480 8	620 4	256 5	346 6	804 7	014 7	095
Guinea-bissau 792 1	017 1	368 1	493 1	538 693 868 1	133 1	225 1	257
Guyana 760 732 759 765 767 203 158 134 127 125
Haiti 5	455 6	910 8	006 8	326 8	437 3	867 4	674 4	986 5	050 5	070
Honduras 3	568 4	869 6	456 6	941 7	099 2	150 2	186 2	239 2	216 2	204
Hungary 10	702 10	367 10	012 9	877 9	831 2	206 1	756 1	205 1	070 1	028
Iceland 228 255 282 290 292 24 28 23 22 22
India 688	973 846	443 1	016	831 1	065	462 1	081	229 441	263 493	279 545	599 556	592 559	656
Indonesia 150	133 182	106 211	552 219	883 222	611 80	775 92	439 93	305 92	596 92	276
Iran (Islamic  
Republic of) 39	403 56	664 66	450 68	920 69	788 15	342 18	219 17	589 17	253 17	157
Iraq 12	969 17	357 3	737 2	822
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Countries
Total population
(Thousands)
Agricultural population
(Thousands)
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Ireland 3	400 3	517 3	819 3	956 3	999 635 504 388 362 354
Israel 3	763 4	523 6	042 6	433 6	560 232 187 163 153 150
Italy 56	420 56	729 57	529 57	423 57	346 7	153 4	880 3	061 2	635 2	505
Jamaica 2	135 2	370 2	580 2	651 2	676 663 585 532 517 512
Japan 116	797 123	527 127	024 127	654 127	800 12	452 8	596 4	925 4	132 3	895
Jordan 2	229 3	264 5	036 5	473 5	614 407 490 573 570 567
Kazakhstan 15	655 15	433 15	403 3	077 2	839 2	773
Kenya 16	377 23	585 30	535 31	987 32	420 13	473 18	756 23	048 23	706 23	873
Kuwait 1	373 2	120 2	239 2	521 2	595 25 25 25 27 27
Kyrgyzstan 4	920 5	138 5	208 1	263 1	231 1	220
lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 3	211 4	133 5	279 5	657 5	787 2	554 3	229 4	037 4	297 4	385
latvia 2	372 2	307 2	286 283 254 245
lebanon 2	673 2	721 3	478 3	653 3	708 380 200 129 110 105
lesotho 1	277 1	570 1	783 1	802 1	800 531 648 699 696 691
liberia 1	871 2	134 2	937 3	367 3	487 1	433 1	546 1	986 2	224 2	284
libyan Arab Jamahiriya 3	047 4	305 5	238 5	551 5	659 754 481 313 275 263
lithuania 3	499 3	444 3	422 517 451 430
luxembourg 364 378 435 453 459 20 14 10 9 8
Madagascar 9	051 11	960 15	973 17	404 17	901 7	379 9	342 11	857 12	693 12	974
Malawi 6	178 9	414 11	363 12	105 12	337 5	136 7	725 8	821 9	215 9	327
Malaysia 13	771 17	851 22	995 24	425 24	876 5	390 4	667 4	067 3	825 3	739
Mali 7	047 9	049 11	909 13	007 13	409 6	270 7	759 9	644 10	312 10	549
Malta 324 360 389 394 396 26 10 6 6 5
Mauritania 1	609 2	031 2	646 2	893 2	980 1	148 1	132 1	400 1	508 1	546
Mauritius 966 1	057 1	186 1	221 1	233 257 175 137 127 124
Mexico 67	559 83	229 98	928 103	457 104	931 26	411 25	271 23	218 22	442 22	164
Moldova 4	284 4	267 4	263 977 868 835
Mongolia 1	663 2	213 2	501 2	594 2	630 662 707 607 576 567
Morocco 19	393 24	559 29	111 30	566 31	064 10	932 11	096 10	630 10	465 10	408
Mozambique 12	082 13	519 17	861 18	863 19	182 9	736 10	727 13	737 14	350 14	538
Myanmar 33	703 40	511 47	541 49	485 50	101 25	553 29	670 33	381 34	278 34	543
namibia 1	018 1	407 1	892 1	987 2	011 652 802 927 926 921
nepal 14	883 18	628 23	520 25	164 25	725 13	956 17	424 21	878 23	366 23	872
netherlands 14	147 14	952 15	898 16	149 16	227 788 680 536 497 485
new Caledonia 143 171 215 228 233 70 74 79 79 79
new Zealand 3	117 3	364 3	784 3	875 3	904 341 339 332 327 325
nicaragua 2	921 3	828 5	073 5	466 5	597 1	192 1	135 1	057 1	018 1	003
niger 5	588 7	654 10	748 11	972 12	415 5	101 6	871 9	430 10	425 10	782
nigeria 64	311 86	038 114	750 124	009 127	117 34	787 36	999 38	207 37	977 37	827
norway 4	086 4	242 4	473 4	533 4	552 376 296 227 210 205
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 1	478 2	156 3	192 3	557 3	685 272 327 374 381 384
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Countries
Total population
(Thousands)
Agricultural population
(Thousands)
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
oman 1	189 1	847 2	610 2	851 2	935 596 830 964 979 983
Pakistan 80	846 110	852 142	650 153	578 157	315 53	664 61	987 72	655 75	883 76	917
Panama 1	949 2	411 2	950 3	120 3	177 639 709 683 670 665
Papua new Guinea 3	241 4	116 5	334 5	711 5	836 2	748 3	361 4	119 4	324 4	387
Paraguay 3	114 4	218 5	471 5	878 6	018 1	596 1	909 2	208 2	288 2	314
Peru 17	324 21	750 25	950 27	167 27	567 6	949 7	691 7	817 7	785 7	767
Philippines 48	085 61	110 75	708 79	999 81	408 25	068 27	856 29	786 30	034 30	078
Poland 35	578 38	107 38	668 38	587 38	551 9	466 9	193 7	333 6	785 6	609
Portugal 9	758 9	902 10	015 10	062 10	072 2	782 1	978 1	435 1	304 1	262
Qatar 231 466 581 610 619 7 12 8 6 6
Republic of Korea 38	126 42	875 46	830 47	700 47	951 12	848 7	033 4	113 3	455 3	255
Romania 22	192 23	184 22	476 22	334 22	280 7	239 5	139 3	120 2	671 2	534
Russian Federation 145	586 143	246 142	397 15	277 13	890 13	453
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 265	422 289	546 60	653 56	957
Rwanda 5	155 6	702 7	666 8	387 8	481 4	782 6	147 6	959 7	574 7	644
Saint Kitts and nevis 44 41 42 42 42 15 12 10 9 9
Saint lucia 113 131 146 149 150 38 37 34 33 33
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 100 110 118 120 121 34 31 28 27 27
Samoa 155 160 173 178 180 76 68 60 57 56
Sao Tome and Principe 94 116 149 161 165 70 81 96 100 102
Saudi Arabia 9	618 16	524 22	148 24	217 24	919 4	161 3	218 2	180 1	925 1	844
Senegal 5	539 7	345 9	395 10	095 10	339 4	468 5	642 6	929 7	345 7	488
Serbia and Montenegro 10	556 10	527 10	519 2	107 1	847 1	768
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia 21	431 23	089 6	995 4	809
Seychelles 64 71 79 81 82 54 58 62 63 63
Sierra leone 3	239 4	044 4	427 4	971 5	168 2	263 2	724 2	753 3	011 3	103
Singapore 2	417 3	019 4	013 4	253 4	315 38 12 6 5 5
Slovakia 5	391 5	402 5	407 0 0 487 450 438
Slovenia 1	990 1	984 1	982 0 0 38 27 25
Solomon Islands 229 319 437 477 491 182 244 320 344 352
Somalia 6	430 7	147 5	036 5	381
South Africa 29	151 36	857 43	976 45	026 45	214 7	310 7	227 6	251 5	789 5	621
Spain 37	521 39	297 40	744 41	060 41	128 6	933 4	650 2	982 2	593 2	472
Sri lanka 14	543 16	824 18	595 19	065 19	218 7	628 8	274 8	607 8	656 8	668
Sudan 19	400 24	946 31	443 33	610 34	333 14	029 17	287 19	194 19	605 19	708
Suriname 356 401 425 436 439 84 85 81 80 80
Swaziland 597 846 1	043 1	077 1	083 302 336 355 347 343
Sweden 8	308 8	560 8	857 8	876 8	886 573 424 313 284 275
Switzerland 6	324 6	835 7	173 7	169 7	164 603 579 469 434 422
Syrian Arab Republic 8	965 12	715 16	562 17	800 18	223 3	536 4	252 4	632 4	737 4	771
Tajikistan 6	087 6	245 6	298 2	055 1	985 1	961
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Countries
Total population
(Thousands)
Agricultural population
(Thousands)
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Thailand 46	328 54	385 60	929 62	833 63	465 29	839 30	926 29	833 29	269 29	060
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 2	024 2	056 2	066 260 224 213
Togo 2	523 3	453 4	558 4	909 5	017 1	736 2	260 2	721 2	842 2	873
Tonga 97 99 101 104 105 47 42 35 33 33
Trinidad and Tobago 1	082 1	216 1	289 1	303 1	307 121 134 112 106 103
Tunisia 6	470 8	205 9	518 9	832 9	937 2	513 2	334 2	344 2	311 2	299
Turkey 46	144 57	589 68	279 71	325 72	320 20	392 21	490 21	008 20	630 20	484
Turkmenistan 4	642 4	867 4	940 1	548 1	567 1	572
Uganda 12	468 17	358 23	500 25	827 26	699 10	757 14	502 18	567 20	003 20	533
Ukraine 49	692 48	523 48	151 7	914 7	019 6	748
United Arab Emirates 1	015 2	035 2	820 2	995 3	051 49 155 137 126 122
United Kingdom 55	732 56	974 58	906 59	470 59	648 1	453 1	232 1	049 1	001 986
United Republic of 
Tanzania 18	849 26	087 34	832 36	977 37	671 15	854 21	502 27	240 28	384 28	729
United States of 
America 231	440 255	750 285	001 294	043 297	043 8	556 7	662 6	305 5	944 5	828
Uruguay 2	914 3	106 3	342 3	415 3	439 431 392 374 369 368
Uzbekistan 24	909 26	093 26	479 6	888 6	697 6	626
vanuatu 117 150 197 212 217 58 65 72 74 74
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 15	082 19	500 24	276 25	699 26	170 2	592 2	713 2	310 2	174 2	129
viet nam 53	023 66	073 78	147 81	377 82	481 38	798 47	029 52	617 53	797 54	185
yemen 8	146 11	967 18	029 20	010 20	733 5	776 7	189 9	087 9	482 9	610
Zambia 5	980 8	200 10	411 10	812 10	924 4	543 6	094 7	211 7	302 7	313
Zimbabwe 7	234 10	459 12	639 12	891 12	932 5	236 7	124 7	925 7	844 7	787
World 4 435 172 5 263 049 6 070 378 6 301 463 6 377 646 2 219 655 2 442 413 2 573 143 2 594 704 2 600 301
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land area
(Thousand ha)
Arable land
(Thousand ha)
Permanent crops
(Thousand ha)
Pastures
(Thousand ha)
Countries 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Afghanistan 65	209 7	910 7	910 139 130 30	000 30	000
Albania 2	740 585 579 578 117 125 121 416 417 445
Algeria 238	174 6	875 7	081 7	662 634 554 530 36	321 31	041 31	829
American 
Samoa 20 2 2 2 2 2 3 0 0 0
Angola 124	670 2	900 2	900 3	000 500 500 300 54	000 54	004 54	000
Antigua and 
barbuda 44 8 8 8 1 2 2 3 4 4
Argentina 273	669 26	000 26	400 27	800 981 1	020 1	000 101	040 99	968 99	867
Armenia 2	820 495 65 835
Australia 768	230 44	031 47	900 50	304 155 181 296 438	740 416	400 404	900
Austria 8	245 1	536 1	426 1	399 99 79 71 2	040 1	995 1	920
Azerbaijan 8	260 1	760 240 2	562
bahamas 1	001 7 8 7 2 2 4 2 2 2
bahrain 71 2 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4
bangladesh 13	017 8	892 9	137 8	084 266 300 400 600 600 600
barbados 43 16 16 16 1 1 1 2 2 2
belarus 20	748 6	133 124 2	995
belgium 3	023 862 21 507
belize 2	281 45 52 64 7 25 35 44 49 50
benin 11	062 1	500 1	615 2	380 85 105 265 442 550 550
bhutan 4	700 104 113 140 18 19 20 265 300 415
bolivia 108	438 1	943 2	100 2	928 119 155 203 31	500 33	200 33	831
bosnia and 
Herzegovina 5	120 1	000 100 1	030
botswana 56	673 402 418 377 2 3 3 25	600 25	600 25	600
brazil 845	942 45	000 50	681 57	640 7	864 6	727 7	560 171	414 184	200 196	206
brunei 
Darussalam 527 3 3 9 5 4 4 6 6 6
bulgaria 11	063 3	827 3	856 3	526 350 300 252 2	004 2	003 1	804
burkina Faso 27	360 2	745 3	520 4	040 40 55 60 6	000 6	000 6	000
burundi 2	568 930 930 960 320 360 360 900 835 950
Cambodia 17	652 2	000 3	695 3	700 70 100 107 580 1	554 1	500
Cameroon 46	540 5	910 5	940 5	960 1	020 1	230 1	200 2	000 2	000 2	000
Canada 909	351 44	723 45	504 45	810 5	752 6	361 6	368 15	921 15	903 15	435
Cape verde 403 38 41 44 2 2 3 25 25 25
Central African 
Republic 62	298 1	870 1	920 1	930 75 86 94 3	000 3	000 3	125
Chad 125	920 3	137 3	273 3	520 13 27 30 45	000 45	000 45	000
Chile 74	880 3	836 2	802 1	979 214 247 318 12	800 12	850 12	935
China 932	742 96	924 123	678 137	124 3	295 7	719 11	533 334	001 400	001 400	001
Colombia 103	870 3	712 3	305 2	818 1	480 1	695 1	727 40	100 40	083 40	920
Comoros 223 75 78 80 20 35 50 15 15 15
Congo 226	705 488 479 490 37 42 50 10	000 10	000 10	000
Costa Rica 5	106 283 260 225 223 250 300 2	010 2	330 2	340
TABLE	A2
land use
S T A T I S T I C A l  A n n E x 1
land area
(Thousand ha)
Arable land
(Thousand ha)
Permanent crops
(Thousand ha)
Pastures
(Thousand ha)
Countries 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Côte d’Ivoire 31	800 1	955 2	430 3	100 2	300 3	500 3	700 13	000 13	000 13	000
Croatia 5	592 1	458 128 1	570
Cuba 10	982 2	630 3	031 3	224 700 810 780 2	607 2	900 2	550
Cyprus 924 103 106 98 65 51 42 5 5 4
Czech Republic 7	727 3	082 236 961
former 
Czechoslovakia 5	035 4	964 134 131 1	682 1	641
Democratic 
People’s 
Republic of 
Korea
12	041 2	285 2	288 2	600 180 180 200 50 50 50
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
34	150 6	620 6	670 6	700 980 1	190 1	100 15	000 15	000 15	000
Denmark 4	243 2	639 2	561 2	281 14 10 8 252 217 358
Dominica 75 7 5 5 10 11 14 2 2 2
Dominican 
Republic 4	838 1	070 1	050 1	096 350 450 500 2	092 2	090 2	100
Ecuador 27	684 1	542 1	604 1	616 920 1	321 1	363 4	016 4	921 5	087
Egypt 99	545 2	286 2	284 2	801 159 364 490 0 0 0
El Salvador 2	072 558 550 640 242 260 250 610 640 794
Equatorial 
Guinea 2	805 130 130 130 100 100 100 104 104 104
Eritrea 10	100 560 3 6	967
Estonia 4	239 843 12 131
Ethiopia 100	000 10	000 695 20	000
former People’s 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Ethiopia
13	000 10	750 715 662 45	400 44	900
Fiji 1	827 90 160 200 80 80 85 120 170 175
Finland 30	459 2	369 2	269 2	183 3 6 9 164 122 26
France 55	010 17	472 17	999 18	440 1	400 1	191 1	142 12	850 11	380 10	124
French 
Polynesia 366 2 2 3 22 21 20 20 20 20
Gabon 25	767 290 295 325 162 162 170 4	700 4	700 4	665
Gambia 1	000 155 182 285 4 5 5 400 450 459
Georgia 6	949 793 269 1	938
Germany 34	895 12	030 11	971 11	804 500 443 216 5	989 5	618 5	048
Ghana 22	754 1	900 2	700 3	950 1	700 1	500 2	150 8	400 8	405 8	350
Greece 12	890 2	903 2	899 2	741 1	022 1	068 1	113 5	255 5	255 4	675
Guatemala 10	843 1	270 1	300 1	395 480 485 570 1	300 2	500 2	602
Guinea 24	572 702 728 975 440 500 625 10	700 10	788 10	700
Guinea-bissau 2	812 255 300 300 48 117 248 1	080 1	080 1	080
Guyana 19	685 480 480 480 15 22 30 1	220 1	230 1	230
Haiti 2	756 780 780 780 320 320 320 500 497 490
Honduras 11	189 1	484 1	462 1	068 273 358 359 1	500 1	500 1	508
Hungary 9	211 5	027 5	054 4	602 306 234 201 1	294 1	186 1	051
TABLE	A2	(cont.)
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 71
land area
(Thousand ha)
Arable land
(Thousand ha)
Permanent crops
(Thousand ha)
Pastures
(Thousand ha)
Countries 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Iceland 10	025 8 7 7 2	274 2	274 2	274
India 297	319 162	955 162	788 160	555 5	300 6	650 9	200 12	100 11	602 11	040
Indonesia 181	157 18	000 20	253 20	500 8	000 11	720 13	100 12	000 13	110 11	177
Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) 163	620 12	981 15	190 14	324 732 1	310 2	002 44	000 44	000 44	000
Iraq 43	737 5	250 5	300 189 290 4	000 4	000
Ireland 6	889 1	108 1	041 1	077 2 3 2 4	617 4	605 3	333
Israel 2	171 325 343 338 88 88 86 120 148 142
Italy 29	411 9	483 9	012 8	479 2	953 2	960 2	805 5	126 4	868 4	353
Jamaica 1	083 135 119 174 105 100 110 257 257 229
Japan 36	450 4	874 4	768 4	474 587 475 356 600 450 428
Jordan 8	824 299 290 242 38 90 157 790 791 791
Kazakhstan 269	970 21	535 136 185	098
Kenya 56	914 3	800 4	200 4	500 480 500 560 21	300 21	300 21	300
Kuwait 1	782 1 4 10 0 1 2 134 136 136
Kyrgyzstan 19	180 1	335 55 9	291
lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
23	080 780 799 877 26 61 81 800 800 878
latvia 6	205 1	845 29 611
lebanon 1	023 210 183 190 91 122 142 10 12 16
lesotho 3	035 292 317 330 4 4 4 2	000 2	000 2	000
liberia 9	632 371 400 380 205 215 215 2	000 1	993 2	000
libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 175	954 1	753 1	805 1	815 327 350 335 13	000 13	300 13	300
lithuania 6	268 2	933 59 497
luxembourg 259 62 1 65
Madagascar 58	154 2	540 2	720 2	900 500 605 600 24	000 24	000 24	000
Malawi 9	408 1	518 1	815 2	100 82 115 140 1	840 1	840 1	850
Malaysia 32	855 1	000 1	700 1	820 3	800 5	248 5	785 259 276 285
Mali 122	019 2	010 2	053 4	634 40 40 40 30	000 30	000 30	000
Malta 32 12 12 8 1 1 1
Mauritania 102	522 210 400 488 4 6 12 39	250 39	250 39	250
Mauritius 203 100 100 100 7 6 6 7 7 7
Mexico 190	869 23	000 24	000 24	800 1	530 1	900 2	500 74	499 77	500 80	000
Moldova 3	288 1	821 335 388
Mongolia 156	650 1	182 1	370 1	174 1 2 123	405 124	285 129	294
Morocco 44	630 7	530 8	707 8	767 500 736 885 20	900 20	900 21	000
Mozambique 78	409 2	870 3	450 3	900 230 230 235 44	000 44	000 44	000
Myanmar 65	755 9	573 9	567 9	909 449 502 589 363 359 314
namibia 82	329 655 660 816 2 2 4 38	000 38	000 38	000
nepal 14	300 2	270 2	287 2	324 29 66 105 1	890 1	800 1	757
netherlands 3	388 790 879 910 32 30 34 1	198 1	097 1	012
new Caledonia 1	828 7 9 6 8 6 4 250 217 234
new Zealand 26	799 2	616 2	511 1	500 914 1	354 1	841 14	156 13	490 13	863
TABLE	A2	(cont.)
S T A T I S T I C A l  A n n E x 1
land area
(Thousand ha)
Arable land
(Thousand ha)
Permanent crops
(Thousand ha)
Pastures
(Thousand ha)
Countries 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
nicaragua 12	140 1	070 1	300 1	917 175 195 234 4	815 4	815 4	815
niger 126	670 10	212 11	036 14	483 8 11 17 20	500 22	000 23	000
nigeria 91	077 27	850 29	539 28	200 2	535 2	535 2	650 40	000 40	000 39	200
norway 30	625 817 864 883 119 112 157
occupied 
Palestinian 
Territory
602 104 111 111 113 115 120 158 151 150
oman 30	950 23 35 38 28 45 42 1	000 1	000 1	000
Pakistan 77	088 19	994 20	484 21	302 306 456 658 5	000 5	000 5	000
Panama 7	443 435 499 540 120 155 148 1	300 1	470 1	500
Papua new 
Guinea 45	286 167 192 205 495 580 650 110 135 175
Paraguay 39	730 1	620 2	110 2	850 115 89 88 15	800 21	100 21	700
Peru 128	000 3	220 3	500 3	700 330 420 585 15	129 17	916 16	900
Philippines 29	817 5	228 5	480 5	650 4	400 4	400 5	000 997 1	260 1	500
Poland 30	436 14	621 14	388 13	993 340 345 337 4	046 4	060 4	083
Portugal 9	150 2	423 2	344 1	800 718 781 715 838 838 1	437
Qatar 1	100 4 10 18 1 1 3 50 50 50
Republic of 
Korea 9	873 2	060 1	953 1	718 136 156 200 51 70 55
Romania 22	971 9	834 9	450 9	381 663 591 527 4	467 4	728 4	949
Russian 
Federation 1	638	134 124	374 1	864 90	924
former Union 
of Soviet 
Socialist 
Republics
226	417 224	400 5	100 4	520 321	800 327	300
Rwanda 2	467 760 880 900 255 305 250 700 694 520
Saint Kitts and 
nevis 36 8 8 7 6 2 1 1 2 2
Saint lucia 61 5 5 4 12 13 14 3 3 2
Saint vincent 
and the 
Grenadines
39 5 5 7 5 7 7 2 2 2
Samoa 283 55 55 59 67 67 68 1 1 2
Sao Tome and 
Principe 96 1 2 6 35 39 45 1 1 1
Saudi Arabia 214	969 1	890 3	390 3	592 72 91 193 85	000 120	000 170	000
Senegal 19	253 2	341 2	325 2	355 9 25 45 5	700 5	744 5	650
Serbia and 
Montenegro 10	200 3	406 330 1	851
former Socialist 
Federal 
Republic of 
yugoslavia
7	153 7	020 731 718 6	401 6	346
Seychelles 46 1 1 1 4 5 6
Sierra leone 7	162 450 486 490 49 54 60 2	204 2	204 2	200
Singapore 67 2 1 1 6 1 1
Slovakia 4	808 1	450 126 865
Slovenia 2	014 173 31 314
TABLE	A2	(cont.)
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 71
land area
(Thousand ha)
Arable land
(Thousand ha)
Permanent crops
(Thousand ha)
Pastures
(Thousand ha)
Countries 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Solomon 
Islands 2	799 12 17 18 42 52 56 39 39 40
Somalia 62	734 984 1	022 16 20 43	000 43	000
South Africa 121	447 12	440 13	440 14	753 814 860 959 81	420 82	500 83	928
Spain 49	900 15	558 15	335 13	400 4	941 4	837 4	904 10	739 10	300 11	462
Sri lanka 6	463 850 875 895 1	030 1	025 1	015 439 439 440
Sudan 237	600 12	360 13	000 16	233 100 235 420 98	000 110	000 117	180
Suriname 15	600 40 57 57 9 11 10 20 20 21
Swaziland 1	720 183 180 178 6 12 13 1	102 1	076 1	200
Sweden 41	033 2	979 2	845 2	706 4 4 3 725 568 447
Switzerland 4	000 391 391 413 20 21 24 1	609 1	609 1	095
Syrian Arab 
Republic 18	378 5	230 4	885 4	542 454 741 810 8	378 7	869 8	359
Tajikistan 13	996 930 128 3	254
Thailand 51	089 16	515 17	494 15	865 1	783 3	109 3	380 640 780 800
The former 
yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia
2	543 555 44 636
Togo 5	439 1	950 2	100 2	510 85 90 120 1	000 1	000 1	000
Tonga 72 16 16 15 14 12 11 4 4 4
Trinidad and 
Tobago 513 70 74 75 46 46 47 11 11 11
Tunisia 15	536 3	191 2	909 2	864 1	510 1	942 2	126 3	999 3	793 4	561
Turkey 76	963 25	354 24	647 23	826 3	125 3	030 2	553 10	100 12	000 12	378
Turkmenistan 46	993 1	850 65 30	700
Uganda 19	710 4	080 5	000 5	060 1	600 1	850 2	100 5	000 5	112 5	112
Ukraine 57	935 32	564 932 7	910
United Arab 
Emirates 8	360 16 35 60 7 20 187 200 230 305
United 
Kingdom 24	193 6	918 6	620 5	876 78 66 52 11	473 11	517 11	036
United 
Republic of 
Tanzania
88	359 3	100 3	500 4	000 900 900 1	000 43	000 43	000 43	000
United States 
of America 915	896 188	755 185	742 176	018 1	869 2	034 2	050 237	539 239	172 234	000
Uruguay 17	502 1	403 1	260 1	373 46 45 42 13	632 13	520 13	543
Uzbekistan 42	540 4	475 350 22	800
vanuatu 1	219 18 20 20 85 85 85 25 35 42
venezuela 
(bolivarian 
Republic of)
88	205 2	957 2	832 2	595 713 778 810 17	350 18	250 18	240
viet nam 32	549 5	940 5	339 6	200 630 1	045 1	938 288 342 642
yemen 52	797 1	366 1	523 1	545 97 103 124 16	065 16	065 16	065
Zambia 74	339 5	094 5	249 5	260 14 19 27 30	000 30	000 30	000
Zimbabwe 38	685 2	505 2	890 3	220 100 120 130 17	100 17	163 17	200
World 13 004 202 1 345 989 1 395 973 1 397 656 102 020 119 883 135 821 3 244 404 3 368 403 3 442 078
TABLE	A2	(cont.)
S T A T I S T I C A l  A n n E x 1
Share in total water use
(Percentage)
Irrigated land
(Thousand ha)
Agricultural Industrial Domestic 
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2002 2003Countries 2000 2000 2000
Afghanistan 2	505 2	720
Albania 62.0 11.1 26.9 372 415 340 346 353
Algeria 64.9 13.2 21.9 258 444 568 569 569
American Samoa
Angola 60.0 17.1 22.9 80 80 80 80 80
Antigua and barbuda
Argentina 73.7 9.5 16.8 1	550 1	550 1	550 1	550 1	550
Armenia 65.8 4.4 29.8 286 286 286
Australia 75.3 10.0 14.7 1	548 1	892 2	367 2	545 2	545
Austria 0.9 64.0 35.1 4 4 4 4 4
Azerbaijan 67.5 27.7 4.8 1	455 1	455 1	455
bahamas 1 1 1 1 1
bahrain 56.7 3.3 40.0 1 2 4 4 4
bangladesh 96.2 0.7 3.2 1	512 2	851 4	198 4	597 4	725
barbados 22.2 44.4 33.3 1 5 5 5 5
belarus 30.1 46.6 23.3 131 131 131
belgium 40 40 40
belize 20.0 73.3 6.7 1 2 3 3 3
benin 45.4 23.1 31.5 9 10 12 12 12
bhutan 94.1 1.2 4.7 27 39 40 40 40
bolivia 80.6 6.9 12.5 137 123 130 132 132
bosnia and Herzegovina 3 3 3
botswana 41.2 18.0 40.7 2 1 1 1 1
brazil 61.8 18.0 20.3 1	600 2	650 2	903 2	920 2	920
brunei Darussalam 1 1 1 1 1
bulgaria 18.8 78.2 3.0 1	189 1	251 624 592 588
burkina Faso 86.3 0.8 13.0 10 19 25 25 25
burundi 77.1 5.9 17.0 14 15 21 21 21
Cambodia 98.0 0.5 1.5 120 240 270 270 270
Cameroon 73.7 8.1 18.2 15 23 26 26 26
Canada 11.8 68.7 19.6 595 721 773 785 785
Cape verde 2 3 3 3 3
Central African Republic 4.0 16.0 80.0 0 1 2 2
Chad 82.6 17.4 13 16 26 30 30
Chile 63.5 25.2 11.3 1	255 1	600 1	900 1	900 1	900
China 67.7 25.7 6.6 45	304 47	234 54	324 54	937 54	596
Colombia 45.9 3.7 50.3 400 650 900 900 900
Comoros 47.0 5.0 48.0
Congo 8.7 21.7 69.6 1 1 2 2 2
Costa Rica 53.4 17.2 29.5 61 77 108 108 108
Côte d’Ivoire 64.5 11.8 23.7 44 66 73 73 73
Croatia 3 5 11
TABLE	A3
Water use and irrigated land
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 710
Share in total water use
(Percentage)
Irrigated land
(Thousand ha)
Agricultural Industrial Domestic 
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2002 2003Countries 2000 2000 2000
Cuba 68.8 12.2 19.0 765 892 870 870 870
Cyprus 70.8 0.0 29.2 30 36 40 40 40
Czech Republic 2.3 57.0 40.7 24 24 24
former Czechoslovakia 137 244
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 55.0 25.2 19.8 1	120 1	420 1	460 1	460 1	460
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 30.6 16.7 52.8 6 10 11 11 11
Denmark 42.5 25.2 32.3 384 432 447 448 449
Dominica
Dominican Republic 66.1 1.8 32.2 165 225 273 275 275
Ecuador 82.2 5.3 12.5 620 817 865 865 865
Egypt 86.4 5.9 7.8 2	453 2	621 3	310 3	422 3	422
El Salvador 59.4 15.6 25.0 36 40 45 45 45
Equatorial Guinea 0.9 15.7 83.3
Eritrea 94.5 0.2 5.3 21 21 21
Estonia 5.1 38.0 57.0 4 4 4
Ethiopia 93.6 0.4 6.0 290 290 290
former People’s 
Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia
160 162
Fiji 71.4 14.3 14.3 1 1 3 3 3
Finland 2.7 83.6 13.7 60 63 64 64 64
France 9.8 74.5 15.7 1	369 1	980 2	628 2	600 2	600
French Polynesia 1 1 1 1
Gabon 41.7 8.3 50.0 4 5 7 7 7
Gambia 65.4 11.8 22.9 1 1 2 2 2
Georgia 59.0 21.1 19.9 469 469 469
Germany 19.8 67.9 12.3 460 481 485 485 485
Ghana 66.4 9.7 23.9 20 28 31 31 31
Greece 80.4 3.2 16.3 950 1	200 1	441 1	431 1	453
Guatemala 80.1 13.4 6.5 87 117 130 130 130
Guinea 90.1 2.0 7.9 90 90 95 95 95
Guinea-bissau 82.3 4.6 13.1 17 17 24 25 25
Guyana 97.6 0.6 1.8 124 143 150 150 150
Haiti 93.9 1.0 5.1 70 84 92 92 92
Honduras 80.2 11.6 8.1 66 70 79 80 80
Hungary 32.1 58.6 9.3 190 201 223 230 230
Iceland 0.1 66.6 33.3
India 86.5 5.5 8.1 38	448 46	760 55	983 55	983 55	808
Indonesia 91.3 0.7 8.0 4	080 4	402 4	477 4	500 4	500
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 90.9 2.3 6.8 5	181 7	000 7	576 7	600 7	650
Iraq 1	743 3	200
TABLE	A3	(cont.)
S T A T I S T I C A l  A n n E x 11
Share in total water use
(Percentage)
Irrigated land
(Thousand ha)
Agricultural Industrial Domestic 
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2002 2003Countries 2000 2000 2000
Ireland 0.0 77.0 23.0
Israel 62.4 6.8 30.7 204 202 194 194 194
Italy 45.1 36.7 18.2 2	400 2	615 2	699 2	750 2	750
Jamaica 48.8 17.1 34.1 24 25 25 25 25
Japan 62.5 17.9 19.7 3	056 2	846 2	641 2	607 2	592
Jordan 65.0 4.0 31.0 37 63 75 75 75
Kazakhstan 81.8 16.5 1.7 3	556 3	556 3	556
Kenya 63.9 6.3 29.7 40 55 85 90 103
Kuwait 52.3 2.3 45.5 1 3 10 13 13
Kyrgyzstan 93.8 3.1 3.2 1	072 1	072 1	072
lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 90.0 5.7 4.3 107 135 174 175 175
latvia 13.3 33.3 53.3 20 20 20
lebanon 66.7 0.7 32.6 86 86 104 104 104
lesotho 20.0 40.0 40.0 1 2 3 3 3
liberia 54.5 18.2 27.3 2 3 3 3 3
libyan Arab Jamahiriya 83.0 2.9 14.1 223 435 470 470 470
lithuania 7.4 14.8 77.8 7 7 7
luxembourg
Madagascar 95.7 1.5 2.8 646 1	000 1	086 1	086 1	086
Malawi 80.2 5.0 14.9 18 20 52 56 56
Malaysia 62.1 21.1 16.9 322 343 365 365 365
Mali 90.1 0.9 9.0 60 78 224 236 236
Malta 19.8 1.0 79.2 1 1 2 2 2
Mauritania 88.2 2.9 8.8 49 49 49 49 49
Mauritius 67.7 2.8 29.5 16 17 20 21 22
Mexico 77.1 5.5 17.4 4	980 5	600 6	300 6	320 6	320
Moldova 32.9 57.6 9.5 303 300 300
Mongolia 52.3 27.3 20.5 36 78 84 84 84
Morocco 87.4 2.9 9.8 1	208 1	258 1	397 1	445 1	445
Mozambique 87.3 1.6 11.1 65 103 115 118 118
Myanmar 98.2 0.5 1.2 1	041 1	026 1	814 1	985 1	870
namibia 71.0 4.7 24.3 4 4 7 8 8
nepal 96.5 0.6 2.9 521 984 1	146 1	170 1	170
netherlands 33.9 59.9 6.2 480 554 565 565 565
new Caledonia 2 4 9 10 10
new Zealand 42.2 9.5 48.3 183 281 285 285 285
nicaragua 83.1 2.3 14.6 60 60 61 61 61
niger 95.4 0.5 4.1 23 66 72 73 73
nigeria 68.8 10.1 21.1 200 221 245 270 282
norway 10.5 66.7 22.8 74 97 127 127 127
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 19 18 16 16 15
TABLE	A3	(cont.)
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 712
Share in total water use
(Percentage)
Irrigated land
(Thousand ha)
Agricultural Industrial Domestic 
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2002 2003Countries 2000 2000 2000
oman 90.4 2.2 7.4 38 57 69 72 72
Pakistan 96.0 2.0 1.9 14	753 16	107 17	953 17	990 18	230
Panama 28.0 4.9 67.1 28 31 42 43 43
Papua new Guinea 1.4 42.3 56.3
Paraguay 71.4 8.2 20.4 58 65 67 67 67
Peru 81.6 10.1 8.3 1	143 1	188 1	199 1	200 1	200
Philippines 74.0 9.4 16.6 1	218 1	547 1	550 1	550 1	550
Poland 8.3 78.7 13.0 105 100 100 100 100
Portugal 78.2 12.2 9.6 630 631 650 650 650
Qatar 72.4 3.4 24.1 3 6 13 13 13
Republic of Korea 48.0 16.4 35.6 889 987 880 880 878
Romania 57.0 34.4 8.6 2	301 3	124 3	082 3	077 3	077
Russian Federation 17.8 63.5 18.8 4	600 4	600 4	600
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 17	410 20	800
Rwanda 68.0 8.0 24.0 4 4 9 9 9
Saint Kitts and nevis
Saint lucia 1 2 3 3 3
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 1 1 1 1 1
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe 10 10 10 10 10
Saudi Arabia 89.0 1.2 9.8 567 1	583 1	620 1	620 1	620
Senegal 93.0 2.6 4.4 62 85 104 120 120
Serbia and Montenegro 23 32 32
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia 150 161
Seychelles 7.4 27.6 65.0
Sierra leone 92.1 2.6 5.3 20 28 30 30 30
Singapore
Slovakia 181 183 183
Slovenia 3 3 3
Solomon Islands
Somalia 133 200
South Africa 62.7 6.0 31.2 1	119 1	200 1	498 1	498 1	498
Spain 68.0 18.5 13.4 3	028 3	387 3	719 3	780 3	780
Sri lanka 95.2 2.5 2.4 462 522 641 638 743
Sudan 96.7 0.7 2.7 1	700 1	817 1	865 1	863 1	863
Suriname 92.5 3.0 4.5 42 46 51 51 51
Swaziland 96.5 1.2 2.3 40 45 50 50 50
Sweden 8.8 54.4 36.8 70 114 115 115 115
Switzerland 1.9 73.9 24.1 25 25 25 25 25
Syrian Arab Republic 94.9 1.8 3.3 548 717 1	221 1	333 1	333
TABLE	A3	(cont.)
S T A T I S T I C A l  A n n E x 1
Share in total water use
(Percentage)
Irrigated land
(Thousand ha)
Agricultural Industrial Domestic 
1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2002 2003Countries 2000 2000 2000
Tajikistan 91.6 4.7 3.7 719 721 722
Thailand 95.0 2.5 2.5 3	007 4	248 4	973 4	986 4	986
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 55 55 55
Togo 45.0 2.4 52.6 1 7 7 7 7
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago 6.5 25.8 67.7 3 4 4 4 4
Tunisia 82.0 4.2 13.8 232 328 393 394 394
Turkey 74.2 11.0 14.8 2	712 4	024 4	743 5	215 5	215
Turkmenistan 97.5 0.8 1.7 1	800 1	800 1	800
Uganda 40.0 16.7 43.3 6 9 9 9 9
Ukraine 52.5 35.4 12.2 2	393 2	262 2	208
United Arab Emirates 68.3 8.7 23.0
United Kingdom 2.9 75.4 21.7 140 162 170 170 170
United Republic of 
Tanzania 89.4 0.5 10.1 117 144 163 184 184
United States of America 41.3 46.0 12.7 20	582 20	800 22	543 22	384 22	385
Uruguay 96.2 1.3 2.5 77 125 188 202 210
Uzbekistan 93.2 2.1 4.7 4	281 4	281 4	281
vanuatu
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 47.4 7.0 45.5 367 472 575 575 575
viet nam 68.1 24.1 7.8 1	685 2	867 3	000 3	000 3	000
yemen 95.3 0.6 4.1 291 354 497 500 550
Zambia 75.9 7.5 16.7 19 30 133 156 156
Zimbabwe 78.9 7.1 14.0 80 106 174 174 174
World 70.0 20.0 10.0 209 657 244 196 275 090 277 247 277 098
TABLE	A3	(cont.)
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Cereals 
(Thousand tonnes)
Meat
(Thousand tonnes)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Afghanistan 4	060 2	754 240 238
Albania 916 792 522 489 499 42 51 66 75 76
Algeria 1	958 2	481 1	872 4	266 3	998 185 436 546 564 581
American Samoa 0 0 0 0 0
Angola 371 298 546 721 725 81 99 139 139 139
Antigua and barbuda 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Argentina 24	579 19	988 36	569 33	961 34	212 3	703 3	539 4	001 3	762 4	175
Armenia 294 305 443 49 53 54
Australia 21	150 21	390 36	232 41	652 31	520 2	752 3	009 3	743 3	852 3	769
Austria 4	388 5	115 4	711 3	996 5	009 720 842 971 998 987
Azerbaijan 1	507 1	993 2	087 109 134 144
bahamas 1 1 0 0 0 7 6 8 8 8
bahrain 7 10 14 13 13
bangladesh 20	983 27	987 37	960 40	876 41	044 241 305 428 449 449
barbados 2 2 0 0 0 12 15 15 14 16
belarus 4	283 5	116 6	589 625 605 629
belgium 2	436 2	561 2	932 1	754 1	740 1	821
belize 27 33 56 56 49 4 7 11 17 18
benin 366 566 970 1	043 1	109 41 43 46 49 54
bhutan 159 102 126 108 127 5 7 7 7 7
bolivia 663 845 1	221 1	486 1	341 209 263 405 440 446
bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1	146 792 1	439 35 32 35
botswana 37 61 23 38 45 50 59 58 53 54
brazil 30	805 37	702 50	148 67	453 63	812 5	224 8	228 15	332 18	388 19	919
brunei Darussalam 3 1 0 1 1 5 6 16 18 19
bulgaria 8	129 8	872 5	231 3	831 7	463 659 740 482 401 414
burkina Faso 1	166 1	975 2	698 3	564 2	902 53 111 176 202 212
burundi 219 296 261 287 280 21 29 23 23 23
Cambodia 1	334 2	591 4	201 5	026 4	427 27 120 193 210 214
Cameroon 866 890 1	272 1	584 1	684 115 175 214 219 219
Canada 42	727 52	917 49	502 50	174 52	684 2	514 2	799 4	006 4	217 4	592
Cape verde 6 10 27 12 4 2 5 8 8 9
Central African 
Republic 103 101 170 201 192 46 74 110 124 127
Chad 508 677 1	161 1	618 1	213 61 98 117 122 125
Chile 1	742 2	997 2	624 3	693 3	956 356 507 955 1	041 1	126
China 286	488 390	171 420	308 376	123 413	166 14	526 30	644 62	833 71	155 74	306
Colombia 3	339 4	090 3	668 4	062 4	409 829 1	186 1	377 1	494 1	587
Comoros 18 19 21 21 21 2 2 2 2 2
Congo 15 11 8 9 9 18 21 27 28 31
Costa Rica 337 266 292 229 234 100 148 187 182 190
Côte d’Ivoire 866 1	225 2	019 1	808 2	205 118 125 162 170 171
Croatia 3	017 2	355 3	268 130 147 149
TABLE	A4
Production of cereals and meat
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TABLE	A4	(cont.)
Cereals 
(Thousand tonnes)
Meat
(Thousand tonnes)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Cuba 551 547 841 1	076 888 272 316 230 194 200
Cyprus 87 107 101 142 107 35 65 102 108 109
Czech Republic 6	914 5	762 8	783 800 771 750
former Czechoslovakia 9	762 12	228 1	413 1	562
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 6	004 7	201 3	554 4	324 4	461 236 320 203 242 246
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 900 1	471 1	624 1	569 1	570 173 204 217 212 211
Denmark 7	346 9	211 9	203 9	051 8	963 1	303 1	559 2	027 2	114 2	158
Dominica 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Dominican Republic 450 531 662 656 620 124 221 329 298 328
Ecuador 686 1	422 1	800 1	967 2	128 168 255 491 579 591
Egypt 8	134 12	672 19	356 20	682 21	315 440 754 1	315 1	371 1	437
El Salvador 719 785 798 791 822 57 72 111 117 127
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 1 1 1
Eritrea 207 99 83 30 32 32
Estonia 552 506 608 57 68 71
Ethiopia 8	654 8	720 9	280 529 597 593
former People’s 
Democratic Republic  
of Ethiopia
5	739 5	894 528 599
Fiji 19 30 16 17 16 13 20 22 26 27
Finland 2	993 3	845 3	548 3	788 3	616 305 340 339 376 382
France 46	078 57	683 63	426 54	940 70	534 5	423 5	767 6	538 6	408 6	255
French Polynesia 2 2 2 2 2
Gabon 11 23 27 32 32 24 27 31 31 32
Gambia 69 99 176 204 213 6 6 6 7 7
Georgia 631 742 663 104 109 109
Germany 32	044 37	910 46	473 39	426 51	097 6	925 6	987 6	377 6	602 6	798
Ghana 726 1	155 1	674 2	041 1	943 111 143 160 172 177
Greece 4	951 5	491 4	828 4	535 5	040 525 528 496 463 478
Guatemala 1	122 1	413 1	165 1	147 1	172 108 147 231 248 248
Guinea 678 632 1	015 1	161 1	142 22 26 49 53 56
Guinea-bissau 102 165 162 121 171 11 14 18 19 19
Guyana 267 214 505 506 506 14 6 15 27 27
Haiti 419 405 423 398 367 65 59 90 101 100
Honduras 492 664 591 587 108 81 86 136 187 202
Hungary 13	001 14	603 12	158 8	770 16	737 1	425 1	547 1	125 1	200 1	047
Iceland 26 19 24 27 26
India 138	182 195	478 238	012 233	406 232	360 2	620 3	881 5	272 5	941 6	032
Indonesia 33	605 51	258 60	484 63	024 65	314 676 1	446 1	722 2	223 2	392
Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 8	855 12	973 14	002 20	930 21	810 647 986 1	558 1	621 1	646
Iraq 1	803 2	541 149 233
Ireland 2	009 1	950 2	117 2	147 2	501 629 831 1	056 976 979
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 71
Cereals 
(Thousand tonnes)
Meat
(Thousand tonnes)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Israel 239 331 182 324 294 186 236 460 560 576
Italy 18	025 17	921 20	588 17	864 23	267 3	514 3	924 4	127 4	020 4	079
Jamaica 7 3 2 1 1 52 71 100 103 103
Japan 14	318 13	946 12	444 10	826 11	990 3	002 3	499 2	983 3	019 3	028
Jordan 88 105 44 80 53 34 65 126 125 132
Kazakhstan 13	885 14	739 12	334 637 693 737
Kenya 2	279 2	958 2	921 3	351 2	730 280 370 448 483 497
Kuwait 0 1 3 3 3 40 42 74 71 75
Kyrgyzstan 1	654 1	633 1	709 197 194 188
lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 1	056 1	443 2	321 2	518 2	733 30 45 78 94 87
latvia 882 932 1	059 62 71 73
lebanon 41 80 123 146 145 69 80 172 198 201
lesotho 198 170 198 180 248 23 25 22 22 22
liberia 254 191 175 100 110 15 17 19 21 21
libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 225 284 216 213 213 142 132 150 142 142
lithuania 2	350 2	623 2	856 177 196 214
luxembourg 149 164 179 41 46 46
Madagascar 2	178 2	541 2	756 3	129 3	391 210 250 280 266 297
Malawi 1	341 1	560 2	336 2	142 1	843 32 42 57 59 59
Malaysia 2	061 1	886 2	154 2	331 2	268 289 634 923 1	070 1	158
Mali 1	082 2	114 2	596 2	858 2	845 124 161 204 257 247
Malta 8 8 11 12 12 8 15 19 20 19
Mauritania 48 131 166 153 125 50 62 78 89 89
Mauritius 1 2 0 0 0 9 16 27 33 32
Mexico 20	391 23	553 28	822 30	315 32	751 2	535 2	839 4	468 4	870 5	040
Moldova 2	199 1	583 2	944 91 84 86
Mongolia 320 718 151 165 139 234 257 275 157 200
Morocco 3	583 7	456 3	485 8	473 8	604 248 447 592 604 600
Mozambique 649 629 1	591 1	813 2	007 66 81 90 90 90
Myanmar 12	986 14	111 21	818 24	163 24	822 252 259 444 550 639
namibia 73 103 101 107 107 64 65 77 110 109
nepal 3	640 5	680 7	055 7	684 7	581 128 186 237 251 257
netherlands 1	280 1	327 1	590 1	740 1	754 1	926 2	685 2	823 2	223 2	350
new Caledonia 3 1 4 6 4 4 4 6 6 6
new Zealand 789 783 888 899 866 1	143 1	204 1	294 1	426 1	433
nicaragua 392 453 693 972 773 83 72 105 136 150
niger 1	702 2	120 2	714 3	102 2	672 98 97 134 133 133
nigeria 7	427 18	100 21	288 22	616 22	783 669 753 968 1	042 1	067
norway 1	129 1	410 1	246 1	287 1	426 195 215 268 275 290
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 40 68 62 96 85 99
oman 2 5 6 6 6 12 25 33 38 41
TABLE	A4	(cont.)
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Cereals 
(Thousand tonnes)
Meat
(Thousand tonnes)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Pakistan 17	200 21	038 28	422 28	964 30	311 714 1	327 1	697 1	848 1	917
Panama 253 336 303 403 403 69 101 170 164 168
Papua new Guinea 4 4 11 10 11 215 272 350 387 393
Paraguay 472 818 1	205 1	643 1	979 210 337 387 351 414
Peru 1	430 1	983 3	566 3	927 3	389 357 497 816 939 958
Philippines 10	942 14	350 16	917 18	116 19	910 785 1	091 1	882 2	309 2	364
Poland 18	466 27	594 25	017 23	391 29	635 2	745 2	960 2	927 3	472 3	271
Portugal 1	210 1	683 1	528 1	186 1	363 437 556 730 679 697
Qatar 1 3 6 7 7 7 14 12 14 13
Republic of Korea 8	452 8	412 7	606 6	355 7	325 471 930 1	673 1	776 1	747
Romania 18	109 18	286 15	479 12	962 24	314 1	646 1	562 1	014 1	147 779
Russian Federation 67	190 65	562 76	231 4	399 4	945 4	981
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 159	029 184	357 15	255 19	531
Rwanda 271 289 234 298 319 26 31 38 47 50
Saint Kitts and nevis 0 1 1 1 1
Saint lucia 0 2 2 2 2 2
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Samoa 3 5 5 5 5
Sao Tome and Principe 0 3 2 3 3 0 0 1 1 1
Saudi Arabia 303 4	214 2	404 2	949 2	792 126 411 629 631 643
Senegal 850 996 1	040 1	452 1	085 69 111 165 162 167
Serbia and 
Montenegro 7	682 5	541 9	873 913 843 808
former Socialist 
Federal Republic of 
yugoslavia
15	521 16	512 1	463 1	448
Seychelles 1 2 2 2 2
Sierra leone 542 566 254 309 309 16 19 21 23 23
Singapore 155 167 119 111 93
Slovakia 2	814 2	490 3	793 354 332 312
Slovenia 490 402 586 183 184 180
Solomon Islands 13 5 5 6 2 3 3 3 3
Somalia 305 497 119 163
South Africa 14	195 12	744 11	775 11	825 12	352 1	084 1	375 1	658 1	848 1	887
Spain 14	709 19	306 20	198 21	412 24	747 2	601 3	459 4	955 5	479 5	531
Sri lanka 2	130 2	370 2	839 3	106 2	668 52 56 101 124 130
Sudan 2	931 2	771 3	888 6	380 3	643 445 419 668 715 715
Suriname 258 229 178 194 195 11 15 8 9 9
Swaziland 92 91 97 70 71 20 17 22 21 21
Sweden 5	407 5	677 5	309 5	352 5	508 544 507 558 551 554
Switzerland 843 1	331 1	118 878 1	130 467 480 425 433 432
Syrian Arab Republic 3	069 2	598 4	577 6	223 5	249 172 219 343 391 391
Tajikistan 496 866 860 30 45 49
TABLE	A4	(cont.)
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Cereals 
(Thousand tonnes)
Meat
(Thousand tonnes)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Thailand 20	316 23	624 30	132 31	420 28	277 932 1	399 1	987 2	211 1	817
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 559 472 684 25 28 28
Togo 301 505 737 816 787 16 29 31 33 34
Tonga 2 2 2 2 2
Trinidad and Tobago 13 17 7 6 6 24 28 41 61 62
Tunisia 1	146 1	626 1	449 2	312 2	155 97 147 244 243 245
Turkey 25	232 28	283 30	235 30	807 34	050 714 1	148 1	352 1	494 1	583
Turkmenistan 1	717 2	667 2	785 153 210 224
Uganda 1	171 1	597 2	200 2	413 2	625 149 200 267 263 259
Ukraine 28	878 19	662 40	997 1	625 1	725 1	595
United Arab Emirates 1 2 0 0 0 22 55 81 91 88
United Kingdom 18	840 22	644 21	691 21	511 22	030 3	009 3	340 3	476 3	271 3	270
United Republic of 
Tanzania 3	010 4	201 4	226 4	261 5	020 185 275 332 363 362
United States of 
America 301	133 292	217 334	614 348	897 389	066 24	325 28	827 37	567 38	911 38	891
Uruguay 1	012 1	230 1	923 2	171 2	523 415 456 550 530 602
Uzbekistan 4	094 6	106 5	855 497 560 592
vanuatu 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 7 6 7
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 1	550 2	037 2	775 3	116 3	714 672 777 1	280 1	238 1	170
viet nam 12	218 20	008 33	984 37	705 39	341 529 1	065 1	982 2	482 2	664
yemen 897 693 689 418 497 71 123 171 206 207
Zambia 990 1	467 934 1	365 1	364 81 95 127 127 127
Zimbabwe 2	275 2	393 2	144 1	259 837 114 137 188 205 207
World 1 573 227 1 903 961 2 084 615 2 085 774 2 270 360 136 219 179 648 234 671 253 688 260 098
TABLE	A4	(cont.)
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Countries
Capture fisheries and 
aquaculture
(Thousand tonnes)
 Forest products
(Thousand m3)
Forest products
(Thousand tonnes)
Freshwater
and 
diadromous 
fish
Marine 
fish
other
aquatic 
animals
Woodfuel Industrial 
roundwood
Sawnwood Wood-
based 
panels
Wood
pulp
Paper
and 
paperboard
Afghanistan
Albania 2 2 1 221 75 97 37 3
Algeria 1 136 4 7	545 119 13 48 	 41
American Samoa 4
Angola 10 224 6 3	487 1	096 5 11 15
Antigua and barbuda 2 1
Argentina 37 761 155 3	972 9	706 1	388 1	112 782 1	511
Armenia 1 62 6 2 2 	 2
Australia 21 156 90 3	092 25	685 4	038 2	083 1	107 3	097
Austria 3 3	539 12	943 11	133 3	419 1	934 4	852
Azerbaijan 9 0 0 6 7 0 0 148
bahamas 1 10 	 17 1 	
bahrain 0 8 6
bangladesh 1	756 234 112 27	694 282 388 9 19 46
barbados 2 	 5 	 	
belarus 5 1	097 6	446 2	304 815 61 279
belgium 2 23 3 550 4	215 1	215 2	698 531 2	131
belize 0 0 14 126 62 35 	
benin 19 14 7 162 332 31 	
bhutan 0 4	479 133 31 32
bolivia 6 1 2	228 650 347 12 	
bosnia and Herzegovina 8 0 0 1	316 2	677 888 27
botswana 0 655 105 	 	
brazil 420 436 160 136	637 110	470 21	200 6	283 9	580 8	221
brunei Darussalam 0 2 1 12 217 90 	
bulgaria 5 3 3 2	187 2	646 332 533 92 171
burkina Faso 9 11	727 1	183 2 	
burundi 14 8	390 333 83 	
Cambodia 270 34 23 9	386 125 4 5 	
Cameroon 55 52 1 9	407 1	800 702 88
Canada 176 614 529 2	901 196	667 60	655 16	575 26	424 20	578
Cape verde 8 0 2 	 	 	
Central African Republic 15 2	000 832 69 2
Chad 70 6	362 761 2 	
Chile 569 4	615 426 13	111 29	432 8	015 1	927 3	338 1	170
China 19	124 11	542 18	242 191	044 95	061 12	211 44	914 4	080 53	463
Colombia 93 97 22 8	469 1	993 622 225 209 899
Comoros 15 0 	 9 	 	
Congo 26 17 1 1	219 896 157 36
Costa Rica 21 17 8 3	445 1	687 812 65 3 20
Côte d’Ivoire 6 48 1 8	655 1	678 512 340
TABLE	A5
Production of fish and forest products (2004)
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Countries
Capture fisheries and 
aquaculture
(Thousand tonnes)
 Forest products
(Thousand m3)
Forest products
(Thousand tonnes)
Freshwater
and 
diadromous 
fish
Marine 
fish
other
aquatic 
animals
Woodfuel Industrial 
roundwood
Sawnwood Wood-
based 
panels
Wood
pulp
Paper
and 
paperboard
Croatia 3 33 4 954 2	887 582 103 109 464
Cuba 28 23 14 2	767 808 181 149 	 18
Cyprus 0 4 0 3 7 5 2
Czech Republic 24 1	190 14	411 3	940 1	390 732 934
former Czechoslovakia
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 9 174 86 5	737 1	500 280 	 56 80
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 218 5 69	777 3	653 40 3 	 3
Denmark 44 966 123 817 810 196 373 402
Dominica 1 0 	 	 66 	
Dominican Republic 3 10 3 556 6 	 	 130
Ecuador 8 333 59 5	427 1	211 755 261 2 100
Egypt 574 270 21 16	792 268 2 56 	 460
El Salvador 4 27 14 4	173 682 16 	 	 56
Equatorial Guinea 1 2 0 447 364 4 15
Eritrea 0 7 0 2	406 2 	 	
Estonia 4 70 14 2	200 8	100 2	000 388 70 66
Ethiopia 10 93	029 2	928 18 93 	 16
former People’s 
Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia
Fiji 0 42 5 37 346 84 16
Finland 60 89 4	519 49	281 13	544 2	029 12	619 14	036
France 49 503 289 2	500 32	450 9	860 6	046 2	503 10	249
French Polynesia 0 12 0
Gabon 9 34 4 1	070 3	500 133 222
Gambia 3 28 0 638 113 1 	
Georgia 0 3 0 50 10
Germany 68 218 33 5	847 48	657 19	850 14	108 2	244 20	392
Ghana 81 314 5 20	678 1	350 480 435
Greece 7 142 42 1	057 469 191 842 266
Guatemala 8 3 7 15	905 419 366 43 	 31
Guinea 4 89 11	635 651 26
Guinea-bissau 0 6 0 422 170 16 	
Guyana 1 37 19 866 481 36 54
Haiti 0 6 2 1	993 239 14 	
Honduras 5 11 22 8	699 920 437 9 7 95
Hungary 20 2	672 2	988 205 638 579
Iceland 8 1	696 33
India 3	029 2	345 714 303	839 19	146 17	500 2	341 1	827 4	145
Indonesia 1	152 3	852 852 76	564 32	497 4	330 5	393 5	482 7	223
TABLE	A5	(cont.)
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Countries
Capture fisheries and 
aquaculture
(Thousand tonnes)
 Forest products
(Thousand m3)
Forest products
(Thousand tonnes)
Freshwater
and 
diadromous 
fish
Marine 
fish
other
aquatic 
animals
Woodfuel Industrial 
roundwood
Sawnwood Wood-
based 
panels
Wood
pulp
Paper
and 
paperboard
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 150 307 18 77 743 68 665 240 415
Iraq
Ireland 16 244 79 20 2	542 939 841 45
Israel 18 8 0 2 25 181 275
Italy 39 182 184 5	814 2	883 1	580 5	596 492 9	667
Jamaica 4 9 5 570 282 66 	
Japan 369 3	346 1	463 114 15	615 13	603 5	288 10	586 29	253
Jordan 1 0 253 4 	 	 	 25
Kazakhstan 34 171 130 265 10 58
Kenya 120 6 2 20	370 1	792 78 83 98 165
Kuwait 0 3 2
Kyrgyzstan 0 18 9 22 	 	 2
lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 95 5	928 392 182 13
latvia 1 121 3 970 11	784 3	988 394 38
lebanon 1 3 0 82 7 9 46 	 42
lesotho 0 2	047 	 	 	
liberia 4 6 0 5	576 337 20 30
libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0 46 536 116 31 	 	 6
lithuania 5 149 7 1	260 4	860 1	450 393 99
luxembourg 13 264 133 400
Madagascar 33 83 22 10	770 183 893 5 1 9
Malawi 57 5	102 520 45 18
Malaysia 82 1	136 289 3	119 22	000 5	598 6	963 123 978
Mali 101 4	965 413 13 	
Malta 2 0
Mauritania 5 177 17 1	581 6 	 	
Mauritius 0 10 0 6 8 3
Mexico 115 1	080 344 38	269 6	913 2	962 430 338 4	391
Moldova 5 30 27 5 10
Mongolia 0 186 445 300 2
Morocco 2 854 40 298 563 83 35 177 129
Mozambique 19 12 14 16	724 1	319 28 3 	
Myanmar 825 1	092 71 37	560 4	196 1	056 118 1 43
namibia 2 565 4
nepal 40 12	702 1	260 630 30 	 13
netherlands 11 501 89 290 736 273 8 119 3	459
new Caledonia 3 3 	 5 3 	
new Zealand 6 444 182 19	722 4	369 2	219 1	596 920
nicaragua 1 10 16 5	906 93 45 8
niger 52 8	596 411 4 	
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Countries
Capture fisheries and 
aquaculture
(Thousand tonnes)
 Forest products
(Thousand m3)
Forest products
(Thousand tonnes)
Freshwater
and 
diadromous 
fish
Marine 
fish
other
aquatic 
animals
Woodfuel Industrial 
roundwood
Sawnwood Wood-
based 
panels
Wood
pulp
Paper
and 
paperboard
nigeria 226 251 32 60	852 9	418 2	000 95 23 19
norway 630 2	461 69 1	229 7	551 2	230 493 2	528 2	294
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 3 0
oman 153 13
Pakistan 184 348 38 25	599 2	679 1	180 354 28 700
Panama 1 184 14 1	219 93 30 7 	
Papua new Guinea 12 219 3 5	533 1	708 60 45
Paraguay 24 5	944 4	044 550 161 	 13
Peru 44 9	239 352 7	300 1	635 671 97 91
Philippines 516 1	929 279 13	070 2	975 339 777 175 1	056
Poland 60 157 10 3	396 29	337 3	743 6	491 1	027 2	635
Portugal 1 202 25 600 10	953 1	100 1	316 1	949 1	674
Qatar 11 0
Republic of Korea 30 1	132 819 2	463 2	089 4	366 3	860 545 10	511
Romania 11 2 3	015 12	762 4	588 951 262 462
Russian Federation 416 2	505 131 48	000 134	000 21	500 7	159 6	885 6	789
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics
Rwanda 8 5	000 495 79
Saint Kitts and nevis 0 0
Saint lucia 0 1 0
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 9
Samoa 0 3 2 70 61 21
Sao Tome and Principe 4 0 	 9 5 	
Saudi Arabia 2 45 19
Senegal 52 374 19 5	243 794 23 	
Serbia and Montenegro 5 0 0 2	097 1	423 575 77 21 159
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia
Seychelles 94 1
Sierra leone 17 112 5 5	403 124 5 	
Singapore 3 2 3 	 	 25 355 	 87
Slovakia 3 304 6	936 1	837 508 520 798
Slovenia 2 1 0 725 1	826 461 474 153 558
Solomon Islands 36 0 138 554 12
Somalia
South Africa 2 867 16 12	000 21	159 2	171 1	022 2	076 3	774
Spain 38 769 360 2	055 14	235 3	730 4	754 1	905 5	490
Sri lanka 31 237 19 5	646 694 61 22 3 25
Sudan 56 5 17	482 2	173 51 2 	 3
TABLE	A5	(cont.)
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Countries
Capture fisheries and 
aquaculture
(Thousand tonnes)
 Forest products
(Thousand m3)
Forest products
(Thousand tonnes)
Freshwater
and 
diadromous 
fish
Marine 
fish
other
aquatic 
animals
Woodfuel Industrial 
roundwood
Sawnwood Wood-
based 
panels
Wood
pulp
Paper
and 
paperboard
Suriname 0 19 14 44 161 59 1
Swaziland 0 560 330 102 8 191 	
Sweden 9 262 5 5	900 61	400 16	900 681 12	106 11	589
Switzerland 3 1	000 3	700 1	505 897 271 1	777
Syrian Arab Republic 14 3 0 18 40 9 27 	 1
Tajikistan 0
Thailand 546 2	270 1	202 19	985 8	700 288 685 916 3	420
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 1 699 132 28 16
Togo 9 21 0 4	424 254 13 	
Tonga 1 0 	 2 2 	
Trinidad and Tobago 9 1 35 51 33 	
Tunisia 2 91 20 2	138 214 20 104 	 94
Turkey 70 519 55 5	278 11	225 6	215 3	833 225 1	643
Turkmenistan 15 0 3
Uganda 377 0 36	235 3	175 264 5 	 3
Ukraine 38 158 33 8	396 6	466 2	019 1	308 27 702
United Arab Emirates 0 90 1
United Kingdom 175 523 162 231 8	042 2	782 3	533 344 6	240
United Republic of 
Tanzania 299 46 3 21	505 2	314 24 4 54 25
United States of 
America 708 3	523 1	336 43	608 414	702 87	436 44	262 54	301 83	612
Uruguay 2 110 11 4	267 2	132 230 6 41 96
Uzbekistan 4 18 8 	 	 	 11
vanuatu 0 65 30 91 28 28 	
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 55 356 101 3	793 1	526 947 233 142 723
viet nam 896 1	334 849 21	250 5	237 2	900 117 278 888
yemen 240 16 353 	 	 	
Zambia 70 7	219 834 157 18 	 4
Zimbabwe 16 8	115 992 397 77 42 80
World 36 080 71 821 31 112 1 771 978 1 645 682 415 553 224 929 174 635 354 490
TABLE	A5	(cont.)
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 71
Agricultural exports
(US$ million)
Share of agricultural exports
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Afghanistan 300 147 51.58 66.84
Albania 111 106 19 28 25 	 29.19 6.71 6.16 4.18
Algeria 119 46 29 55 55 0.92 0.38 0.16 0.22 0.17
American Samoa 4 11 5 0 0 2.91 3.59 1.59 0.09 0.09
Angola 157 9 3 2 2 9.63 0.26 0.04 0.02 0.01
Antigua and barbuda 1 2 0 1 1 2.22 4.83 0.16 0.25 0.29
Argentina 5	816 6	414 10	873 13	867 15	839 69.86 56.74 42.72 46.90 45.84
Armenia 33 77 79 11.15 11.19 10.97
Australia 8	475 11	460 15	271 15	173 20	871 42.74 30.05 26.34 20.16 26.02
Austria 726 1	350 3	531 5	637 7	475 4.46 3.53 5.18 5.80 6.37
Azerbaijan 67 154 189 4.02 5.94 5.24
bahamas 14 34 46 43 46 0.28 1.51 1.52 0.72 0.77
bahrain 13 6 29 54 43 0.38 0.17 0.54 0.81 0.57
bangladesh 184 157 107 103 114 26.91 10.44 1.89 1.78 1.73
barbados 54 51 70 66 72 27.35 25.54 26.46 26.43 25.96
belarus 528 817 1	076 7.66 8.20 7.83
belgium 17	176 22	595 26	304 	 	 9.07 8.84 8.59
belize 57 88 133 123 121 54.35 69.37 69.66 59.95 59.10
benin 38 83 187 257 228 80.43 29.86 54.87 94.74 75.11
bhutan 4 11 14 14 10 21.85 14.69 12.10 11.70 8.59
bolivia 82 159 402 494 616 8.51 17.88 33.68 30.94 28.71
bosnia and Herzegovina 44 77 113 6.84 7.74 9.14
botswana 84 82 116 62 52 18.85 4.49 4.54 2.05 1.50
brazil 8	665 8	750 14	215 20	914 27	215 44.31 26.95 26.44 28.62 28.21
brunei Darussalam 2 9 1 2 1 0.06 0.41 0.04 0.04 0.03
bulgaria 1	851 1	443 555 799 1	066 18.51 13.24 11.94 10.74 10.75
burkina Faso 70 92 130 291 314 86.40 68.72 54.02 77.51 61.03
burundi 80 77 38 30 23 97.03 94.09 78.11 79.04 48.43
Cambodia 5 41 34 40 55 41.03 32.68 2.74 1.94 2.16
Cameroon 593 512 293 587 654 49.77 30.00 16.27 25.54 25.16
Canada 6	800 8	887 15	878 17	598 20	574 10.68 7.16 6.14 6.46 6.50
Cape verde 1 2 0 0 0 35.33 29.56 2.44 2.10 3.00
Central African Republic 51 53 27 17 1 48.55 41.96 18.08 12.98 0.56
Chad 115 128 125 115 123 80.55 70.61 66.62 60.37 64.75
Chile 362 1	188 2	942 3	655 4	268 8.56 13.80 16.12 17.19 13.33
China 5	041 14	527 16	648 20	460 20	827 8.89 6.65 2.98 2.53 2.02
Colombia 2	546 2	413 2	917 2	818 3	390 74.86 36.65 23.64 21.55 20.63
Comoros 12 15 6 20 26 83.13 75.52 28.66 50.04 65.61
Congo 15 12 20 33 40 2.01 1.21 0.93 1.43 1.76
Costa Rica 672 890 1	681 1	782 2	014 68.50 59.87 29.63 29.37 31.98
Côte d’Ivoire 1	812 1	650 2	130 3	216 3	093 66.38 57.12 51.13 58.55 49.54
Croatia 394 673 659 8.82 10.87 8.21
Cuba 4	560 3	897 858 610 620 87.20 84.86 53.25 35.87 36.50
TABLE	A6
value of agricultural exports and share in total exports
S T A T I S T I C A l  A n n E x 1
Agricultural exports
(US$ million)
Share of agricultural exports
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Cyprus 180 283 429 262 227 34.88 31.39 43.87 28.43 23.98
Czech Republic 1	242 1	737 2	546 4.20 3.56 3.71
former Czechoslovakia 626 689 4.37 5.53
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 135 58 26 21 22 11.96 3.65 2.70 2.23 2.33
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 205 135 38 22 39 16.83 13.19 11.01 5.47 9.71
Denmark 5	006 7	929 9	023 11	398 13	185 31.05 23.71 17.65 17.14 17.17
Dominica 7 34 22 14 15 56.92 65.94 42.31 35.28 37.10
Dominican Republic 635 396 556 588 646 62.71 51.18 65.03 55.25 48.45
Ecuador 635 837 1	476 1	974 1	958 28.20 31.69 31.56 32.68 25.65
Egypt 675 450 575 938 1	314 24.92 15.19 9.63 11.43 12.57
El Salvador 715 298 503 397 427 73.89 49.04 18.13 12.68 12.63
Equatorial Guinea 18 7 8 4 7 79.86 11.83 0.85 0.39 0.73
Eritrea 2 1 3 5.58 2.56 9.38
Estonia 274 475 302 7.59 8.45 5.08
Ethiopia 290 450 380 61.85 74.76 49.59
former People’s 
Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia
377 279 92.82 89.39
Fiji 200 196 163 198 213 63.40 42.24 28.42 29.42 31.36
Finland 706 717 1	022 1	312 1	516 5.38 2.95 2.33 2.47 2.47
France 17	250 31	549 33	844 42	127 46	642 16.66 14.88 10.44 10.75 10.40
French Polynesia 8 6 8 18 25 25.79 5.10 2.71 11.28 12.70
Gabon 12 6 12 9 17 0.57 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.41
Gambia 26 12 12 19 22 63.19 37.01 49.22 64.79 74.39
Georgia 123 169 184 41.58 34.98 28.36
Germany 10	531 20	101 23	836 32	847 39	240 5.32 5.06 4.29 4.37 4.30
Ghana 641 403 521 1	037 1	212 64.40 41.39 31.75 52.13 52.07
Greece 1	289 2	565 2	669 2	973 3	122 28.82 31.58 24.89 21.78 20.55
Guatemala 918 793 1	449 1	307 1	417 72.53 68.53 56.77 52.51 48.22
Guinea 31 27 31 41 51 7.94 3.56 4.65 4.94 5.39
Guinea-bissau 8 13 51 48 62 57.46 74.26 84.79 69.40 90.43
Guyana 155 116 218 183 190 45.11 42.63 43.09 35.71 32.23
Haiti 71 38 26 21 20 40.22 22.12 8.50 6.04 5.10
Honduras 588 627 575 560 824 74.52 75.50 44.60 41.66 53.71
Hungary 2	115 2	376 2	276 3	231 3	585 23.32 24.26 8.17 7.61 6.54
Iceland 28 36 31 43 51 3.19 2.34 1.55 1.79 1.76
India 2	452 2	843 4	942 6	504 7	058 29.90 16.13 11.71 11.39 9.83
Indonesia 2	314 2	962 4	815 6	992 9	401 10.73 11.55 8.64 10.91 13.19
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 188 526 1	031 1	600 1	427 1.22 3.09 4.21 4.71 3.51
Iraq 57 63 0.29 0.81 0.09 0.42 0.92
Ireland 2	817 5	233 6	425 7	519 9	246 35.91 22.89 8.33 8.11 8.87
Israel 871 1	186 1	051 1	181 1	430 16.58 10.15 3.69 3.72 3.71
Italy 5	783 10	786 15	737 20	645 24	424 7.66 6.73 6.58 6.90 7.00
TABLE	A6	(cont.)
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 71
Agricultural exports
(US$ million)
Share of agricultural exports
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Jamaica 133 217 287 292 266 14.45 19.71 19.08 21.36 16.78
Japan 908 1	174 1	898 1	695 1	873 0.71 0.40 0.44 0.36 0.33
Jordan 197 137 303 440 563 34.39 12.36 15.10 14.29 14.51
Kazakhstan 577 733 693 7.42 5.67 3.45
Kenya 668 666 1	033 1	291 1	296 53.99 61.13 57.30 53.49 48.29
Kuwait 109 37 55 28 16 0.60 0.57 0.34 0.13 0.06
Kyrgyzstan 92 102 113 19.28 17.52 15.76
lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 1 35 31 15 20 6.47 27.57 9.63 3.86 5.57
latvia 160 351 308 8.57 12.12 7.80
lebanon 206 136 149 239 252 21.32 26.28 19.62 15.66 14.44
lesotho 15 15 7 6 6 28.72 23.96 3.00 1.23 1.21
liberia 136 62 64 83 96 24.41 16.36 12.86 16.60 19.21
libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0 38 33 14 12 0.00 0.34 0.38 0.17 0.14
lithuania 455 757 997 11.98 10.58 10.76
luxembourg 495 709 732 	 	 5.46 5.33 4.51
Madagascar 303 179 135 192 118 82.89 57.87 31.27 48.04 29.54
Malawi 232 362 433 469 392 89.40 93.61 94.92 99.83 81.06
Malaysia 3	740 4	519 6	153 9	581 10	917 31.35 15.26 6.82 9.13 8.63
Mali 182 252 268 333 336 90.62 78.31 43.87 35.69 36.07
Malta 30 35 50 100 76 6.68 3.21 2.36 4.43 3.05
Mauritania 40 41 25 18 18 19.76 9.44 6.92 4.40 4.53
Mauritius 257 363 308 355 407 67.00 32.40 19.66 18.01 19.20
Mexico 1	860 2	874 7	385 8	725 9	879 12.82 11.26 9.19 9.96 9.76
Moldova 323 498 592 64.39 63.03 60.12
Mongolia 170 145 137 79 63 42.74 24.26 29.44 12.84 10.18
Morocco 516 612 759 981 964 22.95 15.49 10.39 11.19 9.97
Mozambique 155 44 52 104 124 57.13 33.32 10.79 10.38 12.38
Myanmar 237 171 380 419 379 54.24 37.60 19.28 16.89 14.99
namibia 194 166 136 291 237 14.01 14.47 11.50 23.10 12.95
nepal 51 56 74 155 95 39.45 28.71 11.11 23.64 13.25
netherlands 15	405 29	465 30	034 41	914 47	818 22.40 22.88 13.20 14.16 13.36
new Caledonia 2 2 3 3 3 0.58 0.32 0.34 0.27 0.34
new Zealand 3	296 4	941 5	979 7	954 10	031 65.60 53.62 48.11 46.66 50.58
nicaragua 442 215 364 392 512 83.74 70.00 61.42 64.77 84.62
niger 78 60 74 63 27 15.76 21.52 26.27 30.71 13.19
nigeria 525 233 415 612 487 2.55 2.01 2.39 3.08 1.56
norway 340 352 427 545 611 2.02 1.11 0.78 0.81 0.75
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 80 53 67 54 54 23.72 26.73 18.89 18.14 18.02
oman 35 69 418 481 402 1.00 1.44 4.21 4.12 3.01
Pakistan 916 1	170 1	093 1	234 1	254 39.17 21.90 12.50 10.34 9.37
Panama 217 286 315 271 320 56.74 65.39 38.11 31.33 33.91
Papua new Guinea 332 250 319 359 401 35.04 19.03 16.36 16.25 15.70
TABLE	A6	(cont.)
S T A T I S T I C A l  A n n E x 1
Agricultural exports
(US$ million)
Share of agricultural exports
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Paraguay 240 742 671 1	020 1	350 77.36 82.27 67.53 61.11 67.98
Peru 337 319 682 863 1	137 9.32 9.51 10.11 9.49 9.01
Philippines 1	849 1	240 1	447 1	953 2	051 34.43 14.97 3.98 5.27 5.17
Poland 999 1	577 2	558 4	160 6	679 6.45 11.48 8.06 7.76 8.93
Portugal 429 909 1	443 2	091 2	439 10.37 6.02 5.79 6.58 6.82
Qatar 10 10 17 20 0.30 0.10 0.13 0.11
Republic of Korea 591 1	125 1	609 1	901 2	135 3.29 1.69 1.04 0.98 0.84
Romania 1	306 299 433 603 765 12.13 4.34 4.29 3.43 3.26
Russian Federation 935 2	339 2	197 1.01 1.72 1.20
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 2	824 2	463 3.85 2.85
Rwanda 82 97 40 29 34 92.93 89.74 55.28 46.33 34.86
Saint Kitts and nevis 14 12 9 9 11 65.84 41.81 19.40 16.03 19.56
Saint lucia 22 76 33 29 35 60.76 65.88 65.66 64.55 42.78
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 15 56 31 28 20 85.61 74.23 65.19 73.24 60.12
Samoa 14 8 5 7 6 91.06 89.24 29.26 47.93 37.82
Sao Tome and Principe 15 4 4 6 4 63.93 78.06 29.75 43.09 28.17
Saudi Arabia 91 413 389 385 372 0.09 1.03 0.59 0.40 0.39
Senegal 140 186 135 175 182 26.73 26.66 17.68 15.47 14.31
Serbia and Montenegro 286 511 688 16.77 30.00 32.24
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia 1	037 1	177 11.64 8.48
Seychelles 3 1 1 2 6 16.50 1.39 0.61 0.74 3.21
Sierra leone 58 21 8 12 14 30.80 13.54 23.09 8.91 7.69
Singapore 1	498 2	668 2	780 2	563 3	004 8.24 5.12 2.22 1.78 1.67
Slovakia 410 691 1	010 3.55 3.23 3.67
Slovenia 298 471 531 3.36 3.69 3.36
Solomon Islands 25 21 34 41 42 35.57 27.23 30.52 35.40 35.99
Somalia 129 63 90.48 52.51
South Africa 2	125 1	863 2	151 2	937 3	421 9.85 8.07 7.53 8.09 7.48
Spain 3	504 7	749 14	179 21	442 24	294 17.77 14.52 12.65 13.73 13.61
Sri lanka 663 684 968 1	012 1	143 64.43 37.71 19.58 19.74 19.85
Sudan 533 531 358 438 395 92.81 97.64 25.15 16.79 15.15
Suriname 48 38 56 31 18 10.27 8.36 10.43 4.81 2.15
Swaziland 179 311 307 150 269 53.78 56.90 31.99 15.67 28.03
Sweden 753 1	180 1	861 2	813 3	351 2.61 2.15 2.25 2.76 2.74
Switzerland 1	021 1	826 2	140 2	751 3	269 3.69 3.10 2.64 2.73 2.75
Syrian Arab Republic 274 612 672 851 983 14.06 17.26 15.03 12.16 14.05
Tajikistan 103 217 204 14.59 27.15 22.31
Thailand 3	410 5	760 7	285 10	284 11	926 54.32 24.13 11.52 13.17 12.41
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 209 235 260 17.11 17.24 15.65
Togo 72 104 103 132 131 28.22 40.64 27.87 21.45 35.69
Tonga 7 9 7 15 14 87.40 68.40 39.47 46.42 44.88
TABLE	A6	(cont.)
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 71
Agricultural exports
(US$ million)
Share of agricultural exports
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Trinidad and Tobago 78 109 229 222 116 2.24 5.80 6.07 4.29 1.82
Tunisia 191 322 493 470 974 8.76 9.52 8.09 5.85 10.06
Turkey 1	949 3	238 3	975 4	831 5	958 59.22 25.45 13.91 10.22 9.44
Turkmenistan 256 55 86 12.17 1.53 2.42
Uganda 341 206 272 115 359 99.26 90.52 56.52 20.53 40.53
Ukraine 1	810 2	722 3	415 12.80 11.79 10.45
United Arab Emirates 225 636 893 1	177 1	404 1.26 3.18 1.19 1.34 1.60
United Kingdom 7	699 12	431 15	256 17	192 21	185 7.70 7.21 5.51 5.63 6.11
United Republic of 
Tanzania 419 269 472 385 481 73.29 68.03 70.92 34.13 36.19
United States of America 41	418 44	668 55	293 62	305 63	893 19.91 11.36 7.49 8.60 7.81
Uruguay 497 727 981 1	220 1	624 48.65 44.77 44.64 55.49 55.05
Uzbekistan 972 852 835 30.16 22.86 16.65
vanuatu 18 12 13 11 22 48.17 58.45 54.06 75.63 91.44
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 82 247 352 204 210 0.48 1.64 1.37 0.85 0.62
viet nam 95 667 2	260 2	488 3	312 22.29 31.09 16.51 12.33 16.42
yemen 29 64 66 117 103 4.13 10.53 1.99 3.13 2.76
Zambia 9 24 105 115 201 0.73 1.82 9.96 11.52 16.79
Zimbabwe 487 670 921 740 846 37.65 41.10 43.70 25.61 22.94
World 224 117 319 336 414 279 523 885 604 329 12.00 10.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
TABLE	A6	(cont.)
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Agricultural imports
(US$ million)
Share of agricultural imports
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Afghanistan 147 174 18.32 22.02
Albania 38 119 268 359 289 	 17.24 22.48 19.25 12.72
Algeria 2	098 2	693 2	582 3	062 4	050 20.81 30.18 27.41 24.69 22.25
American Samoa 17 34 20 13 15 9.04 9.23 4.17 4.28 4.77
Angola 374 471 405 825 983 27.10 33.14 13.04 24.22 27.50
Antigua and barbuda 20 37 30 31 29 20.67 16.82 4.29 5.73 5.33
Argentina 586 301 1	292 735 886 6.59 5.45 5.55 5.31 3.95
Armenia 204 218 272 23.78 17.06 20.15
Australia 918 1	751 2	975 3	886 4	470 4.94 4.52 4.74 4.48 4.63
Austria 1	683 2	727 4	550 6	367 7	426 7.68 5.89 6.25 6.40 6.31
Azerbaijan 219 314 419 	 	 18.03 11.95 11.94
bahamas 119 222 350 232 247 1.95 8.95 18.45 10.53 11.21
bahrain 216 279 391 525 545 6.75 7.63 9.38 9.28 8.41
bangladesh 483 735 1	726 1	833 1	984 25.46 23.41 21.32 21.05 17.56
barbados 89 118 157 191 140 17.46 17.14 14.17 15.95 9.89
belarus 903 1	058 1	450 11.48 9.15 8.87
belgium 14	538 20	241 23	042 	 	 8.16 8.62 8.08
belize 37 43 67 63 78 25.26 18.96 15.70 11.43 14.19
benin 95 105 181 214 381 28.90 43.93 27.46 24.19 44.51
bhutan 5 15 23 23 28 7.85 14.88 10.55 12.69 15.82
bolivia 120 103 233 254 231 14.55 13.45 13.19 15.73 12.54
bosnia and 
Herzegovina 515 670 993 21.52 20.37 25.01
botswana 102 210 375 358 155 15.18 11.66 21.45 16.76 5.44
brazil 2	340 2	420 3	865 3	600 3	598 10.20 11.12 6.87 7.11 5.46
brunei Darussalam 81 165 197 244 193 15.50 16.49 15.21 18.22 11.69
bulgaria 700 678 403 642 849 7.25 6.64 6.27 5.98 5.89
burkina Faso 73 106 173 138 152 21.93 19.60 28.23 15.00 13.67
burundi 29 22 19 30 42 18.16 9.50 14.23 19.34 24.09
Cambodia 66 14 231 143 162 33.08 7.13 16.10 4.96 4.61
Cameroon 125 209 240 346 401 8.70 15.03 15.90 15.71 16.70
Canada 4	551 6	979 11	443 14	206 15	194 7.62 5.99 5.07 5.92 5.55
Cape verde 26 41 79 102 113 40.65 31.12 31.83 37.79 41.77
Central African 
Republic 25 39 26 25 29 30.71 24.57 21.71 20.98 24.44
Chad 9 27 42 73 74 10.39 7.66 9.81 7.25 7.40
Chile 731 402 1	200 1	482 1	655 14.14 5.56 6.92 7.67 6.65
China 10	612 17	254 23	544 31	886 41	688 17.86 8.55 4.44 4.12 4.15
Colombia 451 348 1	431 1	668 1	859 10.32 6.72 12.26 11.96 11.12
Comoros 13 18 15 30 34 43.01 37.36 23.73 34.76 40.42
Congo 61 86 146 220 261 16.28 15.69 23.89 36.59 43.48
Costa Rica 123 174 451 572 691 8.91 9.37 7.33 7.47 8.35
Côte d’Ivoire 449 428 437 637 711 17.31 20.27 11.87 18.12 19.82
Croatia 701 1	190 1	403 8.47 8.37 8.45
TABLE	A7
value of agricultural imports and share in total imports
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Agricultural imports
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Share of agricultural imports
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Cuba 1	059 1	038 797 901 927 17.66 16.78 17.17 18.01 18.54
Cyprus 170 248 679 513 638 15.11 9.65 17.81 11.51 11.60
Czech Republic 1	856 2	759 3	921 5.75 5.38 5.64
former 
Czechoslovakia 2	009 1	302 13.53 10.42
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 247 300 384 292 455 16.73 11.10 29.54 22.47 34.99
Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 186 223 217 287 317 25.47 27.29 46.30 47.77 52.85
Denmark 2	310 3	071 4	424 6	072 7	108 12.32 9.95 9.71 10.57 10.43
Dominica 11 28 30 29 31 28.48 24.93 23.70 22.96 25.76
Dominican Republic 207 302 556 745 837 15.37 16.86 9.49 14.63 15.59
Ecuador 167 185 392 625 735 7.94 9.06 9.72 9.56 9.34
Egypt 2	551 2	925 3	510 2	741 3	014 43.64 35.80 20.52 18.49 16.77
El Salvador 163 206 644 793 884 15.72 14.76 13.73 13.76 14.76
Equatorial Guinea 7 14 12 48 57 22.32 23.08 2.67 9.65 11.30
Eritrea 59 105 130 12.15 24.37 30.30
Estonia 574 898 732 11.97 11.28 8.40
Ethiopia 266 591 423 17.27 22.16 12.82
former People’s 
Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia
93 208 13.79 24.96
Fiji 80 87 113 158 187 14.42 13.12 13.40 13.50 14.69
Finland 1	062 1	341 1	911 2	546 2	954 7.73 5.49 5.78 5.99 5.82
France 13	991 21	943 23	896 30	657 34	638 11.54 9.49 7.35 7.69 7.45
French Polynesia 98 157 186 253 286 18.60 17.83 14.50 15.77 18.96
Gabon 108 117 170 127 226 15.21 14.47 17.65 12.25 16.52
Gambia 37 70 73 67 163 26.50 37.70 31.89 33.38 71.07
Georgia 232 262 403 35.87 22.93 21.79
Germany 26	041 37	707 34	623 45	588 50	822 13.78 10.90 7.12 7.54 7.09
Ghana 114 180 404 629 1	038 10.46 14.18 13.52 16.16 19.90
Greece 1	158 2	893 3	311 4	744 5	754 11.88 15.07 11.26 10.57 10.95
Guatemala 149 191 657 843 962 9.66 11.14 13.34 13.00 12.32
Guinea 57 126 155 209 216 18.60 18.46 17.34 21.75 19.78
Guinea-bissau 17 24 37 46 41 29.47 31.41 66.47 66.10 58.73
Guyana 53 36 100 90 89 13.85 11.58 17.42 15.71 13.71
Haiti 113 201 351 397 470 31.79 57.53 34.21 33.42 35.95
Honduras 146 111 445 533 650 15.78 11.59 15.75 16.29 16.58
Hungary 1	108 709 1	028 1	681 2	284 11.43 7.36 3.29 3.56 3.85
Iceland 101 143 186 247 292 10.49 8.85 7.57 8.87 8.50
India 1	356 964 3	590 4	904 5	108 10.20 4.44 7.02 6.88 5.43
Indonesia 1	517 1	755 4	292 4	406 5	181 14.53 8.22 14.55 10.43 9.95
Iran, (Islamic 
Republic of) 2	266 2	842 2	963 2	771 3	055 19.94 14.97 19.05 9.37 8.09
Iraq 1	869 1	733 20.53 37.43
TABLE	A7	(cont.)
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Ireland 1	385 2	193 3	409 4	446 4	960 13.12 11.18 6.89 8.25 8.18
Israel 936 1	204 1	842 2	009 2	425 11.93 7.95 5.52 5.87 5.91
Italy 13	944 23	400 21	512 26	831 31	694 15.52 13.56 9.32 9.02 9.03
Jamaica 210 264 432 432 438 17.30 14.11 12.68 11.34 10.77
Japan 17	519 29	114 35	334 36	989 41	478 13.28 12.79 10.21 9.65 9.11
Jordan 535 621 834 1	020 1	379 21.23 25.61 19.09 17.75 16.86
Kazakhstan 437 621 934 8.64 7.38 7.30
Kenya 153 194 467 440 483 7.29 9.20 14.12 11.85 10.61
Kuwait 921 717 1	237 976 1	093 14.75 14.38 16.07 8.88 9.11
Kyrgyzstan 75 96 102 13.95 13.41 10.89
lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 32 13 75 93 120 34.80 6.36 13.88 17.71 23.70
latvia 678 1	101 792 21.09 20.99 11.32
lebanon 587 779 1	161 1	285 1	346 19.01 25.57 17.66 17.93 14.33
lesotho 107 139 140 79 65 23.49 19.33 19.06 7.72 6.35
liberia 97 83 78 93 118 19.23 31.06 19.52 23.21 29.44
libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 1	224 1	236 1	206 784 1	148 17.93 23.73 26.09 17.42 25.50
lithuania 557 789 1	013 10.05 8.05 8.25
luxembourg 1	001 1	474 1	723 	 	 8.47 9.12 8.70
Madagascar 103 59 96 165 90 17.87 13.27 15.02 19.51 10.62
Malawi 32 78 50 159 58 8.20 13.08 8.48 23.25 6.19
Malaysia 1	339 2	211 3	851 4	333 5	842 13.32 7.50 5.23 5.18 5.55
Mali 60 110 144 162 148 15.04 18.50 18.27 14.34 13.05
Malta 161 190 259 362 400 18.99 10.24 8.67 11.20 10.91
Mauritania 89 150 202 291 345 32.96 66.55 55.79 60.59 71.85
Mauritius 152 201 282 353 408 26.21 13.36 13.66 14.16 15.38
Mexico 2	664 4	578 9	691 12	179 13	439 13.98 14.14 9.23 10.88 10.44
Moldova 91 233 283 12.08 16.60 16.01
Mongolia 62 63 93 119 174 10.49 7.66 16.62 14.90 21.67
Morocco 932 820 1	618 1	671 2	058 22.71 12.74 14.54 11.75 11.74
Mozambique 98 219 220 303 342 13.57 25.40 17.34 17.87 20.17
Myanmar 40 96 329 345 421 8.33 12.91 15.43 16.52 18.90
namibia 71 100 226 206 280 4.39 8.40 16.86 11.53 12.86
nepal 37 122 225 369 187 11.75 19.46 15.29 22.58 9.90
netherlands 10	815 17	005 17	780 25	100 28	707 15.43 13.24 8.42 9.48 8.99
new Caledonia 81 112 132 174 209 19.62 13.36 8.67 8.27 9.97
new Zealand 317 648 1	115 1	536 1	790 6.44 7.41 8.46 8.21 8.07
nicaragua 121 120 288 296 301 16.17 17.94 15.85 15.74 16.03
niger 89 117 130 133 136 16.84 31.74 34.78 32.50 26.14
nigeria 2	148 567 1	410 2	172 2	264 14.07 10.01 14.63 20.02 15.99
norway 1	186 1	440 1	871 2	662 3	051 7.66 5.65 5.55 6.74 6.37
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 32 29 549 522 528 4.89 3.12 22.17 29.03 29.35
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oman 263 506 1	139 1	147 1	169 14.98 18.38 21.76 16.86 13.29
Pakistan 791 1	326 1	893 1	779 2	208 17.17 18.28 18.38 13.65 12.30
Panama 130 163 396 444 642 9.31 11.67 12.05 14.38 17.87
Papua new Guinea 174 209 198 194 215 17.97 15.41 19.71 16.28 14.71
Paraguay 76 114 345 238 275 15.66 10.99 12.18 10.20 9.15
Peru 539 589 1	007 1	109 1	359 22.43 16.97 14.10 13.45 13.85
Philippines 623 1	191 2	550 2	891 3	132 7.99 9.65 7.32 7.32 7.40
Poland 2	908 1	216 3	166 3	922 5	494 16.72 11.05 6.54 5.77 6.16
Portugal 1	595 2	753 4	013 4	935 5	800 18.38 11.81 10.08 10.45 10.57
Qatar 202 271 360 501 448 13.81 17.14 12.60 11.50 9.29
Republic of Korea 3	457 6	572 7	963 9	661 10	616 15.08 9.26 5.67 5.40 4.73
Romania 1	402 980 1	005 1	759 2	145 11.98 12.11 7.70 7.33 6.57
Russian Federation 7	952 10	994 12	363 22.63 14.58 12.84
former Union of 
Soviet Socialist 
Republics
17	473 18	481 26.32 19.87
Rwanda 36 46 64 35 60 14.46 14.77 22.07 13.44 21.22
Saint Kitts and nevis 8 19 30 33 58 20.44 16.48 18.65 18.83 35.23
Saint lucia 25 58 78 86 51 21.04 20.68 23.36 26.88 13.24
Saint vincent and 
the Grenadines 18 28 30 42 34 33.40 20.98 18.45 21.13 17.24
Samoa 14 18 21 32 41 21.94 22.69 18.28 22.94 26.54
Sao Tome and 
Principe 5 9 11 19 20 21.00 29.75 22.93 31.01 33.36
Saudi Arabia 4	107 3	651 4	908 6	025 6	203 13.71 14.74 16.45 16.33 13.94
Senegal 268 385 468 749 847 26.35 31.89 29.32 31.79 29.60
Serbia and 
Montenegro 446 755 868 11.30 12.93 12.12
former Socialist 
Federal Republic of 
yugoslavia
1	546 1	944 10.34 12.04
Seychelles 19 29 45 63 49 20.43 16.81 10.68 15.24 9.85
Sierra leone 85 104 130 175 153 24.48 61.98 37.35 31.52 25.15
Singapore 1	922 3	547 4	014 3	961 4	366 8.33 6.03 3.46 3.10 2.66
Slovakia 831 1	164 1	606 6.43 5.32 5.45
Slovenia 783 891 1	114 7.74 6.44 6.48
Solomon Islands 10 18 19 23 10 14.68 16.61 13.57 19.42 8.29
Somalia 148 82 40.05 25.42
South Africa 708 930 1	278 1	861 2	650 4.41 5.41 4.69 4.57 5.49
Spain 4	110 8	002 11	208 16	319 19	798 13.41 9.50 7.53 7.82 7.95
Sri lanka 373 514 753 831 926 20.93 19.67 11.82 12.46 11.61
Sudan 297 284 420 396 638 18.96 24.76 27.70 14.60 23.53
Suriname 49 51 106 97 107 9.79 11.03 21.65 13.79 14.59
Swaziland 40 96 197 92 71 7.35 14.64 16.96 7.70 5.90
Sweden 2	191 3	208 4	067 5	792 6	648 7.24 6.25 5.96 6.93 6.70
Switzerland 2	962 4	513 4	827 6	194 6	725 9.21 6.95 5.87 6.42 6.02
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Syrian Arab Republic 614 677 791 1	050 1	193 14.77 27.97 18.77 19.81 22.52
Tajikistan 112 106 111 16.54 12.07 8.04
Thailand 557 1	576 2	644 3	528 3	830 6.26 4.90 4.57 4.75 4.06
The former yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia
238 325 404 12.85 14.13 14.05
Togo 86 104 56 92 98 17.12 20.91 9.79 10.95 17.59
Tonga 10 16 20 19 22 31.10 27.96 26.19 18.97 22.57
Trinidad and Tobago 333 249 324 363 419 11.87 18.03 10.13 9.31 8.63
Tunisia 518 608 784 976 1	181 15.28 12.09 8.86 8.94 9.27
Turkey 267 1	827 2	769 4	179 4	659 3.66 9.27 6.08 6.03 4.78
Turkmenistan 132 142 99 7.05 5.65 3.07
Uganda 36 31 146 223 281 11.19 5.10 9.83 17.84 13.94
Ukraine 965 2	110 1	691 6.97 9.17 5.83
United Arab Emirates 1	035 1	734 2	830 3	902 4	825 12.14 14.60 5.80 6.73 8.32
United Kingdom 15	757 21	802 27	054 35	054 41	406 14.81 10.37 8.10 8.94 8.94
United Republic of 
Tanzania 114 82 332 296 406 9.62 5.90 20.17 13.94 16.21
United States of 
America 18	204 26	384 44	380 53	480 59	874 7.70 5.21 3.81 4.10 3.92
Uruguay 153 121 389 323 322 10.13 8.63 11.80 14.66 11.05
Uzbekistan 350 152 166 11.41 5.12 4.36
vanuatu 13 14 18 19 20 20.07 16.72 18.50 24.73 15.39
venezuela 
(bolivarian Republic 
of)
1	679 936 1	684 1	762 2	206 15.70 11.86 11.25 19.04 13.21
viet nam 374 226 1	312 1	512 1	968 27.03 8.86 9.03 5.99 7.80
yemen 714 699 769 1	004 1	050 23.79 40.32 33.94 27.33 28.58
Zambia 102 47 89 109 97 10.50 5.13 11.28 7.81 5.75
Zimbabwe 40 56 131 219 465 3.39 2.98 6.93 11.59 21.92
World 244 702 345 084 439 286 550 135 634 508 12.00 10.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
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Afghanistan 80.90 66.05 70.48 77.17
Albania 64.60 62.34 65.75 57.25 53.21 16.48 24.47 66.70 40.58 71.06
Algeria 62.34 62.58 50.73 50.79 54.03 90.83 67.82 39.57 54.53 59.57
American Samoa 64.38 60.26 59.34 71.78 71.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Angola 69.97 82.75 78.25 81.94 83.78 16.47 	 	 73.99 70.25
Antigua and barbuda 77.08 70.62 68.61 72.88 68.53 94.40 27.62 89.49 63.18 62.72
Argentina 58.72 58.49 62.94 54.04 48.81 35.44 60.64 60.62 62.01 64.54
Armenia 54.13 59.72 57.00 96.75 97.89 97.54
Australia 80.72 84.94 88.96 86.85 88.48 52.70 55.95 56.92 61.94 56.37
Austria 59.32 63.42 66.47 67.70 67.72 61.26 63.00 69.68 72.14 75.86
Azerbaijan 41.25 47.74 40.71 78.59 68.14 64.20
bahamas 69.40 67.11 75.27 79.73 77.94 92.79 93.50 73.71 73.61 69.19
bahrain 55.34 54.73 59.71 67.59 70.23 87.68 92.84 94.64 78.26 75.88
bangladesh 52.54 51.95 61.69 55.55 58.81 31.38 9.24 10.94 14.01 41.30
barbados 64.71 68.80 72.21 72.41 67.07 98.22 96.19 98.19 98.03 98.16
belarus 62.61 72.62 70.32 74.99 78.18 78.77
belgium 	 	 66.17 64.77 64.81 	 	 69.27 70.50 70.41
belize 84.53 84.56 80.98 83.03 83.92 93.48 79.25 70.44 53.25 48.33
benin 60.70 78.67 62.44 63.43 78.20 58.35 20.58 33.11 54.69 30.62
bhutan 94.96 81.59 74.98 88.18 86.04 23.27 50.74 74.13 63.94
bolivia 61.92 62.07 58.32 53.06 58.86 69.06 50.38 88.42 90.71 90.05
bosnia and Herzegovina 66.97 71.13 69.34 48.81 90.41 87.79
botswana 81.44 74.58 74.49 76.64 68.49 93.51 90.82 97.39 96.90 87.74
brazil 21.12 46.92 48.56 41.61 52.36 80.42 75.74 63.76 56.64 54.74
brunei Darussalam 74.00 66.98 74.85 74.05 76.49 62.95 36.49 85.17 75.76 59.22
bulgaria 53.46 57.04 72.57 70.27 65.32 60.67 54.49 56.67 57.24 52.48
burkina Faso 79.02 72.44 83.06 90.96 88.27 12.48 9.78 14.78 46.12 34.82
burundi 93.89 94.04 85.44 53.32 40.19 100.00 100.00 98.70 96.07 93.76
Cambodia 96.07 99.88 85.88 76.00 87.72 72.34 60.56 36.44
Cameroon 72.60 91.46 72.75 73.69 72.49 32.17 31.10 27.22 32.62 20.11
Canada 59.78 62.37 67.37 66.84 67.06 24.03 29.00 45.74 51.89 52.39
Cape verde 63.09 75.23 75.99 74.21 80.50 11.07 0.79 87.96 100.00 100.00
Central African Republic 61.71 70.52 81.66 89.60 95.16 7.87 3.49 1.37 0.05 	
Chad 74.50 98.82 96.70 97.15 93.28 0.55 1.35 2.27 1.36 0.08
Chile 54.26 75.94 72.29 75.57 77.01 29.06 32.67 51.03 44.78 48.61
China 28.68 49.26 47.81 46.45 46.06 61.40 56.89 60.42 57.32 65.83
Colombia 49.85 34.55 48.73 45.35 44.06 41.84 32.72 50.50 59.40 55.10
Comoros 76.20 76.01 82.08 69.48 74.21 5.63 0.20 0.07 0.02 0.01
Congo 75.00 77.49 79.76 69.25 73.46 31.67 96.70 97.91 94.48 98.19
Costa Rica 55.78 44.70 51.24 52.36 49.05 23.68 17.16 34.11 36.60 38.31
Côte d’Ivoire 61.92 62.87 64.78 67.86 73.43 26.77 22.25 26.22 30.28 27.40
Croatia 65.16 67.36 66.55 80.64 83.76 87.02
Cuba 60.24 60.30 63.19 62.57 55.86 98.05 96.12 96.60 90.96 91.49
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Cyprus 56.46 64.22 71.23 73.27 76.02 36.82 38.48 46.62 51.14 42.95
Czech Republic 68.24 68.81 67.39 70.40 76.25 76.05
former Czechoslovakia 45.09 63.85 69.85 60.05
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 34.92 38.61 54.81 63.94 52.44 86.96 34.37 0.78 0.80 0.89
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 36.26 58.25 66.84 75.72 65.39 69.95 46.10 42.44 67.79 63.16
Denmark 74.57 76.42 75.24 75.54 75.54 63.46 58.74 60.11 61.59 61.11
Dominica 72.00 75.63 79.11 82.98 81.61 10.46 5.41 10.38 14.42 11.12
Dominican Republic 61.18 60.97 74.41 64.94 68.72 83.38 69.54 60.11 55.32 61.04
Ecuador 47.89 46.27 57.60 64.58 64.85 47.23 12.16 18.11 17.97 19.74
Egypt 46.92 45.29 41.53 36.79 43.76 43.97 38.35 65.22 64.85 60.79
El Salvador 59.56 65.19 66.39 64.00 63.86 62.34 65.76 88.64 92.00 92.26
Equatorial Guinea 78.38 89.71 67.00 86.54 84.06 1.28 0.39 0.69 0.33
Eritrea 50.18 37.26 32.30 43.46 15.44 3.65
Estonia 60.83 64.09 74.30 56.55 61.02 84.34
Ethiopia 39.10 32.74 44.61 12.65 16.14 9.78
former People’s 
Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia
40.38 51.00 25.88 29.83
Fiji 58.79 54.06 57.83 54.43 55.44 98.53 96.46 93.15 91.94 90.26
Finland 50.01 59.40 71.52 74.67 74.71 83.93 81.45 82.24 78.50 76.54
France 51.51 56.69 67.06 67.83 68.63 56.92 57.68 66.25 67.28 67.85
French Polynesia 67.85 74.62 75.94 78.46 78.16 96.76 78.42 91.95 78.54 88.30
Gabon 63.47 71.65 71.42 69.26 68.37 9.40 57.40 87.96 93.39 98.36
Gambia 92.41 94.88 90.00 95.36 94.59 98.33 89.54 88.45 99.27 90.19
Georgia 41.25 53.71 67.30 90.41 88.65 85.46
Germany 49.34 55.80 61.31 61.37 62.95 73.15 70.04 75.53 76.75 76.57
Ghana 59.58 70.17 64.14 76.01 77.63 9.96 9.43 12.31 21.95 20.89
Greece 41.05 57.30 58.44 59.76 61.02 71.39 63.04 71.79 74.49 72.22
Guatemala 45.60 69.14 72.95 69.63 67.45 57.01 55.87 52.96 55.97 55.37
Guinea 96.83 94.97 87.00 81.78 88.59 1.05 8.62 35.49 8.38
Guinea-bissau 92.34 96.35 97.54 95.57 94.42 53.32 4.42 0.73 0.37 0.27
Guyana 64.09 59.03 70.12 75.22 75.92 99.77 99.63 99.01 98.50 97.69
Haiti 67.53 84.29 83.16 78.62 78.42 37.23 45.39 24.87 22.03 22.97
Honduras 41.68 65.66 73.19 73.74 69.78 28.85 12.06 32.79 41.89 30.72
Hungary 71.71 63.73 76.66 74.70 68.93 35.57 38.53 45.30 47.22 44.98
Iceland 80.99 79.70 81.03 78.13 75.96 19.48 64.31 38.98 28.78 25.62
India 80.80 50.07 71.15 71.50 72.34 68.32 71.97 67.00 60.65 65.28
Indonesia 74.44 51.85 61.32 56.38 53.22 78.37 70.94 76.56 82.38 87.48
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 58.03 50.23 45.78 59.09 62.67 48.55 8.13 41.16 32.98 31.06
Iraq 48.99 53.98 1.82 2.95
Ireland 62.10 74.59 73.34 72.57 73.92 59.01 77.99 81.87 84.55 85.51
Israel 31.99 46.43 61.14 60.62 58.84 38.47 57.21 48.54 50.75 46.91
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Italy 35.50 43.18 51.35 53.61 55.98 67.75 72.90 78.95 80.05 82.98
Jamaica 56.18 63.52 71.86 71.06 68.05 76.55 69.05 74.35 78.84 81.54
Japan 34.10 43.93 50.27 48.78 48.23 93.76 89.34 93.91 88.70 90.86
Jordan 45.37 46.68 53.22 60.27 57.68 17.24 27.18 47.50 52.54 55.42
Kazakhstan 89.10 85.44 91.21 11.86 18.13 14.97
Kenya 65.78 73.16 62.24 73.85 61.34 71.40 54.03 54.10 51.38 48.39
Kuwait 42.54 45.75 55.46 57.20 55.83 53.03 77.44 87.82 97.19 95.31
Kyrgyzstan 53.36 82.43 86.22 60.05 59.90 64.90
lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 100.00 98.84 98.22 97.83 98.09 2.58 14.14 6.56
latvia 69.85 69.33 69.58 87.75 80.06 87.23
lebanon 38.93 59.90 57.52 54.80 60.31 8.74 18.44 58.85 72.04 45.74
lesotho 63.91 57.55 47.31 45.73 38.34 15.92 89.88 82.57 73.04 99.54
liberia 84.55 90.32 67.21 77.12 78.85 29.17 40.25 51.10 12.99 18.70
libyan Arab Jamahiriya 55.40 65.86 63.99 78.98 72.08 	 31.60 88.09 50.35 36.32
lithuania 70.26 66.69 67.86 73.63 68.66 74.14
luxembourg 	 	 73.25 75.00 73.74 	 	 66.62 72.20 71.02
Madagascar 99.65 82.36 91.63 95.97 88.59 12.84 19.74 12.95 7.87 15.16
Malawi 70.04 44.09 70.62 73.26 80.40 94.08 86.50 82.30 73.82 71.11
Malaysia 62.10 60.02 61.55 58.57 62.17 90.35 84.91 91.27 94.73 95.53
Mali 82.63 85.04 88.77 89.57 89.33 7.45 6.95 9.33 13.04 10.58
Malta 59.23 69.58 79.21 78.15 79.89 72.18 84.21 95.79 95.27 94.53
Mauritania 76.52 77.62 82.10 76.49 75.31 0.28 0.41 0.81 0.95
Mauritius 81.92 72.96 71.19 69.11 71.52 99.90 98.91 96.20 98.54 99.06
Mexico 33.38 49.40 48.43 52.55 52.44 29.20 34.33 47.20 47.93 47.90
Moldova 60.69 60.67 70.66 80.24 83.50 82.22
Mongolia 76.43 94.13 73.75 74.98 82.14 0.56 2.08 6.98 1.32 28.29
Morocco 46.31 54.22 37.84 44.80 40.52 27.13 46.12 34.07 32.94 42.90
Mozambique 52.31 60.07 70.03 60.50 57.95 95.61 88.30 96.28 46.72 36.99
Myanmar 99.33 97.67 90.71 89.51 90.32 88.25 33.48 17.40 16.67 9.71
namibia 28.64 24.73 69.96 71.67 83.71 13.31 39.14 63.59 75.63 67.53
nepal 37.12 54.42 59.69 63.09 49.36 11.69 16.41 63.61 75.62 72.07
netherlands 58.48 61.35 60.63 60.71 62.37 60.14 61.13 66.87 68.02 68.46
new Caledonia 75.98 69.59 80.45 80.74 81.70 68.44 53.69 34.79 38.94
new Zealand 69.24 73.93 79.39 80.92 80.77 61.22 62.61 68.32 66.74 64.96
nicaragua 47.23 69.81 73.23 74.16 81.13 61.74 68.66 65.72 65.27 67.75
niger 73.96 67.43 91.84 94.90 90.10 1.42 1.32 5.40 7.43 20.95
nigeria 73.15 62.73 63.88 69.68 67.16 27.66 11.29 15.04 13.12 16.17
norway 50.78 65.90 69.02 69.04 70.60 95.92 94.70 95.49 97.30 95.48
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 47.31 67.39 63.89 65.39 64.53 42.70 17.04 33.00 34.53 35.08
oman 59.65 52.61 59.84 62.95 63.94 44.08 35.85 70.26 84.02 85.77
Pakistan 64.31 60.60 63.79 64.18 68.20 90.69 82.45 83.87 70.23 80.95
Panama 71.71 73.87 74.73 74.84 83.43 34.80 17.88 22.46 22.73 22.32
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Papua new Guinea 77.33 77.45 71.02 64.24 67.84 55.15 63.10 82.27 59.12 65.02
Paraguay 75.24 94.49 83.20 67.36 82.18 33.90 18.86 34.45 33.50 42.22
Peru 48.22 57.74 57.92 56.09 58.84 77.00 81.21 63.00 54.75 52.15
Philippines 57.80 66.48 67.45 69.47 76.09 91.80 79.76 71.54 73.62 74.39
Poland 35.77 57.08 64.27 66.73 65.81 55.38 50.09 73.81 68.65 69.98
Portugal 32.26 48.54 56.82 56.77 57.78 92.75 88.94 84.95 83.39 82.47
Qatar 51.21 46.19 51.13 57.27 56.71 	 37.32 22.82 47.48 59.69
Republic of Korea 50.72 41.01 49.99 51.05 52.19 79.16 63.95 69.10 83.43 85.99
Romania 30.45 47.27 60.65 48.40 49.09 34.29 42.09 35.01 37.39 42.09
Russian Federation 61.63 61.20 57.54 63.86 39.89 58.42
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 46.52 54.12 54.53 65.93
Rwanda 82.58 80.97 73.67 76.93 87.20 0.98 81.12 88.49 38.36 33.81
Saint Kitts and nevis 77.80 74.40 77.73 77.95 84.52 98.49 99.83 99.42 99.37 99.18
Saint lucia 75.28 71.18 75.80 78.19 68.17 36.05 13.24 26.97 41.65 6.44
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 53.38 60.35 62.15 67.30 61.95 21.66 19.93 30.12 39.28 7.40
Samoa 72.72 60.75 51.73 66.74 70.80 64.45 64.20 91.04 89.64 87.55
Sao Tome and Principe 82.42 93.22 94.20 90.87 90.16 9.24 3.85 1.25 0.79 3.76
Saudi Arabia 48.92 52.64 54.09 51.35 59.76 59.05 27.33 72.38 84.30 77.37
Senegal 74.24 65.75 74.38 74.74 72.93 95.58 96.35 90.41 91.55 82.95
Serbia and Montenegro 63.53 75.52 76.93 79.56 69.53 82.19
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia 33.77 46.87 54.84 53.65
Seychelles 83.21 77.32 78.76 72.68 81.46 88.24 70.85 68.20 61.18 93.90
Sierra leone 78.16 77.98 77.35 79.31 79.65 14.03 13.21 25.92 13.23 11.12
Singapore 64.83 62.60 64.48 66.63 69.85 74.65 76.87 76.92 87.80 90.37
Slovakia 70.38 70.56 69.07 72.73 74.47 72.67
Slovenia 62.78 66.62 64.63 76.95 83.47 83.26
Solomon Islands 89.25 84.15 85.55 92.81 80.69 88.79 73.13 80.23 76.76 76.65
Somalia 81.36 82.84 0.91
South Africa 58.93 63.79 73.06 69.37 70.18 45.23 53.72 58.19 55.88 53.02
Spain 24.25 54.10 60.99 62.43 63.86 51.70 47.99 49.90 49.24 50.67
Sri lanka 78.50 65.94 58.53 58.91 60.13 59.55 62.40 53.89 56.35 59.62
Sudan 77.15 52.85 46.31 46.03 36.27 31.85 25.45 20.58 18.95 19.90
Suriname 65.40 64.22 62.98 77.54 78.46 85.85 70.42 58.51 21.94 46.05
Swaziland 60.12 59.43 65.18 62.45 56.74 87.91 91.49 94.82 84.06 90.68
Sweden 69.66 67.86 70.86 71.01 71.70 53.04 78.03 82.36 83.34 85.86
Switzerland 54.69 62.78 68.97 68.51 69.58 95.38 97.13 98.34 98.25 98.31
Syrian Arab Republic 62.59 57.99 64.40 65.60 62.03 28.51 21.75 13.45 15.91 25.98
Tajikistan 45.21 68.74 82.31 66.71 55.40 49.09
Thailand 81.96 79.50 69.08 66.71 65.44 79.20 85.84 86.47 86.48 92.57
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 64.03 65.30 60.86 70.18 68.00 64.71
TABLE	A8	(cont.)
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Share in total food  imports
(Percentage)
Share in total food exports 
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Togo 79.84 72.69 57.62 56.98 56.69 1.33 53.92 61.44 70.60 57.61
Tonga 75.62 72.60 62.70 62.85 64.95 75.58 7.10 9.87 3.26 6.84
Trinidad and Tobago 62.69 55.37 72.86 73.61 71.69 85.61 93.87 94.66 94.18 90.65
Tunisia 46.00 46.91 47.14 50.90 53.28 70.39 70.97 81.19 72.39 85.31
Turkey 86.65 54.12 54.31 46.20 54.23 52.68 59.85 71.93 72.44 76.76
Turkmenistan 87.52 87.83 87.50 10.00 29.82 23.31
Uganda 84.51 87.55 81.67 61.34 58.49 0.95 37.74 35.48 45.71
Ukraine 61.95 56.86 65.81 50.90 68.01 64.34
United Arab Emirates 54.50 52.05 55.13 54.40 61.65 64.96 55.59 71.03 64.05 58.83
United Kingdom 61.57 68.54 69.64 69.11 69.64 70.54 72.02 83.85 82.05 85.10
United Republic of 
Tanzania 60.86 95.94 74.86 64.72 57.78 24.83 26.74 20.00 20.00 20.90
United States of America 78.41 69.44 67.23 70.10 71.87 26.63 36.61 45.81 44.08 42.57
Uruguay 35.80 43.84 71.11 56.01 67.35 54.61 69.26 75.77 74.49 75.81
Uzbekistan 56.95 82.46 59.23 52.98 35.97 17.75
vanuatu 89.71 89.28 90.01 89.97 89.05 90.27 80.20 91.61 73.22 92.70
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 55.83 59.88 68.61 76.95 70.51 21.07 46.98 70.93 82.20 68.61
viet nam 63.06 92.52 84.63 76.78 75.33 81.94 79.00 79.69 84.14 86.29
yemen 53.41 57.31 64.76 56.89 49.47 73.07 37.95 26.74 46.06 48.92
Zambia 35.30 51.52 71.19 58.78 83.42 81.71 33.80 85.02 66.49 30.44
Zimbabwe 56.51 63.06 65.15 33.70 45.07 58.20 56.46 63.64 55.99 65.43
World 51.85 57.17 61.50 62.13 63.01 53.57 58.38 63.11 63.60 64.93
TABLE	A8	(cont.)
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Per capita GDP
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Per capita agricultural GDP  
of the agricultural population
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Afghanistan
Albania 1	094 927 1	189 1	393 1	467 371 367 634 709 795
Algeria 1	847 1	793 1	768 1	917 1	984 340 513 645 782 825
American Samoa
Angola 926 902 737 818 880 116 98 60 80 88
Antigua and barbuda 4	238 7	746 9	375 10	110 10	534 1	000 1	056 1	294 2	313 2	375
Argentina 7	306 5	884 7	574 6	856 7	387 2	326 2	362 3	577 3	868 4	189
Armenia 622 882 974 1	163 1	496 1	641
Australia 13	995 16	271 20	444 21	853 22	303 7	921 10	223 15	166 20	079 20	826
Austria 15	631 19	381 23	299 24	139 24	658 3	469 5	120 10	149 11	567 13	082
Azerbaijan 646 851 938 389 491 524
bahamas 13	738 15	682 15	743 16	210 16	372 7	250 9	231 13	000 15	300 15	600
bahrain 11	173 9	704 11	756 12	943 14	930 8	286 14	300 34	143 40	143 55	167
bangladesh 235 258 330 359 371 108 116 149 160 164
barbados 7	707 8	673 9	513 9	274 9	668 6	640 7	941 11	727 11	300 15	700
belarus 1	135 1	357 1	513 1	017 1	340 1	447
belgium 15	093 18	420 22	043 22	671 23	279 5	861 8	395 15	278 18	089 19	079
belize 1	931 2	532 3	396 3	887 3	973 873 1	063 1	635 2	947 3	026
benin 317 305 362 387 387 131 163 243 278 295
bhutan 102 154 236 263 268 63 77 89 90 129
bolivia 1	077 872 1	007 1	021 1	038 258 272 304 323 312
bosnia and Herzegovina 1	145 1	219 1	269 2	566 4	286 4	833
botswana 1	137 2	352 3	027 3	408 3	544 212 244 184 184 192
brazil 3	116 3	162 3	469 3	499 3	636 441 736 1	223 1	512 1	589
brunei Darussalam
bulgaria 1	367 1	733 1	551 1	821 1	939 880 1	159 2	629 3	296 3	635
burkina Faso 187 203 222 236 238 66 70 78 77 88
burundi 131 145 110 106 108 65 64 54 53 52
Cambodia 526 256 272 298 309 347 174 148 150 148
Cameroon 679 670 590 636 655 330 319 477 576 621
Canada 16	681 19	168 22	960 24	315 24	835 6	466 13	489 19	108 23	152 24	428
Cape verde 633 868 1	209 1	309 1	351 206 411 630 691 708
Central African Republic 320 276 256 235 234 153 142 176 198 197
Chad 155 203 183 217 276 72 77 93 117 202
Chile 2	471 3	117 4	937 5	185 5	434 1	120 1	805 2	305 2	635 2	814
China 238 487 1	066 1	321 1	441 93 145 209 227 241
Colombia 1	607 1	848 1	980 2	038 2	086 796 1	288 1	224 1	210 1	109
Comoros 357 332 289 284 281 138 147 156 168 167
Congo 965 1	113 922 952 965 112 133 123 141 149
Costa Rica 3	192 3	111 4	051 4	235 4	333 811 1	119 1	670 1	800 1	867
Côte d’Ivoire 967 668 675 615 591 295 239 315 330 338
Croatia 4	171 4	769 4	958 3	613 4	351 4	784
Cuba 2	418 2	934 2	469 2	573 2	681 496 773 830 931 995
TABLE	A9
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Per capita GDP
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Per capita agricultural GDP  
of the agricultural population
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Cyprus 5	387 8	755 11	656 12	353 12	714 786 2	415 5	179 6	267 6	724
Czech Republic 5	404 5	880 6	123 2	293 2	477 2	623
former Czechoslovakia
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 301 423 691 475 490 148 335 688 510 539
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 252 204 90 87 90 97 98 87 78 81
Denmark 20	900 24	467 29	612 30	393 31	059 6	083 10	463 18	985 19	828 21	109
Dominica 1	824 3	097 3	423 3	139 3	203 1	360 2	300 2	278 2	056 2	647
Dominican Republic 1	498 1	602 2	333 2	434 2	447 811 848 1	486 1	727 2	263
Ecuador 1	363 1	310 1	294 1	368 1	438 469 655 497 561 582
Egypt 854 1	150 1	460 1	524 1	558 328 463 620 682 710
El Salvador 1	919 1	632 2	113 2	134 2	138 583 535 629 632 674
Equatorial Guinea 1	448 692 2	941 3	715 3	982 289 200 290 270 290
Eritrea 184 173 170 42 28 30
Estonia 3	983 4	951 5	317 1	792 1	878 2	000
Ethiopia 101 99 109 55 48 56
former People’s 
Democratic Republic  
of Ethiopia
Fiji 1	916 1	777 2	069 2	174 2	235 664 723 745 759 975
Finland 15	284 19	559 22	867 24	249 25	107 6	646 7	658 12	526 14	549 15	492
France 15	788 19	068 21	948 22	579 22	987 5	426 8	825 16	365 17	562 20	934
French Polynesia 10	636 14	159 14	511 15	656 15	766 649 1	000 1	263 1	456 1	500
Gabon 4	731 4	113 3	931 3	910 3	924 705 699 672 810 874
Gambia 325 325 322 323 341 149 117 127 111 125
Georgia 585 729 799 631 772 717
Germany 15	672 19	439 22	583 22	886 23	238 2	691 5	478 10	047 11	188 12	236
Ghana 235 215 255 273 281 183 148 164 175 179
Greece 8	558 8	845 10	281 11	508 11	990 2	817 3	836 5	051 5	015 6	350
Guatemala 1	715 1	476 1	682 1	669 1	672 743 678 768 775 804
Guinea 426 341 386 402 405 108 86 105 114 118
Guinea-bissau 163 183 154 135 137 84 92 98 99 102
Guyana 820 622 950 956 969 611 759 1	433 2	118 2	184
Haiti 830 659 491 469 445 391 340 201 201 192
Honduras 957 895 914 936 958 232 303 360 429 451
Hungary 3	645 4	054 4	645 5	235 5	470 638 922 1	507 1	693 2	040
Iceland 21	601 25	318 29	596 30	845 32	226 24	958 24	857 28	696 48	000 50	455
India 222 312 452 510 538 126 159 192 200 201
Indonesia 392 601 778 853 886 182 227 278 312 325
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1	318 1	150 1	441 1	652 1	738 413 537 774 932 983
Iraq
Ireland 9	734 13	152 24	566 28	200 29	264 6	150 10	829 28	531 36	365 39	008
Israel 12	591 15	092 18	640 17	984 18	395 5	720 10	219 19	344 21	170 22	527
TABLE	A9	(cont.)
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Per capita GDP
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Per capita agricultural GDP  
of the agricultural population
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Italy 12	889 16	144 18	609 19	164 19	420 3	409 4	898 9	060 9	421 9	336
Jamaica 2	458 2	808 2	881 2	931 2	962 640 904 996 992 1	021
Japan 23	909 33	078 37	073 38	198 39	184 6	847 10	385 13	143 15	341 16	714
Jordan 1	824 1	580 1	683 1	765 1	849 221 369 283 339 347
Kazakhstan 1	186 1	614 1	770 515 640 662
Kenya 361 372 344 341 343 88 87 78 78 79
Kuwait 21	601 14	359 16	275 15	911 15	719
Kyrgyzstan 278 301 317 377 434 456
lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 222 225 327 359 372 176 173 223 232 235
latvia 3	277 4	141 4	535 1	085 1	374 1	478
lebanon 10	239 3	280 4	820 5	110 5	353 5	026 5	355 7	992 9	964 11	095
lesotho 307 389 485 526 543 205 191 205 197 198
liberia 755 266 177 120 118 758 282 201 140 139
libyan Arab Jamahiriya 4	517 5	656 6	660 7	319 7	503 1	387 3	119 8	470 11	229 12	270
lithuania 3	281 4	117 4	420 1	493 1	874 2	023
luxembourg 19	365 30	735 44	023 45	558 46	987 4	900 7	286 12	900 12	000 27	000
Madagascar 330 265 244 226 232 91 91 86 83 83
Malawi 159 134 150 147 149 51 41 68 70 72
Malaysia 1	847 2	558 3	825 4	069 4	277 999 1	577 1	915 2	242 2	359
Mali 218 182 210 234 232 96 101 105 115 107
Malta 4	870 6	506 9	537 9	541 9	629 1	808 7	000 18	500 18	833 22	800
Mauritania 326 308 353 373 386 88 111 133 121 122
Mauritius 1	600 2	524 3	766 4	161 4	294 829 1	543 1	978 2	173 2	282
Mexico 5	088 4	959 5	753 5	737 5	903 639 751 957 1	050 1	106
Moldova 305 367 394 338 368 395
Mongolia 497 566 378 405 442 429 463 451 368 444
Morocco 924 1	099 1	165 1	259 1	282 332 582 501 700 725
Mozambique 179 161 214 254 269 75 63 70 80 85
Myanmar
namibia 1	975 1	639 1	798 1	871 1	926 273 279 343 346 363
nepal 148 182 233 236 240 80 94 96 99 98
netherlands 15	651 18	518 23	148 23	077 23	288 6	405 10	787 17	343 15	746 16	363
new Caledonia 9	692 13	386 12	349 13	171 13	176 986 1	541 1	684 1	899 1	949
new Zealand 10	592 11	678 13	820 15	041 15	586 6	686 9	802 13	084 8	376 8	800
nicaragua 1	113 738 776 769 779 465 404 673 769 783
niger 275 199 172 175 170 92 82 78 80 76
nigeria 427 373 366 393 397 187 228 308 348 364
norway 21	633 27	445 37	310 38	505 39	457 6	019 8	615 14	044 14	462 19	273
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 1	381 871 730 824 593 630
oman 4	696 6	896 7	718 7	807 7	848 178 292 397 432 446
Pakistan 334 451 510 527 547 144 188 239 240 242
TABLE	A9	(cont.)
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Per capita GDP
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Per capita agricultural GDP  
of the agricultural population
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
Panama 3	263 2	960 3	912 3	995 4	168 698 797 1	148 1	340 1	418
Papua new Guinea 587 542 639 596 599 185 181 212 195 197
Paraguay 1	530 1	504 1	425 1	351 1	358 565 688 729 826 834
Peru 2	283 1	697 2	028 2	130 2	205 373 412 628 693 708
Philippines 985 909 994 1	055 1	100 355 360 401 445 466
Poland 3	371 2	947 4	267 4	587 4	835 298 342 740 839 870
Portugal 5	971 8	194 10	574 10	674 10	770 1	091 1	662 2	337 4	283 4	470
Qatar
Republic of Korea 3	305 6	639 10	786 12	290 12	793 1	218 2	724 5	382 5	807 6	973
Romania 1	880 1	881 1	674 1	911 2	075 588 1	031 1	522 1	905 2	403
Russian Federation 1	760 2	141 2	309 978 1	266 1	222
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics
Rwanda 280 266 237 254 261 112 93 108 119 117
Saint Kitts and nevis 2	841 5	220 7	738 8	000 8	310 667 667 800 889 1	333
Saint lucia 2	389 3	802 4	610 4	537 4	667 868 1	595 1	147 788 1	485
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 1	540 2	455 2	822 2	933 3	025 588 1	161 1	036 1	111 1	370
Samoa 1	174 1	138 1	335 1	382 1	411 329 368 617 596 643
Sao Tome and Principe 585 336 315 329 333 71 86 104 100 108
Saudi Arabia 15	907 8	763 8	392 8	434 8	625 636 2	362 4	233 4	975 5	469
Senegal 420 421 466 492 509 126 119 122 119 126
Serbia and Montenegro 	 0 817 919 986 680 869 973
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia
Seychelles 4	500 5	493 7	646 7	012 6	793 352 276 274 270 254
Sierra leone 287 252 150 210 217 201 183 118 170 177
Singapore 8	942 14	461 21	982 22	223 23	746 6	368 12	583 18	167 19	400 21	400
Slovakia 3	773 4	245 4	474 1	747 2	018 1	566
Slovenia 9	547 10	454 10	942 13	500 17	000 20	440
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa 3	267 3	003 3	009 3	228 3	334 416 531 616 662 690
Spain 8	549 10	944 13	732 14	706 15	137 1	830 3	559 6	114 7	034 8	563
Sri lanka 448 581 857 929 976 244 287 332 338 335
Sudan 288 293 388 432 449 114 116 224 57 60
Suriname 2	573 2	097 2	129 2	319 2	410 869 906 1	099 1	163 1	725
Swaziland 894 1	188 1	330 1	381 1	403 407 443 414 409 423
Sweden 18	952 22	835 26	758 28	250 29	235 5	890 9	833 13	022 15	306 17	004
Switzerland 28	354 31	964 34	043 34	618 35	231 4	461 5	660 7	810 8	578 8	972
Syrian Arab Republic 978 862 1	100 1	109 1	122 662 575 889 934 1	000
Tajikistan 164 210 231 130 189 178
Thailand 807 1	452 1	998 2	246 2	359 221 317 367 431 413
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Per capita GDP
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Per capita agricultural GDP  
of the agricultural population
(US$ constant 2000 prices)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001 2003 2004
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 1	720 1	734 1	769 1	331 1	438 1	540
Togo 362 310 292 289 291 121 150 171 172 176
Tonga 1	021 1	202 1	505 1	577 1	590 617 714 1	057 1	152 1	152
Trinidad and Tobago 6	811 4	929 6	208 7	576 8	021 545 627 1	027 991 806
Tunisia 1	328 1	476 2	048 2	229 2	332 480 744 1	023 1	103 1	209
Turkey 1	873 2	373 2	779 2	951 3	171 1	009 1	059 1	221 1	265 1	329
Turkmenistan 624 989 1	140 435 618 964
Uganda 241 177 251 271 277 163 96 108 112 115
Ukraine 637 810 915 573 658 807
United Arab Emirates 44	881 22	213 24	293 22	871 22	832 62	286 19	542 33	504 36	429 38	254
United Kingdom 15	743 19	795 24	312 25	681 26	399 6	900 10	700 12	452 13	249 17	567
United Republic of 
Tanzania 355 257 262 300 313 165 131 140 153 160
United States of America 22	361 27	400 33	915 35	175 36	352 8	329 12	375 22	323 25	338 27	651
Uruguay 5	064 4	854 5	972 5	165 5	759 2	267 2	628 3	289 3	772 4	122
Uzbekistan 553 595 632 602 722 751
vanuatu 1	145 1	147 1	218 1	094 1	101 414 446 472 811 838
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 5	907 4	945 4	823 3	964 4	567 1	389 1	606 2	076 2	155 2	582
viet nam 201 228 400 470 499 110 108 145 157 159
yemen 491 465 524 529 524 180 109 147 164 169
Zambia 461 370 312 341 353 84 81 88 89 92
Zimbabwe 553 587 564 604 613 120 117 141 178 182
World 3 973 4 531 5 189 5 352 5 505 328 384 436 453 472
TABLE	A9	(cont.)
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TABLE	A10
Dietary energy, protein and fat consumption
Energy
(kcal/person/day)
Protein
(g/person/day)
Fat
(g/person/day)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003
Afghanistan 2	280 1	960 64 55 40 40
Albania 2	690 2	560 2	860 79 79 96 62 66 86
Algeria 2	640 2	880 3	040 67 78 82 62 71 68
American Samoa
Angola 2	110 1	770 2	070 51 42 45 50 46 43
Antigua and barbuda 2	120 2	450 2	320 66 81 73 76 100 83
Argentina 3	210 2	960 2	980 107 94 94 116 103 100
Armenia 2	260 68 47
Australia 3	070 3	210 3	120 105 109 107 115 132 134
Austria 3	330 3	490 3	740 96 101 111 146 156 162
Azerbaijan 2	620 77 41
bahamas 2	470 2	720 2	710 71 81 92 79 91 96
bahrain
bangladesh 1	980 2	060 2	200 44 44 48 15 19 25
barbados 3	040 3	130 3	110 85 96 92 94 108 99
belarus 2	960 87 99
belgium 3	640 92 162
belize 2	770 2	580 2	840 69 64 76 74 64 69
benin 2	040 2	320 2	530 49 55 62 48 43 48
bhutan
bolivia 2	130 2	120 2	220 55 54 57 52 49 58
bosnia and Herzegovina 2	710 72 58
botswana 2	030 2	240 2	180 65 69 68 44 57 51
brazil 2	680 2	780 3	060 64 68 83 65 82 93
brunei Darussalam 2	590 2	790 2	850 72 82 82 55 72 73
bulgaria 3	620 3	460 2	850 104 107 89 107 116 95
burkina Faso 1	720 2	290 2	460 51 67 71 33 46 56
burundi 2	030 1	860 1	640 68 57 45 16 14 10
Cambodia 1	710 1	810 2	060 39 43 51 13 21 32
Cameroon 2	280 2	090 2	270 57 50 59 48 44 46
Canada 2	930 3	030 3	590 93 96 106 120 129 147
Cape verde 2	540 2	930 3	220 68 71 76 54 68 99
Central African Republic 2	300 1	870 1	940 36 40 46 64 61 64
Chad 1	640 1	740 2	160 50 51 66 39 44 67
Chile 2	670 2	540 2	860 71 70 80 60 63 85
China 2	330 2	680 2	940 54 65 82 33 53 90
Colombia 2	290 2	410 2	580 49 54 60 47 56 65
Comoros 1	800 1	900 1	750 39 44 42 35 43 42
Congo 2	040 1	890 2	150 38 40 43 41 44 54
Costa Rica 2	510 2	730 2	850 62 68 71 60 70 78
Côte d’Ivoire 2	830 2	470 2	630 59 52 54 50 50 59
Croatia 2	770 74 87
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Energy
(kcal/person/day)
Protein
(g/person/day)
Fat
(g/person/day)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003
Cuba 2	880 2	880 3	190 70 68 78 78 80 53
Cyprus 2	790 3	050 3	240 77 95 105 104 123 132
Czech Republic 3	240 93 115
former Czechoslovakia 3	360 3	520 99 102 123 131
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 2	300 2	450 2	160 74 80 63 37 48 35
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 2	110 2	190 1	610 33 33 25 34 35 26
Denmark 3	100 3	190 3	450 87 102 110 135 132 140
Dominica 2	240 2	970 2	770 58 76 83 59 83 76
Dominican Republic 2	270 2	270 2	290 50 50 49 57 65 78
Ecuador 2	360 2	490 2	710 50 50 57 60 87 99
Egypt 2	900 3	180 3	350 72 84 93 65 58 58
El Salvador 2	300 2	450 2	560 56 60 67 50 54 61
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea 1	520 47 29
Estonia 3	160 90 96
Ethiopia 1	860 54 20
former People’s 
Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia
1	860 1	640 59 48 25 24
Fiji 2	500 2	600 2	960 62 68 74 88 97 97
Finland 3	040 3	160 3	150 94 99 102 129 127 127
France 3	390 3	540 3	640 112 117 118 148 163 170
French Polynesia 2	760 2	850 2	900 76 87 99 91 102 124
Gabon 2	420 2	450 2	670 71 69 73 44 49 55
Gambia 1	770 2	380 2	280 43 52 52 40 52 77
Georgia 2	520 71 52
Germany 3	330 3	390 3	490 96 98 100 136 142 141
Ghana 1	700 2	010 2	650 40 44 55 35 36 38
Greece 3	310 3	570 3	680 105 112 117 124 141 145
Guatemala 2	290 2	340 2	210 58 59 56 44 44 49
Guinea 2	230 2	040 2	420 50 47 51 50 42 58
Guinea-bissau 2	010 2	260 2	070 42 45 39 54 55 51
Guyana 2	500 2	360 2	730 63 58 76 52 31 56
Haiti 2	040 1	770 2	090 48 44 47 34 29 38
Honduras 2	120 2	310 2	360 53 55 57 42 57 65
Hungary 3	450 3	670 3	500 97 102 95 131 151 149
Iceland 3	300 3	110 3	240 132 114 124 143 123 130
India 2	080 2	370 2	440 51 57 57 33 41 52
Indonesia 2	220 2	650 2	880 47 59 64 35 51 61
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2	730 2	930 3	090 72 77 83 61 63 61
Iraq 2	840 3	050 75 78 58 63
Ireland 3	570 3	610 3	690 112 114 117 137 137 136
Israel 3	150 3	390 3	680 106 111 124 108 120 149
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Energy
(kcal/person/day)
Protein
(g/person/day)
Fat
(g/person/day)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003
Italy 3	560 3	600 3	670 106 111 113 129 151 157
Jamaica 2	610 2	530 2	680 66 63 68 64 64 75
Japan 2	710 2	820 2	770 87 95 92 69 80 86
Jordan 2	610 2	800 2	680 67 74 69 62 70 80
Kazakhstan 2	710 85 80
Kenya 2	250 2	020 2	150 62 56 59 42 45 49
Kuwait 2	980 2	410 3	060 92 73 84 88 82 113
Kyrgyzstan 3	050 101 54
lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 2	070 2	110 2	320 51 51 61 22 23 29
latvia 3	020 83 109
lebanon 2	710 3	140 3	170 75 79 89 82 102 113
lesotho 2	360 2	420 2	630 69 68 73 33 37 37
liberia 2	550 2	320 1	940 50 42 32 48 47 52
libyan Arab Jamahiriya 3	450 3	270 3	330 90 82 79 109 105 107
lithuania 3	370 110 100
luxembourg 3	710 118 161
Madagascar 2	370 2	110 2	040 57 50 47 35 31 29
Malawi 2	270 1	930 2	140 66 53 55 40 27 33
Malaysia 2	760 2	770 2	870 59 65 75 78 97 84
Mali 1	700 2	240 2	230 51 62 63 42 49 46
Malta 3	280 3	260 3	530 102 101 118 112 114 110
Mauritania 2	050 2	540 2	780 71 79 81 55 61 71
Mauritius 2	670 2	840 2	960 61 69 80 67 72 80
Mexico 3	120 3	090 3	180 85 81 91 79 81 89
Moldova 2	730 66 54
Mongolia 2	380 2	210 2	250 80 75 79 85 80 84
Morocco 2	750 3	060 3	070 72 85 84 52 59 59
Mozambique 1	860 1	780 2	070 32 32 39 32 38 33
Myanmar 2	330 2	620 2	900 60 65 79 35 42 49
namibia 2	230 2	070 2	260 68 59 65 42 34 52
nepal 1	850 2	390 2	450 49 62 62 26 32 38
netherlands 3	050 3	260 3	440 93 96 108 130 138 144
new Caledonia 2	910 2	830 2	780 78 78 82 99 103 113
new Zealand 3	080 3	170 3	200 98 95 92 124 128 118
nicaragua 2	270 2	230 2	290 62 55 62 44 45 47
niger 2	140 2	060 2	160 64 55 57 35 31 39
nigeria 2	050 2	430 2	700 48 56 61 55 59 63
norway 3	320 3	170 3	480 102 98 107 144 130 144
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 2	240 61 63
oman
Pakistan 2	210 2	320 2	340 55 59 59 46 56 69
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Energy
(kcal/person/day)
Protein
(g/person/day)
Fat
(g/person/day)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003
Panama 2	270 2	270 2	260 57 59 64 67 65 65
Papua new Guinea
Paraguay 2	580 2	470 2	530 75 70 69 70 69 87
Peru 2	130 2	010 2	570 54 50 67 38 41 48
Philippines 2	220 2	320 2	450 51 55 58 36 41 48
Poland 3	530 3	380 3	370 111 103 99 117 113 112
Portugal 2	780 3	410 3	750 76 101 119 87 120 141
Qatar
Republic of Korea 2	990 3	020 3	040 83 82 89 37 57 78
Romania 3	210 3	020 3	520 98 91 109 95 92 101
Russian Federation 3	080 91 83
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 3	360 3	240 103 104 94 100
Rwanda 2	270 1	960 2	070 54 47 49 15 16 15
Saint Kitts and nevis 2	270 2	630 2	700 62 71 81 67 86 87
Saint lucia 2	360 2	690 2	960 61 83 95 64 64 81
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 2	420 2	290 2	580 55 58 71 59 68 68
Samoa 2	460 2	650 2	910 60 71 84 96 116 133
Sao Tome and Principe 2	090 2	280 2	440 46 51 48 68 83 73
Saudi Arabia 2	900 2	770 2	820 77 77 76 76 81 82
Senegal 2	280 2	260 2	310 67 68 58 54 53 69
Serbia and Montenegro 2	670 75 118
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia 3	650 3	540 106 101 104 110
Seychelles 2	260 2	310 2	460 66 68 84 44 53 73
Sierra leone 2	110 1	980 1	930 45 42 44 58 56 45
Singapore
Slovakia 2	830 77 107
Slovenia 2	970 102 108
Solomon Islands 2	220 2	060 2	250 56 52 51 53 45 41
Somalia 1	650 1	760 55 58 64 62
South Africa 2	780 2	830 2	940 73 73 77 63 66 76
Spain 3	050 3	270 3	410 96 104 113 113 140 154
Sri lanka 2	360 2	250 2	390 47 48 54 47 45 44
Sudan 2	180 2	160 2	260 63 67 71 75 59 69
Suriname 2	400 2	490 2	660 61 63 60 52 47 71
Swaziland 2	400 2	450 2	360 63 59 60 41 46 45
Sweden 2	980 2	970 3	160 97 95 107 124 123 125
Switzerland 3	460 3	310 3	500 96 95 96 158 151 157
Syrian Arab Republic 2	950 2	800 3	060 80 72 78 83 81 101
Tajikistan 1	840 48 40
Thailand 2	280 2	190 2	410 50 51 57 32 45 52
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 2	800 72 91
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Energy
(kcal/person/day)
Protein
(g/person/day)
Fat
(g/person/day)
Countries 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003 1979–1981 1989–1991 2001–2003
Togo 2	190 2	180 2	320 50 52 53 33 44 48
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago 2	960 2	670 2	770 78 63 65 73 72 76
Tunisia 2	820 3	120 3	250 77 84 89 70 84 94
Turkey 3	230 3	510 3	340 96 101 96 77 89 90
Turkmenistan 2	750 85 70
Uganda 2	110 2	310 2	380 51 55 57 23 29 32
Ukraine 3	030 84 79
United Arab Emirates 3	300 2	950 3	220 104 94 106 130 105 92
United Kingdom 3	170 3	250 3	440 89 94 104 137 137 138
United Republic of 
Tanzania 2	190 2	120 1	960 54 53 47 31 31 31
United States of America 3	180 3	460 3	770 99 107 114 128 138 156
Uruguay 2	850 2	570 2	850 86 79 86 103 90 86
Uzbekistan 2	270 67 64
vanuatu 2	560 2	530 2	590 65 58 60 98 101 87
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 2	760 2	390 2	350 70 58 62 78 69 68
viet nam 2	030 2	140 2	580 47 50 63 19 27 46
yemen 1	970 2	060 2	020 59 57 57 37 40 41
Zambia 2	220 1	960 1	930 59 49 48 35 30 29
Zimbabwe 2	260 2	050 2	010 60 52 45 54 51 55
World 2 550 2 700 2 800 67 72 75 59 68 78
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TABLE	A11
number of undernourished and proportion in total population
number of people  
undernourished
(Millions)
Proportion of undernourished  
in total population
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003
Afghanistan
Albania 0.2* 0.2 5* 6
Algeria 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.5 9 5 6 5
American Samoa
Angola 2.6 5.6 5.4 5.0 37 58 49 38
Antigua and barbuda
Argentina 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.9 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Armenia 1.8* 0.9 52* 29
Australia <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Austria <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Azerbaijan 2.6* 0.8 34* 10
bahamas** 26.0 22.7 39.2 21.3 12 9 14 7
bahrain
bangladesh 33.3 39.2 50.4 43.1 39 35 40 30
barbados** 4.4 4.9 8.7 0.5 <2.5 <2.5 3 <2.5
belarus 0.1* 0.3 <2.5* 3
belgium <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
belize** 6.4 12.7 12.1 11.4 4 7 6 5
benin 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 37 20 17 14
bhutan
bolivia 1.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 26 28 24 23
bosnia and Herzegovina 0.3* 0.4 9* 9
botswana 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 35 23 27 30
brazil 18.1 18.5 16.5 14.4 15 12 10 8
brunei Darussalam** 13.3 9.8 9.3 11.7 7 4 3 3
bulgaria 0.7* 0.7 8* 9
burkina Faso 4.2 1.9 2.0 2.1 62 21 19 17
burundi 1.6 2.7 3.8 4.5 38 48 63 67
Cambodia 4.0 4.4 5.4 4.6 60 43 46 33
Cameroon 2.0 4.0 4.7 4.0 23 33 34 25
Canada <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Cape verde
Central African Republic 0.5 1.5 1.8 1.7 23 50 52 45
Chad 3.1 3.5 3.4 2.7 69 58 49 33
Chile 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.6 7 8 5 4
China 304.0 193.6 145.6 150.0 30 16 12 12
Colombia 6.1 6.1 5.1 5.9 22 17 13 14
Comoros 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 54 47 55 62
Congo 0.7 1.4 1.8 1.2 41 54 59 34
Costa Rica 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 11 6 5 4
Côte d’Ivoire 0.7 2.3 2.3 2.2 8 18 16 14
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TABLE	A11	(cont.)
number of people  
undernourished
(Millions)
Proportion of undernourished  
in total population
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003
Croatia 0.7* 0.3 16* 7
Cuba 0.3 0.7 1.8 0.2 3 7 17 <2.5
Cyprus** 29.5 9.6 7.9 7.1 5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Czech Republic 0.1 0.1 <2.5 <2.5
former Czechoslovakia
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 4.3 3.6 7.3 7.9 25 18 34 35
Democratic Republic of  
the Congo 10.0 12.2 27.2 37.0 36 31 60 72
Denmark <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Dominica** 20.3 2.9 4.9 0.6 27 4 7 8
Dominican Republic 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.3 25 27 26 27
Ecuador 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 11 8 5 5
Egypt 3.6 2.5 2.2 2.4 8 4 3 3
El Salvador 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.7 17 12 14 11
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea 2.2 2.9 68 73
Estonia 0.1* 9* 3
Ethiopia 35.8 31.5 61 46
former People’s 
Democratic Republic  
of Ethiopia 
Fiji 0.1 0.1 0.1 14 10 7 4
Finland <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
France <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
French Polynesia** 7.5 7.6 8.8 9.4 5 4 4 4
Gabon 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 12 10 8 5
Gambia 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 60 22 31 27
Georgia 2.4* 0.7 44* 13
Germany <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Ghana 7.2 5.8 3.2 2.4 65 37 18 12
Greece <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Guatemala 1.2 1.4 2.2 2.8 18 16 21 23
Guinea 1.5 2.5 2.3 2.0 32 39 31 24
Guinea-bissau 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 41 24 31 37
Guyana 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 13 21 12 9
Haiti 2.6 4.6 4.5 3.8 48 65 59 47
Honduras 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.5 31 23 21 22
Hungary 0.1 <2.5* <2.5
Iceland <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
India 261.3 214.8 201.8 212.0 38 25 21 20
Indonesia 36.5 16.4 11.8 13.8 24 9 6 6
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.7 7 4 3 4
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number of people  
undernourished
(Millions)
Proportion of undernourished  
in total population
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003
Iraq
Ireland <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Israel <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Italy <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Jamaica 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 10 14 11 10
Japan <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Jordan 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 6 4 7 7
Kazakhstan 0.3* 1.2 <2.5* 8
Kenya 3.3 9.5 10.0 9.7 20 39 36 31
Kuwait 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 4 24 5 5
Kyrgyzstan 1.0* 0.2 21* 4
lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 33 29 28 21
latvia 0.1* 0.1 3* 3
lebanon 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 9 <2.5 3 3
lesotho 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 20 17 14 12
liberia 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 21 34 42 49
libyan Arab Jamahiriya <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
lithuania 0.2* 4* <2.5
luxembourg <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Madagascar 1.8 4.3 5.7 6.5 20 35 40 38
Malawi 1.6 4.8 4.1 4.0 26 50 40 34
Malaysia 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 3 3 <2.5 3
Mali 4.5 2.7 3.4 3.5 64 29 32 28
Malta <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Mauritania 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 40 15 11 10
Mauritius 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 10 6 6 6
Mexico 3.1 4.6 5.0 5.1 5 5 5 5
Moldova 0.2* 0.5 5* 11
Mongolia 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.7 16 34 45 28
Morocco 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 10 6 6 6
Mozambique 7.1 9.2 9.5 8.3 59 66 58 45
Myanmar 6.2 4.0 3.1 2.7 18 10 7 5
namibia 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.4 23 34 35 23
nepal 7.7 3.9 5.6 4.1 52 20 26 17
netherlands <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
new Caledonia** 9.4 17.0 19.4 23.0 7 10 10 10
new Zealand <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
nicaragua 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.5 26 30 33 27
niger 1.9 3.2 3.9 3.7 33 41 42 32
nigeria 23.9 11.8 8.9 11.5 37 13 9 9
norway <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
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number of people  
undernourished
(Millions)
Proportion of undernourished  
in total population
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 0.3 0.6 12 16
oman
Pakistan 23.6 27.8 24.8 35.2 29 24 19 23
Panama 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 21 21 24 25
Papua new Guinea
Paraguay 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.8 12 18 13 15
Peru 4.9 9.3 4.6 3.3 28 42 19 12
Philippines 12.9 16.2 15.4 15.2 27 26 22 19
Poland 0.4* 0.3 <2.5* <2.5
Portugal <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Qatar
Republic of Korea 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Romania 0.3* 0.1 <2.5* <2.5
Russian Federation 6.4* 4.1 4* 3
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics
Rwanda 1.3 2.8 2.8 3.0 24 43 51 36
Saint Kitts and nevis** 11.7 5.5 8.2 4.5 26 13 19 11
Saint lucia** 21.2 10.5 9.9 7.5 19 8 7 5
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines** 14.1 24.3 30.7 14.2 14 22 27 12
Samoa** 22.3 17.7 18.2 7.1 14 11 11 4
Sao Tome and Principe** 24.7 21.1 26.7 18.3 26 18 20 12
Saudi Arabia 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.9 <2.5 4 4 4
Senegal 1.3 1.8 2.2 2.2 23 23 25 23
Serbia and Montenegro 0.5* 1.1 5* 10
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia
Seychelles** 10.5 10.1 8.7 7.2 17 14 11 9
Sierra leone 1.3 1.9 1.8 2.4 40 46 44 50
Singapore
Slovakia 0.2* 0.3 4* 6
Slovenia 0.1* 0.1 3* 3
Solomon Islands 0.1 0.1 0.1 19 33 21 20
Somalia
South Africa 1.7 2.1 2.6 1.9 6 6 6 4
Spain <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Sri lanka 3.0 4.8 4.6 4.1 20 28 26 22
Sudan 5.7 7.9 6.5 8.8 29 31 23 27
Suriname 0.1 0.1 18 13 10 10
Swaziland 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 15 14 23 19
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number of people  
undernourished
(Millions)
Proportion of undernourished  
in total population
(Percentage)
Countries 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003 1979–1981 1990–1992 1995–1997 2001–2003
Sweden <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Switzerland <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Syrian Arab Republic 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 3 5 4 4
Tajikistan 1.2* 3.8 22* 61
Thailand 10.7 16.8 13.7 13.4 23 30 23 21
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 0.3* 0.1 15* 7
Togo 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.2 30 33 25 25
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 6 13 15 11
Tunisia 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 3 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Turkey 1.4 1.0 1.5 2.0 3 <2.5 <2.5 3
Turkmenistan 0.5* 0.4 12* 8
Uganda 4.1 4.2 5.4 4.6 33 24 26 19
Ukraine 2.4* 1.2 <2.5* 3
United Arab Emirates 0.1 0.1 0.1 <2.5 4 <2.5 <2.5
United Kingdom <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
United Republic of 
Tanzania 5.2 9.9 15.7 16.1 28 37 50 44
United States of America <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5
Uruguay 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 3 7 4 3
Uzbekistan 1.7* 6.7 8* 26
vanuatu** 13.4 19.0 21.9 24.0 11 12 12 12
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 0.6 2.3 3.4 4.5 4 11 15 18
viet nam 19.7 20.6 16.7 13.8 37 31 23 17
yemen 3.2 4.2 5.6 7.1 39 34 36 37
Zambia 1.7 4.0 4.6 5.1 29 48 48 47
Zimbabwe 2.0 4.8 5.6 5.7 28 45 47 45
World 944.8 855.1 833.9 856.4 21 16 15 14
	 *	Data	refer	to	1993–95
	**	Number	of	undernourished	is	expressed	in	thousands
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TABLE	A12
life expectancy and child mortality
life expectancy at birth
(Years)
Child mortality rate
(Per thousand live births)
Countries 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003
Afghanistan 40 42 280 260 257
Albania 69 72 71 74 74 72 45 34 25 21
Algeria 59 67 70 71 71 134 69 55 45 41
American Samoa
Angola 41 46 47 47 47 265 260 260 260 260
Antigua and barbuda 71 74 75 75 75 21 15 12
Argentina 70 72 73 74 75 38 28 25 20 20
Armenia 72 74 75 49 37 33
Australia 74 77 78 79 80 13 10 6 6 6
Austria 72 76 77 78 79 17 9 7 6 5
Azerbaijan 69 65 	 98 93 91
bahamas 68 69 69 69 70 35 29 23 17 14
bahrain 68 71 72 73 73 30 19 18 16 15
bangladesh 49 55 58 61 62 205 144 116 82 69
barbados 72 75 76 75 75 29 16 16 14 13
belarus 69 68 68 18 17 17
belgium 73 76 77 78 78 15 9 9 6 5
belize 69 73 73 74 71 70 49 44 41 39
benin 48 52 53 53 53 214 185 170 160 154
bhutan 	 	 60 62 64 227 166 133 100 85
bolivia 52 58 61 63 64 170 120 92 75 66
bosnia and Herzegovina 73 73 74 19 18 17
botswana 58 57 50 39 38 84 58 66 101 112
brazil 63 66 67 68 69 86 60 48 39 35
brunei Darussalam 71 74 75 76 77 22 11 9 7 6
bulgaria 71 72 71 72 72 24 16 18 16 15
burkina Faso 44 45 45 44 43 247 210 207 207 207
burundi 47 44 42 42 42 195 190 190 190 190
Cambodia 40 50 53 54 54 190 115 120 135 140
Cameroon 50 54 54 50 48 173 139 156 166 166
Canada 75 77 78 79 79 13 9 7 6 6
Cape verde 61 65 68 69 69 80 60 50 40 35
Central African Republic 46 48 46 43 42 189 180 180 180 180
Chad 42 46 48 48 48 225 203 200 200 200
Chile 69 74 75 76 76 39 19 14 12 9
China 67 69 69 70 71 64 49 46 40 37
Colombia 66 68 70 71 72 56 36 29 24 21
Comoros 50 56 59 61 62 165 120 100 82 73
Congo 50 51 51 51 52 125 110 108 108 108
Costa Rica 73 77 77 78 79 26 17 16 12 10
Côte d’Ivoire 49 50 48 46 45 172 157 175 188 192
Croatia 72 73 74 11 8 7
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TABLE	A12	(cont.)
life expectancy at birth
(Years)
Child mortality rate
(Per thousand live births)
Countries 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003
Cuba 74 75 76 77 77 22 13 10 9 8
Cyprus 75 77 77 78 78 20 12 10 7 5
Czech Republic 73 75 75 8 5 4
former Czechoslovakia
Democratic People’s  
Republic of Korea 67 66 61 61 63 43 55 55 55 55
Democratic Republic of  
the Congo 49 52 49 46 45 210 205 205 205 205
Denmark 74 75 75 77 77 10 9 7 5 4
Dominica 	 73 75 76 77 23 20 16 14
Dominican Republic 63 66 67 67 67 92 65 53 40 35
Ecuador 63 68 68 70 71 98 57 43 32 27
Egypt 56 63 65 68 69 173 104 71 49 39
El Salvador 57 66 69 70 70 118 60 47 40 36
Equatorial Guinea 43 47 49 51 52 243 206 175 156 146
Eritrea 50 51 51 122 97 85
Estonia 68 71 71 20 11 9
Ethiopia 44 42 42 192 176 169
former People’s Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia
Fiji 64 67 68 69 70 42 31 25 22 20
Finland 73 75 76 78 78 9 7 4 5 5
France 74 77 78 79 79 13 9 7 5 5
French Polynesia 	 70 71 73 74
Gabon 48 52 52 53 53 115 92 91 91 91
Gambia 40 49 52 53 53 231 154 137 128 123
Georgia 73 73 74 45 45 45
Germany 73 75 76 78 78 16 9 7 6 5
Ghana 53 57 59 57 54 157 125 110 100 95
Greece 74 77 78 78 78 23 11 9 6 5
Guatemala 57 61 64 65 66 139 82 64 53 47
Guinea 40 44 46 46 46 300 240 208 175 160
Guinea-bissau 39 42 44 45 46 290 253 235 215 204
Guyana 61 64 64 63 62 90 90 84 74 69
Haiti 51 53 54 53 52 195 150 137 125 118
Honduras 60 65 66 66 66 103 59 49 43 41
Hungary 69 69 70 71 73 26 16 12 9 8
Iceland 77 78 79 80 80 8 5 5 4 4
India 54 59 61 63 63 173 123 104 94 87
Indonesia 55 62 64 66 67 125 91 66 48 41
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 58 65 67 69 69 130 72 55 44 39
Iraq 62 61 83 50
Ireland 73 75 76 76 78 14 9 7 6 6
Israel 73 76 77 78 79 19 12 7 6 6
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life expectancy at birth
(Years)
Child mortality rate
(Per thousand live births)
Countries 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003
Italy 74 77 78 80 80 17 10 7 5 4
Jamaica 71 73 74 75 76 34 20 20 20 20
Japan 76 79 80 81 82 11 6 6 5 4
Jordan 	 69 70 72 72 65 40 35 30 28
Kazakhstan 65 64 61 67 73 73
Kenya 55 57 53 47 45 115 97 111 120 123
Kuwait 71 75 76 77 77 35 16 14 10 9
Kyrgyzstan 66 66 65 74 70 68
lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 45 50 52 54 55 200 163 134 105 91
latvia 66 70 71 20 13 12
lebanon 65 68 69 70 71 44 37 34 32 31
lesotho 53 58 51 41 37 155 120 103 91 84
liberia 51 45 44 47 47 235 235 235 235 235
libyan Arab Jamahiriya 61 69 70 72 73 70 42 29 20 16
lithuania 69 72 72 16 12 11
luxembourg 73 75 76 78 78 16 9 6 6 5
Madagascar 51 53 53 55 56 175 168 156 137 126
Malawi 44 45 42 39 38 265 241 216 188 178
Malaysia 67 71 72 73 73 42 21 12 9 7
Mali 42 45 44 42 41 300 250 233 224 220
Malta 73 76 77 78 79 17 14 11 8 6
Mauritania 47 49 50 51 51 175 183 183 183 183
Mauritius 66 69 70 72 72 40 25 23 20 18
Mexico 67 71 72 73 74 74 46 36 30 28
Moldova 66 68 67 36 33 32
Mongolia 58 63 64 65 66 140 104 89 75 68
Morocco 58 64 66 68 69 144 85 61 46 39
Mozambique 44 43 45 42 41 220 235 212 178 158
Myanmar 52 55 56 57 57 134 130 117 110 107
namibia 53 58 57 47 40 108 86 77 69 65
nepal 48 54 56 59 60 195 145 120 95 82
netherlands 76 77 77 78 79 11 8 6 6 5
new Caledonia 68 71 72 73 74
new Zealand 73 75 77 79 79 16 11 7 6 6
nicaragua 59 65 67 69 69 120 68 52 43 38
niger 40 42 44 45 46 320 320 295 270 262
nigeria 46 49 50 47 45 216 235 238 205 198
norway 76 77 78 79 79 11 9 6 4 4
occupied Palestinian 
Territory 65 40 33 27 24
oman 60 69 72 74 74 95 30 18 14 12
Pakistan 55 59 61 63 64 153 130 118 108 103
Panama 70 72 74 75 75 46 34 30 26 24
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life expectancy at birth
(Years)
Child mortality rate
(Per thousand live births)
Countries 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003
Papua new Guinea 51 55 57 57 57 108 101 98 95 93
Paraguay 67 68 69 70 71 61 37 34 31 29
Peru 60 66 68 69 70 126 80 60 42 34
Philippines 61 66 68 69 70 81 63 50 40 36
Poland 70 71 72 74 75 24 19 15 9 7
Portugal 71 74 75 76 76 31 15 9 6 5
Qatar 67 72 74 75 75 32 25 18 16 15
Republic of Korea 67 70 72 73 74 18 9 6 5 5
Romania 69 70 70 70 70 36 32 25 22 20
Russian Federation 65 65 66 22 21 21
former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics
Rwanda 46 40 38 40 40 219 173 209 203 203
Saint Kitts and nevis 	 67 69 71 72 36 30 25 22
Saint lucia 68 71 71 72 74 24 21 19 18
Saint vincent and the 
Grenadines 67 71 72 73 73 26 21 25 27
Samoa 63 66 68 69 70 98 42 29 26 24
Sao Tome and Principe 	 62 64 65 66 118 118 118 118
Saudi Arabia 61 69 71 73 73 85 44 34 29 26
Senegal 45 50 52 52 52 218 148 143 139 137
Serbia and Montenegro 72 73 73 19 16 14
former Socialist Federal 
Republic of yugoslavia
Seychelles 	 70 71 72 73 21 20 17 15
Sierra leone 35 35 36 37 37 336 302 293 286 284
Singapore 72 74 76 78 	 13 8 5 4 3
Slovakia 72 73 73 12 9 8
Slovenia 73 75 76 7 5 4
Solomon Islands 60 65 67 69 70 56 36 30 25 22
Somalia 43 42 225 225
South Africa 57 62 58 48 46 91 60 59 63 66
Spain 75 77 78 79 80 16 9 7 5 4
Sri lanka 68 70 71 73 74 48 32 25 20 15
Sudan 48 52 55 58 59 142 120 106 97 93
Suriname 66 69 70 70 70 56 48 44 41 39
Swaziland 52 57 58 45 43 143 110 110 142 153
Sweden 76 78 79 80 80 9 6 4 4 3
Switzerland 76 77 78 80 81 11 8 6 6 5
Syrian Arab Republic 62 66 68 70 71 74 44 31 22 18
Tajikistan 68 67 66 123 120 118
Thailand 64 69 69 69 69 58 40 34 29 26
The former yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 72 73 74 25 14 11
Togo 49 51 49 49 50 175 152 146 142 140
TABLE	A12	(cont.)
T H E  S T A T E  o F  F o o D  A n D  A G R I C U l T U R E  2 0 0 71
life expectancy at birth
(Years)
Child mortality rate
(Per thousand live births)
Countries 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003 1980 1990 1995 2000 2003
Tonga 	 69 70 71 72 27 24 21 19
Trinidad and Tobago 68 71 72 73 72 40 24 18 20 20
Tunisia 62 70 71 73 73 100 52 37 28 24
Turkey 61 66 67 68 69 133 78 60 45 39
Turkmenistan 66 65 65 89 99 102
Uganda 48 47 44 43 43 185 160 156 145 140
Ukraine 67 68 68 24 21 20
United Arab Emirates 68 74 75 75 75 27 14 11 9 8
United Kingdom 74 76 77 77 78 14 10 7 7 6
United Republic of Tanzania 50 50 49 44 43 175 163 164 165 165
United States of America 74 75 76 77 77 15 10 9 9 8
Uruguay 70 73 73 74 75 42 24 23 17 14
Uzbekistan 69 68 67 75 71 69
vanuatu 	 65 67 68 69 110 70 56 44 38
venezuela (bolivarian 
Republic of) 68 71 72 73 74 42 27 26 23 21
viet nam 60 65 67 69 70 66 53 44 30 23
yemen 52 54 57 58 142 126 117 113
Zambia 51 49 45 38 37 155 180 182 182 182
Zimbabwe 55 56 49 40 39 108 80 90 117 126
World 63 65 66 66 67 118 95 89 83 80
TABLE	A12	(cont.)
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Glossary	of	terms
Agricultural biodiversity
Agricultural	biodiversity	is	a	broad	term	that	includes	all	components	of	biological	
diversity	of	relevance	to	food	and	agriculture	and	all	components	of	biological	diversity	
that	constitute	the	agro-ecosystem:	the	variety	and	variability	of	animals,	plants	and	
micro-organisms,	at	the	genetic,	species	and	ecosystem	levels,	that	are	necessary	to	
sustain	key	functions	of	the	agro-ecosystem,	its	structure	and	processes.
biological diversity
The	variability	among	living	organisms	from	all	sources	including,	inter alia,	terrestrial,	
marine	and	other	aquatic	ecosystems	and	the	ecological	complexes	of	which	they	are	
part;	this	includes	diversity	within	species,	among	species	and	of	ecosystems.
buyer (of an environmental service)
An	individual	or	group	who	would	be	positively	affected	by	more	of	the	service	and	
therefore	willing	to	provide	some	financial	incentive	for	its	provision.
Carbon sequestration
Storage	of	carbon	for	an	extended	period	in	a	chemical	form	that	does	not	contribute	
to	global	warming.	The	most	common	methods	of	carbon	sequestration	are	above-	and	
below-ground	additions	to	biomass,	additions	to	soil	organic	carbon	and	additions	
to	stocks	of	inorganic	carbon	compounds	that	do	not	break	down	easily	(e.g.	calcium	
carbonate).
Direct use value
The	value	derived	from	marketed	goods	and	services,	normally	involving	private	
benefits.
Ecosystem
A	dynamic	complex	of	plant,	animal,	and	micro-organism	communities	and	the	non-
living	environment	interacting	as	a	functional	unit.
Ecosystem services
The	benefits	people	obtain	from	ecosystems.
Ecosystem externality
An	uncompensated	provision	of	an	ecosystem	service	(positive	externality)	or	an	
unpenalized	negative	effect	on	the	delivery	of	ecosystem	services	(negative	externality).	
See also environmental services.
Environmental services
The	subset	of	ecosystem	services	characterized	by	externalities.
Existence value
The	benefits	people	obtain	from	knowing	that	an	ecosystem	service	exists,	even	if	they	
will	never	actually	use	the	service	themselves.	Also referred to as non-use value.
Farmer
All	producers	of	agricultural	products,	including	crops,	livestock,	fish,	and	forest	
products.	
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Indirect use value
The	benefit	that	people	derive	indirectly	from	services	such	as	watershed	protection,	
carbon	sequestration,	and	biodiversity	conservation.	
non-use value
The	benefits	people	obtain	from	knowing	that	an	ecosystem	service	exists,	even	if	they	
will	never	actually	use	the	service	themselves.	Also referred to as existence value.
opportunity cost
The	benefits	that	producers	would	have	to	forgo	in	order	to	change	their	practices,	for	
example	in	order	to	provide	an	environmental	service.
option value
The	value	associated	with	preserving	a	future	possibility	for	using	an	ecosystem	service.
Payments for environmental services 
Voluntary	cash	transfers	between	buyers	and	sellers	for	the	provision	of	an	
environmental	service.
Public good
A	good	whose	use	by	one	person	does	not	affect	its	use	by	another	person	and	for	
which	it	is	not	possible	to	exclude	users.
Seller (of an environmental service)
An	individual	or	group	who	could	modify	their	practices	to	provide	more	of	the	
environmental	service.	This	report	focuses	on	farmers.
Use value
The	sum	of	direct use value	and	indirect use value.
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The State of Food and Agriculture 2007 explores the poten-
tial for agriculture to provide enhanced levels of environ-
mental services alongside the production of food and fibre. 
The report concludes that demand for environmental 
services from agriculture – including climate change mitiga-
tion, improved watershed management and biodiversity 
preservation – will increase in the future, but better 
incentives to farmers are needed if agriculture is to meet 
this demand. As one among several other possible policy 
tools, payments to farmers for environmental services hold 
promise as a flexible approach to enhancing farmer 
incentives to sustain and improve the ecosystems on which 
we all depend. Nevertheless, challenges must be overcome 
if the potential of this approach is to be realized, especially 
in developing countries. Policy efforts at international and 
national levels are necessary to establish the basis for such 
payments. The design of cost-effective programmes 
requires careful analysis of the specific biophysical and 
socio-economic contexts and consideration of the poverty 
impacts programmes may have. By clarifying the challenges 
that need to be addressed in implementing such an 
approach, this report is intended to contribute to the 
realization of its potential.
Included in this issue is a mini CD-ROM of the FAO Statistical Yearbook 
2005–2006 Vol. 2/1, containing time series data for 200 countries in Arabic, 
Chinese, English, French and Spanish.
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